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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 52062 | 1 July 2016 15:14:00 | Research And Test Reactor Event | Usgs Research Reactor Scram Due to One of Three Power Instruments Not Functioning | At 0914 MDT on 7/1/16, a routine GSTR (Geological Survey TRIGA Reactor) startup and ascent to 900 kW was initiated after successful completion of the daily prestart checks and an excess reactivity check. At 0919 as power was passing through approximately 50 kW, it was clear to the operator that one of the three power instruments (the NP1000) was not functioning since it was still reading 0 percent when it should have been reading >5 percent. The reactor was scrammed, Reactor Supervisor notified, and troubleshooting commenced. Shortly after this, the NP1000 signal cable was found to have an intermittent connection through a tee connector that was installed at the instrument box. The connector was replaced to resolve the problem and tested satisfactorily. At 1050 the reactor was started up again. All power instrumentation operated correctly and the daily power operation was performed without further problems. The NP1000 is a required safety instrument for operation of the reactor, so malfunction of the instrument is a violation of the facility's Technical Specifications. Specifically, Specification E.7 states: 'The type and minimum number of safety systems which shall be operable for reactor operation are shown in Table I.' Table I requires the NP1000 to provide a high power scram at 110 percent power, but the connector problem would have prevented a high power scram from occurring in that instrument. The licensee notified the NRC Project Manager and the NRC SME (Subject Matter Expert) for Research and Test Reactors. | ||
| ENS 52054 | 30 June 2016 13:15:00 | Research And Test Reactor Event | Reactor Shutdown After Technical Specification Violation | At 0712 (MDT) on 6/30/16 a routine GSTR (Geological Survey TRIGA Reactor) startup and ascent to 900 kW was initiated after successful completion of the daily prestart checks and an excess reactivity check. At 0715 (MDT), as power was passing through (approximately) 200 kW, it was clear to the operator that one of the three power instruments (the NP1000) was not functioning since it was still reading 0% when it should have been reading (approximately) 20%. The reactor was then shutdown, Reactor Supervisor notified, and troubleshooting commenced. Shortly after this, the NP1000 signal cable was found to have the coaxial cable pulled out of one of the connectors in the signal path. Repair, troubleshooting, and testing were performed to resolve the problem. At 0804 (MDT) the reactor was started up and all power instrumentation operated correctly and the daily power operation was performed without further problems. The NP1000 is a required safety instrument for operation of the reactor, so malfunction of the instrument is a violation of the facility's Technical Specifications. Specifically, specification E.7 states: 'The type and minimum number of safety systems which shall be operable for reactor operation are shown in Table I.' Table I requires the NP1000 to provide a high power scram at 110% power, but the cable problem would have prevented the high power scram from occurring in that instrument. The licensee will notify the NRC Project Manager. | ||
| ENS 50642 | 25 November 2014 21:21:00 | Non | Reactor Console Key Left in Control Console Unattended | On Tuesday, November 25, 2014, a violation of Technical Specification A.1, 'Shutdown,' occurred at the USGS TRIGA research reactor. Contrary to the specification, the key to the console key switch was left in the control console, in the OFF position, while the control room was unoccupied. This condition existed intermittently for approximately nine minutes during the time period from 1421 MST to 1436 MST, when the Reactor Supervisor discovered the key. The reactor was shutdown during this time period, and the staff members were performing routine maintenance. The facility shutdown checklist had been completed, and the key had been locked in a lock box, but the key was subsequently removed from the lock box by a Senior Reactor Operator and put in the console switch for maintenance checks. The reactor was continuously occupied by reactor staff during this event, and there were no non-staff personnel present. This event is being reported to the NRC's facility inspector, NRC Operations Center, the USGS Reactor Administrator, and the USGS Reactor Operations Committee. | ||
| ENS 50009 | 8 April 2014 16:27:00 | Non | Report of Technical Specification Violation | Event details: While performing a routine reactor pulse for surveillance purposes, the signal input cable to one of the power monitoring safety channels was disconnected, making the associated high power scram not functional. The pulsing procedure requires disconnecting this cable for preoperational testing, but states that the instrument input be returned to its normal operating status prior to actually performing the operation. Contrary to the procedure, this was not done and the reactor was operated at 2 watts for 7 minutes without that required safety channel operating. A second safety channel was fully operational during that time. The high power scrams are not required during pulse mode operations. The disconnected cable was subsequently discovered and reconnected. The licensee informed the NRR Program Manager (Morlang). |