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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 57174 | 14 June 2024 15:35:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 1100 CDT on June 14, 2024, during routine fuel inspections required under Technical Specification 4.1.5, a fuel pin (serial number 11420) did not pass the go/no-go test for transverse bend. This measurement is described in Technical Specification 3.1.5.2.a as part of the fuel inspection conducted under the surveillance described in Technical Specification 4.1.5. Failure of an element to meet any one of the specifications listed in Technical Specification 3.1.5.2 specifies that the fuel element is considered 'damaged' and therefore may not be used in reactor operations. Visual inspection of the pin prior to placement in the test rig did not indicate any obvious degradation that would be exceptional for a pin with seventeen years of burnup history. There have been no indications of cladding failure on routine primary coolant analyses. The pin has been removed from service and will be replaced with a spare unused element. As required by Technical Specification 4.1.5.2, an inspection of the entire core fuel inventory will be initiated and will be completed prior to resuming routine operations. After the identification of the failure, the test rig calibration was confirmed and the pin was checked again, confirming the element failed the transverse bend specification. The reactor was not operating at the time of the event. NRC Project Manager has been notified.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: During the Technical Specification (TS) 4.1.5.2 required inspection of the entire core resulting from the finding detailed above, an additional element (SN 11391) failed to pass the inspection for transverse bend on Friday, June 21, 2024, requiring that element to be declared as 'damaged' in accordance with TS 3.1.5.2 (same as above). As this meets the definition of a 'reportable occurrence' under the definitions in TS 1.3. In accordance with the requirements of TS 6.6.2 and 6.7.2, we have hereby notified the HOO (Headquarters Operations Officer) by a revision or update of the previous report of damaged fuel, Event Number 57174. Additional details: 1. Visual inspection of the pin prior to placement in the test rig did not indicate any obvious degradation that would be exceptional for a pin with seventeen years of burnup history. 2. There have been no indications of cladding failure on routine primary coolant analyses. 3. The pin (SN 11391) has been removed from service and will be replaced with a spare element. 4. We have also informed our project managers. 5. The inspection of the remaining uninspected elements is almost complete, as of this writing no further "damaged" elements have been identified. Notified NRR PM (Boyle), NPR Event Coordinator (Waugh) |
| ENS 57155 | 30 May 2024 22:52:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: On May 30, 2024, at 1949 EDT, Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100 percent power due to an electrical fault on the B unit auxiliary transformer. The unit has been stabilized in mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and all control rods fully inserted into the core. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system and Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 57154 | 30 May 2024 18:09:00 | The following information was provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email and phone: On May 30, 2024, at 1710 (EDT), BRC received a notification from Cape Coral Fire (department) concerning a deceased individuals body exploding while being cremated. The BRC received this notification because the deceased individual was known to have been receiving pancreatic cancer treatment. A notification was also received from the State watch office. The son of the deceased stated that he did not believe that the deceased had received treatment within the last two months, but he was unsure. Crematory staff stated that a large flame exited the bottom of the oven and they began to feel sick. A crematory employee stated that the body completed the cremation process in half the time expected. The Cape Coral Fire (department) responded. Background readings were observed at 3 micro R/hr and readings within the incident room registered at 10 micro R/hr. An inspector has been assigned by regional manager for immediate response. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The contaminated areas have been isolated and locked until the inspector arrives. Florida Incident Number: FL24-041
The elevated (background) readings were identified as thorium in the bricks. Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco) and NMSS Events via email. |
| ENS 57152 | 30 May 2024 17:07:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 0430 (EDT) on May 30, 2024, conversion operators were performing a deionized (DI) water flush on the conversion line 3 decanter following completion of the acid wash. The DI water valve required closing on the conversion line 3 decanter platform to complete the evolution. In the process of completing this step on the decanter platform, an operator inadvertently stepped on a catch pan containing a small quantity of nitric acid. When the operator stepped on the pan, it flipped over causing nitric acid to splash onto the operators leg. The nitric acid is added either manually to a bucket or by connecting a hose to the decanter system to perform the acid wash step. The nitric acid supply line for acid wash additions is isolated by a spring-loaded valve, and a catch pan is located underneath this segment of nitric acid piping to collect residual liquid drips and protect the decanter platform floor from corrosion. The operator was wearing the required personal protective equipment for the DI water flushing evolution. The operator immediately reported the exposure to a nearby coworker and was instructed to rinse the exposed skin. The skin area was rinsed for approximately twenty minutes. The incident commander and medical first responders from the Columbia Fuel Fabrication Facility (CFFF) emergency brigade provided initial medical treatment. Health physics (HP) surveys detected contamination on the exposed area of the employees skin. Direct survey results were 2700 dpm/100 cm squared alpha for the inner right thigh/knee area, 2000 dpm/100 cm squared for the inner right ankle and 800 dpm/100 cm squared alpha for the left hand. All smear survey results of the exposed skin area were below clean area limits (less than 200 dpm/100 cm squared). As a precaution to ensure comprehensive evaluation and treatment for nitric acid exposure to the skin, the operator was transported by ambulance to an offsite medical facility. Per procedure the employees leg was wrapped in plastic, and the employee was accompanied by a CFFF HP technician for evaluation. Contamination surveys were performed in the ambulance and at the offsite medical facility and all results were below clean area limits indicating no spread of contamination during care for the employee. All potentially contaminated materials associated with the transport were collected and returned to the CFFF for disposal. All Conversion lines were inspected for extent of condition with pans or pales containing nitric acid. Containers with acid were emptied and valves in the vicinity of each decanter in conversion were inspected for leaks. The event did not exceed the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 as analyzed in the integrated safety analysis. This event did not impact safety equipment. A causal analysis and corrective actions will be documented in the corrective action program. NRC Regional staff was notified. |
| ENS 57151 | 30 May 2024 15:29:00 | The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Department) via email: On May 30, 2024, the Department was notified by the licensees radiation safety officer (RSO) that a Humboldt 5001 moisture density gauge was damaged at a temporary job site. The gauge contains a 40 millicurie americium-241 source and a 10 millicurie cesium-137 source. The RSO stated the technicians were standing next to the gauge waiting to perform a test when a drum compactor ran next to them and ran over the gauge. The gauge case was damaged. The cesium source operating rod was broken, but the cesium source remained fully shielded. The americium-241 source was still in its housing. Dose rates at the gauge were normal. No overexposures occurred due to the event. The gauge was returned to its storage location. The technicians contacted a service company to inspect and repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: I-10108 Texas NMED Number: TX240016 |
| ENS 57149 | 29 May 2024 12:20:00 | The following is a synopsis of information provided by the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) via email and phone: At 1138 EDT, the radiation safety officer reported that a Troxler gauge was run over by construction equipment. The initial report was that the source did not retract as a result of the damage. The BRC inspector should be prepared to conduct contamination surveys for source leakage and provide guidance on transporting the damaged gauge safely. Gauge Information Make: Troxler Activity: 8 mCi Cs-137, 40 mCi Am-241:Be Florida Incident No.: FL24-039 The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The gauge was successfully retracted by the BRC inspector and there was no additional personnel exposure from the damaged gauge.
A (BRC) inspector responded. The source rod was successfully retracted, contamination swipes were performed on the gauge, and a survey was performed at the location of the accident; no elevated swipes or readings were observed. The gauge was maintained by licensee who will be transporting it to Troxler for evaluation. Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco) and NMSS Events via email |
| ENS 57135 | 22 May 2024 14:33:00 | The following synopsis was provided by the licensee via phone: On 5/21/24, a 200 millicurie lutetium-177 (Lu-177) source was delivered to the Karmonas Cancer Institute and was placed in a clean hot laboratory. A physics resident cleaning the hot laboratory placed the box containing the source outside the hot lab on a trash can. A custodian threw the box in the trash at the end of the day. The licensee notified the trash management company and the facility security department. No threat to public health is expected based on source packaging. The NRC Region 3 inspector was also notified. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A Less than Cat 3 LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 57150 | 30 May 2024 12:26:00 | The following information was provided by the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection via email: While performing routine 6-month fixed gauge shutter checks, the licensee became aware of a shutter that was stuck partially open. The fixed gauge is located 20 feet above a platform and only accessible to licensee staff via scaffolding. No member of the public has access to this location. The shutter is currently in its normal open position. No maintenance activities are scheduled which would require closure of the shutter. The licensee has a contract with the manufacturer. They have scheduled them to assess this situation and make any necessary repairs. Gauge information: Cs-137 sealed source in Ohmart/Vega holder SH-F2 (s/n 0361CG), max activity 300 mCi. Leak test conducted October 2023. No detectable leakage. NJ Event ID Number: To Be Determined |