Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 57186 | 22 June 2024 08:02:00 | The following is a synopsis of information provided by Framatome, Inc. (Framatome) via email: During startup testing at the affected plant, unexpected high reactor peaking factor readings resulted from an incorrect boron concentration of Al2O3-B4C pellets in two burnable poison rod assemblies (BPRAs). The cause of the issue was due to 0.2 percent boron concentration Al2O3-B4C pellets inadvertently combined with the intended 2.0 percent boron concentration Al2O3-B4C pellets, which were then placed back into inventory labeled as 2.0 percent. This issue was determined to be a 10 CFR 21 Defect on June 21, 2024. Corrective actions are that Framatome replaced the two affected BPRAs with BPRAs fabricated correctly and a root cause analysis has been initiated by Framatome which is scheduled for completion by July 31, 2024. The affected plant is Oconee Unit 3. The name and address of the individual reporting this information is: Gayle Elliott Director, Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Framatome Inc. Office 434 832-3347 Mobile 434 841-0306 3315 Old Forest Road Lynchburg, VA 24501 gayle.elliott@framatome.com |
| ENS 55993 | 13 July 2022 14:28:00 | The following information was provided by Framatome Inc. via email: Framatome Inc. (Framatome) supplied an Eaton Electrical Cutler Hammer, Inc. (Eaton) D26MRD704A1 Relay to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, McGuire Nuclear Station, that failed to change state during testing of their load sequencer. This relay was supplied as a safety related component by Framatome. A molded contact bar in the D26 top adder deck prevented a contact spring from settling into its proper position. Top adder decks manufactured between 2003 and 2022 were inspected for the existence of flashing, but no specific time frame where the excess flashing was found could be identified. Testing of additional relays with this similar excess flashing condition, by both Framatome and Eaton, showed that contact springs tended to stay in place and were unaffected by the excess flashing. There have been no past similar relay reports by Framatome customers despite there being at least 587 other relays with top adder decks supplied as commercially dedicated components. Eaton has also indicated that they have had no other reports of this condition or failures associated with it. The extent of condition determined that the failure is an isolated incident. Only one relay, supplied to McGuire Nuclear Station, failed to change state. In the future, as a precaution, the Framatome commercial grade dedication process will include the inspection of the adder deck contact bars. Relays containing contact bars with excess flashing will be rejected. |
| ENS 53780 | 6 December 2018 16:00:00 | The following is a synopsis from the Part 21 report received via e-mail: During an outage at Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, the licensee replaced the mechanical shaft seal on the 11 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump. During subsequent post maintenance testing, it was found that there was significant seal leakage on the pump. An evaluation was completed on December 4, 2018, which determined that it was a substantial safety hazard. The licensee has shipped back six seals to Framatome to be tested. It was determined that the cause of the failure was improper O-ring installation by the manufacturer. Discussions with Framatome indicate that only Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant is effected by this defect, but investigations are still ongoing. Affected Plant: Region 3: Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant |
| ENS 53442 | 2 June 2018 14:32:00 | The following report was received via a fax: Identification of Basic Activity: Eaton NBF66F Relay Basic Activity Supplied By: Framatome Inc. Nature of Defect: While performing analysis on AC Eaton NBF relays, Framatome discovered that, unless a specific application technique is utilized while applying epoxy to the pin within the crossbar, the potential for the epoxy to become foreign material is introduced. This foreign material could migrate to the area between the moving and stationary magnets, preventing the relay from completing its change of state when called upon. This condition does not occur in the de-energized direction. Framatome has not been notified of any occurrence of this condition. A different epoxy application technique was utilized between 2008 and May of 2013 on relays provided to HB Robinson (the only customer requiring the epoxy application by Framatome). Thus, a potential for this defect is limited to those relays provided during that time period. Defect Determination Date: This issue was determined to be a 10 CFR 21 defect on May 31, 2018. Number and Location of Basic Components: 307 potentially affected safety related relays with epoxy applied to their relay pins were supplied to the H.B. Robinson nuclear plant. Corrective Actions to Date: The application process was reevaluated and revised in 2013. Advice related to the Defect: Framatome is working to provide advice to the customer on the path forward related to this defect. |
| ENS 50636 | 25 November 2014 10:10:00 | The following information was summarized from the report obtained from the vendor via facsimile: The defect is related to the thermal conductivity model in the codes TACO3 and GDTACO which are used in the AREVA LOCA model for B&W plants. The thermal conductivity model does not adequately represent the change in conductivity with burnup for the fuel. The correction of the thermal conductivity model results in the peak cladding temperature limit in 10 CFR 50.46 (2200 degrees F) being exceeded. The defect exists for the following plants: Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 1, Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 2, Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 1, Three Mile Island Unit 1, and Davis-Besse Unit 1 If there are any technical questions or concerns, please contact: Gayle Elliott AREVA, lnc., 3315 Old Forest Road Lynchburg, VA 24501 Ph. # 434-841-0306. |
| ENS 43982 | 13 February 2008 15:26:00 | The following information was received via facsimile: Reportable Defect (i) Name and address tithe individual informing the Commission: Gayle Elliott, 3315 Old Forest Road, Lynchburg, VA 24501 (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, potentially may contain ATRIUM- fuel assemblies with damaged spacer side plates. (iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which falls to comply or contains a defect: AREVA NP Inc. (AREVA NP) supplied the ATRIUM-10 fuel assemblies to the Susquehanna units. The spacer side plates were damaged during recent re-channeling campaigns at the reactor site. (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such a defect or failure to comply: The damaged (missing) spacer side plates could impact the critical power performance of the fuel assemblies and the local power peaking distribution within the fuel assembly. (v) The date on which the information of such a defect or failure to comply was obtained: This issue was determined to be a deviation on December 27, 2007. (vi) In the case of a basic component which fails to comply, the number and the location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part: The known defect has occurred at Susquehanna Unit 1. Based on the number of spacer pieces found, four (4) fuel assemblies could be damaged. (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for this action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action: AREVA NP recommended and PPL Implemented Operating Limit penalties for the potentially damaged fuel assemblies to protect the MCPR Safety Limit and LHGR SAFDL. (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees: See (vii) above. |
| ENS 41864 | 22 July 2005 16:22:00 | AREVA provided the following information via facsimile. Reportable Defect (i) Name and address of the individual informing the Commission: Gayle Elliott, 3315 Old Forest Road, Lynchburg, VA 24501. (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: The components that contain the defect are pressurizer heaters. (iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: Framatome ANP, Inc. supplied pressurizer heaters with internals manufactured by Thermocoax. (iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such a defect or failure to comply: This issue concerns installed pressurizer heaters that were supplied by Framatome ANP. The heaters in question had a deficiency that may have resulted in a portion of the heated length being located inside the pressurizer heater nozzles (sleeves). Evaluation indicates that the failure mode could cause heating of the pressure boundary base metal (pressurizer heater nozzle) above the design temperature specification. (v) The data on which the information of such a defect or failure to comply was obtained: This issue was determined to be a deviation on June 15, 2005. (vi) In the case of a basic component which fails to comply, the number and the location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part: Framatome ANP supplied 36 Thermocoax pressurizer heaters to Arizona Public Service for Palo Verde Unit 3 and 30 heaters to Entergy for Waterford Unit 3. (vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for this action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action: All of the heaters supplied for Palo Verde Unit 3 have been removed from service and will not be reinstalled in the plant. All of the pressurizer heaters delivered for Waterford 3 (except for five) have been removed from service. The remaining five pressurizer heaters are currently installed in the pressurizer, however, Entergy has taken steps to preclude electrically energizing of these heaters and, therefore, the adverse conditions that could be created by the defect are precluded. (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees: See (vii) above. Also see related Event # 41783 |
| ENS 41396 | 10 February 2005 09:45:00 | The following information was received via facsimile: Basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: The component which is defective is a SIS Control Wire. Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: Framatome ANP Nature of the defect: This issue concerns defective crimps associated with AMP Faston Flag Receptacles (with Tab-Lok features) utilized on SIS Control Wire which was supplied to STP (South Texas Project) Nuclear Operating Company. A failure of the crimp connection could cause an unwanted action or prevent a desired action that could affect the operation of a safety related system. A variety of safety related systems could be impacted depending on where the wires are used. This commercial grade product was manufactured/supplied by Eaton Electrical and dedicated/supplied by Framatome ANP for a safety-related application on DS Type Circuit Breakers. The defective wires were identified prior to installation in the plant. The date on which the information of such a defect or failure to comply was obtained: This issue was determined to be a deviation on February 8, 2005. In the case of a basic component which fails to comply, the number and the location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part: Framatome ANP supplied 50 SIS Control Wires to STP Nuclear Operating Company. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for this action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action: Framatome ANP contacted STP Nuclear Operating Company and requested that all 50 SIS Control Wires supplied by Framatome ANP be returned. To prevent further occurrence of this problem Framatome ANP has taken a number of corrective actions in conjunction with the company supplying the commercial grade product, including additional inspection requirements in the dedication process to ensure crimps meet the manufacturers requirements. |