Semantic search
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
| Quarter | Site | Title | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05000458/FIN-2015002-01 | 2015Q2 | River Bend | Inadequate Operating Margin for Reactor Protection System A Motor Generator Set for Overvoltage Protection Results in Loss of Shutdown Cooling | The inspectors reviewed a finding for the licensees failure to raise the overvoltage setpoint on the reactor protection system A motor generator set when the output of the generator was raised. This resulted in a reduction of the operating margin between the overvoltage trip setpoint and normal operating voltage. As a result, a spike in the output of the A motor generator on February 24, 2015, exceeded the overvoltage trip setpoint and caused the reactor protection system motor generator set output breaker to open which resulted in a loss of shutdown cooling while the reactor was shut down for refueling operations. With spent fuel in the reactor vessel, reactor coolant temperature increased 6.4 degrees until reactor protection system A was re-energized and shutdown cooling was restored. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2015-01216. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of configuration control, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the tripping of the reactor protection system A motor generator set output breaker, resulted in a loss of power to the reactor protection system. This subsequently caused a loss of shutdown cooling and decay heat removal while the plant was shut down for a refueling outage. The inspectors initially screened the finding in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process. The inspectors used NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, dated May 5, 2014, to evaluate the significance of the finding. The finding did not require a quantitative assessment because adequate mitigating equipment remained available and the finding did not constitute a loss of control, as defined in Appendix G. Therefore, the finding screened as Green. A cross-cutting aspect to this finding is not being assigned as this performance deficiency occurred in 1988 and therefore is not indicative of current licensee performance. |
| 05000458/FIN-2015002-02 | 2015Q2 | River Bend | Failure to Maintain Design Control for 18 Upgraded Hydraulic Control Unit Accumulators | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to verify the adequacy of the design of replacement accumulators, 18 of which were installed in the control rod drive system at the River Bend Station. The accumulators were reverse-engineered, purchased from a commercial supplier (Tobul Accumulator), and dedicated for use as a basic component; however, the licensees technical justification for the acceptability of the reverse-engineered component, contained in Equivalency Evaluation 98-0632-000 was inadequate. The equivalency evaluation failed to verify the adequacy of critical design parameters related to the performance of the accumulators, such as flow rates, leakage rates, pressure ranges of operation, stroke times, temperature ranges of operation, and seismic qualification. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2014-03118. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, at the time of installation, the licensee had not taken sufficient actions to ensure that the accumulators could reliably provide the motive force to insert control rods upon a scram initiation signal under all design basis conditions. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012. Using Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that the finding screened as Green because it did not affect other diverse methods of reactor shutdown; it did not involve manipulations that added positive reactivity to the reactor core; it did not affect control rod scram time testing data; and it did not result in the mismanagement of reactivity by the operators. A cross-cutting aspect to this finding is not being assigned as this performance deficiency occurred in 1998 and therefore is not indicative of current licensee performance. |
| 05000416/FIN-2015001-01 | 2015Q1 | Grand Gulf | Failure to Take Timely Corrective Actions Associated with Division 1 and 2 Standby Service Water Pump House Ventilation System Due to Degraded Relays | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensee's failure to take timely corrective actions to correct a condition adverse to quality associated with the division 1 and 2 standby service water pump house ventilation systems. Specifically, in June 2011, the licensee identified that relays associated with the standby service water system pump house ventilation system failed due to age/environmental degradation, which resulted in an unplanned inoperability of the standby service water system. However, the licensee did not implement timely corrective actions for replacing these relays, which resulted in the inoperability of the division 1 standby service water system in December 2014, and again in January 2015. The licensee documented this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2015-00739. The short-term corrective actions included replacing all of the division 1 and 2 standby service water ventilation pump house relays in February and early March 2015. The inspectors determined that the failure to take timely corrective actions to replace degraded relays in the standby service water pump house ventilation system was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined the issue to be of very low safety significance (Green) because all applicable screening questions in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, were answered no. The inspectors determined that this performance deficiency was not indicative of current plant performance, and therefore no cross-cutting aspect was considered. |
| 05000416/FIN-2015001-02 | 2015Q1 | Grand Gulf | Failure to Follow a Procedure Resulting in the Unplanned Inoperability of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, for failure to follow a procedure which resulted in the unplanned inoperability of the reactor core isolation cooling system. This occurred when licensee technicians tested for continuity between incorrect points, while performing surveillance activities related to the residual heat removal system. This resulted in an invalid group 4 isolation signal and an isolation of the reactor core isolation cooling steam supply. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN- 2015-01532, and took immediate corrective actions to stop the residual heat removal system surveillance activity and restore the reactor core isolation cooling system to service. The failure to properly follow the surveillance procedure, which resulted in the unplanned inoperability of the reactor core isolation cooling system, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Specifically, the licensees failure to properly follow the surveillance procedure resulted in the unplanned inoperability of the reactor core isolation cooling system, which adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) in that the issue did not affect the design or qualification of the reactor core isolation cooling system; did not represent a loss of the reactor core isolation cooling system function (in that the isolation could have been promptly reset by procedures, had the system operation been required); and did not represent loss of function for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time. The inspectors determined this finding had cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with avoiding complacency, in that the I&C technicians did not implement appropriate error reduction tools to ensure the meter was connected to the correct points, which resulted in the invalid group 4 isolation signal, and inoperability of the reactor core isolation cooling system (H.12). |
| 05000416/FIN-2015001-06 | 2015Q1 | Grand Gulf | Failure to Adequately Establish Commercial-Grade Items as Basic Components | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to verify the suitability of replacement parts that were procured from commercial suppliers. Specifically, the inspectors noted that none of the tests specified by the licensee were sufficient to ensure that the seismic qualification of an auxiliary relay had been maintained. The finding was entered into the licensees corrective action system as Condition Report CR-GGN-2014-05049. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the licensee performed an operability determination, which evaluated the safety impacts of postulated relay chatter during a seismic event, for the applications in which these relays were installed. The licensees subsequent operability evaluation determined that potential relay chatter would not impact the safety-related functions of the relays in the applications in which they were installed. Thus, all applicable screening questions in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, were answered no. A cross-cutting aspect is not being assigned to this finding. |
| 05000416/FIN-2015001-03 | 2015Q1 | Grand Gulf | Emergency Action Level Scheme for Nonfunctional Seismic Monitor | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2) for the licensees failure to follow and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements of the planning standard 50.47(b)(4), which requires that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, is in use by the licensee. Specifically, the licensee had identified, on October 15, 2013, that the seismic monitoring instrumentation was non-functional, but had not further evaluated the plant configuration, and the effect on emergency action level declaration capabilities for seismic events. The licensee documented this issue in Condition Report CR-GGN-2015-00713. The corrective actions, based on CR-GGN-2013-06514, were implemented, and a new seismic monitor was installed, tested, and brought into service on January 30, 2015. The licensees inability to promptly declare Emergency Action Level (EAL) HA6, as required in the approved emergency classification and action level scheme per 10 CFR Part 50.47(b)(4), was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, it negatively impacts the cornerstone attribute of procedure quality in that the plant configuration prohibited the timely declaration of the facility EALs, as written. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the issue affected the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, dated September 23, 2014, the inspectors determined that the issue is of very low safety significance (Green) because an Emergency Action Level was rendered ineffective such that HA6 would not be declared, consistent with Table 5.4-1 and Figure 5.4-1. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with evaluation, in that the organization did not thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes, and extent of conditions, commensurate with their safety significance; in that while following Technical Requirements Manual requirements for a non-functional piece of equipment (seismic monitor), the complete effect was not evaluated to ensure the EALs were still capable of being implemented (P.2). |
| 05000416/FIN-2015001-04 | 2015Q1 | Grand Gulf | Failure to Properly Calibrate Main Steam Line Radiation Monitors and Containment/Drywall High Range Radiation Monitors | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(c) for the licensees failure to properly calibrate the main steam line radiation monitors and the containment/drywell high range radiation monitors. The violation was of very low safety significance and was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGNS-2015-01832. The failure to properly calibrate radiation monitors was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of employee health and safety and is associated with the cornerstone attribute of plant instrumentation. Specifically, the failure to properly calibrate radiation monitors impacts their ability to be used to assess dose rates. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, dated August 19, 2008, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because it was not an as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) issue, there was no overexposure or substantial potential for overexposure, and the licensees ability to assess dose was not compromised. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area because the licensee did not ensure that calibration procedures were adequate, nor was proper calibration equipment designed, characterized, and made available (H.1). |
| 05000416/FIN-2015001-05 | 2015Q1 | Grand Gulf | Failure to Establish, Implement, and Maintain Appropriate Changes to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual For REMP Airborne Sampling | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.1, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Specifically, when changes were made to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual in 1997, the licensee failed to establish an airborne sampling location for a community with the highest deposition factor (D/Q) for the site. As immediate corrective actions, the licensee evaluated their Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, evaluated the dose differential for the monitoring locations, and developed a plan to meet the environmental sampling requirements. The issue was documented in Condition Report CR-GGNS-2015-01835. The failure to establish an air sampling location in the vicinity of a community having the highest D/Q was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the environment and public domain. Specifically, the failure to maintain the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual with appropriate airborne radionuclide sampling requirements adversely impacts the licensee's ability to validate offsite radiation dose assessments for members of the public under certain effluent release conditions. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix D, dated February 12, 2008, Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the violation had very low safety significance because it involved the environmental monitoring program. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the procedure adherence component of the human performance area because licensee personnel failed to follow procedures when they determined the airborne sampling locations for the updated Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (H.8). |