Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 45273 | 18 August 2009 15:08:00 | At 0920 on 08/18/2009, the Unit 1 HPCI turbine stop valve (FV15612) showed dual indication following performance of the weekly functional test of the HPCI lube oil system. Subsequent investigation revealed that the valve stem was not in the full closed position. LCO 3.5.1 for the HPCI system was entered at 0920 on 08/18/2009. An investigation is in progress to determine the nature of the problem. This incident is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCI pump was declared inoperable. This is a 14 day LCO. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 43060 | 21 December 2006 14:46:00 | A Press Release will be issued for an inadvertent actuation of the Emergency Sirens during testing. This item is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an offsite notification of an event of public interest. Following maintenance on a single siren, Columbia County emergency management personnel were requested to test it. The County inadvertently activated all 112 sirens within 10 miles of the plant. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State. |
| ENS 42407 | 12 March 2006 09:12:00 | While performing local leak rate testing (LLRT) during a planned refueling outage, Susquehanna discovered a Type C penetration on Unit 1 with a leak rate of 12,700 sccm. The limit for this penetration, which can bypass secondary containment, is 4,247 sccm or 9 scfh. Even with this leak rate, the combined leak rate for all penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests meets the acceptance criteria of 10CFR50 Appendix J, which is 190,744.7 sccm. This condition seriously degrades the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, and is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
THE FOLLOWING IS A RETRACTION OF ENS NOTIFICATION #42407 On March 12, 2006, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station reported that a Type C penetration valve on Unit 1 experienced a leak rate of 12,700 sccm during testing. This leakage rate exceeded the TS allowed limit of 4,247 sccm (9 scfh) for Secondary Containment Bypass Leakage (SCBL) valves. Although a non-intrusive investigation determined that a significant amount of the leakage was past a non-Technical Specification test boundary valve, workers were unable to immediately quantify the exact amount of leakage attributable to this valve. Susquehanna conservatively assigned all leakage experienced during the test to the primary containment isolation valve being tested and reported the situation as a condition that seriously degraded the nuclear power plant per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). Subsequently, Susquehanna successfully re-worked the test boundary valve that was adversely affecting the leak rate test results. With no other changes in test conditions beyond this improvement in the test boundary, the test was re-performed with 464 sccm leakage observed. Total calculated leakage for SCBL amounted to 1306 sccm, well within Tech Spec limits. These results indicate that the excessive leakage was leakage past the test boundary valve and not the tested PCIV. As such, the SCBL limit was never exceeded and the ENS notification (#42407) is, therefore, being retracted. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Dan Holody). |
| ENS 42081 | 26 October 2005 12:22:00 | Due to an electrical fault in the Susquehanna Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the power to the building has been removed. Testing and repairs are underway and expectations are that power will be restored in approximately 6 hours. The EOF is located approximately 30 miles from the Susquehanna plant and the loss of power does not effect plant operation. Until repairs are complete communications and accident assessments will be made in the on site Technical Support Center (TSC). The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, Luzerne and Columbia Counties have been notified by the Susquehanna Emergency Planning Organization. The NRC and PEMA will be notified upon power restoration. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
As of approximately 1300 hours on 10/26/2005, power was restored to the Susquehanna Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the facility is considered operable. The NRC Resident Inspector will be updated. Notified the R1DO (Silk). |
| ENS 41918 | 14 August 2005 20:42:00 | This is a Voluntary Report based on a State Notification that does not meet the criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). At approximately 19:10 hours, the Susquehanna Control Room was notified that offsite fire departments had responded to the Susquehanna Learning Center. This was due to a fire alarm received by the corporate office from the building due to a loss of power to the facility. Offsite fire department personnel along with our Training department inspected the building and found no indications of fire. The Susquehanna Learning Center is located outside of the protected area and approximately one eighth mile from the main access road on State Route 11. Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency was advised. The loss of power to the training building was the result from lightning in the area. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 40642 | 5 April 2004 04:02:00 | At 0030 (ET) during setup for Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP Surveillance testing, the controlling procedure required making the Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C ESS buses inoperable. The specification has a 1 hour time limit for restoration, or the associated Diesel Generators must be declared inoperable. Due to delays during the setup of equipment the time requirements were not met, and the associated Diesel Generators were declared inoperable at 0130. The Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three operable Diesel Generators to safely shutdown. Therefore, this condition is reportable for Unit 2 under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Unit 1 is in Mode 5 and therefore not impacted. The Loss of Power instruments were restored, and the Diesel Generators declared operable at 0223. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #40642 AND #40646: On April 5, 2004, PPL Susquehanna, LLC reported three events to the NRC associated with Unit 1 Division 1 LOCA/LOOP surveillance testing. In each case, the safety function of two (out of 4) emergency diesel generators was brought into question during the testing. In two of these events, the E (substituting for A) and C diesel generators were administratively declared inoperable per Technical Specifications. This was necessary because Loss of Power instrumentation for the 1A and 1C buses, rendered inoperable in support of the test procedure, was not restored within 1 hour. In the third event, the E (for A) and C emergency diesel generators were, again, declared inoperable when two ESW pump start timers failed to meet acceptance criteria thus bringing the proper start sequencing of emergency loads into question. Because the Susquehanna Safety Analysis requires three diesel generators to safely shutdown an operating unit, the potential compromise of the diesel generator safety function was a concern for Unit 2 in each instance. (NOTE: Unit 1 was in Refueling Mode 5 and was, therefore, not impacted by these events.) Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 2. Subsequent engineering analysis has concluded that, although the declaration of diesel generator inoperability was correct and in accordance with Technical Specifications, fulfillment of these administrative actions did not result in an actual loss of safety function during any of the above described events. Details of the analysis show that the diesel generators were available to supply emergency power to the ESS buses and/or that sufficient redundant equipment was available to fulfill the safety function needs of Unit 2. These analysis conclusions provide the basis for retraction of the ENS reports made on April 5, 2004." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (R. Conte) |