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| Quarter | Site | Title | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05000336/FIN-2009003-02 | 2009Q2 | Millstone | Licensee-Identified Violation | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control states, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that the applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, for those structures systems, and components, are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Contrary to this, in April2007, Dominion removed relief valves 3CHS*RV8510A and B from the charging system alternate minimum recirculation flow path. This modification connected non-seismic American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) B31.1 piping to safety related ASME Code Class 2 piping without an appropriate means of isolation. Dominion produced evaluations that demonstrated that the ASME B31.1 piping would not rupture in a seismic event and entered the issue into their corrective action process, CR 333528. This finding is of very low safety significance because the finding is a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality |
| 05000336/FIN-2009003-03 | 2009Q2 | Millstone | Licensee-Identified Violation | License Condition 2.H for Unit 3 states, in part, that Dominion shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the FSAR. The Fire Protection Evaluation Report of the FSAR requires Dominion to comply with Branch Technical Position (BTP) CMEB 9.5-1, position C.5.c for alternative or dedicated shutdown capability. The BTP CMEB 9.5-1, positionC.5.c(1) requires in part that, During the post fire shutdown, the reactor coolant system process variables is maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal AC power, and the fission product boundary integrity is not affected. Contrary to this, from initial plant operation until Unit 3 entered cold shutdown conditions on October 12, 2008, implementing the alternative shutdown method while a SI Sactuation occurred during certain postulated fires requiring control room evacuation, could result in a water-solid pressurizer and water relief through the pressurizer safety relief valves. The pressurizer safety relief valves are not qualified for water relief and may fail to open. This finding was entered into Dominions Corrective Action Program (CR 107561). Dominion promptly established compensatory actions consistent with Unit 3s fire protection program requirements on August 29, 2008,when the fire protection program nonconformance was identified. Dominion subsequently completed a plant modification to the safety injection circuits during the Fall 2008 refuel outage and eliminated the potential for a single spurious actuation of the SIS resulting in pressurizer overfill. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the external factors attribute (fire) of the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, a control room fire requiring evacuation while a spurious SIS injection signal occurred could have caused the pressurizer to fill solid and pressurizer safety relief valves to relieve water. The inspectors used Phase 3 of the NRCs IMC 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process (SDP), to determine that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) |
| 05000336/FIN-2009003-01 | 2009Q2 | Millstone | Failure to Survey a Contaminated Component | An NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified for Dominions failure to effectively survey, label, and control contaminated tools and equipment. Specifically, Dominion failed to perform adequate surveys to identify a hose fitting having a contact dose rate measurement of 160 mrem per hour as required by 10CFR 20.1501. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program asCR322737.This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the program and process attribute of the Radiation Safety cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. By not surveying and labeling the hose fitting, workers could have received unplanned exposure when not informed of the radiological hazard present. The finding has a cross cutting aspect in the area of work practices, because the licensee did not assure that personnel follow procedures H.4(b). Specifically, procedure RPM 2.4.2, Radiological Control of Material and Vehicles, was not properly implemented to assure compliance with 10 CFR 20 requirements |
| 05000352/FIN-2008006-01 | 2008Q3 | Limerick | Failure to Implement a Maintenance Activity for the Reactor Building Crane | A Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control was identified. The NCV was related to Exelons failure to implement a preventative maintenance requirement described in a design calculation used to upgrade the 125 ton reactor building bridge crane. The finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could become a more significant safety concern if the crane components were allowed to degrade in an undetected manner. Specifically, the failure to develop the specified preventative maintenance practice could lead to operation of the crane in a degraded condition. The inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, because other significance determination process guidance was not suited to provide reasonable estimates of the significance of this inspection finding. With the assistance of Region I management, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because there was no actual crane operational problem during the spent fuel handling activities. |
| 05000318/FIN-2004008-01 | 2004Q2 | Calvert Cliffs | Failure to Adequately Implement Modification Design Review of the Reactor Regulating System Quick Open Circuit | A self-revealing event identified a finding of low to moderate safety significance, because Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) did not perform a modification design review, as required by station procedures. Following a Unit 2 reactor trip on January 23, 2004, the atmospheric dump valves and turbine bypass valves automatically Quick Opened, as designed. However, the Quick Open signal did not clear when the reactor coolant temperature dropped below the Quick Open setpoint, because of a reactor regulating system relay failure. As a result, an uncontrolled cooldown of the reactor coolant system occurred, which in turn caused a loss of the normal heat removal system. This finding was more than minor because it was considered to be a precursor to a more significant event. A Significance Determination Process Phase-3 risk analysis determined that this finding was of low to moderate safety significance, based on the change in core damage frequency. |