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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 41754 | 7 June 2005 22:33:00 | This report is a result of an ongoing evaluation of a previously identified deficiency with the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Strategy with respect to use of charging pumps for a fire in Fire Area A06, 1B-32 480V MCC area. This issue was originally identified on April 8, 2005 during work on the Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Project. This was entered into the Point Beach Corrective Action Program, and compensatory fire rounds were initiated. A postulated fire in the east side of the MCC 1 B-32 could damage both the power and the control cables for charging pumps 1 P-2A and 1 P-2B, and the control cables for redundant charging pump 1 P-2C. The resultant condition of the 1 P-2C charging pump control circuit could prevent operation of this pump as directed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis and FOP 1.2, Potential Fire Effected Safe Shutdown Components. The condition exists as the result of a lack of physical cable separation for power and control cables for the Unit 1 charging pumps. An Operability recommendation was performed for this issue and determined that the condition was Operable but Non-Conforming. Based on a continuing review of further information related to this condition, it has been determined that this condition is reportable based on the resultant effect on available charging pump capability. The condition could have resulted in losing the availability of all but a single charging pump operating at slow speed, which would not provide sufficient reactor coolant pump seal cooling, and thereby degrade the level of plant safety. The identified condition requires a revision to the Safe Shutdown Analysis. Plant fire mitigation procedure changes to ensure adequate charging pump capability, and reactor coolant pump seal cooling have been made. The Safe Shutdown Analysis will be revised. The Resident Inspector will be notified. |
| ENS 41212 | 19 November 2004 19:01:00 | The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile: On November 9, 2004, NMC personnel performed a containment entry for Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2 to locate and identify the source of a secondary steam leak. A leak was suspected due to increased pumping of the Unit 2 containment sump 'A'. A steam leak was identified on the body of valve 2MS-465D. This valve is an isolation valve for main steam flow transmitter 2FT-465. For containment isolation considerations, the main steam system is considered to be a closed system inside containment. The steam leak discovered on 2MS-465D cannot be isolated from containment penetration P-1, the main steam line penetration. Accordingly, we declared Technical Specification Condition 3.6.3.C not met. (This condition is applicable to penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system) and entered TSAC (Technical Specification Action Condition) C.1. The required action for this condition is to isolate the affected penetration flow path with a completion time of 72 hours. In order to repair this valve wall leak, it will be necessary to shutdown and cooldown PBNP Unit 2. Accordingly, at 1622 CST we initiated a reactor shutdown of PBNP Unit 2. Since we anticipate that we would be unable to (meet) the allowed completion time for this TSAC, we have determined that this reactor shutdown is required by the Technical Specifications and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.(b)(2)(i). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 40822 | 16 June 2004 18:27:00 | During a weekly growl test of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) emergency sirens on June 16, 2004, the Manitowoc County sirens were inadvertently activated at 1459 CDT. PBNP is investigating the cause of this event. The sirens were activated for approximately one minute. As a result of the inadvertent actuation, the Village of Mishicot, the City of Two Rivers, Manitowoc County, and Kewaunee County, Wisconsin were notified. There was no impact to the plant as a result of the activation of the sirens. The alert notification system remains operable. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a result of the notifications made. The Resident Inspector was notified |