Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 57044 | 21 March 2024 21:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) | Lost Tritium Aiming Post Lights | The following information was provided by the licensee: At around 1700 CDT on March 21, 2024, the Detroit Army Arsenals radiation safety officer (RSO) noticed a picture of two Army M58 Aiming Post Lights, which typically contain 5 Ci of tritium each, on a Reddit sub-group. The post indicated that the devices were a "going away gift" from the Army, and that the individual was no longer in the Army. The sealed sources appeared to be intact, but the RSO could not see the serial numbers. The RSO plans on reporting this to his chain of command and to the Army Criminal Investigative Service. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A Less than Cat 3 LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | ||
| ENS 56467 | 13 April 2023 21:50:00 | 10 CFR 20.2202(b)(1) | Unaccounted for Troxler Moisture Gauge | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: While finishing the renewal of our license, I was not able to account for one device found in a 2016 inventory, the number of devices matched the number of devices listed on our 2016 license. Both the license and inventory from 2016 listed 10 devices, I could only account for 9 devices. On the 11th of April, documentation was found in our property management system that listed the device as transferred to an outside agency, agency is unknown. The last leak test preformed on this device was in 2013, so the condition of the shielding in 2016 is not known, when it was transferred. The missing device is a Troxler model 3411 device serial number is 13760. The device contains two sources americium-241 with 44 millicuries at 1.480 giga becquerels (SN 47-9073), and cesium-137 with 9 millicuries at 0.296 giga becquerels (SN 50-2578) THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdfThe following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: | ||
| ENS 54308 | 17 September 2019 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) | Loss and Discovery of Tritium (H-3) Sources | This report is for an item on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) License Number 21-32838-01, Docket Number 030-38500. A 30-day report will be sent to NRC Region III in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, Part 20.2201. On 17 September, at approximately 0855 EDT, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) received a phone notification from one of their Installation Safety Managers concerning a possible radioactive device found inside a dumpster at an off base construction development site in Stafford County, VA. MCCDC Safety Personnel inspected the device and did not discover any breaches nor cracks of the large tritium vial. The device contained a tag with the radioactive symbol and the statement 'IF FOUND RETURN TO NEAREST MILITARY ACTIVITY.' The device was recovered and transported to the low-level radioactive waste storage locker on the Quantico Marine Corps Base. Item Name: COLLIMATOR, INFINITY AIMING REFER Nomenclature: COLLIMATOR INF A M1A1 National Stock Code: 1240-00-332-1780 Model: 10556235 Serial Number: 1504 Radionuclide: Tritium (H3) Activity: 10 Curies The Department of the Navy, Naval Sea Systems Command Detachment, Radiological Affairs Support Office, contacted the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) Safety Office via telephone on 1 October 2019. The TACOM Radiation Safety Program Manager notified NRC Region III Senior Health Physicist (Piskura) to verify if this item was reported as lost. She could not verify if the item was previously reported as lost and informed TACOM on 2 October 2019 to notify the NRC Operations Center. Additional information will be provided in the 30-day report. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | ||
| ENS 53884 | 20 February 2019 14:30:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) | Report of Loss of Ni-63 Sources Used in Improved Chemical Agent Monitors | The following was received from the licensee via e-mail: The concerned radioactive material is part of an Army Chemical Detection Equipment (CDE) and is called an Improved Chemical Agent Monitor (ICAM) NSN (National Stock Number) 6665-01-357-8502 and Chemical Agent Monitor (CAM), NSN 6665-01-199-4153. Each ICAM and CAM contains 10 mCi of Ni-63. The items with the radioactive material are under US Army NRC License 21-32838-01 issued to the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM). TACOM is located in Warren, MI. The reporting was based on 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(ii) (Reports of Theft or Loss of Licensed Material). Licensed material in a quantity greater than 10 times the quantity specified in Appendix C. The quantity specified in Appendix C is 100 microCi. One ICAM/CAM containing 10 mCi is 10,000 microCi. (The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO)) had reported nine CDE, but after confirming the serial numbers, we determined that one of the CDE (serial number 11769) was under another NRC license 19-10306-01 issued to the US Army Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) located in Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG), Maryland. This report is for eight CDE under TACOM's NRC license. We have six ICAMs and two CAMs that are lost for a total of 80,000 microCi. The serial numbers for the ICAMs are Z47-M-13972, Z47-M-13526, Z47-M-01859, Z47-M-15832, Z47-M-21980 and Z47-M-18759. The serial numbers for the CAMs are Z16-M-01075 and Z16-M-01025. The ICAMs/CAMs are not known to leak and do not have a leak test requirement. The Ni-63 is inside the ICAM/CAM. (The RSO) was notified via e-mail on February 19, 2019, at 1545 EST, by the Army Rad waste agency (Joint Munitions Command (JMC) located in Rock Island, IL) of the following: 'A package containing nine each CDE was in route from APG, Maryland to Pine Bluff Arsenal (PBA), Alabama via (a Common Carrier) and was lost in the possession of (the Common Carrier). The CDE were being sent for demilitarization and eventual disposal of the Ni-63. The subject package was dropped off at (the Common Carrier) in Baltimore, MD on 26 Nov 2018. The tracking system showing the package as 'In (Common Carrier) Possession'.' Prior to the notification on February 19, 2019, JMC called PBA shipping and receiving. PBA personnel indicated that subject package was not received at their location. Also, APG personnel traveled to the (Common Carrier) facility where the items were dropped off. Personnel confirmed that the package was not at that facility. As of February 19, 2019, JMC indicated that (the Common Carrier) has not formally issued the a statement of loss, but that JMC will continue to track this for APG. It was a Local Project for JMC with ID number of APG 2018-001. On February 20, 2019, at 0847 EST, the (RSO) called (the Common Carrier) with the tracking number. (The RSO) spoke to (an individual) who indicated that a case was assigned to the shipment and a claim was put in. (The RSO) was put in contact with the Trace Department, and was then told that the shipment was considered lost. Shipments after 14 days are considered lost. This event is related to NRC Event Number 53888. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | ||
| ENS 53872 | 31 January 2019 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) | Report of Loss of Am-241 Sources Contained in Helicopter Lasers | The following is a summary of a call with the US Army Aviation Missile Command. While taking inventory of sources located in decommissioned helicopter lasers, the US Army Aviation Missile Command identified that they were missing 88 Am-241 sources located in 44 helicopter lasers. It can not be determined exactly where the sources were lost, though the licensee is going to provide possible options, including that the lasers could have been lost during combat. It is assumed that the sources are not in public areas. It can not be determined when the sources were lost. The licensee noted that it is unlikely anyone would receive a dose as a result of this loss of material because it is difficult to retrieve the sources. The US Army continues to attempt to find the sources during routine house keeping activities. They have a similar license for a new aircraft and will perform inventory checks more frequently to ensure that any losses are more promptly reported. The licensee has notified the NRC Regional Office. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | ||
| ENS 52387 | 12 October 2016 19:24:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) | Lost Shipment of Material Containing Tritium | USMC shipped the package (containing 45.06 Ci of tritium) via (common carrier) out of Hawthorne Army Depot, Hawthorne, NV on October 6, 2016 to MARCORLOGBASE, Director Fleet Support Dir Code 587, Radford Blvd, Suite 20320, Albany, GA. The package was signed for with initials and a signature showing delivery on October 12, 2016 at 1424 (EDT). There were several attempts of delivery before the package was delivered. The initials of who signed for the shipment cannot be traced to anyone and the signature is unreadable. (The common carrier) indicates delivery to the address of a receptionist. The package had UN2911 markings on opposite sides of the package. USMC RADCON conducted a physical search of USMC Albany locations to include the Post Office with no results. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Albany was contacted and DLA performed a physical search with no results. Also, another shipment from Hawthorne was sent out to a different location, which was received. This location was checked for receipt of the concerned package. On November 2, 2016, an Albany All Hands/Base wide official message was sent out regarding the package. The conclusion at this time is that the package is considered missing and likely somewhere at MCLB, Albany. The US Navy indicates that physical searches and base wide notifications continue in the effort to locate the package. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | ||
| ENS 50199 | 12 June 2014 20:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) | Lost Depleted Uranium Projectile | The licensee was conducting a test fire exercise at the Ford Farms section of the Aberdeen Test Center when a depleted uranium penetrator projectile went off it's intended flight path, exited the building, and landed in an area near the facility designated to receive test rounds. Ford Farms is an indoor hard target test facility. There were no injuries or projected dose to workers or the public. No additional effort will be made to recover the projectile because the projectile landed in a historic impact area of Aberdeen containing various other unexploded ordinance. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf | ||
| ENS 45667 | 27 January 2010 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) | Mositure Density Gauge Received with Inoperable Locking Mechanism | The Army Depot in Stockton, CA received at 1401 PST on 01/27/10 a CPN Moisture Density Gauge shipped from a field unit. Upon receipt inspection, they identified that the locking mechanism was separated from the guide tube. The source was in the shielded position at the time of discovery. The field unit which shipped the device on 01/26/10 was contacted and asserts that the unit was intact at the time of shipment. The device is a CPN, Model MC-1, S/N M1712089, manufactured in the 1970's containing two sources; 10 millicuries Cesium-137 and 50 millicuries Americium-241/Be. The damaged device is currently in secure storage and scheduled for disposal. | ||
| ENS 47791 | 16 December 2009 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) | Missing Chemical Agent Detector | When returning from deployment a Virginia National Guard unit discovered that they had lost a M43A1 Chemical Detector containing 250 uCi of Am-241. The unit searched the facility as well as a storage warehouse located in Richmond, VA for the device, but they were unable to locate it.
Retraction due to the detector found in the same location in a different Army unit. Notified the R1DO (Caruso), R3DO (Bloomer) and the FSME (McIntosh). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source | ||
| ENS 45360 | 16 September 2009 07:00:00 | 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) | Four Defective Moisture Density Gauges | As part of the pre-operational check at the Defense Distribution Depot in Tracy, CA, operators discovered that four of their CPN Model MC-1 Moisture Density Gauges were defective. The 4 moisture density gauges were manufactured approximately 30 years ago and each contains two sources; 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Americium-241/Be (nominal). These gauges will not be returned to the manufacturer for evaluation and repair, but rather disposed of at an approved facility. The 4 units are currently locked in their storage containers, and those containers are locked inside another locked cabinet at the Defense Distribution Depot in Tracy, CA. The four gauges serial number and the reason for being defective are as follows: 1) s/n M17092033 - Locking mechanism does not work. 2) s/n M17112087 - Locking mechanism does not work. 3) s/n M17092041 - Handle broken. 4) s/n M17071988 - Broken guide tube. The licensee notified NRC Region 3 Office. | ||
| ENS 45158 | 16 April 2009 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) | Sources Lost During Shipment | Two Improved Chemical Agent Monitors (ICAMs) were lost during a shipment from ORNG (Oregon National Guard) to Guam National Guard. Each ICAM contains a sealed source containing 10 mCi of Ni-63. (SSDR NR-1129-D-103-S). The ICAMs were packaged by ORNG personnel in May, 2007. The missing ICAMs were reported missing to the licensee on 9 Feb 09. In the weeks following the notification, the licensee conducted an investigation to determine if the ICAMs were actually lost or misplaced within military control. The licensee believes the two ICAMs were lost during the transport between Andersen AFB and Guam National Guard between 15-17 Aug 2007. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source | ||
| ENS 43548 | 30 July 2007 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) | Two Missing M114 A1 Elbow Telescopes | Location : Anniston AD (Army Depot), Anniston, AL Date reported to the licensee: 2 Aug 2007 by the Anniston AD RSO Licensed material involved: M114A1 elbow telescopes 2 each. NSN 1240-00-150-8889. Each elbow telescope contains 5.6 curies of tritium ( gaseous form). Historical information: On 30 June, two M102 howitzers left the maintenance repair facility at Anniston Army Depot from bldg. 418. Each howitzer contains a carrying case that contains the M114A1, M140 alignment device and M137 pantel telescope. The M102 howitzers and associated cases were transported to a contractor operated paint facility located on post in bldg 143. The howitzers were to be painted. When work was completed by the contractor, the howitzers and associated carrying cases (containing the tritium fire control devices) were moved to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) shipping area on or about July 23rd. During the week of July 23rd, DLA personnel inspected the howitzers and associated components prior to them being shipped. It was at this time that DLA discovered that the M114A1 elbow telescopes were missing from each of the respective cases. The other tritium devices in the carrying case (M140 and M137) were still present. The licensee RSO contacted Army CID on 3 August for assistance in investigating the loss of the devices. Army CID from Ft. McPherson, GA office will begin their investigation on Monday August 6th 2007. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source | ||
| ENS 43524 | 24 July 2007 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) | Failed Source Shield Lock on Moisture Density Gauge | The Tester, Density and Moisture (Soil and Asphalt) Nuclear Method Campbell Pacific Model MC-1 (CCE), NSN 6635-01-030-6896, Serial Number M17112090, is assigned to the 980th Angering Battalion at Austin, TX. The MC-1 Tester had on manufacture (in 1977) 10 mCi of Cesium 137 and 50 mCi of Americium 241/Be. The sources are solid, sealed, and double encapsulated. The MC-1 Tester is licensed through an Army NRC license 21-01222-05, issued to the US Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC), located in Warren, MI. The tester was used in Iraq in 2005 and was shipped back to the unit location in Texas in 2006. It is unknown, if the tester had any mechanical difficulties in Iraq . The tester had received servicing through CPN International, Inc. on June 19, 2003. (Servicing included replacing) standard wear items such as gaskets and the handle. Also, the electronic assembly was bench tested with the two detectors, and the body of the tester is cleaned with the guidetube and rod assembly cleaned/lubed. The tester was also calibrated and leak tested The tester hasn't been used since its use in Iraq . The tester has been in storage with the only interaction being physical inventories, radiation surveys of the storage and leak tests of the radioactive sources. On 24 July 2007, the undersigned received an e-mail (after-hours) indicating that the referenced tester was inoperative with an inoperative handle lock, that wouldn't engage. The e-mail asking for disposition of the tester. Confirmation of the information was made with two Army personnel doing internal radiation audits of Army radiation programs, who were visiting the unit. The Army personnel were told on their visit, that there was some difficulty with the locking mechanism. They were told, that the tester was hard to unlock and that they (the unit) didn't lock the handle for this reason. The tester is inside its transport case, locked inside of a lead lined box, inside of a locked connex container, which is locked inside a gate at the unit location. The tester sources to include rod remain inside the tester housing and no other apparent tester deficiencies outside the lock mechanism has been observed. The shutter is in place and closed. The tester will not lock in the various positions (i.e. safe, 6 inch, 8 inch and 12 inch). When the lock button is pushed in, it springs out. The lock could not be locked with the key. There are no known personnel exposures. The tester sources were last leak tested on July 2, 2007, which showed no leakage. The only personnel having access to the keys and the tester is the Local RSO. This ensures that the tester is not used. The transport case containing the tester is also now locked. It is planned to transport the tester back to the manufacturer for disposition. The tester has been coded as H for unserviceable. Instructions were provided to the unit today to perform a wipe test of the shipping container, prepare the tester for shipment, and to ship it to the manufacturer. Also, a reminder e-mail was sent to the unit and to various Army Commands of the requirement to report tester safety defects immediately to TACOM LCMC Warren, MI. This e-mail was sent again today (July 27, 2007) as it was sent out on July 5, 2007. | ||
| ENS 43468 | 26 June 2007 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) | Damaged Campbell Pacific Moisture Density Gauge | On June 26, 2007, the 62nd Engineering Unit, located in Ft. Hood, Texas and recently returned from deployment, sent an email to the US Army TACOM LCMC, located in Warren , MI regarding a damaged Campbell Pacific (CPN) MC-1 moisture density gauge, serial number: M7112095. The device contains a 10 millicurie Cs-137 source and a 50 millicurie Am-241:Be source (1977 activity strength). The email requested guidance on the failure of the device handled assembly to lock in 'safe' or any other position. The lead trap door is disconnected from pushrod and fails to allow source rod to extend. The unit is on recuperative leave and the US Army will follow up with the unit personnel later this week. The US Army will continue to investigate to determine the status of the device, where and when it was damaged, and the status of the sources and the device's storage location.
The tester was used in Iraq and was shipped back to the unit in Texas in Dec 06. In Iraq, the tester had some difficulty with the lead trap door not easily sliding out of the way, when the rod was pushed down, but it did function. The rod locking mechanism worked in Iraq. On 18 Jun, the Local Radiation Safety Officer (LRSO) with the 62nd Engr Bn was notified verbally of a display problem involving the tester. A trained operator made the notification. On 26 June, the LRSO and Alternate LRSO both trained operators then decided to check out the tester. They cranked down on the display screw and the tester display functioned. They then decided to check the tester out further and discovered that the handle wouldn't lock in the safe and other positions. They compared this to another tester and then determined that the tester had a problem needing maintenance. The LRSO then sent an e-mail on 26 June asking for maintenance or turn-in instructions. The maintenance check (which includes ensuring proper function of the tester, the rod moving freely through the ranges and cleaning the tester of any dust and dirt) at the unit was the first, since its arrival from IRAQ. The unit planned to use the tester, but after discovering the problem with it, they then used another tester. The testers at the unit have maintenance done every six months depending on the use of the equipment. The rod with the source is inside of the tester housing. The tester is stored like normal in its transport case. The shutter is in place and closed. The lead trap door is in place. The lead trap door just doesn't slide out of the way when the source rod is lowered, thus it is preventing the source from being exposed or from coming out of the tester. The rod when operated will move through different positions, but will not lock at those positions (i.e. safe, 6 inch, 8 inch and 12 inch). This is due to a pin engaging defect. The rod will fully retract. If the tester probe is locked, then the rod will not move through the positions. There are no known personnel exposures. The tester is in a double locked room and the tester is in a locked DOT 7A container inside of a locked greenlee box. The only personnel having access to the keys and the testers are the LRSO and Alternate LRSO. This ensures that the tester is not used. Licensee is awaiting the results of a radiation survey of the storage area to be performed today (the last one performed was in April) and results from a leak test, which was performed on 27 June 07. The radiation survey was requested as a result of the tester failure and the leak test was performed, because it is the annual leak test period for the testers. The leak test was sent to our Army lab in Redstone, AL. Licensee has placed a call to expedite the analysis of the leak test and to check if they have received it. It is planned to transport the tester back to the manufacturer for disposition. Notified R3DO ( R. Lanksbury) and FSME EO (M. Burgess) | ||
| ENS 42713 | 6 July 2006 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1) | Unplanned Tritium Contamination During Maintenance | On July 6, 2006 a range indicator SSDR no. NR-155-S-116-S containing (four) 0.8 Ci (curies) tritium lamps (3.2 curies total) was broken during a maintenance procedure at Ft. Bragg, NC Special OPS, 3rd Group Direct Support weapons room, Bldg E-1978. The Ft. Bragg RSO was notified on 7 July 2006 of the incident. Improper maintenance procedure was the reason for the breakage of the tritium sealed source. Two persons were involved in the incident. One tritium bioassay was taken of one individual. The second individual did not have a bioassay taken due to the fact he went on TDY (Temporary Duty) before the discovery of the accident. Leak test of the broken range indicator showed removable contamination of 0.95 microcuries. An area survey of the weapons room by the Ft. Bragg RSO showed a maximum contamination of 0.3 micro curies (64,944 dpm). The Ft. Bragg RSO closed and secured the arms room from re-entry of personnel. The Ft Bragg RSO performed decontamination of the weapons room and brought the tritium removable contamination below regulatory concerns (<10,000 dpm). The licensee was notified of the incident on July 12, 2006. | ||
| ENS 42336 | 10 February 2006 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) | Potentially Defective Moisture Density Gauge Locking Mechanism | As part of the Pre-Operational Check, Operators discovered the one of their CPN Model MC-1 Moisture Density Gauges had a potentially defective locking mechanism, i.e., "the handle could be moved down through the blocking mechanism no matter which position the key was in. The CPN Model MC-1, S/N M18012172 was manufactured approximately 30 years ago and contains two sources; 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Americium-241/Be (nominal). The unit is currently locked in its' storage container at the Sierra Army Depot in CA, awaiting return to the manufacturer for evaluation and repair. The licensee notified NRC Region 3 Office. | ||
| ENS 41325 | 5 January 2005 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) | Two Lost M43A1 Chemical Agent Detectors Containing Am-241 Sealed Sources | On 1/5/05 during maintenance activities at the Oregon National Guard Camp Withycombe located in Clackamas, OR, two (2) M43A1 Chemical Agent Cells (reg. device #1129-D-102S) were discovered missing. Each missing Chemical Agent Cell contained an Am-241sealed source of 250 microCuries. The serial numbers for the two (2) missing sources are Z03-C-12123 and Z03-C-05051. An exhaustive search of the maintenance area including the low-level waste disposal facility was conducted with negative results. | ||
| ENS 41211 | 17 November 2004 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1) | Unplanned Contamination Due to a Broken M1A1 Collimator | During an exercise conducted in May 2004 at Camp Shelby, MS an M1A1 Collimator, NSN 1240-00-332-1780, containing 10 Curies Tritium was removed from service, i.e., possibly broken, and double-bagged for storage. The device was subsequently transported from Camp Shelby to Shelbyville, TN and ultimately forwarded to the Combined Support Maintenance Shop of the TN National Guard located in Smyrna, TN for repair. A routine pre-maintenance wet swipe test indicated contamination levels as high as 619,094 disintegrations/min using a liquid scintillation meter. This corresponds to an activity of 0.27 microcuries. Two TN National Guard staff have submitted samples for bioassay. The results will be available on Monday, 11/22. Radiation surveys conducted at the Shelbyville and Smyrna, TN storage locations were negative. The device is currently double-bagged in the low level rad waste storage area of the Combined Support Maintenance Shop awaiting disposal. | ||
| ENS 40969 | 13 August 2004 09:30:00 | 10 CFR 30.50(b)(4) | Us Army Radioactive Material Involved in a Fire. | On August 13, 2004 and aircraft hanger located on Fort Wainwright, East of Fairbanks, burned to the ground. Three chemical detectors containing a total activity of 70 millicuries of Nickel-63 were stored inside a metal wall locker within the aircraft hanger. The aircraft hanger has been cordoned off and a US. Army Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) is on the scene. One ICAM, and Two M22 Acada chemical detectors were stored in the metal wall locker. | ||
| ENS 40941 | 28 July 2004 14:20:00 | 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1) | Marine Corp Tritium Device Incident | On 28 July 2004, at approximately 0920 hours, the installed Tritium-in-Air monitor for the Tritium Instrument Repair Room (TIRR) at Maintenance Center Albany ((MCA), Georgia) abruptly alarmed. On 27 July 2004, the six counter sources (0.45 Curies each/2.7 Curie total) contained within the gear box of an M137 panoramic telescope had been replaced. The M137 unit was placed on an alignment fixture on the morning of 28 July. Upon alarm actuation, the TIRR and the Optics/Fire Control Shop were evacuated. Assembly of personnel was in a common area exterior to the shop. The MCA radiation protection assistant (RPA) and the Base radiation safety officer (BRSO) were summoned. Entry into the TIRR was made with the use of a Johnston Labs Model 111 portable tritium-in-air monitor. Suspicions were satisfied when the portable tritium-in-air monitor indicated 30-microCuries/m3 of tritium gas in the immediate vicinity of the test fixture and mounted M137 panoramic telescope. The TIRR utilizes a negative pressure ventilation system, which is directly ducted to the environment. The door to the TIRR was opened and within approximately one-half hour, the gaseous tritium levels had been reduced to background. The M137 was double bagged and placed within the TIRR vent hood. Two workers were present in the TIRR when the evacuation alarm sounded. The shop supervisor entered the area to assess the accuracy of the alarm condition. These three individuals were sent to the on-base medical clinic for urine collection. Samples were taken at time zero plus four hours, time zero plus eight hours, and for the-twenty-four hour period immediately following the time zero plus eight hour sample. The primary worker received a slight uptake of gaseous tritium. Dose calculations for that uptake proved the uptake to be (statistically) less than 0.0 milliRem. The other worker and the supervisor showed no evidence of any tritium uptake. Contamination wipes revealed no contamination of the test fixture or the wall.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: This note is to rescind the incident report number 40941. The event occurred at a Marine Corp Base in Albany, GA. The initial call into the NRC Operation Center on 10 August, 2004, stated that this was a potential incident under Part 30.5. After further review of the incident we have concluded and concurred with by Mr. Darrel Wiedeman, Region III, that the release of tritium was very minimal resulting in no closure of work areas, no surface contamination of work areas, or radiation dose to employees involved. The event therefore is determined to be non-reportable. Notified R1DO(Jackson), R2DO(Julian), R3DO(Clayton) and NMSS (Essig). | ||
| ENS 40606 | 23 March 2004 18:15:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(ii) | the Us Army Reported a Missing Beam Splitter for a M1A1 Tank. | On 03/03/04 the Texas National Guard discovered that one of their M1A1 tanks which was stored in a outside fenced area at their Army training facility in Wylie, Texas was missing a tritium beam splitter from its muzzle reference sensor. A thorough search was made of the entire area with negative results and a wipe of the tank also tested negative. The beam splitter contained a sealed 10 curie tritium source. All of the other tanks stored in the same fenced area with the one having the missing source were inspected and found to be intact.
Following reinspection, it was determined that the tritium beam splitter was not missing from the muzzle reference sensor. The individual who conducted the initial inspection could not see the illumination in the day light. When it was reinspected in a dark area, appropriate illumination was noted. Therefore the source was still in the beam splitter. Notified NMSS (Psyk), R3DO (Madera) and R4DO (Graves). | ||
| ENS 40650 | 11 March 2004 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i) | Lost Tritium Sealed Source | The US Army Tank Automotive Armaments Command reported that, during routine maintenance following live fire exercises at the National Training Center, Fort Erwin, CA, the US Army determined that the beam splitter from the muzzle reference sensor was missing from the muzzle of one of the tanks. The beam splitter contains a 10 curie tritium sealed source. The range was searched with negative results. Device number: NR-155D-120-S. |