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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 49749 | 21 January 2014 10:20:00 | The following (in part) was received via facsimile: The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC preliminary notification in general conformity to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.21 (a)(2). On November 15, 2013 C&D Technologies, Inc. (C&D) was informed by Nuklearna Elelktrarna Krsko (NEK) of Slovenia that the vent assemblies in a lot 66 units of LCY-39 batteries were not engaging properly to form a seal between the vent assembly and the battery cover. This issue was detected and corrected prior to installation and use of the batteries. The vent assembly is a safety related component with the primary function of preventing spark or flame propagation back into the cell from external sources. Lack of engagement or seal between the vent assembly and cover may provide a path for flame or spark propagation. Subsequent evaluation of the design of the cover to vent assembly seal has shown that under certain combinations of assembly, gasket and cover dimensions a clearance fit is formed that may exist in installed batteries. To date no other user of LCY-35, 37, or 39 batteries that use these covers and vent assemblies has reported a similar situation, however, the possibility exists that this issue may exist in products used by US licensees. And may pose a safety hazard. Thus, C&D is submitting this report to the NRC and notifying C&D's customers that use LCY batteries of this report, and actions to be taken to eliminate the possible safety hazard. U.S. Licensees using batteries possibly containing the clearance fit have been notified of the filing of this report with recommendations that they inspect their batteries for any signs of problems. A procedure (attached) will allow users to detect clearance fits between the vent assembly and cover. Replacement parts will be provided by C&D for affected cells that will eliminate the possibility of clearance fits. The affected US facilities are: Oconee Nuclear Station, Indian Point Energy Center, Arkansas Nuclear One, Beaver Valley Nuclear Generating Station, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Edwin I. Hatch Power Plant, and Wolf Creek Generating Station. The affected foreign facilities are: Bruce, Laguna Verde, Krsko and Pickering. |
| ENS 49667 | 20 December 2013 11:45:00 | The following was received via facsimile: The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC a report in general conformity to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.21 (a)(2). On October 22, 2013, C&D Technologies, Inc. (C&D) was informed by Entergy Nuclear Northeast that a KCR-13 battery installed at the Indian Point Nuclear Energy Center had developed a small crack in the polycarbonate jar material. The jar is a safety related component with the primary function of containing electrolyte. C&D does not believe that significant quantity of electrolyte was lost through this crack, because there was a normal level of electrolyte in the battery. This unit has been replaced, and the unit was sent by Entergy to an outside lab, Lucius Pitkin (LPI) of New York, NY, for analysis. As C&D did not have access to the components of the allegedly defective battery, and a report has not yet been issued by Lucius Pitkin, C&D cannot perform a root cause technical evaluation and affirm whether there is any defect in the component or manufacturing process, or whether the reported condition may have been due to user abuse of product, improper maintenance or other negligence or error. No formal report from Entergy or LPI Is expected before the expiration of the 60 day limit from the date C&D was notified of the issue. Thus, C&D is submitting this interim report to the NRC and notifying C&D's customers that use C&D KCR-13 batteries of this interim report. (C&D is also) initiating an action plan to evaluate the reported potential defect and determine whether it could pose a substantial safety hazard for any U.S. licensee using such batteries. Concurrent actions underway to complete the evaluation: a) On receipt of the final report by LPI/Indian Point by C&D, C&D shall evaluate the findings and the causes for failure. Maximum time 14 days from receipt of the report. b) In conjunction with the licensees identified in section vi, C&D will recommend maintenance assessment of all KCR-13 batteries at these locations to determine their status, and specifically the presence of any evidence of potential defects via visual examination. For any cells exhibiting the presence of potential defect, C&D shall further recommend that they be returned for analysis. Estimated completion date of analysis is thirty (30) days from the receipt of the returned batteries. KCR-13 batteries are used in Indian Point and Monticello Nuclear Plants. For further information contact: Robert Malley VP Quality and Process Engineering Office Phone 215-619-7830 Email bmalley@cdtechno.com
The following updated information was received from C&D Technologies: Subject: Updated Interim Report - Inability to Complete 10CFR Part 21 Evaluation regarding cracking in KCR-13 Standby Battery Jars As previously stated, C&D did not have access to the components of the allegedly defective battery, and a report has not yet been issued by Lucius Pitkin. C&D cannot perform a root cause technical evaluation and affirm whether there is any defect in the component or manufacturing process, or whether the reported condition may have been due to user abuse of product, improper maintenance or other negligence or error until a final report Is issued by Lucius Pitkin. Although several requests to both Indian Point and Lucius Pitkin have been made, a receipt date for the analysis results is still indeterminate. If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact: Robert Malley VP Quality and Process Engineering Office Phone 215-619-7830 Email bmalley@cdtechno.com Notified R1 (DeFrancisco), R3DO (Kunowski) and Part 21 Group (via email).
The following report was received via fax: C&D has recently received and is evaluating the report from Lucius Pitkin and will perform a root cause technical evaluation and affirm whether there is any defect in the component or manufacturing process, or whether the reported condition may have been due to user abuse of product, improper maintenance or other negligence or error. The planned final evaluation should be completed by May 31, 2014 at which time it is anticipated that a final report will be issued. Notified the R1DO (Lilliendahl), R3DO (Riemer), and Part 21 Group (via e-mail).
The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile: The information provided in the C&D facsimile serves as C&D's final analysis of the issue. Conclusion: While the images do show indications of environment stress cracking (ESC) and fatigue, the lack of chemical evidence of the actual agent makes it difficult to determine the source of the material. Polycarbonate (the container material) has known stress cracking agents for example esters, aliphatic hydrocarbons, aromatic hydrocarbons, halogenated hydrocarbons, ketones, etc. and the C&D Installation and Operation Manual clearly states that the only approved material for contact with the jar and cover (other than materials used in the construction of the battery) for cleaning purposes is water and sodium bicarbonate. If one of the previously mentioned materials came into contact with the jar, it could have caused the ESC that was observed. The standing recommendation to system operators is to limit any chemical that can come into contact with the battery to only approved materials. In the event that an unapproved material contacts the battery, the unit should be cleaned and observed for any subsequent damage caused by the agent. Notified R1DO (Cahill), R3DO (Pelke), and Part 21 Group (via e-mail). |
| ENS 49967 | 28 March 2014 13:02:00 | The following is the summary portion of the report submitted by fax: Subject Interim Report - Inability to Complete 10CFR Part 21 Evaluation Regarding Misaligned Separators in LCR-25 Standby Batteries The purpose of this letter is to provide the NRC a report in general conformity to the requirements of 10CFR Part 21.21 (a)(2). On February 14, 2012 C&D Technologies, Inc. ('C&D') was informed by Entergy Operations that an LCR-25 battery installed at the Palisades Nuclear Power Plant had shown signs of misaligned separators (also known as shifted separators) of between 1/8 to1/4 (inch). This was identified by the Palisades plant on or about November 4, 2011. On January 16, 2012, three additional cells were identified as experiencing separator misalignment. C&D requested that Palisades return the affected batteries for evaluation of this anomaly and issued a Return Material Authorization for that purpose. But since voltage readings were acceptable for all units involved, Palisades determined that an operability issue did not exist and opted to keep the batteries in service until their refuel outage scheduled for Fall, 2013. C&D inadvertently closed the internal corrective action without providing an Interim Report as required by 10CFR, Part 21. C&D has not performed a root cause technical evaluation to determine if there is any defect in the component or manufacturing process or whether the reported condition may have been due to user abuse of product, improper maintenance or other negligence or error. Thus, C&D is submitting this interim report to the NRC and notifying C&D's customers that use C&D LCR-25 batteries of this interim report, and is initiating an action plan to evaluate the reported potential defect and determine whether it could pose a substantial safety hazard for any U.S. licensee using such batteries. If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact: Robert Malley VP Quality and Process Engineering bmalley@cdtechno.com (215) 619-7830 The sites affected are: Palisades - 65 x LCR-25 NUC Batteries and, Crystal River - 4 x LCR-25 NUC Batteries
The following was excerpted from the final report received from C&D Technologies, Inc. via facsimile: Conclusion: The conclusion drawn from the return and analysis is that the misaligned separator was present from the time of assembly in the C&D facility through installation and initial operation. Recommendations: C&D recommends that operators of nuclear batteries perform an inspection of their batteries to detect misaligned separators. Inspection may be performed visually, and with the aid of mirrors as necessary. Corrective Actions: C&D has enhanced both in process and final battery inspection processes to detect and eliminate misaligned separators from shipment. C&D is also preparing an enhanced incoming inspection work form for nuclear battery operators that will better enable the operators to detect and segregate batteries with misaligned separators from use. Further Reporting: No further reporting is anticipated. C&D Contacts: Further information on this issue can be obtained from: Larry Carson- Nuclear Product Manager Office Phone 215-775-1314 Email: lcarson@cdtechno.com Robert Malley-VP Quality and Process Engineering Office Phone 215-619-7830 Email bmalley@cdtechno.com Notified R1DO (Lilliendahl), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Dickenson), and NRR Part 21 Group via email.
The following information was excerpted from the revised final report submitted by email: This update (dated 9/22/2014 and provided to NRC on 10/28/2014) is Revision 1 to Final Report from C&D Technologies originally submitted on 9/16/2014. An interim report was submitted 3/27/14 while the product was being returned for analysis. C&D has performed an analysis of the returned product, and is submitting this report to the NRC and notifying affected C&D customers to the possibility of separator misalignment in LCR, KCR, and LCY products (versus original report affecting LCR products only). U.S. Licensees using batteries possibly containing the potential defect are being notified of the filing of this final report with recommendations that they examine their batteries for any signs of similar problems. If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact: Robert Malley, VP Quality and Process Engineering, bmalley@cdtechno.com, (215) 619-7830. List of affected plants: NRC Region 1: Nine Mile Point, Millstone, Indian Point, Vermont Yankee, Limerick, Three Mile Island, Beaver Valley, Susquehanna, Salem, Hope Creek, Crystal River NRC Region 2: Oconee, St. Lucie, Harris, Robinson, Summer, Farley, Hatch, Vogtle, Browns Ferry, Sequoyah, Watts Bar NRC Region 3: Kewaunee, Fermi, Palisades, Braidwood, Byron, Clinton, LaSalle, Perry, Cook, Duane Arnold, Point Beach, Monticello, Prairie Island NRC Region 4: Arkansas Nuclear One, Grand Gulf, Waterford, Cooper, Fort Calhoun, Diablo Canyon Foreign: Bruce, Laguna Verde, Point Lepreau, Krsko, Darlington, Pickering, Chin Shan, Kuosheng, Maanshan, Lungmen Other: Knoll Atomic Power Laboratory Notified R1DO (Bickett), R2DO (Blamey), R3DO (Lipa), R4DO (Whitten) and NRR Part 21 Group via email.
The following was excerpted from the final report update received by fax: The purpose of this letter is to update a report provided to the NRC on 09/22/14 regarding misaligned separators in Class 1 E battery products. We are revising Section II for the models of the product affected, and Section VIII for the advice provided for customers. These revisions are provided below: (ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect. The products affected include LCUN and LCU model lines in addition to the previously reported LCR, KCR, and LCY products. (This did not add to the list of facilities affected) (viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees. Based on experience gained through site visits and review of products that completed product life C&D is changing the criteria for inclusion in the scope of this Part 21 report. The change increases the allowable separator misalignment. If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact: Robert Malley, VP Quality and Process Engineering, bmalley@cdtechno.com, (215) 619-7830. Notified R1DO (Bickett), R2DO (Blamey), R3DO (Lipa), R4DO (Whitten) and NRR Part 21 Group via email. |