Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 44995 | 17 April 2009 09:22:00 | At 0207 hours on 04/17/2009, the SPDS (Safety Parameter Display System) and ERDS (Emergency Response Data System) was removed from service to support activities for a planned maintenance outage on the UPS power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 48 hours. During this time, Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available. Since the SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The plant is in Op. Con. 5 (Refueling), Reactor Coolant Temperature is 87 (degrees) F and 'A' RHR is in shutdown cooling. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42066 | 20 October 2005 14:30:00 | On October 20, 2005, the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) is being removed from service to perform planned upgrades to the system. The removal of SPDS from service for Hope Creek also affects the transmission of data via the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). Appropriate compensatory measures are in place while SPDS is out of service. The SPDS is expected to be returned to service in approximately 8 days. This is a voluntary/courtesy notification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41956 | 28 August 2005 11:04:00 | At 0325 on 8/28/05 the `B' Drywell to Suppression Chamber vacuum breaker indication began cycling from closed to intermediate open. Attempts were made to close the vacuum breaker from the control room were not successful. Attempts to establish a differential pressure between the drywall and suppression chamber airspace were also not successful at getting the vacuum breaker to close and stay closed. Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 was entered at 0325 and a plant shutdown was initiated at 1100 to comply with Technical Specifications. With the vacuum breaker open or partially open, the pressure suppression function of the suppression chamber could be compromised in the event of a postulated loss of coolant accident and therefore this safety function is degraded. The inoperability of this vacuum breaker is reportable in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(v), The cause of the open vacuum breaker is currently not known. The plant will be taken to cold shutdown to facilitate torus entry to effect repairs. There was no other equipment that was unavailable that contributed to this event. All other safety related equipment is currently operable. The licensee is starting a normal shutdown. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will be notifying the LAC Township. |
| ENS 40710 | 28 April 2004 12:48:00 | In the process of performing an assessment of the Hope Creek diesel driven fire pump fuel oil supply, a review of the most recently performed fuel oil analysis was performed. This review identified that a fuel oil sample analysis performed on February 11, 2004, to satisfy the 92-day surveillance requirement specified in procedure NC.FP-AP.ZZ-0005, 'Fire Protection Surveillance and Periodic Test Program,' showed that the fuel oil did not meet the procedural acceptance criteria for viscosity (was low out of specification). The diesel driven fire pump was not declared inoperable at this time and no compensatory measures were put in place. Upon discovery of the out of specification fuel sample, the diesel driven fire pump was declared inoperable on April 27, 2004 at 1616 hours and compensatory measures were established. Although the diesel driven fire pump is inoperable due to failure to meet this acceptance criteria, engineering judgment based upon vendor recommended viscosity requirements and satisfactory surveillance pump performance indicates that the diesel driven fire pump would continue to operate and perform its necessary functions with the lower viscosity fuel oil. Failure to declare the diesel driven fire pump inoperable and establish appropriate compensatory measures is contrary to the provisions of Hope Creek Operating License Section 2.C.7, 'Fire Protection'. This event is being reported in accordance with Hope Creek Operating License Condition 2.F which requires a 24 hour notification for violation of the requirements of Section 2.C of the Operating License. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
An investigation was performed regarding the out of specification fuel oil sample for the diesel driven fire pump that identified that the Chemistry procedure used to perform the fuel oil sample analysis contained testing criteria for viscosity that differed from the requirements of the testing criteria in procedure NC-FP-AP.22-0005, 'Fire Protection Surveillance and Periodic Test Program.' The Chemistry procedure required viscosity testing to be performed at 40 deg C and the Fire Protection surveillance procedure acceptance criteria requires testing for viscosity at 20 deg C. A fuel oil sample obtained on April 26, 2004 was re-analyzed using the required testing parameters of the Fire Protection surveillance procedure and was determined to be within acceptance criteria (satisfactory). A review of previous fuel oil sample analysis data back to August 2000 was performed and compared to the current testing results. The current test results were determined to bound the previous test data. Based on this information, the diesel driven fire pump fuel oil has been acceptable throughout this time period. The diesel driven fire pump was returned to an operable status and the impairment closed. Since the pump remained operable, there was no violation of the Fire Protection Program. The report for violation of License Condition 2.C.7 of the Operating License is being retracted. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (A. Della Greca). |
| ENS 40378 | 6 December 2003 04:44:00 | The reactor was being shutdown as part of a planned evolution to allow repairs on the Reactor Water Cleanup flange leak. After the Reactor Protection System Mode Select Switch had been placed in shutdown, the resulting reactor level transient caused the Level 3 low reactor level set point to be reached. The Reactor Protection System had already been de-energized and the lowest level reached during the transient was +2 inches. This level transient is a normal occurrence on a reactor shutdown, and level was restored to the normal operating band. There was no effect on the plant due to reaching the low level set point. No other abnormal plant response was noted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector
Upon further review of this event, the resulting Level 3 low reactor water level signal following the manual scram is considered part of the pre-planned sequence in accordance with the guidance of NUREG-1022. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and is being retracted. Notified R1DO (J. Noggle) |