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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 50888 | 13 March 2015 15:48:00 | The following was received from the licensee via email: This notification is being submitted pursuant to the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 21 to report that, during the manufacturing of a replacement cover for a 24 inch gate valve on the reactor recirc line at Exelon LaSalle, Weir Valves and Controls used a weld that was not compliant to ASME Ill Subsection NB requirements. During review of the weld at site, the question was raised based on site procedures required a 2:1 profile in accordance to EPRI guidelines. During review of the documentation to determine if the 2:1 profile was required in this case, Weir Valves and Controls determined that improper weld call out was used on the design prints. The weld was corrected at site to meet the both ASME Ill Subsection NB requirements and EPRI guidelines. Weir Valves and Controls has performed an extent condition review and has concluded that no other undersized welds were made and delivered to any other operating sites. The root-cause of the issue was the improper call-out of the weld by design engineering. Weir Valves and Controls is performing corrective actions to ensure future re-occurrences cannot occur in design engineering. |
| ENS 49809 | 7 February 2014 19:13:00 | The following is a summary of information provided via facsimile: Based on recent testing conducted on a 24 inch Class 150 TRICENTRIC (triple offset butterfly valve) to evaluate bearing coefficients of friction (COF), it has been determined that there exists an unseating load that has not been accounted for on our TRICENTRIC Triple Offset Product Line. Weir has not experienced a field failure of the product, but recent testing by a customer indicated anomalies that required review by Weir. The review of the unseating anomaly relates to two inputs; the inputted seating torque and increases in differential pressure across the disc after initial closure. Weir has developed a conservative approach for calculating this additional loading. Weir has reviewed data from customers for several recent orders, and has determined that there is a minimal risk of failure of an item to perform its safety function. However, based on the safety related functions of these items, Weir cannot provide absolute assurance of operability on items in service without confirming with the end user. Weir will be releasing an industry notice that will address our initial findings, continue with the detailed investigation, and advise customers concerning the recommended corrective actions. Known customer - PSEG |