Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 48481 | 6 November 2012 03:56:00 | On Tuesday, November 06, 2012, at 00:06 EST, during the application of a tag-out associated with feedwater level control, the 12 feedwater flow control valve (FCV-29-137) unexpectedly partially opened. As a result, reactor vessel water level rose to the high level turbine trip set point causing the main turbine to trip. The turbine trip signal then resulted in the initiation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) channels 11 and 12 logic. No actual system component starts or actuations occurred as a result of the logic initiation and no actual HPCI injection occurred due to the system configuration, nor was injection required. Actions were taken to manually isolate the 12 feedwater flow control valve and reactor vessel water level was restored to normal. This meets NRC 8-Hour reporting criteria per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
This notification is being made to retract Event Notification (EN) #48481, which reported an automatic actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system initiation logic. The HPCI system is automatically initiated based on conditions representing a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The initiation signals are: - Low reactor water level - This is a direct indication of a potential loss of adequate core cooling. - Turbine trip - During a LOCA within the drywell, high drywell pressure due to the line break will cause a reactor scram, which causes a turbine trip, which then by design initiates the HPCI system. The event occurred with the reactor in the cold shutdown condition, with the main turbine and main turbine shaft-driven feedwater pump (#13) out of service. In the cold shutdown condition, the probability of a LOCA is low and the HPCI system is not required by the Technical Specifications to be operable. Neither of the conditions requiring actuation of the safety function of the HPCI system (high drywell pressure or low reactor water level) was present. Although the turbine trip signal was in response to an actual sensed high reactor water level condition, high reactor water level is not a plant condition satisfying the requirement for actuation of the safety function of the HPCI system. With reactor vessel water level high, the safety function of the HPCI system (i.e. to provide adequate core cooling) was already completed. Thus, the HPCI initiation signal was invalid, and the event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified the R1DO (Hunegs).
Upon further review, it has been determined the event did constitute a valid actuation of the HPCI system and is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(4)(A). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Joustra). |
| ENS 47563 | 30 December 2011 22:00:00 | The licensee has received information from Oswego County Emergency Management Office concerning errors in the 2012 edition of the Oswego County Public Emergency Response Information Calendar. The 2012 calendar mailed to residents within the 10-mile emergency planning zone near the Fitzpatrick and Nine Mile Point nuclear power plants contains errors in the maps depicting the individual Emergency Response Planning Areas (ERPAS). Oswego County notes that while its partners in emergency planning for the nuclear power plants work on a permanent solution, residents should retain their 2011 calendars and refer to them for the correct ERPA information if an emergency at one of the plants occurs. The calendar is a joint effort between Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, Entergy Nuclear, the Oswego County Emergency Management Office, the Oswego County Department of Community Development, Tourism and Planning, and the New York State Office of Emergency Management. It contains guidelines for public response to radiological and other types of emergencies for people that live within ten miles of the nuclear facilities at Nine Mile Point. Oswego County plans to repost the 2011 calendars (which contain accurate emergency response planning area maps) on its website, www.oswegocounty.com/emo. The 2011 calendars should be available on the website no later than Tuesday, January 3, 2012. Anyone with questions may call the Oswego County Emergency Management Office at 315-591-9150 or 1-800-962-2792. The licensee is providing this information as a courtesy notification to the NRC since the press release is being issued by Oswego County and not by the licensee. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. See related notification from Fitzpatrick - EN #47562. |
| ENS 46630 | 20 February 2011 12:02:00 | On Sunday, February 20, 2011, at 1007 EST, James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) Nuclear Station Shift Manager (SM), John Walkowiak, notified Nine Mile Point (NMP), and NYS Warning Point, via the RECS Line, of a loss of the Tone Alert System for greater than one hour from the National Weather Service as of 0853 (EST). Site Emergency Procedures define a loss of Tone Alert System for greater than one hour, as a significant loss of Emergency Communications (EPIP-EPP-30). This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the NMP and JAF Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8-Hour reporting criteria 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The County Alert Sirens, which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System, remained operable. The loss of the Tone Alert System constitutes a significant loss of Emergency Off-Site Communications capability. Compensatory measures were verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper-reach system, which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. Local law enforcement personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ. As of 1124 hours on February 20, 2011, Nine Mile Point was notified by the Oswego County 911 Center that the Tone Alert System has been returned to service. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45503 | 17 November 2009 21:20:00 | At 1819 on November 17, 2009, with Nine Mile Point Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power, (Nine Mile Point was) notified via the RECS Line by Oswego County Warning Point, that the National Weather Service Tone Alert Radio System for Nine Mile Point and James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plants has been out of service for greater than 1 hour as of 1740 on 11/17/2009. This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) population for the Nine Mile Point and James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets the NRC 8-hour reporting criteria per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The County Alert Sirens, which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System, remain operable. The loss of the National Weather Service Tone Alert Radio System constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications capability. Compensatory measures were verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This includes the use of the hyper-reach system, which is a reverse 911 feature, available from the Oswego County 911 center. Local law enforcement personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ. The event has been entered into the site's corrective action program and the NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. See EN# 45504 for James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Plant.
At 0318 on November 18, 2009, notified via the RECS (Radiological Emergency Communication System) Line by Oswego County Warning Point that the National Weather Service Tone Alert Radio System for Nine Mile Point and James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plants has been returned to service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO(McKinley) |
| ENS 44686 | 26 November 2008 15:52:00 | On 11-26-2008, at 13:06 EST, both Control Rooms were notified by Emergency Planning Department that the following phone notification systems are out of service: RECs (Radiological Emergency Communications System) line, ENS line and HPN line. Also, three dedicated '754' prefix lines in the TSC are currently inoperable. Site Information Technology Department personnel are working with communications equipment vendor, Verizon, to resolve the issues. State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector have been notified.
The RECs, ENS, and HPN lines have been returned to service with the exception of a line to the State Warning Point in Albany NY. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 44387 | 6 August 2008 21:09:00 | This 8-hour non-emergency report is being made based upon requirements of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which states, 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system)'. At 18:40 ET on Wednesday, August 06, 2008, the Reactor Operator At-the-Controls (OATC) discovered that the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) Computer Display was not updating data. This was discovered during periodic Control Room panel walkdowns. The last data update on the SPDS display was at 20:02 ET on Tuesday, August 05, 2008. All other Plant Process Computer functions are available. Information Technology Department personnel will be investigating the cause of the loss of SPDS capability, which is currently unknown. No other Control Room emergency assessment capabilities have been adversely affected. All Control Room panel indicators and annunciators are responding properly. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On Wednesday, August 06, 2008 at 2151 EDT, the Plant Process Computer (PPC) was shutdown and successfully restarted at 2318 EDT. Upon restart, SPDS was verified operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Krohn). |
| ENS 40998 | 30 August 2004 11:42:00 | Nine Mile Point, Unit One is initiating a 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (2) (iv) (B) 4-Hour Non-Emergency notification based upon insertion of a 'MANUAL' scram that occurred at 08:35 on Monday, August 30, 2004. At time of transient, plant was operating in Mode 1, Power Operating Condition, at 99.7% of rated power. At 08:25 on Monday, August 30, 2004, Operators noted oscillations on 13 Feedwater flow control valve (FCV) while in 'AUTOMATIC' mode of operation (normal mode of operation for this equipment). Operators took "MANUAL" control of 13 FCV per Plant Operating Procedures. 13 FCV oscillations continued while in the 'MANUAL' mode, and a decision was made to insert a 'MANUAL' scram at 08:35. All control rods fully inserted and the plant responded as designed to the scram. At 08:44, the scram signal was reset per procedure. Currently, plant is in Mode 2, Hot Shutdown Condition with cooldown in progress. Plant is transitioning to Mode 3, Cold Shutdown Condition, per Plant Operating Procedures. At the time the manual scram was inserted, Reactor Vessel Water Level (RVWL) was 67 inches and decreasing (automatic scram setpoint is 53 inches). The 13 FCV is on the discharge of the turbine-driven feedwater pump. Decay heat is currently being removed by the main condenser via the steam bypass valves. All ECCS and safety-related equipment is available, if needed. At the time of the transient there was no plant maintenance on-going which could have been a contributing factor. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
The notification sent to the NRC on 8/30/04 at 11:42 was found to be incomplete. As a normal and expected response to a manual scram at high power, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (feedwater) automatically initiated during the transient following the manual scram. This should have been reported as an 8 hour Non-Emergency 10CFR50. 72 (b) (3) (iv) (A) notification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Henderson). |