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On June 27, 2014, TVA identified in a reanalyzed hydrologic analysis for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) a deviation from the current hydrologic analysis. The flooding analysis in Section 2.4.3 of the WBN UFSAR assumes that the Watts Bar West Saddle Dike fails completely and instantaneously at approximately 1.5 feet of overtopping during a Peak Maximum Flood (PMF). This assumption exists in the original design basis analysis and the revised analysis which supports WBN-UFSAR-12-01 (Application to Revise Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Regarding Changes to Hydrologic Analysis). The results of recent studies of the West Saddle Dike, conducted as part of the Fukushima Order 2.1 flooding review, indicate that the complete and instantaneous failure of the Watts Bar West Saddle Dike may not be a valid assumption. If the dike does not fail, analyses performed using the codes and methods consistent with those used in original plant design show that the east floodwall of the Watts Bar Dam would overtop. As a result of this overtopping, the east floodwall is assumed to fail. Based on this assumption and analysis, failure of the east floodwall of the Watts Bar Dam would result in an increase in the flood level at the WBN Plant Site. The current licensing basis PMF level for WBN is 734.9 feet as stated in Section 2.4.3.5 of the WBN UFSAR. In addition, it should be noted that by letter dated July 19, 2012, TVA proposed a revised PMF level of 739.2 feet. Introducing non failure of the Watts Bar West Saddle Dike indicated a potential increase of approximately 1.7 feet over the revised PMF level. TVA performed additional analysis using current industry standard for flooding analysis. Specifically, TVA modeled the condition using the United States Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Center River Analysis System (HEC-RAS) tool. TVA's analysis of the condition using HEC-RAS determined that all required safety equipment for WBN would not be impacted and are considered operable based on a Prompt Determination of Operability completed on June 30, 2014. This report addresses a condition as described in 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B). TVA is making this report consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1022 regarding the application of engineering judgment to the evaluation of reportability of an unanalyzed condition. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this condition.

• * * RETRACTION AT 1705 EDT ON 8/21/2014 FROM MATTHEW ROBERTSON TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On June 30, 2014, TVA reported (Event 50245) that during a re-analysis conducted as part of the Fukushima Order 2.1 flooding review, a probable maximum flood (PMF) design assumption that the Watts Bar Dam west saddle dike fails completely and instantaneously at approximately 1.5 feet of overtopping, was determined to be a non-conservative flood model assumption (i.e., invalid). As a result, TVA postulated that Watts Bar Dam's east floodwall would fail, increasing the site flood level at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) by 1.7 feet; a condition that was beyond the current licensing basis. Through subsequent analysis, TVA has demonstrated that although the west saddle dike may not completely and instantaneously fail during a PMF (as previously assumed), the consequential increase in reservoir levels does not result in a failure of the Watts Bar Dam east floodwall and would not result in an increase in the flood level at WBN. Therefore, the previously reported 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) event is being retracted. The NRC resident Inspector has been informed of this event retraction. Notified the R2DO (Hickey).