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| Quarter | Site | Title | Description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 05000280/FIN-2018003-01 | 2018Q3 | Surry | Failure to Control a Modification on the Containment Spray System | An NRC-identified Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for the licensees failure to control the modification for installation of a drain line on the Unit 1 A Containment Spray (CS) pump bearing housing. This resulted in the drain line being blocked by boric acid and inoperability of the Unit 1 A CS pump. |
| 05000281/FIN-2018002-01 | 2018Q2 | Surry | Failure to Follow Preventative Maintenance Procedure Results in Additional Failures of Emergency Bus Undervoltage and Degraded Voltage Relays | An NRC-identified Green NCV of Surry Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.D was identified for the failure to follow procedure ER-AA-102, Preventative Maintenance Program, which resulted in the Unit 2 H emergency bus degraded voltage (DV) relay failure on March 13, 2018, and the Unit 2 J emergency bus under voltage (UV) relay failure on May 21, 2018, while the unit was operating at rated thermal power (RTP). |
| 05000280/FIN-2017004-01 | 2017Q4 | Surry | Inadequate Instructions for Corrective Maintenance on Unit 1 C RC Hot Leg Sample Valve | A self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of Surry Technical Specification (TS) 6.4.A.7 was identified for the failure to have detailed written procedures with appropriate instructions in design change packages (DCPs) 78-001, 80-007, and 84-369 when replacing 1-SS-HCV-101C, the Unit 1 C reactor coolant (RC) hot leg sample valve. This resulted in 1-SS-HCV-101C developing a through-wall leak on the tube to valve socket weld. Additionally, due to the reactor coolant system (RCS) boundary leakage, Unit 1 required an unplanned shutdown per TS 3.1.C.3 on August 9, 2017. This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 1075404. During the shutdown, the licensee made an American Society of Mechanical Engineering (ASME) code repair by cutting and capping the tubing to stop the leak. 1-SS-HCV-101C will be restored to normal system configuration during the next refueling outage in April 2018.The inspectors determined that the failure of the licensee to have the instructions necessary to properly install the C RCS loop hot leg sample valve and tubing as required by Surry procedure SUI-0001 was a performance deficiency (PD). Specifically, DCPs 78-001,80-007, and 84-369 did not have instructions necessary to ensure the 1-SS-HCV-101C and the associated tubing was properly mounted to absorb the stresses applied to the valve and tubing during normal operation of the valve. As a consequence of the insufficient supports, 1-SS-HCV-101C experienced a through-wall leak on a socket weld on August 9, 2017, which subsequently required an unplanned shutdown of Unit 1. Using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, the inspectors determined that the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the procedural quality attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Using IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Table 2, dated October 7, 2016; the finding was determined to adversely affect the Initiating Events Cornerstone. The inspectors screened the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at-Power dated June 19, 2012, and determined that it screened as Green because the deficiency did not cause a loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant to a stable shutdown condition. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because it is not considered current licensee performance. |
| 05000280/FIN-2017004-02 | 2017Q4 | Surry | Failure to Identify a Non-Functional Flood Control Barrier | An NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified for the licensees fa ilure to identify a condition adverse to quality related to the material condition of the machinery equipment room (MER) 5 flood dike. Specifically, the inspectors identified on November 13, 2017, several bolts on the connecting plates of the dike that were visually not flush, and found to be loose. As a result, the licensee declared the MER 5 flood dike non-functional and the D and E main control room (MCR) chillers inoperable. This issue was documented in the licensees CAP as CR 1083839. As immediate corrective action, the licensee torqued all structural bolts to 12 ft-lbs and floor anchor nuts to 55 ft-lbs per WO 38103865619.The inspectors determined that failure to identify a condition adverse to quality associated with the material condition of the MER 5 flood dike was a PD. Specifically, the inspectors identified on November 13, 2017, several loose bolts on the connecting plates of the MER 5 flood dike. As a result, the licensee declared the MER-5 flood dike non-functional and the D and E main control room (MCR) chillers inoperable. The inspectors determined that the PD was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that WO 38103734871 and drawing 11548-FC-6L had fastener torque specifications and a re-torque requirement for the MER 5 dike after it was re-assembled; and failed to identify a non-functional MER 5 flood dike. Using IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Table 2, dated June 19, 2012; the finding was determined to affect the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors screened the finding using IMC0609, Appendix A, SDP for Findings at-Power dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that a detailed risk evaluation was required. A detailed risk evaluation of the PD was performed in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix A by a regional Senior ReactorAnalyst (SRA) using input from the licensees full scope Probabilistic Risk Assessment model. The result of the bounding analysis was an increase in core damage frequency due to the performance deficiency of <1E-6/year, a Green finding of very low safety significance.This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the evaluation component of the problem identification and resolution area, P.2, because the organization did not thoroughly evaluate issues to ensure that resolutions address causes and extent of conditions commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, ETE SU-2017-0044, written for the May, 2017, non-functional MER 5 flood dike, did not thoroughly evaluate gasket type and bolting torque, when evaluating if epoxy was required for the assembly of the MER 5 flood dike. |