Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 52785 | 2 June 2017 17:07:00 | This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) due to both trains of Penetration Room Filtration (PRF) being inoperable due to an inoperable PRF Boundary. At 0920 (CDT) on 6/2/2017, a gap was discovered between an electrical penetration room ceiling and the containment wall where seismic gap material was noted to be missing. The gap was subsequently closed and PRF testing completed sat. The condition was exited at 1345 (CDT). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On 6/2/17 at 1707 CDT Farley Nuclear Plant notified the NRC Operations Center of an entry into Technical Specification 3.7.12 Condition B for Unit 1 loss of two trains of Penetration Room Filtration (PRF). At 0920 (CDT) on 6/2/2017, a gap had been discovered between an electrical penetration and containment where seismic gap material was noted to be missing. The report was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) under Event Notification 52785. Upon further engineering review and satisfactory testing to support operability, Farley has determined that the configuration did not meet the criteria for a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function, and is retracting the notification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Blamey). |
| ENS 52157 | 5 August 2016 20:55:00 | At 1209 CDT on 8/5/16, during testing of Unit 2 Auxiliary Building Pre-action Sprinkler Systems, all zones on the Unit 2 Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel went into an alarm state and were unable to be reset. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Assessment capability. The NRC Resident has been notified. The licensee has initiated all necessary compensatory and corrective actions.
At 1600 CDT on 8/6/16, the Unit 2 Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel was declared functional following repair of master override reset test switch and supply fuse. The Pyrotronics Fire Detection Panel was successfully tested following maintenance. The emergency assessment capability for the site's Emergency Plan has been fully restored. The NRC Resident has been notified Notified the R2DO (Suggs). |
| ENS 51047 | 7 May 2015 09:45:00 | This notification is being made as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) due to a Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 shutdown required by Technical Specifications. At 0509 CDT on 5/7/2015, 1B Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) tripped during transfer of 1B 4160V bus to 1B unit auxiliary transformer. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.4 Condition A was entered for loss of a Reactor Coolant System (RCS) loop. Unit 1 reactor was shut down per operating procedures and entered Mode 3 at 0740 CDT. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51043 | 5 May 2015 13:05:00 | At 0422 CDT on 5/5/2015, with Farley Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 2, and the 1A Steam Generator Feedwater Pump (SGFP) in the tripped condition, the 1B SGFP was manually tripped during troubleshooting. The trip of the second SGFP initiated the auto start signal for the MDAFWPs (motor driven aux feedwater pumps) due to the auto start signal not being defeated. Both MDAFW pumps were in service supplying AFW to the steam generators (SG) when the actuation signal was received. The effects of the auto start signal were to fully open the AFW Flow Control Valves and isolate SG blowdown and SG blowdown sample valves. These actions occurred successfully and the auto start signal was reset. There was no adverse impact to the plant and decay heat continued to be removed through the condenser throughout the event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 50677 | 13 December 2014 10:00:00 | At 0152 CST on December 13, 2014, both strings of the Unit 2 containment smoke detection system were declared non-functional due to a non-radioactive steam leak inside containment. The steam leak was causing spurious alarms to the smoke detection system. This condition prevents identification and assessment of a fire in containment. Required compensatory measures have been established. Since a fire in the containment building is an entry condition for the site's emergency plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The steam leak was caused by a faulty main steam flow detector. The licensee has shut down the reactor to effect repairs. |
| ENS 50034 | 14 April 2014 14:48:00 | This notification is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). At 0600 CDT on 4/14/14, it was determined that the ability to obtain a post-accident hydrogen sample from Unit 1 containment was lost. With both trains of Post-Accident Hydrogen Analyzers (PAHA) out of service, it was discovered that there was reduced sample flow indicated on the backup methodology through a containment sample port (R67). Repair efforts are underway. A follow-up notification will be sent when assessment capability is restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Assessment capability has been restored as of 1933 EDT on April 14, 2014 utilizing the containment particulate rad monitor sample port R-67. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Widmann). |
| ENS 49862 | 28 February 2014 11:02:00 | At 0842 CST on February 28, 2014, the Unit 1 Pyro Panel (fire/smoke detection panel) was removed from service for required maintenance. The Pyro Panel was declared non-functional when it was removed from service. Compensatory measures have been established for all affected areas except the Unit 1 Containment Building. Since a fire in the Containment Building is an entry condition for the site's Emergency Plan, this is considered a loss of emergency assessment capability and is being reported per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Containment temperature is being monitored while the pyro panel is out of service, however this is not considered a satisfactory compensatory measure for maintaining effective assessment capability. A courtesy follow up notification will be sent when the pyro panel is returned to service and functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
At 1704 CST on 2/28/2014 the Unit 1 Pyro Panel was declared functional following the return of the fire indicating unit (FIU) to the original status. The Pyro Panel fire detection system was successfully tested following the maintenance. The emergency assessment capability for the site's Emergency Plan has been fully restored concerning a containment fire. The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R2DO (McCoy). |
| ENS 49789 | 3 February 2014 18:39:00 | The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered non-functional due to a malfunction in the TSC HVAC system. A leak in the refrigerant tubing has resulted in a loss of refrigerant and affected the system's ability to provide proper climate control. Repairs are being planned and will commence today. The out of service time is greater than one hour which by the station's Technical Requirements Manual is an 8 hour non-emergency report. Compensatory measures per site procedure FNP-0-EIP-6.0 (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities are available. These measures include the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. A follow up notification will be made when the TSC is declared functional. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following was received as a courtesy notification follow-up: At 2320 CST on 2/3/2014 the TSC HVAC was declared functional following post maintenance testing. Satisfactory pressure testing, system evacuation, and system re-charging were performed following the repair to two tubing leaks. Emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities have been fully restored to the Technical Support Center. The Emergency Director, and NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been informed. Notified R2DO (McCoy). |
| ENS 48718 | 5 February 2013 17:36:00 | The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered non-functional due to a malfunction in the TSC HVAC system. A lugged connection on the air conditioning system control power relay became loose causing a loss of contact between the spade and the relay. Repairs have been completed and the air conditioning has been returned to service. However, the out of service time was greater than 30 minutes, which by the station's reporting procedures, is an 8 hour non-emergency report. The out of service time was from 0935 to 1342 CST. Compensatory measures per site procedure FNP-0-EIP-6.0 (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities were available. These measures included the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48672 | 14 January 2013 17:52:00 | The facility Technical Support Center (TSC) was rendered non-functional due to a malfunctioning TSC ventilation system. The TSC HVAC Air Handling Unit fan belt broke rendering the air conditioning non functional. Repairs have been completed and the unit has been returned to service however, the out of service time was greater than 30 minutes which by the station's reporting procedures is an 8 hour non-emergency report. The out of service time was from 1225 to 1630 (CST). Compensatory measures per site procedure FNP-0-EIP-6.0 (TSC Setup and Activation) for maintaining emergency assessment, off-site response, and off-site communication capabilities were immediately put in place. These measures include the conditional relocation of the TSC staff in the event of a declared emergency if the Emergency Director deems the TSC to be uninhabitable. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 43106 | 18 January 2007 21:08:00 | Entered a condition which required TS 3.0.3 entry and an 8 hour report. While the 2B RHR equipment outage was in progress, it was discovered that the 2A Battery Charger room cooler was not operating. The condition was investigated and it was found that the thermal overloads were tripped on the supply breaker. They were reset and the fan was restarted. The shift observed the fan operation for 10 minutes and then decided to check the breaker every 30 minutes until a plan could be implemented to swap trains of battery chargers. During the first 30 minute check, the breaker overloads were found tripped again. See time line below. This put us in a condition where an LOSF existed on both trains of RHR due to the requirement to evaluate supported systems when opposite train LCO's are entered. 02:00 2B RHR tagged out for equipment outage, entered LCO for RHR. 16:00 2A Battery Charger room cooler found not running. Entered LCO for DC sources. 16:35 Overloads reset on 2A Battery Charger room cooler supply breaker and fan restarted. LCO initially cleared, but now will conservatively be reinstated since the overloads tripped again later. 17:02 2A Battery Charger room cooler breaker thermal overloads found tripped again. 17:26 2B RHR tagged in and made available, but not yet operable (still need to perform surveillance), 17:37 Swing Battery Charger (2C) placed in service for 2A. Exited LCO for DC sources. LCO 3.0.3 was applicable from 16:00 until 17:37. Condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) 'Event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The eight hour report (EN #43106) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(b) was conservatively reported based on inconsistent operation of non-TS (Technical Specification) attendant equipment (the room cooler supplying cooling to the A-Train Battery charger) leading to the declaration of the battery charger as inoperable. However, no actual loss of safety function existed for the Unit 2 RHR Subsystem. Therefore, the eight hour report is retracted for the following reasons: The A-train DC battery was operable, and the A-train DC Battery Charger and DC bus were available. Procedures and training are in place for the door between the battery charger rooms to be opened to ensure sufficient cooling to the A train DC switchgear room. The time for room temperature heat-up allows for operator actions and the rooms and entry/exit pathways are accessible for operators to perform these actions during normal operations and design basis events. The battery charger room temperature was 86F upon discovery which is well within the equipment capability. Therefore, the battery charger room cooler system was available to provide cooling for the long term design basis accident. Technical specification 3.5.2, Condition A was entered due to the Unit 2 B-Train RHR pump scheduled equipment outage. During the entire time that the Unit 2 B-Train RHR pump was inoperable and out of service, the Unit 2 A-Train RHR pump would have performed its required function to supply sufficient flow during an accident (it was declared inoperable due to an inoperable DC support system, but remained available). Condition A allows one or more ECCS trains to be inoperable provided that 'at least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train' is available. Even with the battery charger room cooler non-functional, the A-Train RHR pump would have performed its safety function and combined with the A-Train charging pump, would have delivered 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train. In summary, a loss of safety function on both trains of RHR did not exist and the 50.72(b)(3)(v)(b) report (EN # 43106) is retracted. Notified R2DO (HAAG). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |