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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 52645 | 28 March 2017 14:47:00 | The following report is made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) due to an unintended initiation signal that occurred on January 31, 2017 with James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) in Mode 5 at zero (0) percent power. On January 31, 2017 at 1425 (EST) the control room received multiple annunciations associated with the following Systems / Trains: Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) / Trains A and B Residual Heat Removal System (RHR) / Trains A and B Core Spray (CS) / Trains A and B Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) All four (4) Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) auto-started with their associated Emergency Service Water pumps operating. RHR and CS both received initiation signals but were defeated per procedure. The HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) auxiliary oil pump was taken to Pull-to-Lock per procedure, and the RCIC steam isolation valve cycled until the breaker was opened to close the valve. An evaluation concluded that the (Emergency Core Cooling System - ECCS) initiation signals were caused by the opening of a portable job box that was stored near sensitive equipment. Upon opening the job box, the lid bumped a reference leg resulting in the initiation signals. All initiation signals were reset and systems restored to normal shutdown lineups. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
To the original report, the licensee added, "This condition recurred at 1624 (EDT on 1/31/17). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cook). |
| ENS 52045 | 26 June 2016 23:08:00 | The United States Coast Guard reported an oil sheen in the vicinity of the station's circulating water system effluent. Investigation by station personnel has not determined the source. The circulating water pumps were secured to mitigate the potential source. The United States Coast Guard response Center, and New York State Department of Environmental Conservation have been notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, FEMA.
The source of the oil sheen has been identified. The source, main turbine lubricating oil, has been stopped and cleanup efforts are underway. Notified R1DO (Gray), DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA. |
| ENS 51694 | 29 January 2016 11:02:00 | On January 29, 2016 James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) received notification from the site Sewage Treatment Plant (STP) operators that the January 6, 2016 monthly settleable solids result for the STP was 0.2 ml/L/hr (milliliter/liter/hour). This value exceeds the State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permit limit of 0.1 ml/L/hr (daily maximum). The STP operators conduct daily process control tests at the STP and did not identify any system upset issues around the January 6, 2016 sample date, or any time since, that would be symptomatic of the slightly elevated settleable solids result. The JAF environmental engineer concluded that a notification to the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) was not required for this event; however, a courtesy notification for permit noncompliance was made. The NYSDEC has been notified. Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), this condition is being reported as an event or situation for which notification to a government agency has been made. The NRC resident has been notified. JAF is currently at 0 percent power in Mode 2 following a forced outage resultant of events on January 23, 2016.
Based on further review of the NRC reporting guidance relative to this criteria, JAF has concluded that this condition is below the reporting threshold outlined in NUREG-1022 Revision 3. NUREG-1022 states the following (page 54), 'Licensees generally do not have to report media and government interactions unless they are related to the radiological health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment.' The condition originally reported in ENS 51694 is considered a minor deviation in sewage process limits, and has no impact on the radiological health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment. Therefore, JAF is retracting ENS 51694. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Bickett). |
| ENS 51579 | 2 December 2015 14:14:00 | On December 1, 2015 at 2036 EST, with James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 100 percent power, Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeded the Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge for approximately one (1) minute and twenty (20) seconds. Secondary Containment (SC) had been declared inoperable prior to this event, to facilitate a planned evolution related to a previous failure that occurred on September 18, 2015 (reference EN #51409). Operators attempted to restore the Reactor Building Ventilation System (RBVS) to the normal system lineup upon completion of the planned evolution. The Secondary Containment differential pressure trended positive, and exceeded the TS SR differential pressure requirement during this transition. Preliminary investigations indicate that the cause of this event is associated with the Above Refuel Floor Exhaust Fan (66FN-13B). The design of the Above Refuel Floor Exhaust portion of the RBVS includes an interlock between the exhaust fan and a downstream damper position switch, which starts the fan when the damper is in the full open position. During the approximate one (1) minute and twenty (20) second duration that the TS SR was not met, 66FN-13B was not running with the associated discharge damper in the open position. Secondary Containment was operable after the SC differential pressure was restored upon start of 66FN-13B, and remains operable. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 51512 | 3 November 2015 16:19:00 | On September 22, 2015, with James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100 percent power, the Emergency and Plant Information Computer (EPIC) indicated a spike in Secondary Containment differential pressure during performance of a surveillance test associated with automatic initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System. Plant data systems recorded Secondary Containment differential pressure exceeding the Technical Specification allowed value. The Secondary Containment differential pressure was at or above zero inches of water for approximately ten (10) seconds, and then immediately trended negative following auto-start of one of the trains of Standby Gas Treatment. An operator was subsequently dispatched to the ventilation control panel, and verified that Secondary Containment differential pressure was more negative than the Technical Specification allowed value. This condition was entered into the Corrective Action Program, and subsequently, it was determined that the approximate ten second duration that Secondary Containment differential pressure was greater than the Technical Specification allowed value was reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. Secondary Containment was Operable following reestablishment of greater than or equal to 0.25 inches of water vacuum, and remains Operable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 50558 | 22 October 2014 14:05:00 | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked. |