Semantic search
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 42205 | 14 December 2005 16:30:00 | The State provided the following information via facsimile: Event type: Theft of Nuclear Pharmacy delivery vehicle en route to hospital Notifications: Local Police Department. Event description: The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on Wednesday (a.m.), December 14, 2005, by the pharmacist/RSO for the facility that one of their delivery vehicles had been stolen at gunpoint. The vehicle was en route to a hospital to deliver radiopharmaceuticals. The vehicle was carrying approximately 795 millicuries of Technetium 99m, 42 millicuries of Thallium 201 and one Iodine 123 capsule at 0.36 millicuries. The Port Royal Police Department was contacted and responded to the incident. The search is still ongoing at this point. The event is still under investigation and updates will be made through the national NMED system as they become available. Contact the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details South Carolina Event Report ID No.: SC050007 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| ENS 42187 | 3 December 2005 12:25:00 | This notification is being made pursuant to Braidwood Station Unit 1, Operating License Condition 2.G, which requires a 24 hour notification to the NRC Operations Center for reactor power operation in excess of 3586.6 megawatts thermal (100 percent rated power), i.e., a violation of Operating License Condition 2.C (1)- Braidwood Station will, following this notification, provide a written report within thirty days in accordance with the procedures described in 10 CFR 50.73(b), (c), and (e). Braidwood Station, Unit 1 experienced a Feedwater temperature transient on November 18, 2004, which caused reactor power to momentarily increase and peak at approximately 101.2% as indicated on the excore nuclear instrumentation system. The duration that reactor power remained above 100% was approximately one minute. Subsequent to the event, a number of peer reviews were conducted to validate that power did not exceed 102%. The results of these reviews questioned the methodology used to determine the power level at the time of the transient. Industry was consulted regarding methodologies appropriate for power level measurement during transient conditions. At 1700 on December 2, 2005, an independent Exelon task force concluded, using a conservative methodology, that reactor power level during this transient did exceed 100% for approximately one minute and was limited to a peak of approximately 103.5% and that the appropriate reports, as specified in the Operating License, should be initiated. This overpower transient, caused by the loss of a Feedwater heater string, is bounded by the Feedwater design basis transient described and analyzed in UFSAR, Section 15.1.1, "Feedwater System Malfunctions Causing a Reduction in Feedwater Temperature, therefore, the event did not place Braidwood Unit 1 in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. No safety limits were exceeded and there was no impact on the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42182 | 1 December 2005 19:34:00 | This report addresses a concern with the capability to field flash the diesel generator after the diesel engine has started in response to a fire in the Control Room. Step C9 in procedure OFN RP-017 opens NB0212 to drop power to NB02 and force an automatic start of the 'B' Train emergency diesel engine. Step C10 states to verify that the diesel engine is running and provides an RNO action to start the diesel if it is not running. Step C10.d in OFN RP-017 has the operator check NB02 voltage on breaker NB0201 NORMAL. There is no RNO action if the voltage is not normal. A fire in control room panel RL015 has the potential to cause a loss of diesel generator field flashing. For example, a short to ground on conductor 51 in cable 14KJK03AH with a simultaneous short to ground on conductor N1 in cable 14NEB11AA could blow the fuse(s) associated with the speed control relays (LSR and HSR). Loss of power to these relays will prevent field flashing, which will prevent voltage generation from the diesel generator, even though the diesel engine may be running. Step C10.b in OFN RP-017 has the operator place the master transfer switch (KJHS0109) in LOC/MAN. Based on drawing E-13KJ03A, this action will isolate the control room start circuit by opening the contact between G7 and H7, and effectively isolate the short circuit potential. However, the fuse may have already blown before this action is taken. The circuit is not provided with redundant fusing, so it may be necessary to replace one or both fuses (FU5 and FU6) in panel KJ122 to re-establish power to the speed relays. Wolf Creek has implemented the following compensatory measures: Staged 4 spare fuses in the emergency locker in the B Train Diesel Generator Room. Revised OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation. Continued hourly fire watch in the control room (established due to another concern). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42180 | 1 December 2005 15:50:00 | While reducing power in order to enter containment, and following a manual main turbine trip due to high vibration, an automatic reactor trip on low steam generator level was received as a result of the turbine trip transient. Containment was being entered to investigate the source of an RCS identified leakage, which was less than the Technical Specification limit. In conjunction with the reactor trip, an automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System was received as expected. All control rods fully inserted on the automatic trip. The current decay heat removal path is via the steam dumps to the main condenser. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the transient. There are no known primary to secondary leaks. All safety related buses are powered from offsite power. With the exception of one diesel out of service for planned maintenance, all emergency diesel generators are available and in standby. Unit 2 was not affected. The licensee notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42148 | 17 November 2005 08:55:00 | Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was unavailable from 00:47 until 01:51 due to an Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERDADS) failure. The problem has been corrected and ERDADS is currently able to supply data to ERDS. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 42130 | 9 November 2005 10:56:00 | On November 3, 2005, reported that a radioactive shipment was missing its contents. On November 3, 2005, at approximately 2:30 pm, Spectratek Services received a call from Protechnics in Kilgore, TX. They stated a seven piece shipment of four (4) fiberboard boxes and three (3) 20-gallon drums had been received. The contents of one of the 20-gallon drums were not in the drum. The drum was to have contained an ammo box with two 25 pound lead shipping containers, each containing 40 millicuries of Antimony-124 used in oil and gas well completion studies. All packages had security seals in place when they arrived at the Protechnics facility in Kilgore. Notification was made to the Protechnics corporate office, the freight company, and the NM Radiation Control Bureau. Interviewing all employees involved in packaging the shipment resulted in written statements from them. The inventory has been double-checked and it appears the material balance is correct. Security camera tapes have been reviewed showing the packaging area for 10/31/2005 (the day of the shipment). The tapes show the radioactive material being loaded into the containers and the containers being closed and they also show the shipment being loaded onto the freight carrier's trailer. Members of the FBI and Homeland Security made visits while conducting their investigation. The investigation is ongoing. Notification was made to the inspector with the Environmental Monitoring Program, Radiation Branch, Department of State Health Services in Texas. State of Texas also notified NRC. See EN-42118. |
| ENS 42110 | 2 November 2005 12:46:00 | The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system checked above. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the Information that needs to be reported as discussed below. (a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated. On October 7, 2005, at 10:01 EDT, a procedure was started to calibrate the Unit 2 Refueling Floor Vent Exhaust radiation monitors 2D11K611C and K611D. Monitor K611C was tested and restored, and K611D was being tested in the tripped condition. At 10:37, the K611C monitor received a momentary, spurious high radiation signal, or spike. As per design, the high radiation signal resulted in the following automatic actions: Group 2 primary containment isolation valves closed, secondary containment isolated, and both Unit 1 and 2 A and B trains of Standby Gas Treatment initiated. The initiation signal was invalid because it did not result in response to an actual high radiation condition, nor did it trip as a result of any other requirement for initiation of the safety function, such as a downscale or inoperable trip, for example. (b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial. The four Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) trains auto started and both Unit 1 and 2 secondary containment fully isolated. This is a complete actuation. The primary containment isolation valve Group 2 isolation was outboard valves only. This is a partial actuation. (c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully. The above systems functioned successfully. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |