Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 43040 | 8 December 2006 22:42:00 | Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) was declared inoperable at 1812 on 12/8/06 because the W-14A, F-16 Control Room Charcoal Filter Fan tripped during performance of the monthly technical specification surveillance test, TS-9. This fan is required to be operable for operability of the CREFS System. This condition is covered by TS 3.7.9, Control Room Emergency Filtration System and both units have entered action condition A, 'CREFS Inoperable' with a required action to 'Restore CREFS to OPERABLE Status' with a completion time of 7 days. CREFS is a single train system. Based on the guidance in NUREG-1022 for single train systems that perform safety functions, this condition was determined to be reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), 'Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function'.
On December 8, 2006, at 22.42 EST, EN 43040 was made by the Point Beach Nuclear Plant in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a system function that is needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS) fan W-1 4A, F-16 Control Room Charcoal Filter Fan tripped during performance of the monthly Technical Specification surveillance test. CREFS was declared inoperable. After further evaluation, it was determined that the safety function of CREFS was not lost. Redundant fan W-14B was operable for the duration of the time fan W-14A was out of service. Single train portions of the system were not affected by the W-1 4A fan trip. Accordingly, this event is not reportable. EN 43040 is, therefore, retracted. Notified R2DO (Burgess) |
| ENS 41683 | 10 May 2005 05:07:00 | Licensee discovered that the ENS Communication Lines from both the Control Room and the Technical Support Center were unavailable. This constitutes a loss of emergency preparedness capability. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 40940 | 11 August 2004 10:15:00 | On August 11, 2004, at approximately 0830 AM CDT, a non-Emergency notification was made to the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources regarding a discovery, on August 4, 2004, of diesel fuel odor in soil at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP). The source of the odor is believed to be oil contaminated soil caused by a past accidental environmental release of fuel oil. This condition was identified while digging holes for a new fence on the northwest side of the plant as part of the PBNP security upgrade. During the excavation, an odor reminiscent of diesel fuel was noted to be emanating from the dirt that was dug up in one area. The dirt from the holes was dry with no obvious fuel oil present. No diesel fuel odor was noted from water and soil at the outfall of a drain in the vicinity of this area. The quantity of diesel contaminated soil is unknown. NMC plans to conduct an investigation to determine the nature and extent of contamination and to ultimately conduct remediation as appropriate. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 40728 | 6 May 2004 13:30:00 | During performance of NDE examinations of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit 1 reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head required by the First Revised NRC Order (EA-03-009), flaw indications were identified on Nozzle 26. The ultrasonic examination (UT) signal for nozzle 26 identified flaw indications in the J-groove weld area that extend into the CRDM tube base material. A dye-penetrant (PT) examination of the nozzle 26 CRDM J-groove material was also performed. The PT exams showed minor surface indications that required further evaluation. Following minor excavation of the weld surface, additional examinations of the J-groove surface were performed. The results of these exams indicated the existence of flaws in the weld that do not meet accepted flaw evaluation guidance. Based upon preliminary analysis, it is expected that these indications would not be found acceptable under ASME standards. Therefore, this condition represents degradation of a principal safety barrier reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). PBNP Unit 1 Nozzle 26 is planned to be repaired prior to placing the RPV Head back into service. The condition was determined to be reportable at 1046 CDT on May 6, 2004. The licensee has notified the Resident Inspectors. |