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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 44263 | 4 June 2008 07:58:00 | On 6/04/08 at 0257, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI pump was placed in service to evaluate HPCI pump start performance. The HPCI pump tripped on low suction pressure when started. An Event Response Team is assembled to investigate the cause of the low suction trip of HPCI. Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or Safety Related equipment was inoperable during this time period. The licensee is in a 14 day LCO due to TS 3.5.1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 6/04/08 at 0758 (EN# 44263). The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI pump was placed in service to evaluate HPCI pump start performance. The HPCI pump received a momentary low suction pressure trip signal in the test configuration alignment. Since the initial report, failure mode cause technical evaluation has determined that the HPCI was always able to satisfy its design safety function. Additional instrumentation was added and data collected from seven HPCI test runs was analyzed. As evidenced by the successful completion of its IST test and the detailed review of multiple HPCI runs, the HPCI system was always able to perform its design function because: --- HPCI restarted on its own with no operator action. --- HPCI would meet its injection time requirements. --- Required flows and required pressures were reached on all HPCI runs . Therefore HPCI was never inoperable. The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction. R1DO (Henderson) notified. |
| ENS 43779 | 11 November 2007 20:06:00 | On 11/11/07 at 1639, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The quarterly HPCI System Valve In-Service Surveillance was in progress. During the performance of the surveillance, the Suppression Chamber supply check valve was unable to be cycled open in accordance with the surveillance procedure. Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The plant is stable in Operational Condition 2, no other Emergency Core Cooling or Safety Related systems are inoperable and plant start-up activities are in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
Further investigation revealed that the existing steps of the controlling surveillance procedure did not consistently equalize pressure across the HPCI suction check valve and therefore did not establish adequate test conditions. The surveillance procedure was revised to ensure adequate test conditions were established and the valve was successfully stroked. Evaluation of the initial assessment of operability determined that the suction check valve was not inoperable. Therefore the HPCI system was also not inoperable as initially declared and continued to be able to perform its safety function. Based on this additional information, the associated non-emergency 8-hour notification made on November 11, 2007, is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township. Notified the R1DO (Barkley). |
| ENS 43368 | 17 May 2007 14:07:00 | I am calling you to provide a notification of a potentially failed air emission test on an auxiliary boiler. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that any emissions from our boilers caused any harm to human health, welfare, or the environment. The emissions are not continuing and there is no assistance required or requested. The statute requires I provide this notification to assert an affirmative defense or a rescission as appropriate. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection Hotline was called to report this, Case number 07-0517-134537, operator 27. During the start-up tuning and testing of our new auxiliary boilers, it appears that a malfunction of equipment during testing resulted in inconclusive test results for NOx loading for our #1 Boiler. For the testing runs, the measured volumetric stack flows were significantly higher than the stoichiometrically calculated stack flows based on fuel flow measurements. While we are still investigating this discrepancy, we preliminarily believe that it was the result of either equipment malfunction, performance of necessary equipment maintenance and equipment start-up and shutdown. The licensee has notified the State (DEP) and will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42764 | 11 August 2006 13:28:00 | At 0955 EST, the Security Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) operator, in preparation for activity on the site firing range, proceeded to activate the Owner Control Area (OCA) Public Address system to make a site page announcement informing station personnel of range activity. During this process, the SAS operator inadvertently depressed the OCA Siren pushbutton instead of the Public Address pushbutton activating the onsite emergency sirens. The OCA siren system also activates an automatic prerecorded page address which informs non-essential personnel to evacuate the Owner Controlled Area. Approximately 50 to 75 nonessential personnel left the Salem and Hope Creek site, prior to the siren being secured and a page announcement made informing personnel of the inadvertent siren activation. Due to the common OCA, the inadvertent siren actuation affected both Salem and Hope Creek. The siren activation was inadvertent and there was not an actual event requiring site evacuation. Local, County and State agencies were informed of the inadvertent siren actuation. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification of Other Government Agencies. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 41995 | 14 September 2005 23:38:00 | On 9/14/05 at 2138, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCl) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI Pump In Service Surveillance Test was in progress with system flow and speed being adjusted to establish surveillance test conditions. Speed and flow oscillations were observed when turbine speed approached 3900 rpm. Since speed and flow oscillations prevented the establishment of surveillance test conditions, HPCI was declared inoperable. Evaluations of these speed and flow oscillations are ongoing. Loss of the HPCI is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or Safety Related equipment was inoperable during this time period. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Evaluation of the HPCI system speed and flow oscillations concluded that the HPCI system was capable of mitigating the consequences of an accident. Therefore this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a loss of a single train safety function and is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Silk) notified. |