Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 49901 | 12 March 2014 10:34:00 | At 0841 (CDT) on March 12, 2014, the Unit 1 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The pyro panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in the Containment Building is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperature is being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. A courtesy follow up notification will be sent when the pyro panel is returned to service and functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
The repairs to the Unit 1 Pyro Panel have been completed and the panel was returned to service on 3/12/14 at 1010 CDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (O'Donohue). |
| ENS 49638 | 16 December 2013 21:37:00 | At 1627 CST on December 16, 2013 Farley Nuclear Plant determined that the following was an unanalyzed condition: As a result of recent industry operating experience (OE 305419, EN 49411, EN 49419) regarding the impact of un-fused Direct Current (DC) ammeter circuits in the Control Room, Farley performed a review of ammeter circuitry for similar issues. The review determined the described condition to be applicable to Farley resulting in an unanalyzed condition with respect to 10 CFR 50 Appendix R analysis requirements. The wiring design for the ammeters contains a shunt in the current flow from each DC battery and battery charger, but the ammeter wiring attached to the shunt does not contain fuses. It is postulated that a fire could cause one of the ammeter wires to short to ground. Concurrently, the fire causes another DC wire from the opposite polarity on the same battery to also short to ground. This would cause a ground loop through the un-fused ammeter cable. The potential exists that the cable could heat up, causing a secondary fire in the ammeter raceway. The secondary fire could adversely affect safe shutdown equipment and potentially cause the loss of the ability to safely shutdown per 10 CFR 50 Appendix R. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition. Compensatory measures have been implemented for affected areas of the plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 49637 | 16 December 2013 21:37:00 | At 1454 CST on December 16, 2013, the Unit 1 pyro panel (smoke detection panel) was declared non-functional due to an unexpected failure. Viable compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in Containment is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperatures are being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however, this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Unit 1 pyro panel has been returned to service as of 1554 CST on 12/17/13, which restores Unit 1 containment fire detection capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Freeman). |
| ENS 49091 | 5 June 2013 17:09:00 | This is a report of a loss of emergency assessment capability as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 1039 CDT on June 5, 2013, Farley Unit 2 experienced a communication failure of the Integrated Plant Computer (IPC). This represents a loss of Unit 2 automated SPDS and ERDS capability. This also rendered the Technical Support Center (TSC) non-functional for Unit 2 since the TSC relies on IPC data displays for event assessment. The Unit 2 IPC was returned to service at 1115 CDT, restoring all affected emergency response capability. Investigation to determine the cause of the failure is ongoing. With the exception of the Unit 2 IPC all systems functioned as required. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. |
| ENS 48926 | 16 April 2013 08:55:00 | This is an 8-hour report of a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities as required by 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0037 CDT on 4/16/13, during the performance of an 'A' train loss-of-offsite-power test per procedure FNP-2-STP-80.14, Farley Unit 2 experienced a complete loss of main control board annunciation. Emergency Power Board annunciators are unaffected. No emergency action level criteria have been exceeded as a result of the loss of annunciation, however, annunciators normally relied upon for emergency assessment are not functional. Troubleshooting to identify the cause of the loss of annunciation is in progress. No estimate for restoring annunciator power is currently available. Compensatory measures for critical parameter monitoring have been established and implemented. Unit 2 plant conditions remain stable in mode 5. Unit 1 is unaffected by this event. There has been no release of radioactivity to the environment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Unit 2 main control room annunciators were restored at 0907 EDT on 4/16/13. The cause of the failure was determined to be a relay in the annunciator power supply circuit. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Vias). |
| ENS 47813 | 6 April 2012 22:18:00 | At 1444 (CDT) on April 6, 2012, during a planned refueling outage on Unit 1, maintenance activities in the high voltage switchyard caused feeder breaker 820 to inadvertently trip. With the second feeder breaker, 924, already out of service, power was lost to the 1B startup transformer. An undervoltage condition was then experienced on the 1G 4160 V emergency bus. As a result, the B1G Sequencer initiated a valid load shed of the 1G 4160 V emergency bus. Due to outage conditions, the B-Train, 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was tagged out and did not automatically start but did receive a valid start signal. None of the ESF loads supplied by the 1G bus started automatically since the 1B EDG was out of service. With a B-Train equipment outage in progress, the 1A RHR pump (A-Train) remained in service for shutdown cooling throughout the event. Although the bus safety function was not needed for plant conditions a valid load shed signal occurred and therefore this event is considered reportable. The 1G 4160 V emergency bus was restored to service at 1542 on April 6, 2012. Investigation revealed a technical inaccuracy in the instructions used during the maintenance activity in the high voltage switchyard that caused feeder breaker 820 to trip. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 46539 | 14 January 2011 12:47:00 | |
| ENS 46123 | 23 July 2010 16:31:00 | The Siren Control Panel at the Houston County Courthouse was unavailable due to a bomb threat (FNP-0-EIP-8.0, step 13.6.3) which caused a loss to the Public Prompt Notification System (i.e.. Tone Alert Radio system and the Sirens) for greater than one hour. The bomb threat occurred at 0852 (07/23/10) and Houston County Courthouse evacuation was commenced. Farley Nuclear Plant was notified of the bomb threat and subsequent evacuation at approximately 0945 (07/23/10). The bomb threat resulted in the Houston County Emergency Management Agency (HCEMA) and the Houston County Sheriff's dispatcher to be evacuated, which resulted in the Alert Notification System (ANS) activation consoles being inaccessible. The HCEMA office was evacuated at 0915 (07/23/10) and the Houston County Sheriff Dispatcher evacuated at 0925. When Farley Nuclear Plant was notified of the bomb threat, Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were dispatched to the local MET Tower console for ANS actuation (TAR's and Sirens) per approved plant procedures, if required. Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were on station at the MET Tower ANS console at 0959 (07/23/10) with capability to activate the ANS console if required. Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were in contact with HCEMA at 1000 (07/23/10). All clear from bomb threat given by Houston County Sheriff's Department and normal access was restored to the HCEMA office at 1100 (07/23/10). At 1109 (07/23/10) HCEMA notified Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel that the HCEMA office was manned and the MET Tower ANS console manning was secured. During the time that the HCEMA office was unmanned, Alabama Emergency Management Agency (AEMA) was the notification point for HCEMA and that any decision to activate the ANS console could be made by HCEMA by direction of AEMA and then performed by Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel. The total length of time that the Alert Notification System was unavailable was 68 minutes. This was based on the bomb threat and evacuation time at 0852 (07/23/10) until Farley Nuclear Plant Emergency Preparedness personnel were in contact with HCEMA at 1000 (07/23/10). The licensee notified Alabama and Georgia Emergency Management Agencies as well as Houston County and Early County Management Agencies. The licensee also notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |