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05000390/FIN-2016002-062016Q2Watts BarFailure to Satisfy TS LCO 3.6.3The NRC identified a Green NCV of TS for the failure to recognize and take the required actions in TS 3.6.3 for inoperable containment penetration flow paths. Specifically, the required actions of TS 3.6.3 applied on November 21, 2015, and were not taken until January 30, 2016. Upon discovery, on January 30, 2016, the affected containment penetrations were isolated by placement of a clearance, thereby satisfying the TS required actions. The licensee entered the violation into the CAP as CR 1172114. The performance deficiency was more than minor because the ERCW supply and discharge containment penetrations for the 1D upper containment cooler were inoperable for longer than the TS allowed outage time. Because the 1D upper containment cooler ERCW containment penetrations were inoperable and resulted in the failure to satisfy TS LCO 3.6.3, reasonable assurance of the integrity of the containment design barrier was adversely affected. The inspectors determined the finding was of low safety significance (Green) because the upper containment cooler ERCW penetrations are small lines (<1-2 inches in diameter) and IMC 0609, Appendix H Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process dated May 6, 2004, Table 4.1 states that small lines (<1-2 inches in diameter) would not generally contribute to LERF. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Conservative Bias, because the licensee failed to make the prudent choice to fully evaluate the unsuccessful surveillance test on November 15, 2015, and instead simply documented the issue in the corrective action program and deferred the solution, resulting in the TS violation six days later.
05000390/FIN-2016002-032016Q2Watts BarUntimely 10 CFR 50.73 Notification of an Inoperable Charging PumpThe NRC identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for the licensee's failure to notify the NRC that the technical specification (TS) limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.5.2 required action and completion time were not met when the 1B-B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) was inoperable due to an inoperable room cooler. Subsequently, the licensee submitted LER 2016-006-00 for this event on June 30, 2016. This issue was placed in the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as CR 1165380. Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this performance deficiency was dispositioned under traditional enforcement and the violation was assessed using Section 2.2.4 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Using the example listed in Section 6.9.d.9, A licensee fails to make report required by 10 CFR 50.73, the issue was determined to be a SL IV violation. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, dated May 6, 2016, traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.
05000391/FIN-2016002-042016Q2Watts BarFailure to Follow Operability Procedure Results in Potential Inoperability of the 2A-A Auxiliary Feedwater PumpThe NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, at Watts Bar Unit 2 for the licensees failure to follow procedure OPDP-8, Operability Determination Process and Limiting Condition for Operation Tracking, Revision 22. Specifically, the 2A-A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (MDAFW) was potentially inoperable in mode 3 due to inadequate compensatory measures that were being controlled outside of the operability process. The issue was corrected and the pump returned to operable status on April 19, 2016. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 1163431. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it represented an improper or uncontrolled work practice that could impact quality or safety, involving safety-related SSCs. Specifically, failure to appropriately use the operability process when measures must be established to compensate for degraded or nonconforming conditions can lead to SSC inoperability. As described in IMC 2517, the significance of this issue was determined using traditional enforcement, because the cornerstone associated with this finding was not being assessed by the reactor oversight process (ROP). The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance, SL IV because it represented a failure to meet a regulatory requirement, specifically a quality assurance (QA) criteria to follow quality-related procedures, which had more than minor safety significance. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Work Management in the Human Performance area because the minor maintenance work order created to compensate for the oil loss from the 2A-A MDAFW pump was never reviewed by operations, which could have identified the out of process error. (H.5).
05000391/FIN-2016002-052016Q2Watts BarFailure to Perform A TDAFW Surveillance In Accordance With ProceduresThe NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, at Watts Bar Unit 2 for the licensees failure to follow the surveillance test program procedure by making adjustments to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump control system during the performance of a surveillance instruction. The licensee reperformed the surveillance instruction with satisfactory results. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 1167102. The performance deficiency was more than minor because making adjustments to the TDAFW pump control system during the performance of a surveillance instruction could invalidate the test and result in the TDAFW pump being inappropriately declared operable. As described in IMC 2517, the significance of this issue was determined using traditional enforcement, because the cornerstone associated with this finding was not being assessed by the reactor oversight process (ROP). The inspectors determined this finding to be of very low safety significance, SL IV, because it represented a failure to meet a regulatory requirement, specifically a QA criteria to follow quality-related procedures, which had more than minor safety significance. The finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Conservative Bias in the Human Performance area because numerous individuals were aware the speed adjustment had been made while completing the surveillance instruction but did not question the appropriateness of that adjustment until prompted by NRC inspectors.
05000390/FIN-2016002-072016Q2Watts BarUntimely 10 CFR 50.73 Notification of Inoperable Containment PenetrationsThe NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for the licensee's failure notify the NRC that the TS LCO 3.6.3 required action and completion time were not met for an inoperable emergency raw cooling water (ERCW) containment isolation valve. Subsequently, the licensee submitted LER 2016-009-00 for this issue on July 15, 2016. This issue was placed in the licensees corrective action program as CR 1174000. Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this performance deficiency was dispositioned under traditional enforcement and the violation was assessed using Section 2.2.4 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Using the example listed in Section 6.9.d.9, A licensee fails to make report required by 10 CFR 50.73, the issue was determined to be a SL IV violation. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, dated May 6, 2016, traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.
05000391/FIN-2016002-082016Q2Watts BarFailure to Follow Maintenance Procedure Results in overspeed trip of the 2C-S Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater PumpA self-revealed Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified at Watts Bar Unit 2 for the licensees failure to follow procedure 0-MI-1.003, Disassembly, Inspection, and Reassembly of Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine. Specifically, the valve stem spring coil gap was not set in accordance with procedure, causing the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump to trip on electrical overspeed when the level control valves (LCVs) were closed. This issue was corrected on May 30, 2016, when the proper spring coil gap was set and verified and the post maintenance test was performed satisfactorily. The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 1175968. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it represented an improper or uncontrolled work practice that could impact quality or safety involving safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The finding was a SL IV violation because it represented a failure to meet a regulatory requirement, specifically a quality assurance (QA) criteria to follow quality-related procedures, which had more than minor safety significance. The finding was assigned a crosscutting aspect of resources in the Human Performance area because the licensee failed to ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety. Specifically, the procedure that set the coil spring gap lacked sufficient detail and rigor to ensure that the coil gap would be set appropriately by the technicians.
05000390/FIN-2016002-092016Q2Watts BarUntimely 10 CFR 50.73 Notification of Failure to Meet Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.5.2.3 for the Emergency Core Cooling SystemThe NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for the licensee's failure to report, within 60 days of discovery, a condition which was prohibited by the plants TS associated with recent performances of TS surveillance requirement (SR) 3.5.2.3 for verification that emergency core cooling system (ECCS) piping is full of water. Subsequently, the licensee submitted LER 2016-003-00 for this issue on May 10, 2016. This violation was placed in the licensees corrective action program as CR 1166564. Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this performance deficiency was dispositioned under traditional enforcement and the violation was assessed using Section 2.2.4 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Using the example listed in Section 6.9.d.9, A licensee fails to make report required by 10 CFR 50.73, the issue was determined to be a SL IV violation. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, dated May 6, 2016, traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.
05000390/FIN-2016002-102016Q2Watts BarUntimely 10 CFR 50.73 Notification of an Inoperable Rod Position IndicationThe NRC identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for the licensee's failure notify the NRC that the TS LCO 3.1.8 required action and completion time were not met when the analog rod position indication (ARPI) and the demand position indication system were not operable. Subsequently, the licensee submitted LER 2016-007-00 for this issue on June 20, 2016. This violation was placed in the licensees corrective action program as CR 1163150. Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this performance deficiency was dispositioned under traditional enforcement and the violation was assessed using Section 2.2.4 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Using the example listed in Section 6.9.d.9, A licensee fails to make report required by 10 CFR 50.73, the issue was determined to be a SL IV violation. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, dated May 6, 2016, traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.
05000390/FIN-2016002-012016Q2Watts BarFailure to Ensure that a Train of Source Range Detection was Available to Monitor Neutron Population During a Fire EventThe NRC identified a Green NCV of Operating License Condition 2.F for the licensees failure to ensure that a train of source range detection was available to monitor neutron population during the initial stages of a fire event on Unit 1. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 1098240. The licensees failure to ensure a train of source range detection was free from fire damage was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events (fire) attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to maintain the capability to monitor neutron population during the early stage of a fire event. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the reactor would have been able to reach and maintain a stable plant condition. No cross-cutting aspect was identified for this issue.
05000390/FIN-2016002-022016Q2Watts BarFailure to Translate Design Requirements into a Maintenance Procedure for the 1B-B Charging Pump Room CoolerThe NRC identified a Green NCV of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control for the licensees failure to specify nominal shaft size along with specific acceptance criteria for shaft tolerance measurements for the 1B-B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) room cooler fan shaft. The licensee repaired the room cooler by replacing the fan shaft and the finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 1146474. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors determined that this finding required a detailed risk analysis since it represented an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its TS-allowed outage time. The finding does not present an immediate safety concern because the licensee has verified current operability. A Senior Reactor Analyst evaluated the increase in core damage frequency due to the pump being non-functional over the exposure period and determined it was 3.6E-7/year (Green). The dominant scenario was a loss of component cooling water, which combined with a loss of RCP seal injection causes a loss of coolant accident and leads to core damage. The risk increase was very low because of the limited exposure time, the availability of the opposite train pump, and the time dependent nature of the pump failing due to lack of room cooling. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of design margin in the area of Human Performance because the licensee failed to carefully guard margins through a systematic and rigorous process. Specifically, the translation of shaft diameter from design documents into 0-MI-0.16 lacked rigor and allowed an undersized shaft to go undetected, leading to cooler failure.
05000390/FIN-2016001-102016Q1Watts BarFailure to Maintain an Adequate Surveillance Procedure for Emergency Core Cooling System VentingThe inspectors identified an apparent violation of TS 5.7.1.1.a, Procedures, for the licensees failure to maintain procedure 1-SI-63-10.1-A, ECCS Discharge Pipes Venting Train A Inside Containment, Revisions 11-16, in accordance with the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.33. Specifically, the procedure did not have provisions for quantifying accumulated gases during venting which allowed emergency core cooling system (ECCS) piping to be vented without being evaluated for potential adverse impacts on system operability. The licensee implemented manual ultrasonic testing (UT) of gas accumulation and entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 1136359. The performance deficiency was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, if left uncorrected, the potential existed for an unacceptable void affecting ECCS operability to develop prior to the next scheduled surveillance. The inspectors determined the finding could not be screened to GREEN and may require a detailed risk evaluation following a determination of whether the finding represents a loss of system and/or function. Because the safety characterization of this finding is not yet finalized, it is being documented with a significance of To Be Determined (TBD). The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Change Management in the area of Human Performance because the licensee failed to use a systematic process to implement changes to the ECCS venting procedure to ensure that Generic Letter 2008-01 commitments would continue to be met.
05000390/FIN-2016001-082016Q1Watts BarCharging Pump 1B-B Room Cooler Fan Bearing FailureInspectors identified an unresolved item (URI) associated with the failure of the 1B-B charging pump room cooler. This item is unresolved pending review of an equipment apparent cause evaluation that was performed after deficiencies were identified by inspectors in the past operability evaluation. On September 27, 2015, the licensee installed a new bearings on the 1B-B CCP room cooler fan shaft as part of planned maintenance (PM) under WO 115790759. The WO noted the room cooler had a broken lubrication line close to the point where it is attached to the outboard fan shaft bearing, but the new bearing on the fan shaft, including the outboard shaft bearing, were installed without an immediate repair of the lubrication line. The bearing replacements for WO 115790759 were accomplished in accordance with maintenance procedure 0-MI-0.16, Maintenance Guidelines for Belt Driven Equipment, Rev. 7. Appendix D, Bearing Installation, Step 14 requires, All remote lubrication lines, remote vibration attachments, etc. shall be verified as attached prior to return to service. The work order noted at this step that the lubrication line to the outboard fan shaft bearing was broken in half and will need to be replaced prior to return to service and the step was left blank. The licensee did not initiate a CR for this degraded condition. Due to the broken lubrication line, the outboard fan shaft bearing was the only fan shaft bearing that was not greased during installation. October 15, 2015, the licensee completed the PMT for the room cooler and noted it to be satisfactory. The broken lubrication line documented in the PM WO was identified and CR 1093983 was initiated to document the condition. This CR stated that the broken lubrication line did not affect the functionality of the fan and could be repaired at the next scheduled PM. This assessment was not questioned during the review of the CR for operability. The fan was returned to service and declared operable. On December 4, 2015, the room cooler failed in service. The licensee declared the 1BB charging pump inoperable and entered the applicable TS LCO. Investigation revealed that the outboard fan shaft bearing had failed. At this point, the inappropriate treatment of the degraded lubrication line under 0-MI-0.16 and the associated PMT was identified. This issue was documented in the licensees CAP in CR 1111791. The licensee performed a past operability evaluation (POE) for CR 1111791 which concluded the fan was operable until several hours before the time of the failure. The POE was based largely on statements from the bearing vendor indicating that the new bearing was pre-lubricated at the factory and should have performed under load for a long period of time without needing to be pre-greased at installation. The POE was hampered by the fact that the licensee did not retain the damaged bearing for failure analysis. The inspectors reviewed the POE and determined that it failed to adequately document sufficient information to either discount the broken lubrication line as a cause of the bearing failure or to identify another cause. In response, the licensee opened an investigation of the cause of the bearing failure under an equipment apparent cause evaluation. Because more information is necessary to evaluate the cause of the 1B-B CCP room cooler fan shaft bearing failure, future inspection is required to determine if a more than minor performance deficiency or violation exists associated with this issue. Specifically, the inspectors need to review the equipment apparent cause evaluation, which was not completed by the end of the inspection period. This is identified as URI 05000390/2016001-08, Charging Pump 1B-B Room Cooler Fan Bearing Failure.
05000390/FIN-2015010-012015Q3Watts Bar420 Minute Operator Manual Action to Provide Source Range Monitoring CapabilityThe inspectors identified an unresolved item associated with a fire protection safe shutdown OMA that established a time requirement of 420 minutes to provide a functional source range monitor. The inspection team noted that procedure 1-AOI-30.2 C36, Fire Safe Shutdown Room 737-A1A, Rev. 0005 included a 420 minute operator manual action (OMA) to establish a functional source range monitor. The OMA was listed as OMA 649 in Calculation EDQ00099920090016, Appendix R Unit 1 & 2 Manual Action, Rev. 4. The inspectors also noted the following: - Westinghouse Owners Group letter, WOG-05-36 (dated 01/28/2005), Section 6.2, Long Term Cold Shutdown Capability, stated that typical instrumentation to achieve a shutdown condition during Appendix R event included the source range monitors. - Technical Specification 3.3.1.L required an operable source range neutron flux channel in Modes 3, 4, and 5; and stipulated that positive reactivity additions (such as plant cooldown) be suspended when the instrument was inoperable. - Procedure 1-AOI-30.2, Fire Safe Shutdown, Rev. 0005, Step 5.3.15, stated that at least one channel of nuclear instrumentation indication must be available to monitor shutdown neutron population. - Procedure 1-AOI-30.2 C36 included a note that stated that RCS cooldown should not be initiated until source range monitoring capability can be assured. - Procedure 1-AOI-30.2 C36 directed operators to depressurize and cooldown an action that was typically required at 60 75 minutes. The 420 minute OMA would allow shutdown and subsequent cooldown of the reactor plant without operators having the ability to monitor neutron population. The licensee contended that OMA 649 was part of the sites licensing bases and thus the capability to monitor source range was not required until 420 minutes. The inspection team determined that this issue required additional inspection because the licensee did not provide an alternative method to monitor neuron population and did not provide adequate restrictions to prevent cooldown activities until monitoring capability was restored. Additionally, the OMA conflicted with the technical specification requirements for source range availability. The issue is unresolved pending additional review to determine if a performance deficiency exists. Required actions to resolve this issue include a detailed review of applicable docketed licensing bases correspondence; consultation with NRRs fire protection and technical specification branches; and an assessment to determine the applicable fire areas if the issue is to be determined to be a more-than-minor performance deficiency. This issue will be tracked as URI 05000290/2015010-01, 420 Minute Operator Manual Action to Provide Source Range Monitoring Capability.
05000369/FIN-2014007-012014Q2McGuireInadequately Sealed Safety Related Electrical CabinetAn NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified when the licensee failed to promptly identify a condition adverse to quality associated with the inadequate sealing for safety related cabinet 1FWPNRWLP (Unit 1 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Channel 4 Level Instrumentation loop). Specifically, the licensee did not identify that the seal around a cable bundle entering the top of 1FWPNRWLP had degraded to the point where it would no longer protect against water intrusion into the cabinet. The licensee placed this issue into their CAP as PIP M-14-05643 and took corrective action by replacing the seal. The inspectors determined that the failure to promptly identify a condition adverse to quality associated with the inadequate sealing of 1FWPNRWLP was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of the automatic RWST swap over function to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Appendix A, Exhibit 2 - Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification and did not represent an actual loss of system and/or function. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of Procedure Adherence, as described in the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to adequately implement the walkdown process outlined in EDM-203 and promptly identify this degradation.
05000259/FIN-2014007-012014Q1Browns FerryFailure to Identify the Root Cause of the Failure of the 1B Standby Liquid Control Pump BreakerAn NRC identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensees failure to adequately identify the root cause for a significant condition adverse to quality as defined in NPG-SPP-22.302 Revision 1, Corrective Action Program Screening and Oversight. Specifically, the licensee initially failed to identify the root cause of the failure of the 1B Standby Liquid Control (SLC) Pump breaker that resulted in the equipment exceeding the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation. The issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Service Request (SR) 851718. This performance deficiency was more than minor since it adversely affected the Reactor Safety Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of availability and reliability of affected equipment. Specifically, the failure to determine the cause of a crack in the breakers phase arc chute that fatigued over time impacted the ability to assign effective corrective actions to prevent recurrence and challenges the reliability of the safety-related equipment to provide required reactivity control capability when required for accident mitigation. The inspectors evaluated the risk of this finding using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power. This determination was based on the evaluation that the inoperable equipment did not concurrently affect a single reactor protection system (RPS) trip signal to initiate a reactor scram, nor did it involve control manipulations that unintentionally added positive reactivity or result in a mismanagement of reactivity by operators. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, in the component of Evaluation, since the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance (P.2).
05000259/FIN-2014007-022014Q1Browns FerryLicensee-Identified ViolationThe following violation of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and constituted a violation of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as Non-Cited Violations. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, states, in part that, measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. These measures shall include provisions to assure that deviations from such standards are controlled. Engineering Document Change 69623 modified plant drawings to add a Furminite injection fitting to 2-FCV-73-81, HPCI Steam Line Warm-up Valve. Contrary to the above, on May 15, 2009, following maintenance performed on 2-FCV-73-81, the licensee failed to reinstall the Furminite injection fitting to the valve resulting in a steam leak determined to exceed the allowable leakage to maintain operability per Technical Specification 3.6.1.3. Using IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined the violation was of very low safety significance (Green) because the penetration was considered a small line (1 to 2 inches) and not expected to contribute to the Large Early Release Frequency. This violation was documented in the licensees corrective action program as PER 56687.
05000259/FIN-2013011-052013Q2Browns FerryMaintenance Personnel Not Following Clearance Procedure ViolationThe team identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, Procedures. The team determined that the maintenance Primary Authorized Employee (PAE) did not verify that all blocking points were danger tagged to ensure worker personal safety and equipment protection for the A2 RHRSW pump planned maintenance. The PAEs decision to only verify two of nine clearance components was a violation of TVA Corporate Procedure NPG-SPP-10.2, Rev. 5, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy . The maintenance PAE did not ensure that the A2 RHRSW pump was isolated from an unexpected release of energy that could have resulted in personnel injury or pump damage. The PAE did not verify or recognize that the A2 RHRSW pump manual discharge valve was full open and not danger tagged closed on May, 6, 2013. This performance deficiency was reasonably within BFNs ability to foresee and correct. This Finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected the BFN Maintenance Supervisors failure to follow the clearance and tagging procedure requirement to verify all danger tag blocking points, he only verified two of nine danger tags, for the A 2 RHRSW planned pump the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern, such as more severe plant transients, engineered safeguard system malfunctions, and a higher probability of personnel injury. The team determined that this Finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function or safety systems out of service for greater than the TS allowed outage time. The team identified a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area. Specifically, the licensee ensures supervisory and management oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported.
05000259/FIN-2011011-042011Q3Browns FerryInaccurate Information Provided Regarding Scoping of Motor Operated Valves in the Generic Letter 89-10 ProgramAn NRC-identified apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a) requirements was identified when it was determined that the licensee provided information that was not complete and accurate in the letter dated January 6, 1997, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Units 2 and 3 Generic Letter (GL) 89-10, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Testing and Surveillance, NRC Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-260, 296/95-19-01, Response to Request for Reevaluation Regarding Reduced Scope of MOVs. Additionally, TVA provided incomplete and inaccurate information to the NRC in a letter from T. E. Abney, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN) Unit 1 Generic Letter 89-10 and Supplements 1 to 7, Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Testing and Surveillance, dated May 5, 2004. This was an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information. The inspectors determined that the failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC was contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.9, and was an apparent violation. Because violations of 10 CFR 50.9 are considered to be violations that potentially impede or impact the regulatory process, they are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process. The regulatory significance was important because this information was material to the NRC because it was used, in part, as the basis for determining that valves FCV-74-52 and FCV-74-66 did not meet the conditions necessary that would require them to be in Browns Ferrys GL 89-10 MOV monitoring program. The issue was preliminarily determined to be an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9.
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