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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 51557 | 20 November 2015 15:34:00 | At 0823 EST on 11/17/2015, the Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, was declared non-functional due to a faulty heat trace circuit. Compensatory measure to perform grab samples every 6 hours was implemented. At 0823 EST on 11/20/2015, the Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, had been out-of-service for 72 hours. The loss of 1-VG-RI-179 is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a loss of emergency assessment capability. Corrective actions continue to be pursued to restore 1-VG-Ri-179 to functional status. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee.
The Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, was returned to service at 1440 EST on 11/21/15. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes).
The purpose of this report is to retract the event notification report made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) on November 20, 2015 at 1534 EST (EN# 51557). After further review it has been determined that the performance of grab samples is an approved back-up method for radiological assessment capabilities as described in the North Anna Emergency Plan implementing procedure EPIP-4.24 Gaseous Effluent Sampling During Emergency. During non-emergencies, VPAP-2103N Offsite Dose Calculation Manual governs grab sampling and is tracked by Operations using 1-LOG-14 Non-Routine Surveillance Log. As such, a loss of radiological assessment capability did not exist and the ability to assess EAL RU1.4 was not affected. This is consistent with NUREG 1022, Rev.3, Supplement 1 and NEI 13-01, Rev. 0. The action was cleared at 1440 hours on 11/21/15 and the Unit 1 'A' Vent Stack radiation monitor, 1-VG-RI-179, was returned to functional status. The NRC Senior Resident lnspector has been informed of this event notification retraction. Notified R2DO (Masters). |
| ENS 51460 | 8 October 2015 18:23:00 | At approximately 2147 EDT on October 7, 2015, a high energy line break (HELB) door between the Turbine Building (TB) and the safety related Emergency Switchgear Room (ESGR) was determined to be unlatched. The door was immediately closed (latched). Investigation determined the door was unlatched for approximately 47 minutes. At 1617 EDT on October 8, 2015, it was determined the Unit 2 ESGR was outside of the design analysis for a Unit 1 HELB. A high energy line break in the TB with the door open could result in equipment in the Unit 2 ESGR experiencing high temperature, pressure, or humidity beyond conditions analyzed for equipment qualification which has the potential to render redundant safety-related equipment inoperable. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) & (B) & (D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of safety functions to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, remove residual heat, and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 49881 | 7 March 2014 08:27:00 | The following information was received by email: On March 6, 2014, UMass Memorial Health Care (license number 60-0096) reported (to the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program) that on March 5, 2014 they had under dosed a patient by more than 20% using Y-90 microspheres. Further pertinent data is: Prescribed Activity: 26.4 mCi of Y-90 (in one fraction injection) Delivered Activity: 20.4 mCi of Y-90 (more than 20% different from prescribed) Resulting in: Prescribed Liver dose: = 32.6 Gy Delivered Liver dose: = 25.2 Gy Dose difference in organ: = 740 rads (i.e., greater than 50 rem and 20% difference) Note Also: Effective dose (requested): 32.6 Gy * 0.04 = 1.3 Sv Effective dose (delivered): 25.2 Gy * 0.04 = 1.0 Sv Effective dose difference: 1.3-1.0=0.3 Sv = 30 rem (greater than 5 rem difference) A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| ENS 46819 | 4 May 2011 12:00:00 | The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via fax: On March 15, 2011, BAE systems called the Massachusetts Radiation program to report a missing Po-210 static eliminator. In 2009, BAE ordered an air nozzle and unexpectedly received it with a Po-210 source. It is assumed that the RSO at that time removed the source from the nozzle and placed into storage. In March, 2009, the RSO left the company and did not inform the Safety, Health, and Environment Manager that an additional source had been received. It was discovered during a February, 2011 internal audit that there was a discrepancy between shipped and inventoried ionizers. The former RSO has been contacted and does not recall where the source was stored. BAE believes the source was never put into their laboratories for use. A search for the source in the BAE laboratories and former RSO work area, etc. has not uncovered the source. The source is a Staticmaster In-line Alpha Ionizer, model P-2021-2002 leased from NRD. It has Serial Number A2GP089, and contained 10 mCi on 3/4/2009. Corrective Actions: BAE has created an inventory log form, and will perform more frequent inventory checks. BAE has also assigned the inventory checks to dedicated lab technicians, who will be overseen by the site RSO. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 46039 | 23 June 2010 15:19:00 | North Anna experienced a severe storm the night of June 22, 2010. At 0910 hours on June 23, 2010, the telecommunications group polled the Early Warning System (EWS) sirens to check operability. The first siren did not respond. It was determined the back-up base radio was not transmitting the audio signal to the sirens. Therefore, activation of the EWS by the state or local agencies would not have been possible. It was possible to activate the EWS sirens locally from North Anna off a separate radio system. At 1040 hours the back-up radio was replaced and tested satisfactory for proper radio function. The primary base radio was also replaced and tested satisfactorily. The polling function test was performed with all 68 sirens responding as designed. The EWS sirens are currently operating off of the primary base radio with the back-up radio available for operation. The EWS was initially on the backup radio. This radio has been replaced. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state government and will notify local government. The licensee will contact local media concerning this event. |
| ENS 46013 | 16 June 2010 13:38:00 | During performance of the Early Warning System (EWS) Polling Function Test the sirens did not respond. At 0859 hours (EDT) on June 16, 2010, the polling function test of the sirens was started. After four (4) sirens did not respond to the polling, the test was suspended and the Telecommunications group was notified. With Telecommunications monitoring the EWS primary base radio, the polling function test was run again. It was determined the audio signals from the status logger were being transmitted to the EWS primary base radio, however, the radio was not keying or transmitting the audio signal to the sirens. A check of the keying signal from the processor to the primary base radio was noted to be operating properly, however, the primary base radio was still not transmitting the audio signal to the sirens. Therefore, activation of the EWS by the state or local agencies would not have been possible. At 0925 hours, the EWS was switched to the back-up radio base station and tested satisfactory for proper radio function. The polling function test was performed with all 68 sirens responding as designed. All 68 sirens polled satisfactory during the last performance of the EWS Polling Function Test on June 2, 2010. The licensee has notified the State and the NRC Resident Inspector. Local agencies will also be informed. |
| ENS 45139 | 18 June 2009 09:20:00 | The following information was obtained from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts via facsimile: On 5/22/2009, a tractor trailer with scrap metal (originating from Second Street Iron & Metal Co., Inc.) set off the radiation alarm monitors at Prolerized New England Company, LLC. The tractor trailer was returned to (the) originator (under DOT Special Permit MA-09-001) where a gauge with Ra-226 luminescent paint was found and isolated. The contact exposure rate was 1.65 mR/hr and the estimated activity was 1 microcurie. On 6/15/2009, the gauge was picked up for disposal by a Radioactive Waste broker. |
| ENS 44553 | 8 October 2008 14:36:00 | The state submitted the following report via e-mail: Received notification on 10/8/2008 that an 'Ice Light' tritium exit sign was discovered lost by the Wal-Mart store located in North Reading, Massachusetts. The exit sign either contained 11 or 20 Curies of H-3. Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| ENS 41456 | 2 March 2005 17:49:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes): On March 2, 2005, at approximately 1239 hours (EST), the transmitter antenna that provides the signal that activates the emergency sirens was determined to be inoperable during testing activities. This affected the system's ability to automatically activate the emergency sirens. The antenna system was restored to service at 1249 hours on March 2, 2005. All sirens re-tested satisfactorily. This event is a loss of the Emergency Notification System and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The equipment was repaired by replacing faulty components. Troubleshooting the failure is in progress. Sirens were last tested satisfactorily on 02/23/05. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |