Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 54771 | 10 July 2020 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Common Emergency Operations Facility Maintenance | At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Oconee, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54509 | 3 February 2020 14:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability Due to Planned Tsc and Osc Upgrades | At 0915 EST on February 3, 2020, planned upgrades to the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) will begin. The work includes upgrades to furniture, carpet, telecommunications, celling tiles, and HVAC vent covers and the installation of new Audio-Visual equipment to include monitors, speakers, and microphones. The work duration is approximately eight weeks. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC and OSC activation during this period, the TSC and OSC will be staffed and activated at the alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the TSC and OSC planned upgrades and the need to assemble and staff the alternate location during an emergency. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | HVAC | |
| ENS 49511 | 7 November 2013 17:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Taken Out of Service for Planned Maintenance | Technical Support Center (TSC) out of service due to planned maintenance. This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Planned maintenance activities during the Unit 2 outage on 11/7/2013 will render TSC out of service for approximately 48 hours. The unit 2 work is on electrical equipment that will impact the power supply to the TSC. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the alternate TSC will be used per existing emergency planning procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event poses no threat to the public or station employees. | ||
| ENS 48770 | 19 February 2013 15:54:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Oconee Alert and Notification System Sirens Out of Service | Event: At 1400 EST on 2/19/2013, Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Emergency Preparedness (EP) was notified that the 65 Oconee Alert and Notification System sirens (65 is the total number of sirens within the ONS 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone) were found to be non-functional at 1054 EST during weekly testing on 2/19/2013. Oconee and Pickens County Emergency Management have been notified and will conduct 'Route Alerting' should ONS experience an emergency event that would normally require siren activation for notifying the public. Route Alerting, a method of backup alerting, is an approved FEMA process and is documented in the Emergency-Plan of both counties. Initial Safety Significance: None. A pre-planned alternate process for notifying the public was put in place immediately and will remain in place until siren repair and testing are completed. Corrective Action(s): An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the siren system failure. Appropriate repairs will be made and testing conducted once the cause is determined. ONS will notify the NRC when the sirens are returned to service. The ONS NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this issue." The licensee has also notified state authorities and the appropriate county authorities as indicated in the event description.
The ONS Siren control systems were recovered and the ONS Alert and Notification System was retested and fully returned to service as of 1040 EST on 2/20/2013. Oconee and Pickens County Emergency Management Division (EMD), South Carolina EMD, and the ONS NRC Senior Resident Inspector were notified of the return of the systems to service. The systems were restored after correcting issues associated with the computer system for the sirens. An investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the event. R2DO (McCoy) notified. | ||
| ENS 48407 | 15 October 2012 10:56:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Area Radiation Monitor Used for Emergency Assessment Failed | At 0656 on 10/15/2012, the Unit 3 Control Room received indication that the area radiation monitor, 3RlA-15 for Unit 3 High Pressure Injection (HPI) Pump Room had faulted. 3RIA-15 is used in the Oconee Emergency Plan Enclosure 4.3 (Abnormal Rad Levels Radiological Effluent) and Enclosure 4.4 (Loss of Shutdown Functions) for declaration of NOUE and/or Alert. Although the loss of a single area radiation monitor is not generally reportable, the loss of 3RIA-15 is conservatively considered as a major loss of emergency assessment capability pending further review of the Oconee Emergency Plan. The loss of 3RIA-15 is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Initial Safety Significance: None. There is no event in progress and the station has implemented an alternate means to monitor area radiation for the Unit 3 HPI Room. Corrective Action(s): Repair and restoration of the affected radiation monitor has been initiated as a high priority work request. An alternate means to monitor Unit 3 HPI Pump Room has been established. The station will notify the appropriate Emergency Response Organization personnel of the loss of 3RIA-15. Corrective actions are in place to review station procedures/processes for improvement relative to reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | ||
| ENS 48284 | 6 September 2012 00:06:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Inoperable Accident Radiation Monitors | This is a non-emergency report. No actual event has occurred. At 2006 EDT, on 9/5/2012, Oconee Nuclear Station Operations declared the radiation monitors out of service for Low Gas Unit Vent monitoring (3RIA-45) and High Gas Unit monitoring (3RIA-46) when the Unit 3 Vent Skid lost its internal memory during a monthly PM to replace the filter cartridge. These monitors are used for determination of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in ALL modes. Oconee Nuclear Station did not initially recognize that criteria for reporting in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) (Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities) was met and acknowledge this notification is outside of the eight (8) hour notification window. There is no adverse impact on nuclear safety. Redundant methods for sampling and determination of activity levels were implemented per SLC 16.11.3. This report is submitted based upon a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Redundant methodology was employed (when the inoperable status was recognized). Repair and restoration of the effected radiation monitors was completed at 2145 on 9/6/2012. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | ||
| ENS 48265 | 2 September 2012 16:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Outage of Emergency Operations Facility | As part of preparation for the upcoming Democratic National Convention (DNC), contingencies are in place associated with the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations. The common EOF is located in Charlotte, NC. Because of the potential for event security to delay staffing of the facility within the prescribed time frame, Duke Energy is implementing its business continuity plan for the EOF during the period from 12:00 PM (noon) on September 2nd until 24:00 (midnight) on September 6th. If a declared emergency were to occur at Oconee Nuclear Station, the EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location. This facility is used as a backup location for the Catawba TSC as specified in station procedures. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. The licensee notified the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Pickens County, and Oconee County. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48264 | 2 September 2012 02:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation Monitor Declared Inoperable | This is a non-emergency report. No actual event has occurred. At 2230 hours EDT, on September 01, 2012, Oconee Nuclear Station Operations determined that the radiation monitor for Low Gas Unit Vent monitoring failed its check source and was declared inoperable. This monitor is used for determination of Emergency Action Levels (EALs) in ALL Modes. Specifically, the criterion states that an Unusual Event should be declared if this radiation monitoring reading reaches 9.35E5 for greater than 60 minutes. This condition was discovered during weekly radiation monitor setpoint determinations. There is no adverse impact on nuclear safety. A redundant method for sampling and determination of activity levels has been implemented per SLC 16.11.3. The same EAL criterion has a redundant determination of Unusual Event classification based on these activity levels. This report is submitted based upon a loss of emergency assessment capability in accordance with 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. | ||
| ENS 42206 | 15 December 2005 14:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Emergency Siren Power | On December 15, 2005, at 0930 hours, it was determined that approximately 17 of 65 Oconee Nuclear Station emergency sirens, located in Pickens and Oconee Counties, failed to send a feedback signal when checked. It is postulated that these sirens are inoperable due to a loss of power attributed to severe icing conditions currently being experienced in both counties. At the time of discovery, current weather conditions were a steady light rain with a temperature of 33 degrees F. Duke is currently attempting to restore power to the affected sirens but does not expect to have all of the inoperable sirens back in service until later in the day. During the loss of siren period, a compensatory means of notifying the public has been put into place to include routing of local law enforcement personnel to the affected areas for public notification should an emergency occur at the station. Because more than 25% of the sirens were unavailable as a result of this event, this event constitutes a major loss of notification capability; consequently, this event is reported as an eight -hour notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) reporting criteria. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and applicable station personnel. Initial Safety Significance: None. Compensatory measures have been put into place to ensure that the members of the public located in the affected areas are appropriately notified by local law enforcement personnel. All three Oconee units remain operable in Mode 1 (100 percent Power) and are unaffected by this condition. Corrective Action(s): Duke will attempt to have all of the inoperable sirens restored as soon as possible and will maintain the compensatory action in-place until full restoration has been completed.
On December 15, 2005, at 0930 hours, it was determined that approximately 17 of 65 Oconee Nuclear Station emergency sirens, located in Pickens and Oconee Counties, failed to send a feedback signal when checked. It is postulated that these sirens are inoperable due to a loss of power attributed to severe icing conditions currently being experienced in both counties. At the time of discovery, current weather conditions were a steady light rain with a temperature of 33 degrees F. Throughout the day and night of December 15th, additional sirens were lost. A maximum number of 40 sirens were eventually lost. On December 16th, 2005, at 0815 Emergency Planning contacted Oconee and Pickens County to assess the siren outage due to ice storm on 12-15-05 and the results of the assessment were that Pickens County still had 17 sirens out of service and Oconee County still had 9 sirens out of service due to the ice storm. The ONS resident NRC inspector was notified this morning at 0818 of the siren issue and all of his questions and concerns were answered. Duke Power Company Community Affairs was also notified. On December 16th, 2005, at 1509, Emergency Planning contacted Oconee and Pickens County. The results were that Pickens County still has 11 sirens out of service and Oconee County still has 2 sirens out of service due to the ice storm. This reduces the total number of sirens out of service to less than the threshold considered a major loss of offsite response capability per the 10CFR 50.72 notification requirements. Duke is currently attempting to restore power to all the affected sirens. Power is expected to be restored to the entire service area by Sunday. During the loss of siren period, a compensatory means of notifying the public was put into place to include routing of local law enforcement personnel to the affected areas for public notification should an emergency occur at the station. Initial Safety Significance: 12-16-05, Safety Significance has not changed. None. Compensatory measures have been put into place to ensure that the members of the public located in the affected service areas are appropriately notified by local law enforcement personnel. All three Oconee units remain operable in Mode 1 (100 percent power) and are unaffected by this condition. Corrective Action(s): Duke will attempt to have all the inoperable sirens restored as soon as possible and will maintain the compensatory action in-place until full restoration has been completed. The R2DO(Decker) had been notified.
This update (December 20, 2005) is to report that all sirens have now been returned to service and tested. Duke has completed repairs to restore and test all sirens. Full restoration has been completed. R2DO (Paul Fredrickson) notified. NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this update by the licensee. | ||
| ENS 41050 | 17 September 2004 14:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Siren Capability | (Oconee is) unable to activate the siren system from the Oconee Law Enforcement Center due to the loss of power. The siren system can be activated from the backup location at Oconee Nuclear Station. Oconee is working to restore power. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |