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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 56815 | 25 October 2023 15:09:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: This is a non-emergency 30-day notification for missing licensed material. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii). On September 25, 2023, while performing the required semi-annual source leak check and inventory, radiation protection personnel could not locate seven sealed radioactive sources. Five of the sources exceed the reporting threshold of ten times the activity listed in 10 CFR 20 Appendix C. Of the five sources, four were Ni-63 sources previously utilized in security bomb detection equipment with a current source radioactivity of between 7.1 and 8.7 mCi. The fifth sealed source exceeding the reporting threshold is an Am-241 former lab calibration standard with a source radioactivity of 0.97 microcuries. These sources were last accounted for on July 6, 2022. Pilgrim's accountability process does not require leak checks or physical inventory of sources that are out of service. A search was conducted for the missing sources; however, they could not be located. These sealed sources are classified as Category 5 radioactive sources in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safety Guide No. RS-G-1.9. Sources that are less than Category 3 (Cat 4 and 5 sources) are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals. Based on the activity of Ni-63 and Am-241 present in the sources, this 30-day phone notification to NRC is provided pursuant to 10CFR20.2201(a)(1)(ii). The required written report pursuant to 10CFR20.2201(b)(1) will be provided to NRC within 30 days. The Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify State and local authorities. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 55844 | 15 April 2022 11:31:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On April 15, 2022 at 1000 hours (EDT), four off-site notifications were made to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Environmental ÿProtection (MADEP) in accordance with the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (310 CMR 40.0000). ÿThe notifications document non-radiological contaminants found slightly above reportable concentrations in select soil and groundwater samples collected during site characterization efforts, as part of the decommissioning process, from four parcels of land at the property.ÿ ÿReportable concentrations in soil were identified in a composite sample for Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs). ÿReportable concentrations in groundwater were identified in samples for per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and Semi Volatile Organic Compound (SVOC). Additionally, the reports include sample results where laboratory reporting limits equaled or exceeded reporting thresholds. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).ÿ There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Lead Decommissioning Inspector and NMSS Project Manager assigned to Pilgrim have been notified. |
| ENS 55202 | 21 April 2021 09:45:00 | On April 21, 2021, at 0752 hours (EDT), an offsite notification was made to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (MADEP) in accordance with Regulation 310 CMR 40.0000: Massachusetts Contingency Plan (MCP). The notification documents non-radiological contaminants found above reportable concentrations in select samples collected during site characterization efforts. The reported reportable concentrations were slightly above reporting limits in a soil sample for Per and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS), two groundwater sampling locations for PFAS, and isolated instances of metals in groundwater including Arsenic, Vanadium, Lead, Antimony, Beryllium, Cadmium, Chromium, Nickel, and Thallium. This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) based on notification being made to another government agency. Concentrations above reporting limits have been entered into the site's corrective action program. As per MCP, the site will proceed with requirements to implement the phased MCP process. This condition does not represent a threat to station personnel or to members of the general public. |
| ENS 49064 | 23 May 2013 18:07:00 | At 1050 hours on Thursday, May 23, 2013, with Pilgrim Station in the Startup/Hot Standby Mode and with the reactor coolant pressure at approximately 525 psig, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI system was being operated in accordance with plant procedures to complete post maintenance test requirements. The flow controller could not achieve required system flow rates with the flow controller in the automatic mode. Plans to restore the automatic flow control capability are in progress. The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification. The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA). |
| ENS 49061 | 23 May 2013 12:42:00 | At 0455 hours on Thursday, May 23, 2013, with Pilgrim Station in the Startup/Hot Standby Mode and reactor coolant pressure approximately 550 psig, primary containment was declared inoperable due to a leak on the High Pressure Coolant Injection system (HPCI) turbine exhaust line while performing the HPCI system flow rate test. Power ascension was suspended pending investigation and repair. Repair plans to restore system integrity are in progress. The plant is in a safe condition and plant personnel are investigating the cause. The Resident Inspector has been informed of this notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D). The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA). The licensee has entered Technical Specification 3.7.A.2 to be in cold shutdown within 24 hours. |
| ENS 48466 | 31 October 2012 20:12:00 | On Wednesday, October 31, 2012 at 1200 hours, with the reactor at approximately 100% core thermal power and steady state conditions, Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System Train 'B' was removed from service (made inoperable) for surveillance testing. At 1441 hours, the control room staff declared the Standby Gas Treatment System Train 'A' inoperable as a result of an engineering analysis that determined that 480 VAC feed, Motor Control Center (MCC) B15, had the potential to exceed its trip set point under worst case bus loading. The inoperability of both SBGT System Trains 'A' and 'B' could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety functions to 'control the release of radioactive material' and 'mitigate the consequences of an accident.' At 1510 hours, a compensatory measure was taken to preclude the overload condition on MCC B15 and the SBGT System Train 'A' was restored to operable status. At the time of submittal of this notification, the SBGT System Train 'B' remains inoperable for replacement of an overload relay. SBGT System Train 'B' is expected to be returned to service this evening. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the Public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 48439 | 24 October 2012 19:23:00 | On October 24, 2012, at 1920 EDT hours with the reactor at 100% core thermal power the following press release is being issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding the status of the ongoing labor negotiations. ENTERGY NUCLEAR STATEMENT - ENTERGY AND UWUA LOCAL 369 AGREE TO TENTATIVE CONTRACT October 24, 2012 Plymouth, Mass. - Entergy Nuclear and the Utility Workers Union of America (UWUA) reached a tentative agreement today on a new four-year labor contract for Local 369 technical employees at Pilgrim Station, pending a ratification vote by Union membership. Additionally, the parties have agreed to a 21-day extension that will expire at midnight on Nov. 14. The previous contract for the approximately 67 workers affected by this union contract will remain in effect during the extension. The original contract was set to expire at midnight Oct. 24. Pilgrim's Site Vice President Robert Smith said, 'We appreciate the hard work of both parties to come to a successful outcome to this negotiation process. We believe the new proposal represents fair and equitable terms both for our employees and the Company.' END The Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this press release and notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). |
| ENS 47997 | 6 June 2012 00:47:00 | On June 6, 2012, at 0045 EDT hours and the reactor at 100% core thermal power the following press release being issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding the status of the ongoing labor negotiations. Plymouth, Mass. - Entergy Nuclear, the company that owns and operates the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is implementing a contingency staffing plan after weeks of negotiations between the Company and the Utility Workers Union of America Local 369 leadership were unsuccessful in reaching an agreement for a new union contract. Local 369 has stated flatly that while its members are not on strike, they reserve the right to walk off the job at any time, without any notice, and leave the nuclear power plant critically understaffed and in violation of the plant's operating license. This disregard for public safety is unacceptable. Accordingly, the company's contingency plan is being implemented. The contingency plan for temporary alternate staffing is consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations and is in the interest of safety and maintaining formal organizational controls on the plant site. Highly qualified individuals from within Pilgrim's management team as well as the Entergy nuclear fleet will be filling the necessary positions. The NRC Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this press release and notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee will be notifying the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. |
| ENS 47553 | 26 December 2011 16:00:00 | On Monday, December 26, 2011, at 1250 hours, with the reactor at 100% core thermal power, the station entered a 24-hour action statement to initiate a controlled shutdown and be less than 104 psig reactor pressure due to suspected leakage across the first stage of safety relief valve (SRV) RV-203-3D and subsequent declaration of the SRV inoperable due to criteria specified in Pilgrim plant procedure 2.2.23. As background; the Pressure Relief System includes four (4) SRVs and two (2) spring safety valves (SSVs). The SRVs discharge through their individual discharge piping, terminating below the minimum suppression pool (torus) water level. The four SRVs and the two SSVs are installed on the Main Steam piping in containment between the reactor pressure vessel and the flow restrictors. While at full power, indication of a steam leak across the first stage pilot of RV-203-3D was determined in accordance with criteria specified in procedure 2.2.23. Specifically, the SRV is inoperable if the pilot stage thermocouple temperature is 35 degrees F below its baseline temperature (with a lower decrease at the 2nd stage thermocouple) and cannot he explained by a corresponding downpower. The safety relief valve was subsequently declared inoperable and the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.D was entered. Due to the valve being declared inoperable, the station is required to be shutdown and reactor coolant pressure below 104 prig within 24 hours per T.S. 3.6.D.2. Currently, preparations are being completed to conduct the reactor shutdown and to initiate safety relief valve repairs. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 46631 | 20 February 2011 17:47:00 | On Sunday, February 20, 2011, at 1034 EST with the reactor shutdown and all control rods fully inserted a valid Reactor Protection System (RPS) low reactor water initiation signal (+12 inch) was received. The RPS actuation signal resulted in reactor scram and actuation of the Primary Containment Isolation Systems for Group II - Primary Containment Isolation and Reactor Building Isolation System (RBIS), and Group VI - Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU). At the time of the event, a controlled reactor shutdown and cooldown was in progress. The Reactor Mode Selector Switch was in 'Startup' and a cooldown was being controlled using the Mechanical Hydraulic Control (MHC) System. Initial event review indicates that the turbine by-pass valve controlling the cooldown closed causing a 'shrink' on indicated reactor water level to briefly lower to +12 inches (lowest observed water level). Reactor water level was immediately restored, the isolations (Group II and VI) were reset, and the RPS signal was reset at 1135 EST. All systems operated as expected, in accordance with design. This event had no impact on the health and/or safety of the public. The US NRC Senior Resident Inspector was in the Main Control Room at the time of the event. The licensee will be notifying the State. |
| ENS 44998 | 18 April 2009 08:38:00 | On April 18, 2009 an informational notification was made to the US NRC. At approximately 0120 EDT on April I8, 2009, the Pilgrim main control room received an emergency medical call stating that a Pilgrim employee had been found unconscious inside the radiologically controlled area of the plant. The individual was treated by the on-site first responders who administered CPR and AED treatment. Off site medical assistance was requested and the individual was transported to the local hospital. At approximately 0230 EDT, Pilgrim was notified that the individual had died of an apparent heart attack. A courtesy notification was made to the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The event had no adverse effect to the health and safety of the public. The licensee confirmed that the employee transported offsite was not radiologically contaminated. No press release is planned.
While Pilgrim does not plan to issue a news release regarding this event, it is anticipated that media coverage of the event will ensue based upon the off-site response to the medical emergency. This 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xi) notification is conservatively being made in advance of any media attention. Notified R1DO (Powell). |
| ENS 44217 | 15 May 2008 20:51:00 | Entergy Pilgrim Station has reached a tentative 4-year agreement with UWUA Local 369. This notification is in anticipation of media interest and Entergy Press Releases. Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency. |
| ENS 43642 | 14 September 2007 13:20:00 | At 0630 hours on September 14, 2007, while operating at 100% power, Pilgrim Station experienced a fish impingement on the intake structure traveling screens. Plant power was reduced to 50% and one of two seawater circulating pumps was secured. The impingement did not impact the operability of safety related cooling water systems. At 1050 hours, plant assessment determined that the impingement, involving a large school of Atlantic juvenile menhaden, is reportable to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under conditions of the Pilgrim National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Following a substantial reduction in the numbers of fish discharged via the traveling screen outfall trough, the seawater pump was restored to service and restoration of the plant to 100% power is in progress. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and will inform both the State and EPA. |
| ENS 43479 | 10 July 2007 22:55:00 | During a planned power reduction to support thermal backwash of the main condenser, an automatic reactor scram resulted from a main turbine trip. The cause for the turbine trip is currently under investigation. Following the reactor scram, the expected reactor level shrink resulted in valid group 2, Reactor Building Ventilation, and group 6, Reactor Water Cleanup System isolations. All safety systems and equipment functioned as designed. A schedule for plant restart has not yet been determined. All control rods fully inserted and no safety relief valves lifted from the scram. Minimum level after the scram was -10 inches. Decay heat is being removed using the main turbine bypass valves to the main condenser and maintaining level using normal reactor feed water. The plant is using the normal shut down electrical lineup and slowly cooling down (currently at 820 psi). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 43245 | 17 March 2007 21:11:00 | On March 17 2007, at approximately 1658 EDT, Group 2 (Reactor Building Ventilation Isolation) and Group 6 (RWCU Isolation) automatic containment isolation signals were received due to low reactor water level following the insertion of a manual scram signal. The manual scram signal was inserted following the reaching of internal administrative limits on changes in unidentified drywell leakage. The receipt of these isolation signals is not unusual following the insertion of a scram signal. The reactor was manually shutdown due to reaching internal administrative limits on changes in unidentified drywell leakage. Prior to the manual shutdown, the leakage had not reached the applicable Technical Specification limits. Drywell leakage as of 1800 EDT was 1.3 GPM identified and 2.59 GPM unidentified with the unit in Hot Shutdown Mode. All safety systems responded as expected. The plant is in a stable condition. Investigation is continuing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 40118 | 29 August 2003 21:08:00 | During performance of routine operability testing, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) tripped and restarted due to an as yet undetermined cause. The trip and restart sequence occurred twice in close succession approximately 20 minutes into a normal run before the operator took action to manually trip the turbine. Investigation into the cause of the malfunction is on-going. The HPCI system has been declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications. The operability of all other Emergency Core Cooling System components has been verified. There was never any actual coolant injection by the HPCI system during this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. The State of Massachusetts will also be notified. |