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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 56420 | 17 March 2023 18:07:00 | The following is a synopsis of information provided by Trillium Valves USA via fax and email: Trillium Valves USA has identified defects in butterfly valves with Limitorque SMB motor actuators supplied to Westinghouse Electric Company from 2010 to 2016. The defect identified is inconsistent crimping of motor leads which caused lack of continuity and either intermittent function or nonfunction of the actuator motor preventing the butterfly valve to close on demand. The defect was identified on July 1, 2022. Westinghouse was notified of the affected orders on March 6, 2023. Trillium Valves USA recommends the inspection of these actuators for lack of continuity at the motor leads which may be impacted by inconsistent crimping of the lead wire to the ring tongue terminal. Trillium Valve USA's Approved Suppliers List has been updated to add a restriction that any repairs or service of safety related equipment must be completed at Limitorque's facility. No service or repair of safety related Limitorque equipment should be performed at Trillium sites. This action was completed on March 2, 2023. The failure to comply with initial notification and written notification has been initiated under Trillium Valves USA corrective action program. Corrective actions will include additional training on the implementation and reporting requirements under 10 CFR 21. This action will be completed by March 31, 2023. U.S. plants affected: Vogtle Unit 3 Vogtle Unit 4 Summer Unit 2 Summer Unit 3 Additional overseas plants affected: Sanmen Unit 1 Haiyang Unit 1 |
| ENS 53928 | 11 March 2019 15:38:00 | This notification is being submitted pursuant to the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 21 to report that a 24" Class 150 Globe valve for RHRSW HX Isolation MOV, E1150F068A at Detroit Edison - Fermi 2, failed to fully open due to the failure of the anti-rotation key. The site notified WVC (Weir Valves and Controls) USA on January 18th of this issue involving a new bonnet that was installed which included a key bushing/key assembly. The new bonnet used was from an originally supplied valve assembly on WVC USA order 0010001147-10 with a quantity of one, Detroit Edison Company PO 4700732583. The key is welded on top and bottom in the key bushing keyway to hold the key in place. After a month in service, during operation, the welds failed which caused the key to drop out or be driven out from the key bushing by friction/vibration. Upon review of the design it was found that the key and key slot were not dimensioned properly for a tight fit allowing a larger than recommended gap between key and keyway. This gap allowed the operational torque loads to put the welds in bending which caused the welds to fail. Loss of the key renders the valve inoperable to open or close. The site has currently restored the key bushing/key assembly with new keys with proper fit and welds to ensure the key is retained. (WVC USA) has performed an extent condition review and has concluded that one other operating site, Georgia Power - SNC, Hatch Unit 1 1WVC USA order 0010000081-10 (55544A), Southern Nuclear Operating Co PO SNG10025571 has a similar key/key bushing assembly. There was a quantity of six valve assemblies shipped for this purchase order. The site has been contacted to evaluate the fit of the key bushing/key assembly. Engineering has determined that improper design clearance was the cause of failure. (WVC USA is) performing corrective actions to ensure future re-occurrences cannot occur in design engineering. Affected sites include: Fermi Unit 2 and Hatch Unit 1. For additional information, contact: Allen Fisher Director of Engineering allen.fisher@mail.weir 978-825-845 |
| ENS 53973 | 3 April 2019 17:32:00 | The following was received via e-mail: This notification is being submitted pursuant to the guidelines of 10 CFR Part 21 to report that a 24in Class 150 Globe valve for RHRSW HX (Residual Heat Removal Service Water Heat Exchanger) Isolation MOV (motor operated valves), E1150F068B at Detroit Edison - Fermi 2, experienced two stem failures. The site notified WVC USA (Weir Valves and Controls, USA) on November 6 of this issue involving two stems. WVC USA had supplied these stems on orders 20000262-10 and 20012001-10, Detroit Edison PO's (part orders) 4700505700 and 4701149217. A new stem failed after approximately 1 month in service in valve F068B. A replacement stem was installed and failed soon after being placed in service. This second stem failure had previously been in service for approximately three years while installed in sister valve F068A. Both stem breakages occurred at the transition area of the stem backseat and were visually identical. See pictures of failure in Attachment A. In the as found condition, the disc to stem connection appears to have lacked design clearances. The cause of this clearance issue was cleaning of the disc surface where the disc nut is tack welded. The material supplied is A276 410 heat treated and tempered to obtain (269-311 BHN). This material was approved by Powell as an acceptable alternate to the original material A182 F6 (269-311 BHN). During original Part 21 evaluation, testing of the stem material revealed low impact values and reflected effects of temper embrittlement. Other possible contributors to the failure were transition region at stem backseat and the valve service conditions where vibration due to throttling has been experienced. It was determined that although temper embrittlement and other factors may have contributed to the failures, that the lack of design clearance led to the failure of the stems and was not reportable by WVC USA. However, after discussions with Detroit Edison, WVC USA was requested to evaluate the failure considering the effects of temper embrittlement that might lead to future failures. WVC USA engineering is unable to determine the effects of temper embrittlement for the A276 410 material. Powell engineering was also consulted and there are no known methods to evaluate the potential for failure on the stem in this condition. As noted in NRC Information Notice No. 85-59, tempering in the 700 degrees F to 1050 degrees F range is not recommended because it results in low and erratic impact properties and poor resistance to corrosion and stress corrosion for 410 stainless steel. The stem failures in this case reflected these low and erratic impact properties based on material testing that was performed by DTE (Detroit Edison) Fermi and WVC USA. The A276 410 materials supplied in this event were tempered at 1025 degrees F and 1050 degrees F. The best solution is to eliminate the potential for temper embrittlement by using a higher required tempering temperature. The recommendation is to use A276 410 tempered at a minimum of 1100 degrees F. This is also in alignment with Code Case N-62-7. We are in the process of updating our item records to reflect this minimum tempering requirement and expect this action to be completed within one month. WVC USA is notifying the following sites of this potential issue so that they can evaluate the impact on the safe operation of the plant. 74347-10 Entergy PO 10118969 Site Grand Gulf Item Number P 26126666ASSEMAO_QLA Stem & Disc Assy 14" Qy (1) Shipped 7/28/06 0020005433-10 Georgia Power Company PO SNG10081312 REV. 2 Site Hatch Item Number P0000419C Stem/Disc Assy 24-300 Globe Valve Qty (1) Shipped 10/29/15 0020006979-10 Detroit Edison Company PO 4700846295 Site Fermi 2 Item Number P0000455C Stem Bin Gate Valve Qty (1) Shipped 6/29/15 0020011676-10 Detroit Edison Company PO 4701123403 Site Fermi 2 Item Number P0000455C Stem Bin Gate Valve Qty (1) Shipped 2/14/18 0020013251-10 Detroit Edison Company PO 4701230062 Site Fermi 2 Item Number P0000283 Stem Globe 24in 150# Qty (1) Shipped 9/19/18 0020013586-10 Detroit Edison Company PO 4701259926 C0#6 Site Fermi 2 Item Number P0000283 Stem Globe 24in 150# Qty (1) Shipped 11/13/18 Stem supplied under order 0020013251-10 is currently installed in F068A and order 0020013586-10 was delivered but not installed. F068B valve has been restored by Detroit Edison with a stem which has acceptable properties for the service. The above Part 21 notification affects Grand Gulf, Fermi 2, and Hatch. Point of Contact: Allen Fisher Director of Engineering 978-825-8451 allen.fisher@mail.weir |