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| Entered date | Event description | |
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| ENS 53884 | 20 February 2019 13:25:00 | The following was received from the licensee via e-mail: The concerned radioactive material is part of an Army Chemical Detection Equipment (CDE) and is called an Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) NSN (National Stock Number) 6665-01-357-8502 and Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), NSN 6665-01-199-4153. Each ICAM and CAM contains 10 mCi of Ni-63. The items with the radioactive material are under US Army NRC License 21-32838-01 issued to the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM). TACOM is located in Warren, MI. The reporting was based on 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(ii) (Reports of Theft or Loss of Licensed Material). Licensed material in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C. The quantity specified in Appendix C is 100 microCi. One ICAM/CAM containing 10 mCi is 10,000 microCi. (The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO)) had reported nine CDE, but after confirming the serial numbers, we determined that one of the CDE (serial number 11769) was under another NRC license 19-10306-01 issued to the US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) located in Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Maryland. This report is for eight CDE under TACOM's NRC license. We have six ICAMs and two CAMs that are lost for a total of 80,000 microCi. The serial numbers for the ICAMs are Z47-M-13972, Z47-M-13526, Z47-M-01859, Z47-M-15832, Z47-M-21980 and Z47-M-18759. The serial numbers for the CAMs are Z16-M-01075 and Z16-M-01025. The ICAMs/CAMs are not known to leak and do not have a leak test requirement. The Ni-63 is inside the ICAM/CAM. (The RSO) was notified via e-mail on February 19, 2019, at 1545 EST, by the Army Rad waste agency (Joint Munitions Command (JMC) located in Rock Island, IL) of the following: 'A package containing nine each CDE was in route from APG, Maryland to Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA), Alabama via (a Common Carrier) and was lost in the possession of (the Common Carrier). The CDE were being sent for demilitarization and eventual disposal of the Ni-63. The subject package was dropped off at (the Common Carrier) in Baltimore, MD on 26 Nov 2018. The tracking system showing the package as 'In (Common Carrier) Possession'.' Prior to the notification on February 19, 2019, JMC called PBA shipping and receiving. PBA personnel indicated that subject package was not received at their location. Also, APG personnel traveled to the (Common Carrier) facility where the items were dropped off. Personnel confirmed that the package was not at that facility. As of February 19, 2019, JMC indicated that (the Common Carrier) has not formally issued the a statement of loss, but that JMC will continue to track this for APG. It was a Local Project for JMC with ID number of APG 2018-001. On February 20, 2019, at 0847 EST, the (RSO) called (the Common Carrier) with the tracking number. (The RSO) spoke to (an individual) who indicated that a case was assigned to the shipment and a claim was put in. (The RSO) was put in contact with the Trace Department, and was then told that the shipment was considered lost. Shipments after 14 days are considered lost. This event is related to NRC Event Number 53888. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 52387 | 21 November 2016 13:38:00 | USMC shipped the package (containing 45.06 Ci of tritium) via (common carrier) out of Hawthorne Army Depot, Hawthorne, NV on October 6, 2016 to MARCORLOGBASE, Director Fleet Support Dir Code 587, Radford Blvd, Suite 20320, Albany, GA. The package was signed for with initials and a signature showing delivery on October 12, 2016 at 1424 (EDT). There were several attempts of delivery before the package was delivered. The initials of who signed for the shipment cannot be traced to anyone and the signature is unreadable. (The common carrier) indicates delivery to the address of a receptionist. The package had UN2911 markings on opposite sides of the package. USMC RADCON conducted a physical search of USMC Albany locations to include the Post Office with no results. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Albany was contacted and DLA performed a physical search with no results. Also, another shipment from Hawthorne was sent out to a different location, which was received. This location was checked for receipt of the concerned package. On November 2, 2016, an Albany All Hands/Base wide official message was sent out regarding the package. The conclusion at this time is that the package is considered missing and likely somewhere at MCLB, Albany. The US Navy indicates that physical searches and base wide notifications continue in the effort to locate the package. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 52087 | 14 July 2016 15:47:00 | On July 13, 2016, the U.S. Army TACOM Radiation Safety Program Manager in Warren, MI was notified of a misplaced U.S. Army chemical alarm containing 250 microcuries of Am-241 from a U.S. National Guard Unit in North Carolina. The chemical alarm was misplaced on April 21. Since the material has not been recovered, the U.S. Army considers the material lost/stolen. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 51434 | 30 September 2015 15:59:00 | The U.S. Army contracted with (common carrier) to pick up two Troxler moisture density gauges from their Life Cycle Management center in Warren, Michigan and deliver them to an Army National Guard (ANG) center in Methuen, Massachusetts. On 9/28/15, (common carrier) tracking indicated that only one of the gauges was delivered. The ANG center didn't receive the gauge until 9/29/15. The RSO at U.S. Army TACOM contacted (common carrier) about the status of the second gauge. On 9/30/15, (common carrier) informed the RSO that the gauge was "misplaced" and an investigation and search was underway. The missing gauge is a Troxler Model 3440+, serial number 68419, containing 8 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241. The U.S. Army will update this report as appropriate.
The common carrier located and delivered the remaining gauge to the proper location. Notified R1DO (Bower), R3DO (Orth), and NMSS Events Notifications via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 51332 | 20 August 2015 15:05:00 | The U.S. Army TACOM Radiation Safety Program Manager in Warren, MI was notified via email of what appeared to be U.S. Army material containing radioactive sources were for sale on eBay. The program manager was not able to find the listing but the information received indicated that the material was already sold or the listing expired. When the program manager contacted eBay about the material and the seller, eBay was uncooperative, citing privacy of the individuals selling/buying the material. The program manager contacted the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative Command in Troy, MI and provided them with all the information pertaining to the material. Since the material was not recovered, the U.S. Army considers the material lost/stolen. The materials are two M8A1 Chemical Agent Alarms each containing nominally 300 microcuries of Am-241. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 47606 | 18 January 2012 15:41:00 | The U.S. Army Life Cycle Command was informed by the Combined Support Maintenance Shop in Richmond, Virginia that a range indicator containing 4 sources of 0.8 Curies each of Tritium may be damaged. Apparently, the range indicators appear cracked and are not illuminating properly. The range indicator is locked inside a secured area with no access allowed. The U.S. Army is waiting for results of swipe surveys to determine if there is an actual spread of contamination.
The licensee is retracting the event based upon swipe survey results being less than the lower limit of detectability. There was no spread of contamination and the device will be disposed of in the future. The licensee notified Bill Lin (Region 3). Notified R3DO(Peterson), R1DO(Bellamy) and FSME(McIntosh). |
| ENS 45667 | 28 January 2010 15:20:00 | The Army Depot in Stockton, CA received at 1401 PST on 01/27/10 a CPN Moisture Density Gauge shipped from a field unit. Upon receipt inspection, they identified that the locking mechanism was separated from the guide tube. The source was in the shielded position at the time of discovery. The field unit which shipped the device on 01/26/10 was contacted and asserts that the unit was intact at the time of shipment. The device is a CPN, Model MC-1, S/N M1712089, manufactured in the 1970's containing two sources; 10 millicuries Cesium-137 and 50 millicuries Americium-241/Be. The damaged device is currently in secure storage and scheduled for disposal. |
| ENS 45360 | 17 September 2009 17:15:00 | As part of the pre-operational check at the Defense Distribution Depot in Tracy, CA, operators discovered that four of their CPN Model MC-1 Moisture Density Gauges were defective. The 4 moisture density gauges were manufactured approximately 30 years ago and each contains two sources; 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Americium-241/Be (nominal). These gauges will not be returned to the manufacturer for evaluation and repair, but rather disposed of at an approved facility. The 4 units are currently locked in their storage containers, and those containers are locked inside another locked cabinet at the Defense Distribution Depot in Tracy, CA. The four gauges serial number and the reason for being defective are as follows: 1) s/n M17092033 - Locking mechanism does not work. 2) s/n M17112087 - Locking mechanism does not work. 3) s/n M17092041 - Handle broken. 4) s/n M17071988 - Broken guide tube. The licensee notified NRC Region 3 Office. |
| ENS 43524 | 26 July 2007 16:12:00 | The Tester, Density and Moisture (Soil and Asphalt) Nuclear Method Campbell Pacific Model MC-1 (CCE), NSN 6635-01-030-6896, Serial Number M17112090, is assigned to the 980th Angering Battalion at Austin, TX. The MC-1 Tester had on manufacture (in 1977) 10 mCi of Cesium 137 and 50 mCi of Americium 241/Be. The sources are solid, sealed, and double encapsulated. The MC-1 Tester is licensed through an Army NRC license 21-01222-05, issued to the US Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC), located in Warren, MI. The tester was used in Iraq in 2005 and was shipped back to the unit location in Texas in 2006. It is unknown, if the tester had any mechanical difficulties in Iraq . The tester had received servicing through CPN International, Inc. on June 19, 2003. (Servicing included replacing) standard wear items such as gaskets and the handle. Also, the electronic assembly was bench tested with the two detectors, and the body of the tester is cleaned with the guidetube and rod assembly cleaned/lubed. The tester was also calibrated and leak tested The tester hasn't been used since its use in Iraq . The tester has been in storage with the only interaction being physical inventories, radiation surveys of the storage and leak tests of the radioactive sources. On 24 July 2007, the undersigned received an e-mail (after-hours) indicating that the referenced tester was inoperative with an inoperative handle lock, that wouldn't engage. The e-mail asking for disposition of the tester. Confirmation of the information was made with two Army personnel doing internal radiation audits of Army radiation programs, who were visiting the unit. The Army personnel were told on their visit, that there was some difficulty with the locking mechanism. They were told, that the tester was hard to unlock and that they (the unit) didn't lock the handle for this reason. The tester is inside its transport case, locked inside of a lead lined box, inside of a locked connex container, which is locked inside a gate at the unit location. The tester sources to include rod remain inside the tester housing and no other apparent tester deficiencies outside the lock mechanism has been observed. The shutter is in place and closed. The tester will not lock in the various positions (i.e. safe, 6 inch, 8 inch and 12 inch). When the lock button is pushed in, it springs out. The lock could not be locked with the key. There are no known personnel exposures. The tester sources were last leak tested on July 2, 2007, which showed no leakage. The only personnel having access to the keys and the tester is the Local RSO. This ensures that the tester is not used. The transport case containing the tester is also now locked. It is planned to transport the tester back to the manufacturer for disposition. The tester has been coded as H for unserviceable. Instructions were provided to the unit today to perform a wipe test of the shipping container, prepare the tester for shipment, and to ship it to the manufacturer. Also, a reminder e-mail was sent to the unit and to various Army Commands of the requirement to report tester safety defects immediately to TACOM LCMC Warren, MI. This e-mail was sent again today (July 27, 2007) as it was sent out on July 5, 2007. |
| ENS 43468 | 2 July 2007 17:03:00 | On June 26, 2007, the 62nd Engineering Unit, located in Ft. Hood, Texas and recently returned from deployment, sent an email to the US Army TACOM LCMC, located in Warren , MI regarding a damaged Campbell Pacific (CPN) MC-1 moisture density gauge, serial number: M7112095. The device contains a 10 millicurie Cs-137 source and a 50 millicurie Am-241:Be source (1977 activity strength). The email requested guidance on the failure of the device handled assembly to lock in 'safe' or any other position. The lead trap door is disconnected from pushrod and fails to allow source rod to extend. The unit is on recuperative leave and the US Army will follow up with the unit personnel later this week. The US Army will continue to investigate to determine the status of the device, where and when it was damaged, and the status of the sources and the device's storage location.
The tester was used in Iraq and was shipped back to the unit in Texas in Dec 06. In Iraq, the tester had some difficulty with the lead trap door not easily sliding out of the way, when the rod was pushed down, but it did function. The rod locking mechanism worked in Iraq. On 18 Jun, the Local Radiation Safety Officer (LRSO) with the 62nd Engr Bn was notified verbally of a display problem involving the tester. A trained operator made the notification. On 26 June, the LRSO and Alternate LRSO both trained operators then decided to check out the tester. They cranked down on the display screw and the tester display functioned. They then decided to check the tester out further and discovered that the handle wouldn't lock in the safe and other positions. They compared this to another tester and then determined that the tester had a problem needing maintenance. The LRSO then sent an e-mail on 26 June asking for maintenance or turn-in instructions. The maintenance check (which includes ensuring proper function of the tester, the rod moving freely through the ranges and cleaning the tester of any dust and dirt) at the unit was the first, since its arrival from IRAQ. The unit planned to use the tester, but after discovering the problem with it, they then used another tester. The testers at the unit have maintenance done every six months depending on the use of the equipment. The rod with the source is inside of the tester housing. The tester is stored like normal in its transport case. The shutter is in place and closed. The lead trap door is in place. The lead trap door just doesn't slide out of the way when the source rod is lowered, thus it is preventing the source from being exposed or from coming out of the tester. The rod when operated will move through different positions, but will not lock at those positions (i.e. safe, 6 inch, 8 inch and 12 inch). This is due to a pin engaging defect. The rod will fully retract. If the tester probe is locked, then the rod will not move through the positions. There are no known personnel exposures. The tester is in a double locked room and the tester is in a locked DOT 7A container inside of a locked greenlee box. The only personnel having access to the keys and the testers are the LRSO and Alternate LRSO. This ensures that the tester is not used. Licensee is awaiting the results of a radiation survey of the storage area to be performed today (the last one performed was in April) and results from a leak test, which was performed on 27 June 07. The radiation survey was requested as a result of the tester failure and the leak test was performed, because it is the annual leak test period for the testers. The leak test was sent to our Army lab in Redstone, AL. Licensee has placed a call to expedite the analysis of the leak test and to check if they have received it. It is planned to transport the tester back to the manufacturer for disposition. Notified R3DO ( R. Lanksbury) and FSME EO (M. Burgess) |
| ENS 42336 | 14 February 2006 18:00:00 | As part of the Pre-Operational Check, Operators discovered the one of their CPN Model MC-1 Moisture Density Gauges had a potentially defective locking mechanism, i.e., "the handle could be moved down through the blocking mechanism no matter which position the key was in. The CPN Model MC-1, S/N M18012172 was manufactured approximately 30 years ago and contains two sources; 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Americium-241/Be (nominal). The unit is currently locked in its' storage container at the Sierra Army Depot in CA, awaiting return to the manufacturer for evaluation and repair. The licensee notified NRC Region 3 Office. |