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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 48607 | 19 December 2012 20:29:00 | At approximately 17:31 hours on December 19, 2012, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit Two reactor automatically scrammed on low RPV level (Level 3, +13 inches) while transitioning the 'A' reactor feed pump from discharge pressure mode to flow control mode. All control rods inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped. Reactor water level lowered to approximately -29 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. An automatic trip of the reactor recirculation pumps occurred, but is not expected at this RPV level. There were no automatic emergency core cooling system initiations. No steam relief valves opened during the event. All safety systems operated as expected. The cause of the loss of feed water flow and trip of the reactor recirculation pumps is under investigation. This report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a 4 hour report, and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an 8 hour report. Decay heat is removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves . On-site electrical power is in the normal configuration. The Unit 2 reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Unit 1 was not affected and operates at 99% power. The licensee will inform the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and make a press release. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 48496 | 9 November 2012 03:03:00 | At approximately 0118 hours (EST) on November 9, 2012, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit Two reactor was scrammed by plant operators due to a loss of ICS (Integrated Control System; which controls the reactor feed and reactor recirculation systems). The reactor operator placed the mode switch in shutdown when reactor water level reached +25 inches and lowering. All control rods inserted and both reactor recirculation pumps tripped at -38 inches. Reactor water level lowered to -52 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) and level 2 (-38 inches) isolations. HPCI and RCIC both automatically initiated. HPCI was overridden prior to injection and RCIC was utilized to restore reactor water level to the normal band. All isolations and initiations at this level occurred as expected. No steam relief valves opened. Pressure was controlled via turbine bypass valve operation. All safety systems operated as expected. The (Unit 2) reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation into the cause of the loss of ICS is underway. Unit One continued power operation (at 78% power). The NRC Resident Inspectors were notified. A press release will occur. The licensee will inform the State of Pennsylvania. Decay heat removal is being maintained through the main condenser. On-site electrical power is in the normal configuration. |
| ENS 48020 | 13 June 2012 12:44:00 | At 1032 (EDT), on June 12, 2012, the Unit 2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) system ceased valid data transmission to the control room computer terminals. Remote terminals were unaffected. The loss was discovered on the morning of 6/13/12 and the connection was restored at 0945 (EDT) on 6/13/12. This was a duration of greater than 8 hours which was not discovered until after the fact. This condition affected unit 2 only. ERDS was unaffected. Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system was unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47970 | 27 May 2012 15:45:00 | At 2130 EDT on 5/26/2012, a condition was reported identifying that the 10 CFR Part 26 requirement for performing waiver evaluations was not met for three security officers held over for compensatory measures after lightning strikes impacted security equipment at PPL Susquehanna, LLC. Granting a waiver under Subpart I, 'Managing Fatigue,' of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 26, 'Fitness for Duty Programs,' involves a process that, once completed, allows individuals who are subject to the Subpart I work hour controls to not meet one of the work hour requirements. Contrary to the above, waivers were not processed for three security officers as required by the regulation and the officers worked hours exceeding the 16 hour limit. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4) requiring a 24-hour ENS notification. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47814 | 7 April 2012 15:27:00 | On 04/07/2012 at 1354 (EDT), Susquehanna Steam Electric Station requested an offsite ambulance via the 911 system for medical assistance. The individual was in the radiologically controlled area and was treated as contaminated. An offsite ambulance arrived on site at 1413 hrs. and the ambulance departed the site at 1424 hrs. enroute to the Berwick Hospital. This is considered a transport of a contaminated individual requiring an 8 hour ENS Notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii). Licensee health physic technicians accompanied the individual to the hospital. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
On 04/07/2012, PPL Susquehanna reported that a potentially contaminated individual was transported offsite via ambulance for medical assistance. The individual had been in the radiologically controlled area when the event occurred, and for medical reasons could not be completely surveyed for radioactive contamination prior to transport to the hospital. Therefore the event was considered transport of a contaminated individual. Health Physics personnel accompanied the individual to the hospital and conducted surveys of the individual, ambulance and hospital equipment and facilities. The results of these surveys indicated that no contamination was detected and the individual, ambulance and all hospital facilities and equipment were non-contaminated. Based on the above information, reporting pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) described in the referenced Event Notification is retracted. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Joustra). |