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ENS 4600111 June 2010 14:56:00Maintenance was being performed on a dissolver enclosure in the Uranium Recovery Facility. Part of the maintenance activities included the spraying of water on the interior surfaces of the enclosure to reduce contamination. A small quantity of this water leaked into an adjoining pass-through glove box, which also had loose contamination on its interior surfaces. As a result, approximately 1 liter of solution with a concentration of approximately 26 grams 235U per liter accumulated on the floor of the pass-through glove box. The amount of uranium mass within the accumulated solution was much less than the minimum amount required for criticality. There was no immediate risk or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. An evaluation is currently being performed on this event. BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70.61, Appendix A, (b)(1) - Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of (10 CFR) 70.61. The dissolver system is shutdown pending further investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4505311 May 2009 12:28:00On May 10, 2009 at about 0215, Waste Treatment operations began pumping sanitary sludge from the sanitary sludge holding tank to the Low Level Radioactivity (LLR) press. This is accomplished by activating an air-actuated diaphragm pump which suctions from the holding tank and discharges to the LLR press. Observations by area operators both at the press and the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) display showed no abnormal conditions. Near or around 0345, area security officers notified the area operators that liquid was accumulating on the ground under the sanitary sludge holding tank. The operator attending to the reported release observed a leak on the discharge side of the diaphragm pump. The pump was halted and the isolation valve at the bottom of the holding tank was closed to halt the release. Plant supervision was promptly notified and efforts were initiated to contain the release using absorbent pads and dikes. Most of the liquid was contained and pumped back into the sanitary system, and approximately 10-20 gallons drained to the system Final Effluent Pond (FEP 601). No liquid was observed to have been released to the James River. On May 11, 2009 at approximately 8:30 am, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) was notified of the release both verbally and by email. This notification was performed to satisfy the notification requirements contained in the current site Virginia Pollutant Discharge Eliminations System (VPDES) permit for unanticipated bypasses of treatment systems. Notification is required verbally (within 24 hours) and in writing (within 5 days) upon discovery of the circumstances surrounding the bypass. There were no radiological concerns with this event. The licensee will contact the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4459022 October 2008 13:35:00In response to media inquiries concerning the NRC's news release involving a notice of violation and proposed civil penalty, Babcock & Wilcox Company responded for BWXT with the attached information to media representatives from Lynchburg News & Advance and the Associated Press out of West Virginia. As requested the NRC news release is also attached. B&W Response to NRC's Notice of Violation: The incident occurred when an operator responded to a spill of hydrofluoric acid using an incorrect neutralizing chemical. As a result, the operator incurred an injury to his eyes. As noted in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Notice of Violation, the actions of the employee, his coworkers and our onsite emergency team after the hydrofluoric acid exposure occurred ensured that the employee was not seriously injured as a result of this incident. This fact is confirmed by the statements of four independent medical opinions; one of these physicians was independently contracted by the NRC. The company (BWXT) acknowledges that this incident identified weaknesses in our spill response procedures and chemical labeling practices. Corrective actions have been developed to address these weaknesses. The company will submit a written response to the NRC within 30 days. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4451423 September 2008 13:01:00Below are the responses to questions BWXT received from (DELETED) at the News & Advance of Lynchburg, VA, and the BWXT responses. Q: In the past year, there have been a number of 'notices of violation' from NRC regarding events at BWXT. Several of these violations or apparent violations involved Raschig Ring-filled Vacuum Cleaners - one overturned from a forklift last year and spilled some nuclear material; later there was a situation in which one of the RRVCs did not have enough raschig rings in it, etc.-and one other incident involved an employee being splashed with a solution that contained some nuclear material. In what ways has the company responded to these events? What measures have been taken to correct procedures and prevent further occurrences? A: The company has performed detailed incident investigations and identified corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence of these types of incidents. For example, in the case of the RRVCs we have developed and are implementing a new vacuum cleaner design that no longer requires the use of Raschig rings. In the case of the chemical spill, the company has strengthened its chemical spill response procedures. Q: How does the company anticipate the performance review to go? A: We appreciate the opportunity to receive feedback from the NRC on our performance on an annual basis. This feedback is valuable to us as we strive to continuously improve our operating and safety performance. We look forward to discussing our safety and operational successes and improvements at the meeting. Q: Some of BWXT's operations are classified; Do you know how detailed the performance review presentation will be? A: For specifics about the NRC's presentation, it would be better to contact the NRC. I can tell you that the information we plan to present will be detailed enough to explain our successes and improvements without revealing any classified information.
ENS 4431323 June 2008 11:28:00I. EVENT DESCRIPTION: In April of this year, BWXT replaced the recirculation columns on the High Level Trough Dissolvers in the Uranium Recovery Facility. The columns were processed out of the area according to standard waste handling procedures for disposal. An NMC technician raised a concern as the columns were checked by BWXT Security before placement into a SeaLand container. The technician believed the response of Security's monitor was overly sensitive compared to the assigned 235-U values based on calculations. NMC immediately placed a hold on the columns. The columns were later moved into the Decon Area of BWXT's Waste Treatment Facility where they were stored for approximately three weeks. The Decon area is posted by Nuclear Criticality Safety for 100 grams of 235-U. NMC personnel conducted subsequent NDA field measurements of the columns and estimated an accumulation of approximately 695 grams 235-U in four of the columns. The Decon Area was immediately secured and a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) generated to clean and reevaluate the columns in the Uranium Recovery's Maintenance area. The four columns were relocated to the Recovery Maintenance area where they were cleaned according to the instructions in the RWP. NDA measurements of the columns and cleaning materials indicated a total 235-U content of 577 grams. The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) in the Decon Area is 400 grams. The Item Relied On For Safety (IROFS) for control of mass was degraded. II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: The safety basis for the Decon Area takes credit for two IROFS, control of mass and moderation. The control for mass was degraded. Although the LCO for 235-U mass was exceeded by 177 grams, this was less than the fully reflected, optimally moderated minimum critical mass of approximately 800 grams. A criticality was not credible in this scenario. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. The amount of 235-U present in the columns was less than the minimum critical mass of approximately 800 grams. However, with the degradation of one IROFS and only one remaining, double contingency could no longer be assured. III. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: BWXT is making this 1 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (a)(5) - Loss of controls such that only one item relied on for safety, as documented in the Integrated Analysis Summary, remains available and reliable to prevent a nuclear criticality accident, and has been in this state for greater than eight hours. IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4421515 May 2008 10:51:00On May 14, 2008 at approximately 6:00 am, personnel discovered a tote of acid being stored in excess of 90 days allowed by Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) regulations. The tote of acid was generated on February 8, 2008 and in order to meet the regulations it should have been shipped on May 8, 2008. An inquiry into the issue was made and the personnel responsible for scheduling shipments believed the generation date was the same as another tote in storage, February 18, 2008. The waste is scheduled to be shipped for disposal on May 16, 2008. A corrective action has been written for this event and an investigation will occur. This concurrent report is being made because the event was reported to the following government agency, Virginia DEQ The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4402029 February 2008 13:15:00In response to additional media inquiries regarding the NRC News Release No. II-08-002, BWXT will provide the attached information to media representatives contacting BWXT for additional information. In response to media inquiries concerning the possible use of Lynchburg city wastewater treatment plant to treat water from BWXT, BWXT will provide the attached information to media representatives contacting BWXT for additional information: Regarding NRC News Release No. II-08-002: Q: What are some of the corrective actions taken by the company? One NRC document I read referred to a corrective action of installing brackets onto the raschig ring vacuum cleaners for transport. Is that one of the corrective actions, and has it been completed? What other corrective actions have been taken? A: We developed a comprehensive list of corrective actions in response to last year incident. Currently, we are in the process of completing all corrective actions, and are on schedule to meet our commitments to the NRC. Q: The Company was given 30 days to pay the fine or appeal it. Which action was taken? A; The company paid the fine. Regarding Wastewater Treatment inquiry: Q: I just learned that the city's wastewater treatment plant is studying the idea of treating water from the B&W facility, and that B&W is paying for the study. Could you provide information, or connect me with someone in the company who can offer a comment on this study? Has B&W been treating its own water before? Why is the company interested in possibly having the city treat the water instead? A: A number of new regulations have been issued in recent years to address discharges of nutrients to the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. To meet the new requirements, B&W is studying a variety of options, including the possibility of constructing a new pipeline to allow us to discharge a portion of our wastewater into the city's waste water treatment plant. We are working with the Lynchburg Regional Wastewater Treatment Facility and Campbell County to perform a feasibility study for this option to ensure that the city's treatment plant can handle our flow without impacting their current treatment parameters. It's important to note that these wastewaters are non-radioactive. However, the project is still very much in the preliminary stages and a decision on whether or not to pursue this option wont be made for some time. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday), NMSS EO (Giitter) and Fuels OUO via email.
ENS 4398313 February 2008 17:01:00During a routine internal audit of the Uranium Recovery 3-inch Extraction System on February 13 at 0930, a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer observed several inconsistencies between the documented limits and controls in the Integrated Safety Analysis summary and those derived in the associated NCS evaluations. These anomalies were non-conservative in nature and included items such as the inside diameters of the columns, column wall thickness, and limits on the number of stainless steel columns in the system. In addition, the most recent NCS evaluation of the system employed a different analytical methodology than earlier evaluations. The evaluation employed the solid angle methodology, which had not been previously utilized to evaluate the 3-inch Extraction System. In past evaluations, the system was modeled using the law of substitution as a 7 x 2 array of 4-inch columns, mirrored in the x and y faces to form an infinite planar array. This change in methodology was incorrect. Based on these uncertainties in the safety basis, the engineer was unable to determine if double contingency was maintained. An evaluation is currently being performed. BWXT is making this 24-hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70.61, Appendix A, (b)(1) - Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of � 70.61. The operation was immediately shutdown by Nuclear Criticality Safety pending further investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
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