Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 45438 | 15 October 2009 18:11:00 | At 1204 power was lost to Safeguards Bus '5' and Emergency Diesel Generator 'A' started and re-energized Bus '5.' Event was caused by starting SI Pump 'A' to fill SI Accumulator 'A' which resulted in a Tertiary Auxiliary Transformer trip and lockout. At the time RHR Pump 'A' was in operation and tripped, RHR Pump 'B' was started within 2 minutes using the Abnormal Operating Procedure and flow restored to the RCS. RCS temperature decreased initially due to an increase in service water cooling and actions were taken to stabilize RCS Temperature. All equipment operated as expected for the voltage restoration to Safeguards Bus '5.' Both trains of RHR were declared inoperable as of 1204 (CDT) due to the loss of normal power supplies per Technical Specification 3.7. Emergency Busses were energized and both trains of RHR remained available for decay heat removal during this event. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45004 | 21 April 2009 07:53:00 | At 0300 on 4/21/09, Emergency Siren K-008, which had a population coverage of 1%, inadvertently actuated and required Emergency Planning Personnel to deactivate (it). Currently Siren K-008 is non-functional and required population coverage of KPS (Kewaunee Power Station) emergency sirens is acceptable. Due to Siren Activation, local offsite agencies have been notified of the failure as follows: Kewaunee Sheriff Department and Kewaunee EOC are aware of the local activation and disconnect so compensatory measures can be initiated if required. Point Beach has been notified. Manitowoc EOC has been notified. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 44718 | 13 December 2008 17:30:00 | At 1420 on 12/13/08 a plant electrician identified that a steam exclusion door would not close when he was transiting through the door. This door would not have closed and maintained the Steam Exclusion Boundary and could have led to steam through out the Auxiliary Building which could have resulted in both Trains of ESF Equipment failing to perform their required functions, i.e., SI, RHR, CC etc. A Unit Supervisor who was in the Auxiliary Building at the time immediately went up to the door and found the latch was broke and the broken piece was removed which then enabled the door to close and latch. At 1425 on 12/13/08 the Steam Exclusion Boundary was restored to functional and both Trains of ESF Equipment restored to operable. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
01/22/2009 - Retraction of EN 44718, both trains of Engineered Safeguards Features (ESF) equipment inoperable due to a degraded steam exclusion boundary door. EN 44718 provided notification that both trains of ESF equipment (e.g. SI, RHR, CCW, etc.) were inoperable due to degradation of a steam exclusion boundary door in the auxiliary building on December 13, 2008. Subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the degraded door remained capable of fulfilling its steam exclusion function during the brief (five minute) period when it was degraded. A degraded latch mechanism prevented the door from latching closed. However, the door was closed against its door jam, which resulted in a sufficiently small gap such that total allowed leak path criteria were not exceeded. Additionally, the door swing was in the direction of postulated steam flow, such that the door would have been held in the closed position by any steam overpressure postulated under accident conditions. Therefore, the door remained functional and the supported ESF equipment in the auxiliary building remained operable. Consequently, this condition did not meet the reportabllity Criteria in 10 CFR 50.72. As a result, the notification made on 12/13/2008 (EN 44718) is hereby retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (O'Brien). |
| ENS 43096 | 12 January 2007 12:39:00 | At 1039 Kewaunee Power Station experienced a loss of auto stop oil pressure on the main turbine while performing the monthly Turbine Trip Mechanism Test resulting in a reactor trip. No safeguards equipment was out of service at time of trip. Following the trip one of the moisture separators associated with the main turbine had its associated steam inlet valve fail open, which resulted in RCS temperature decreasing to 536 degrees F. This valve was manually isolated and RCS temperature returned to normal 547 degrees F. Normal heat sink via the condenser was available during the event. Investigation is continuing into the cause of the turbine trip. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for actuation of the Reactor Protection System and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System." All rods fully inserted and no primary or secondary PORV's lifted. There was no injection from any safety systems, other than AFW. Decay heat is being dumped to the condenser via steam dumps. The reactor coolant pressure and temperature are stable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42884 | 7 October 2006 14:16:00 | A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol. The supervisor's access to the plant has been denied while a review of this matter is performed. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 42762 | 10 August 2006 16:40:00 | At 1400 on 8/10/06 KPS (made) a notification to the State and Local Government that samples taken at settling plugs in the basement of the Auxiliary Building and Turbine Building show elevated tritium levels. Detected tritium levels were between 6,000 and 103,000 pico curies per liter. The Radiological Effluent Program has not detected any elevated tritium levels outside the plant. RCS leakage is .19 gpm, stable and within Technical Specification limits and there is currently no identified leakage from the Spent Fuel Pool. Investigation is continuing to identify the reason for the increase in tritium levels. The licensee notified the following agencies: State of Wisconsin: Department of Emergency Management and Department of Natural Resources Regional Office County governments: Kewaunee County Emergency Director and Manitowoc County Emergency Director The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee is planning a press release concerning the elevated tritium levels. This press release will be issued the morning of 8/11/2006. Notified R3DO (Kozak), NRR EO (Nieh), IRD (Wilson), R3 OPA (Mitlyng), HQ OPA (Hayden)
In the initial notification, KPS personnel stated that there was currently no identified leakage from the spent fuel pool. For clarification, there is no indication of gross leakage from the spent fuel pool. However, KPS personnel will be continuing an investigation by collecting and analyzing water droplets from the Spent Fuel Pool leakage detection telltale drains to determine if the water droplets are from the spent fuel pool. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kozak) |
| ENS 42509 | 18 April 2006 20:22:00 | On 4/18/2006, at 1200 hours, while the plant was operating at full power, the plant entered a 12 hour Technical Specification (TS) action statement for both trains of the Shield Building Ventilation (SBV) System being declared inoperable. The SBV System action statement was entered when the plant declared Relay Flacks RR-119 and RR-120 inoperable due to non-qualified fuses and cables being installed in six (6) of the boxes contained in these racks. The instruments associated with the six (6) boxes were not found in Technical Specification required instruments or alarms. The issue was that a downstream failure on the non-qualified Instruments may not have qualified fault protection, therefore a fault could impact safety related equipment. Other Technical Specification equipment affected by the inoperability of RR-119 and RR-120 include both trains of Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring System (ICCMS), Reactor Vessel Level Indication (RVLIS), Pressurizer Safety Valve Outlet Temperature, and Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Outlet Temperature. At 1611 actions taken by plant staff returned RR-120 to operable and the 12 hour action statement for SBV was exited. The plant remains in a 7 Day Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) pending the return of RR-119. Due to the fact that Train B of SBV has been made operable, a plant shutdown was not commenced. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) 'Any event that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material'. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41752 | 7 June 2005 14:33:00 | At 1125 on 6/7/2005 it was determined that the Emergency Diesel Generators A and B were out of service due to the possibility of Tornado Missiles potentially collapsing the D/G Fuel Oil Tank Vents. The Emergency Diesel Generators are required as a support system for RHR Decay Heat Removal and RHR was also declared inoperable at the same time. Technical Specification requirements for RHR Decay Heat Removal are, if less than the required number of heat sinks are operable, then corrective action shall be taken immediately to restore the minimum number to operable status. Actions are being taken to restore full operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators A and B. Currently RHR is operating and providing decay heat removal and Emergency Diesel Generators are available as a support system for RHR. Event Report # 41528 had similar issues associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators exhaust ducts and their ability to withstand tornado forces. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * RETRACTION FROM G. RISTE TO P. SNYDER ON 7/26/05 AT 1541 * * * Event Notice #41752 was initiated on 6/7/2005 to report an unanalyzed condition with the Emergency Diesel Generators A and B. The initial analysis for tornado missile strike probability results for the Emergency Diesel Generator fuel oil tank vent lines indicated they could be damaged by a tornado missile to the point they would potentially adversely affect Diesel operability. Additional analysis was performed and it was determined that the original fuel tank oil vent line configuration was acceptable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Mark Ring). |
| ENS 41605 | 15 April 2005 16:32:00 | A non-licensed employee supervisor tested positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. |
| ENS 41528 | 26 March 2005 02:43:00 | The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes): While evaluating the capability of the plant to withstand a tornado it was identified that the Diesel Generator Exhaust Stacks may not maintain their design structural integrity. This would place the plant in an unanalyzed condition, however expert engineering judgment is that the damage to the Emergency Diesel Generator Exhausts would not reduce the capacity below that required to ensure decay heat removal. Currently the plant is in refueling shutdown and the Emergency Diesel Generators are not required to be operable per Technical Specifications. This condition will be corrected prior to plant startup. Power is still being supplied to the plant from the Reserve and Tertiary Auxiliary Transformers. This event was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) and further review of the reporting criteria identified that if there is any doubt, this condition should be reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At the request of the Plant Manager at approximately 2100 on 3/25/05, the Shift Manger and Shift Technical Advisor independently reviewed the reporting criteria. Based on the statement in NUREG 1022, Rev 2, when applying engineering judgment and there is doubt regarding whether to report or not, the commission's policy is that the licensees should make the report, it was decided to report per 10CFR50.72. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41163 | 30 October 2004 16:11:00 | The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile: At 1405 (hrs. CDT), Shift Manager was notified that a contract individual in containment had collapsed and needed EMT (Emergency Medical Technician). At 1410, Shift Manager called for an ambulance and individual was transported out of containment. At 1443, he (the injured person) was transported offsite to the hospital. Shift manager notified hospital of individual being contaminated. HP (Health Physics technician) identified minor contamination on the hair on the back of his head, ~200 cpm (counts per minute). Shift Manager also contacted State Department of Health and Family Services (Radiation Protection Section). The patient's status is unknown at this time but appears to be heat stress related. The contamination appears to be the result of a co-worker catching the patient when he was falling down. Plant Health Physics personnel attempted to decontaminate the patient but were unsuccessful. The patient was transported to Two Rivers Hospital in Two Rivers, WI. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41120 | 14 October 2004 15:52:00 | At 1330 EDT on 10/14/04, the control room was notified that a worker in the Containment Building had a potential neck injury. An ambulance was requested to transport the worker. The individual was taken directly from the Containment building to the ambulance and a HP Technician with a radiation detector accompanied the individual to the hospital. A contamination survey was not completed on site. At 1344, the HP Tech and worker left the site for the hospital. The Shift Manager contacted the hospital to alert them of the potential for contamination on the injured person. At 1430, HP Technician confirmed that there was no contamination present. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |