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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 52132 | 29 July 2016 01:51:00 | A review of the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report (FPSSR) found that a postulated fire had the potential to spuriously open all three individual steam generator atmospheric dump valves in addition to a common residual heat release valve. Previous analysis did not consider all of the valves spuriously opening from a fire. The potential impact of these valves spuriously opening is a cooldown that could adversely affect shutdown margin. Hourly fire tours have been put in place for those fire areas that have the potential to initiate this condition. This condition is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. This condition is not applicable to Unit 1.
Retraction of EN 52132 'Postulated Fire Event That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment'. On 07/29/2016, an 8-hour notification (EN 52132) was made describing the discovery of a postulated fire event that could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment, specifically the spurious opening of the three Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDVs) and the Residual Heat Release (RHR) Valve, simultaneously. This notification was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition because of the potential effect on shutdown margin. Further engineering evaluation has determined that the required shutdown margin is not challenged by the event, as bounded by previous analysis of a similar scenario as well as validated operator actions. Therefore, this does not result in a reportable condition. The Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. Notified the R1DO (Cook). |
| ENS 51323 | 17 August 2015 12:59:00 | At 0837 EDT on August 17, 2015, it was determined that Beaver Valley Unit 2 had experienced a small oil leak of approximately 1 liter from equipment located inside the Alternate Intake structure, some of which progressed to the Ohio River. Subsequent to confirmation of this discovery, notification was made to the following offsite agencies starting at 1030 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report# 1125865), Pennsylvania (PA) Department of Environmental Protection, Beaver County Emergency Management, PA Emergency Management Agency, and downstream water authorities (Midland Water Authority, Allegheny Ludlum, East Liverpool Water Co.) This notification is a required 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The source of the oil leak has been stopped. Absorbent material has been placed to contain the oil that had leaked. No press release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 46360 | 25 October 2010 12:04:00 | A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 44597 | 23 October 2008 18:25:00 | This is an information only notification that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 has initiated a plant shutdown as of 1800 on 10/23/08, a proactive measure, to complete repairs on the Train 'A' Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) Pump 2SIS-P21A. On 10/19/08 at 2326, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 removed 2SIS-P21A from service for routine preventive maintenance. Technical Specification 3.5.2, Condition A was entered during this maintenance activity with the Required Action A.1 to restore 2SIS-P21A to operable status within 72 hours (2326 on 10/22/08). On 10/20/08, during this maintenance; the pump shaft was unable to be rotated by hand after approximately 3/4 revolution. The pump was then disassembled and the apparent cause was determined to be that the pump rotating assembly was not centralized in the casing bore resulting in minimal clearance between the pump wear rings. On 10/22/08, First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) requested enforcement discretion from the NRC to permit an additional 36 hours of time to complete repairs on the pump. The NRC verbally granted FENOC's request for enforcement discretion on 10/22/08 at 1105. The enforcement discretion period will expire on 10/24/08 at 1126. Since unexpected difficulties have delayed the reassembly of the pump, FENOC management decided to proactively shutdown Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.2 beginning at 1800 on 10/23/08. While pump reassembly and testing to restore operability may still be completed by the end of the enforcement discretion period, FENOC management determined that it was more prudent to shutdown the unit at this time so that the Operations crews are not placed under undue time pressure to reach Mode 3 conditions. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
This 4-hour notification is to report that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 has initiated a manual reactor shutdown at 0600 on 10/24/08 in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.2, 'ECCS - Operating'. On 10/19/08 at 2326 Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 removed 2SIS-P21A (Train 'A' Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) Pump) from service for routine preventive maintenance. Technical Specification 3.5.2 was not met during this maintenance activity for two operable trains of Emergency Core Cooing System and Condition A was entered with the Required Action A.1 to restore 2SIS-P21A to operable status within 72 hours (2326 on 10/22/08). Problems were unexpectedly encountered during this maintenance; the pump shaft was unable to be rotated by hand after approximately 3/4 revolution. The pump was disassembled and the apparent cause was determined to be that the pump rotating assembly was not centralized in the casing bore resulting in minimal clearance between the pump wear rings. On 10/22/08 FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company requested enforcement discretion from the NRC to permit an additional 36 hours of time to complete reassembly of the pump. The NRC verbally granted FENOC's request for enforcement discretion on 10/22/08 at 1105. The enforcement discretion period would have expired on 10/24/08 at 1126. Since unexpected difficulties have delayed the reassembly of the pump, FENOC management decided to proactively shutdown Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No.2 beginning at 1800 on 10/23/08 (reference Information Only EN#44597). Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 entered Mode 3 at 0519 on 10/24/08 as part of the planned controlled shutdown. On 10/24/08 at 0600, Technical Specification 3.5.2, Condition B was entered based on a determination that the projected work completion time for restoring 2SIS-P21A to operable status would not meet the conditions of the enforcement discretion. Technical Specification 3.5.2, Required Action B.1 was met since the plant was in Mode 3, the plant is continuing the cooldown to be in Mode 4 within 12 hours per Required Action B.2. This event is being reported as a Technical Specification required shutdown pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i). No radiological release occurred due to this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cahill). |
| ENS 44097 | 26 March 2008 14:30:00 | At 0722 on March 26, 2008 at the Beaver Valley Power Station, a contract non-licensed supervisor tested positive for a controlled substance during a pre-access test. This person's access authorization has been denied and is not currently on site. This is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.73(a)(2)(ii). The NRC resident inspector has been notified of the event. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional Information |
| ENS 43683 | 3 October 2007 10:42:00 | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on administrative hold. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42869 | 1 October 2006 15:24:00 | Scaffold that was built for upcoming refueling outage work at Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 may have prevented two Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV) from reaching the full closed position. Scaffold was built on 9/29/06 and 9/30/06 for refueling outage work on the 'A' and 'B' MSIV's. The 'C' MSIV was not impacted. Some of the seismic bracing for these scaffolds were in the area of travel when closing the MSIV's. There is reasonable assurance these braces would have prevented the 'A' and ' B' MSIV's from reaching the full closed position. During a Steam Generator Tube Rupture accident, this MSIV interference may have prevented accident mitigation by not allowing the MSIV to properly close and cause additional release of radioactive material to the environment beyond that already analyzed in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report. On 10/1/06 at 0835 the MSIV inoperability was discovered and Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 (MSIV Operability) and 3.0.3 were entered. The scaffold bracing was moved out of the valve closure path of the 'B' MSIV and at 0915 Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. At 0945 the 'A' MSIV was free to close and Technical Specification 3.7.1.5 was exited. This is being reported as a loss of a safety function for a Main Steam Line Isolation Valve which is required to control the release of radioactive material, and which is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Unit power remained constant throughout the event and no other safety systems have been compromised. The licensee is currently lowering power for the Unit 2 refueling outage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42834 | 7 September 2006 23:23:00 | On September 7, 2006 at 2157 hours, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 was operating at 100% when an automatic reactor trip occurred following a spurious opening of the 'B' Reactor Trip Breaker. The first-out indication for the reactor trip was turbine trip due to reactor trip. Control room personnel entered Emergency Operating Procedure E-0, 'Response to Reactor Trip and Safety Injection.' Safety systems and equipment functioned as designed following the automatic reactor trip. Reactor pressure and temperature have been stabilized following the reactor trip without requiring a Safety Injection. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 utilizing the normal heat sink (main condenser) with steam generator levels restored to post shutdown values by the Auxiliary Feedwater System. All normal and emergency busses are energized from offsite power. The cause of the reactor trip is being investigated. All rods fully inserted, all ESF systems remain operable, and the electrical grid is stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and plans to issue a press release. |
| ENS 42802 | 25 August 2006 10:36:00 | The BVPS Unit 2 Plant Computer System (PCS) will be taken out of service for approximately 5 weeks (8/25/06 to 9/26/06) to implement a planned modification. The current PCS is being replaced and a computer outage is required to allow for the installation of a new PCS. During this time period the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) and Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) will not be available at BVPS Unit 2. ERDS and SPDS parameters will be monitored by control board indications and a temporary computer system (with limited analog inputs). Compensatory actions have been developed, which include a revised emergency implementing procedure specifically addressing temporarily unavailable indications and having an extra Operations Communicator respond to the Control Room during any potential Unit 2 emergency to facilitate data transfer while ERDS/SPDS is out of service. Work on replacing the PCS and returning ERDS/SPDS will be ongoing continuously until complete. This is an 8-hour reportable event per 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Major Loss of Assessment Capability. The operation of BVPS Unit 1 and Unit 2 plant systems will not be affected due to this planned action. BVPS Unit 1 ERDS and SPDS will not be affected by these modifications. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
Work on replacing the PCS and returning ERD/SPDS remains continuously ongoing. However, minor hindrances have caused the scheduled completion of this function to now be October 1, 2006. Previously described compensatory actions remain in effect. The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector. Notified R1DO (Chris Hott). |
| ENS 40320 | 13 November 2003 13:48:00 | Unit 1 was at 100% power when an automatic reactor trip occurred. The Auxiliary Feedwater systems automatically started due to low post trip steam generator levels. This includes the steam driven Auxiliary feedwater pump. The steam discharge of this pump is considered to (be) a gaseous release due to trace amounts of tritium in the secondary system. These trace amounts are well below limits. The pump was shutdown after 31 minutes of operation, terminating the discharge. The Rad Waste & Effluents Section will assess the impact during the event response review. The plant is currently stable in mode 3 with steam generator levels restored to post shutdown values. The steam dumps and main unit condenser are available for heat removal. All normal and emergency busses are energized from offsite power. All rods fully inserted, no ECCS actuation and no primary or secondary relief valves lifted. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |