Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 53176 | 18 January 2018 17:03:00 | This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator. On January 18, 2018 at 1202 EST, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station (VCSNS) lost one of its two redundant offsite power supplies. The loss of the 115kV power supply created an undervoltage condition on the normal incoming Engineered Safety Features power supply to safety related bus 1DA. The 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator started and loads sequenced as designed. The 'A' Residual Heat Removal pump started but did not inject any water into the Reactor Coolant System. The 'A' Emergency Feedwater Pump started and ran for approximately 2 minutes. Other plant equipment and systems also responded as expected. The loss of the 115kV power supply occurred due to an issue with a component in a switchyard, external to VCSNS. The cause of the event is still under investigation. All loads have been transferred back to the offsite 115kV power supply at 1318 EST. The diesel generator was secured at 1321 EST, reset and is ready to auto-start. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 53020 | 17 October 2017 13:22:00 | At approximately 0319 EDT on 10/14/17, site personnel discovered a sanitary lift station overflowing in the protected area. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 12. The estimated release volume was approximately 50 gallons. At 1134 EDT on 10/17/17 an initial notification was made to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The cause of the overflow is still under investigation. Functionality of the lift pump has been restored and cleanup is complete. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 52240 | 14 September 2016 01:02:00 | During routine operator rounds at 2030 EDT, a steam propagation barrier door (SPBD) was discovered propped open for maintenance activities without appropriate station controls. This condition was in existence from approximately 1720 EDT to 2042 EDT when the SPBD was restored to its normal configuration. Throughout the approximate 3 hours and 22 minutes, when the SPBD was propped open, both trains of chill water were rendered non-functional due to a potential high energy line break. This subsequently rendered both trains of high-head safety injection inoperable, which placed the plant in Technical Specification 3.0.3. This condition was corrected prior to commencing a Technical Specification 3.0.3 plant shutdown. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51954 | 24 May 2016 15:28:00 | At approximately 1250 (EDT), a contract employee was found unresponsive in (their) personal vehicle located in the parking lot outside of the owner controlled area. The Fairfield County Coroner arrived on-site and declared the individual deceased at 1345. The fatality was due to an apparent personal medical issue and not work related. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee has notified State of South Carolina Department of Labor - OSHA. |
| ENS 51141 | 9 June 2015 09:13:00 | On June 9, 2015 at 0310 (EDT) the Hope Creek Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned maintenance. The removal of the ventilation potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared emergency requiring activation. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place while the ventilation is out of service. The Emergency Response Organization duty team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to activate in an alternate location. The ventilation system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately 93 hours. The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified. |
| ENS 50889 | 13 March 2015 17:08:00 | A non-licensed corporate employee tested positive for a banned substance. The individual's unescorted access has been revoked. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50315 | 28 July 2014 05:06:00 | At 0118 (EDT) on 7/28/2014, meteorological data was lost to both Salem and Hope Creek. At the time, there were storms in the vicinity which (were) the apparent cause of the temporary loss of data. Both Salem and Hope Creek lost wind direction information. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), major loss of emergency assessment capabilities. At 0130, meteorological data was restored to the control rooms. Plant operations at Hope Creek and both Salem Units 1 and 2 were not affected. All three units remain at full power. The licensees notified the NRC Resident Inspectors. |
| ENS 49722 | 14 January 2014 16:14:00 | Offsite notification to South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). At approximately 1330 EST on January 14, 2014, site personnel discovered a fork lift leaking hydraulic oil in the protected area. The estimated amount of hydraulic oil spilled is between 10-15 gallons. Approximately 3 gallons of hydraulic oil from the spill entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. At 1530 (EST) an initial notification was made to SCDHEC. The spill has been contained and clean up efforts are underway. The NRC Residents have been notified. |
| ENS 49665 | 19 December 2013 19:18:00 | At 1511 (EST) on December 19, 2013, bus 10A404 (D channel 4 kv 1E vital bus) deenergized while transferring infeed breakers after degraded voltage testing. Reactor building ventilation fans tripped resulting in a loss of secondary containment negative pressure. Filtration Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS) was manually started and secondary containment negative pressure was restored at 1525 (EST). Secondary containment pressure is stable with differential pressure negative. The technical specification requirement is to maintain secondary containment at a negative pressure for secondary containment integrity. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. The standby reactor building ventilation fans did not automatically start and (the reason for that) is being investigated." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek township.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: Hope Creek Generating Station Unit 1, is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on December 19, 2013, at 1918 EST (EN# 49665). The notification on December 19, 2013, reported that secondary containment was declared inoperable when reactor building ventilation system (RBVS) fans tripped resulting in the loss of secondary containment negative pressure. Subsequent engineering evaluation concluded that the safety function of secondary containment was not lost. The Hope Creek post-LOCA Exclusion Area Boundary, Low Population Zone, and Control Room dose calculation assumes that primary containment leakage is released directly to the environment with no credit for hold up or filtration for the first 375 seconds after the accident, i.e., the Hope Creek accident analysis does not assume that secondary containment is under vacuum at the start of an accident. In addition, the accident analysis relies upon the operation of the safety related Filtration Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS), which was fully operable. Upon receipt of an accident signal, FRVS would have automatically started and restored secondary containment negative pressure within the time limits of the design assumptions. The trip of the non-safety related RBVS and the failure of the stand-by RBVS fans to start did not result in an adverse impact on the dose consequence analysis. Although secondary containment was declared inoperable, the safety function was not lost and secondary containment was capable of performing its design function of minimizing any ground level release of radioactive material by providing a leak tight boundary so that FRVS may draw a vacuum In the Reactor Building and filter radioactive material at all times. The engineering evaluation is captured In the licensee's corrective action program. Based on the engineering evaluation, the condition reported in EN #49665 did not result in the loss of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material. This event report is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed on the evaluation results and informed of this retraction. Notified R1DO (Powell). |
| ENS 49345 | 16 September 2013 11:53:00 | At approximately 0700 (EDT) on 9/16/13, site personnel discovered a sewer lift station, in the owner controlled area, overflowing. The overflow entered a nearby storm drain that discharges into Outfall 13. The estimated release volume is between 500-1000 gallons. The release has been stopped. At 1045 an initial notification was made to SCDHEC. A pump failure is suspected to be the cause of the back-up and subsequent overflow. Repair and clean-up is in process. The NRC Residents have been notified. |
| ENS 49213 | 24 July 2013 12:21:00 | On July 23, 2013 at 1345 (EDT), the Fitness-for-Duty Snapshot Self-Assessment team identified an anomaly with the Employee Plant Access Control Tracking (EMPACT) program used to randomly select V.C. Summer employees for daily fitness for duty (FFD) screenings. More specifically, when an employee terminates employment at the station, Access Control personnel select 'Exclude from Random' feature in the EMPACT program to remove their name from the program code that randomly selects current employees for daily FFD screenings. When a former employee returns to the station for re-employment, Access Control personnel select 'New Request' within the EMPACT program. The 'New Request' feature is supposed to automatically deselect the 'Exclude from Random' feature, which adds the employee back to the randomly selected population. This feature of the EMPACT program was determined not to be functional. In accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4), this program flaw constitutes: 'Any programmatic .... discovered vulnerability of the FFD program that may permit the undetected drug or alcohol use or abuse by individuals within a protected area, or by individuals who are assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program.' This event has been entered into the station's corrective action program under CR-13-03066. The issue is limited to 53 employees (2.9% of the randomly selected population) that have returned to V.C. Summer for employment in the previous six years. Immediate corrective actions consist of contacting the program vendor, conducting an Access Control Program standdown, and contacting the 53 employees to report for fitness-for-duty screening. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Other utilities known to use the EMPACT software have been contacted. This issue does not affect units 2 or 3 since they use a different system. |
| ENS 48518 | 18 November 2012 11:10:00 | On 11/18/2012 at approximately 1130 EST, the Summer Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will be taken out of service for approximately 12 hours to support a planned maintenance on an inverter that feeds the station's Integrated Plant Computer System (lPCS). During this time frame. ERDS and SPDS will be unavailable. Should the need arise, plant status information will be communicated to the NRC using other available communication systems. SPDS and ERDS are expected to be restored on 11/18/2012 at 1800 EST. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
On November 18, 2012, at approximately 1730, IPCS was returned to service. Completing this planned maintenance activity restored the VCSNS Safety Parameter Display System and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). ERDS was tested this morning, November 19, 2012, by VCSNS and the NRC ERDS Help Desk to verify system operability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Widmann). |
| ENS 42288 | 26 January 2006 16:11:00 | This is a follow-up report of an incident involving a nuclear gauge. The gauge was a model 5192, built by Thermo Measuretech. It was a 100 mCi source of Cesium 137 Serial # B-6809. This gauge was a sealed source, permanently mounted to a 2" high pressure pipe. It was mounted to the plumbing at the rear of Unit 4451, a cement pump unit. The fire apparently started in the building that this truck was housed in for the purposes of thawing a frozen pump. Control of the gauge was never relinquished. A fire started in the facility located approximately 2 miles East of Cut Bank, Mt. and owned by General Well Servicing. The fire is still under investigation by Sanjel's insurance carrier. The fire started approximately 1515 on the 7th of December 2005. I was notified at approximately 1801. I notified the USNRC Emergency number @1904. First responders were notified by the Sanjel Authorized Users about the gauge. The first responders didn't have access to a survey meter; I arrived on site at 0445 on the 8th of December 2005. I conducted a survey from upwind to the building and found no trace of radiation, but I was restricted from going into the facility by Sheriffs deputy until cleared by the Fire Chief at approximately 0730. At 0730, I surveyed the area around the rear of the truck under the observation of the Sheriff s deputy, and surveyed the gauge. I observed readings from 1.5 mRad to what I thought I had read, 11.5 mRad. The survey was made in darkness. I questioned the local fire chief and sheriffs deputy about any personnel coming close to the gauge; I was told that the fire was primarily contained to the front of the vehicle, and the fire fighters were cautioned and restrained from getting within 30 feet of the gauge. I feel that I received the highest dose there removing the gauge/detector and pipe and conducting the survey, taking 10 minutes at 11.5 mRad x 1 (quantifier for beta/gamma sources)= 1.91 mRem/hr. The gauge was removed @ 1200 with the permission of the State Fire Marshall and transported by covered vehicle to the Sanjel Miles City office. The area around where the gauge was mounted was surveyed, rendering no recordable readings. The path from the location of the gauge to the recovery vehicle was also surveyed rendering no noticeable readings. A second survey of the gauge was made at the recovery vehicle in daylight, showing a reading on 3 mRad on the sides of the source, 1.5mRad on the front and 2 mRad on the top, 1mRad on the bottom. This would change the highest dose received to 0.5mRem/hr. The reason for the delay in this report is my interpretation of RIS 2005-06, 10 CFR 20.2202, and HPPOS-322 I felt this was not a reportable incident. I am reporting this after contacting Jack Witten, Tony Gaines and Bob Brown on January 26, 2006. These are my contacts at the Region IV in Arlington, TX. And being advised that this is a reportable incident under 10 CFR 30.50, (b)(ii). The corrective action plan for this incident, is to advise Authorized Users that locations and facilities used on a temporary use must be inspected by management prior to use. As of today, 26 January 2005, the gauge has been transferred to Thermo-Electron for decommissioning due to the repair. The following information was provided to the NRC Operations Center during the initial notification at 2104 EST on 12/07/05 by the RSO for Sanjel, USA, Inc.: RSO for Sanjel, USA, Inc called to inform the NRC that his company owns a truck with a Cs-137 source mounted on the back for measuring cement density. The truck is parked inside a well servicing building in Cutbank, Montana and that building is on fire. Fire company personnel have responded and the local sheriff has set up a barrier to keep unauthorized personnel 1 mile from the site due to the hazardous chemicals stored in the building. Sanjel Technicians have informed the sheriff of the Cs-137 source on their truck. The source manufacturer is Thermal Measure Tech, model 5192, Serial # B-6809, Activity - 100 millicuries. The source is mounted on a pipe to measure the cement density pumped through the pipe, and is enclosed in a lead shield with normal on contact radiation readings of 2 mr/hr. Sanjel NRC license # is 54-27692-01. RSO is enroute to the site of the fire (8 hours away). While in route, he will keep NRC HQ notified of any updates he receives and will make a final report once he can access the situation properly. Notified R4DO (Kennedy) and NMSS EO (Pierson) |