Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 41991 | 14 September 2005 14:11:00 | On September 14, 2005, at approximately 0832 hours (EDT), Brunswick began losing the function of several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. There are a total of 36 sirens located in Brunswick and New Hanover Counties, NC. The maximum number of sirens that were inoperable was twenty (20). As of 1330 (EDT), eleven (11) sirens in Brunswick County and four (4) sirens in New Hanover County remain inoperable. The Brunswick and New Hanover County Emergency Operations Centers are aware of the condition of the sirens and maintenance activities are in progress to restore siren capabilities. Other communications with local, state, and federal emergency response organizations have not been affected. The initial safety significance of this condition is considered minimal. Unit 1 and 2 are currently operating in Mode 1 under normal parameters. State and county emergency response officials are aware of the condition and compensatory measures are in place to provide warning to the affected areas if required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On September 14, 2005, under Event Notification 41991, Brunswick Plant reported the loss of a number of offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. Maintenance activities continue for restoration of the siren capabilities lost. As of 2340 hours (EDT) on September 14, 2005, nine (9) sirens remain inoperable, six (6) sirens in Brunswick County and three (3) sirens in New Hanover County. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday).
On September 14, 2005, at 1411 hours, the Brunswick plant provided a notification (reference Event Number 41991) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for the loss of function several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. This update is to notify the NRC Operations Center that as of September 15, 2005, at 1600 hours, all but 3 of 36 sirens have been restored and the condition no longer meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Restoration efforts for the remaining sirens are in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday) |
| ENS 41926 | 17 August 2005 19:35:00 | On August 17, 2005 at 1615 (EST), Brunswick lost eight off site emergency preparedness sirens for greater than an hour due to severe weather and lightning strikes. The Brunswick County Emergency Operations Center is aware of the loss and has established Backup Route Alerting. Other communications with local, state, and federal response organizations have not been affected. Safety Significance is minimal. Backup Route Alerting was established as a compensatory measure and the sirens were promptly returned to service. The down time was only 1 hour and 44 minutes. All affected sirens were restored operable at 1759 (EST) 8/17/05. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41160 | 29 October 2004 16:25:00 | The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile: On October 29, 2004, at approximately 1600 hours, control room operators were informed by engineering personnel that raceways were located closer than 20 feet from the redundant division without being protected by a fire barrier wrap in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R, Section III.G.2. In 480 volt switchgear room E7, Brunswick is committed to maintaining redundant safe shutdown circuits by a minimum of 20 feet with no-intervening combustibles, unless the circuits are protected by a one-hour fire barrier wrap. Two conduits containing Division II circuits were identified closer than 20 feet to their redundant counterparts with no wrap installed. The (NRC) Resident Inspector has been notified. INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. When the condition was recognized, impairments were established in accordance with the fire protection program and compensatory measures were implemented. In addition, fire detection systems in the affected area have been verified to be operable. The affected area is maintained as a combustible free separation zone. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Impairments have been initiated and appropriate compensatory measures established. The root cause and additional corrective actions are being documented in accordance with the corrective action program. |
| ENS 40315 | 12 November 2003 14:03:00 | On November 12, 2003, at approximately 1003 hours, during an annual emergency preparedness siren test, the five sirens from New Hanover County, NC, did not respond to the signal sent by the New Hanover County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). The sirens were subsequently tested from the Brunswick Nuclear Plant (BNP) Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) and responded as required. Maintenance activities are in progress to restore New Hanover County EOC siren initiation capability. Initiation capability will be maintained at the BNP EOF until the capability is restored to New Hanover County. Of the remaining 31 sirens tested, 30 successfully passed the annual test and are considered to be operable. The additional failed siren blew a control power fuse during the test and has since been repaired, tested, and returned to operable status. The resident inspector has been notified. The safety significance of this event is considered to be minimal. Both Units 1 and 2 are operating in Mode 1 under normal parameters. Compensatory measures are in place to ensure the affected sirens will initiate if required. Activities to restore siren initiation capability are in progress.
Repairs and retesting have been completed and, as of 1530 ET 11/12/03, New Hanover County EOC siren initiation capability has been restored. Notified R2DO (J. Pelchat) |
| ENS 40297 | 4 November 2003 21:20:00 | On November 4, 2003, at approximately 1732 hours, Unit 2 received a generator/turbine trip due to loss of excitation, which resulted in a Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip. Plant response to the reactor shutdown resulted in High Pressure Coolant Injection and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system actuations on low reactor coolant level. Additionally, primary containment isolation system actuation signals for valve groups 1, 2, 3 , 6, 8, and 10 were received and the valves closed as required. All four emergency diesel generators automatically started, but did not load because power was never lost to the emergency buses. The loss of power from the generator trip resulted in reactor building ventilation isolation and automatic start of both trains of the Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system. SBGT Train A immediately tripped, but was successfully placed in service. All control rods fully inserted into the core. At approximately 1857 hours, another RPS trip was received due to low reactor coolant level while cycling Safety Relief Valves; however, all control rods were already inserted. The safety significance of this event is considered to be minimal. The plant responded as designed to the transient with the exception of the SBGT Train A initial starting issue. An event investigation team has been assembled to determine the cause of the event. Plant response to the event is being evaluated and identified issues will be addressed prior to plant restart. The licensee reported that the station electrical grid is normal and the emergency diesel generators have been shutdown and returned to standby status. The current plant conditions are 550 psi, 496 degrees F with RCIC operating to maintain reactor water level. The main condenser is available and being used to dump steam from the reactor. Two safety relief valves opened during the transient and reclosed as expected. The reactor water level decreased to minimum of approximately 90 inches during the transient. The cause of main steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure is under investigation. The licensee also reported that this event caused a Group 6 Isolation, reactor building ventilation isolation, and standby gas treatment actuation signal on Brunswick Unit 1. These Unit 1 systems have been returned to a normal configuration. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |