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| Quarter | Site | Title | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05000397/FIN-2009008-01 | 2009Q3 | Columbia | Failure to Promptly Replace Keep Fill Pumps | The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, which occurred when the licensee failed to promptly correct an identified condition adverse to quality. Specifically, in 1998, the licensee identified an inadequate design of the in keep fill pumps for the reactor core isolation cooling system and emergency core cooling system that resulted in repetitive unexpected failures of the pumps. Corrective actions for this condition adverse to quality had been repeatedly deferred since the condition was originally identified; no effective corrective actions had been taken as of September 2009. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Action Request/Condition Report 204768. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team determined that this performance deficiency was of very low safety significance because it did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent the actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The team determined that this finding had a crosscutting aspect in the resources component of the human performance area because the licensee failed to ensure that resources were available to minimize long-standing equipment issues (H.2(a)). |
| 05000397/FIN-2009008-03 | 2009Q3 | Columbia | Failure to Follow Housekeeping Program Requirements | The team identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to properly implement housekeeping procedures to control transient equipment and materials. Specifically, the inspectors identified loose maintenance carts in both the control room and emergency diesel generator rooms, a large metal ramp in the emergency diesel generator room and improperly stored ladders the emergency core cooling system pump rooms. The licensee either secured or removed the equipment and entered this issue into their corrective action program as Action Request/Condition Report 204514. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the programmatic deficiency could lead to a more significant safety concern. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in an actual loss of a system safety function, did not result in a loss of a single train of safety equipment for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event, and did not involve the total loss of any safety function that contributes to an external event initiated core damage accident sequence. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program area component because the licensee failed to have a low threshold for identifying deficient housekeeping issues (P.1(a)) |
| 05000397/FIN-2009008-05 | 2009Q3 | Columbia | Licensee-Identified Violation | Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires, in part, that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deviations and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to this requirement, from April 2007 through January 2009, the licensee failed to establish measures to assure that a condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee failed to identify that an incorrectly designed transformer subject to overheating and failure had been installed in the Class 1E power system and, following identification in January 2009, the licensee failed to promptly correct the condition adverse to quality. This performance deficiency was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent the actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Action Request/Condition Report 0204769 |
| 05000397/FIN-2009008-02 | 2009Q3 | Columbia | Failure to Ensure Suitability of Class 1E Electrical Components | A noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was revealed on April 7, 2007, when overheating of a Class 1E power conditioning transformer resulted in a fire. The licensee determined that the failed transformer, which had been installed as part of a July 2000 design change, was of an inappropriate design for its application. The licensee replaced the transformer and entered this issue into their corrective action program as Action Request/Condition Report 204769. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team determined that this performance deficiency was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent the actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The team determined that this performance deficiency did not have a crosscutting aspect because it was not indicative of current licensee performance |
| 05000397/FIN-2009008-04 | 2009Q3 | Columbia | Licensee-Identified Violation | Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements (Operation), Appendix A, Section 1.c, required, in part, that safety-related activities including equipment control should be covered by written procedures. Contrary to this requirement, on March 29, 2008, during the process of moving control rods for a sequence exchange, operators inserted a control rod into the core when the control rod pull sheets required the withdrawal of the control rod from the core. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Action Request/Condition Report 179386 |
| 05000237/FIN-2001021-01 | 2001Q4 | Dresden | Past operability of the HPCI system with a degraded support was indeterminate because there was no | The operability of the HPCI system with a degraded pipe support was indeterminate because the licensee did not repair the support, took no action to prevent recurrence of the hydraulic transient that had damaged the support, and did not evaluate the system for recurrence of the transient. The system remained in this degraded condition for at least 70 days, without assurance that it could perform its safety function until, through intervention by the NRC, additional support discrepancies were identified, the degraded support was repaired, and a significant amount of air was vented from the discharge piping. The support damage had been caused by a water hammer due to voids in the discharge piping. The HPCI system would have experienced another water hammer because no actions were taken to eliminate the voids, and the damage to the system from another water hammer may have rendered the system inoperable. The significance of the finding has not yet been determined by the licensee, and this item is considered an Unresolved Item. |