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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 50642 | 25 November 2014 21:21:00 | Non | Reactor Console Key Left in Control Console Unattended | On Tuesday, November 25, 2014, a violation of Technical Specification A.1, 'Shutdown,' occurred at the USGS TRIGA research reactor. Contrary to the specification, the key to the console key switch was left in the control console, in the OFF position, while the control room was unoccupied. This condition existed intermittently for approximately nine minutes during the time period from 1421 MST to 1436 MST, when the Reactor Supervisor discovered the key. The reactor was shutdown during this time period, and the staff members were performing routine maintenance. The facility shutdown checklist had been completed, and the key had been locked in a lock box, but the key was subsequently removed from the lock box by a Senior Reactor Operator and put in the console switch for maintenance checks. The reactor was continuously occupied by reactor staff during this event, and there were no non-staff personnel present. This event is being reported to the NRC's facility inspector, NRC Operations Center, the USGS Reactor Administrator, and the USGS Reactor Operations Committee. | ||
| ENS 50009 | 8 April 2014 16:27:00 | Non | Report of Technical Specification Violation | Event details: While performing a routine reactor pulse for surveillance purposes, the signal input cable to one of the power monitoring safety channels was disconnected, making the associated high power scram not functional. The pulsing procedure requires disconnecting this cable for preoperational testing, but states that the instrument input be returned to its normal operating status prior to actually performing the operation. Contrary to the procedure, this was not done and the reactor was operated at 2 watts for 7 minutes without that required safety channel operating. A second safety channel was fully operational during that time. The high power scrams are not required during pulse mode operations. The disconnected cable was subsequently discovered and reconnected. The licensee informed the NRR Program Manager (Morlang). |