Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 57225 | 12 July 2024 17:37:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation System NON-FUNCTIONAL | The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone: On July 12, 2024, at 1337 EDT, operations discovered that the technical support center (TSC) ventilation system was non-functional, which resulted in an unplanned loss of the TSC that could not be restored within seventy-five minutes. If an emergency had been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the emergency coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because loss of the TSC ventilation system affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The TSC ventilation system remains out-of-service at the time of the notification. In the event of an emergency, the licensee will use the alternate TSC facility per applicable site procedures until the ventilation system is restored. Repair of the ventilation system is being worked around-the-clock. | ||
| ENS 55758 | 25 February 2022 16:33:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Technical Support Center (TSC) | The following information was provided by the licensee: On 2/25/22, at 1133 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) high temperature alarm annunciated in the Control Room due to an equipment malfunction that resulted in an unplanned loss of the TSC for greater than seventy-five minutes. If an emergency had been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the equipment malfunction affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54769 | 10 July 2020 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Common Emergency Operations Facility Maintenance | At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at McGuire, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54472 | 13 January 2020 14:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Technical Support Center Power Modification | This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A planned modification to the Technical Support Center (TSC) power supplies started on January 13, 2020. The work activity includes installation of a permanent back-up diesel generator and rewiring of automatic and manual power transfer switches. The work duration is approximately three weeks. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the Emergency Coordinator and the TSC staff will assemble and staff the alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the TSC modification and the need to assemble and staff the alternate location during an emergency. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 53498 | 9 July 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Unplanned Loss of Technical Support Center (Tsc) Ventilation | On July 9, 2018, at 1155 hours (EDT), while testing the TSC Ventilation System, an equipment malfunction occurred that resulted in an unplanned loss of TSC ventilation functionality/habitability for greater than seventy-five minutes. If an emergency had been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The TSC ventilation system has been placed in an interim configuration that restored functionality and habitability. Additional maintenance is planned to promptly resolve the malfunctioning equipment. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the equipment malfunction affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The equipment malfunction (a failed solenoid valve) resulted in the loss of the ability to pressurize and filter the air in the TSC. | ||
| ENS 53307 | 2 April 2018 14:24:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Technical Support Center (Tsc) Modification | This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A planned modification to the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system started on April 2, 2018. The work activity includes replacement of the air conditioning system. The work duration is approximately three weeks. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the TSC modifications and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 53240 | 1 March 2018 20:55:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Unplanned Loss of Technical Support Center | This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Due to the discovery of a breaker coordination issue during an NRC Inspection, the power supply breakers to the Technical Support Center (TSC), including the ventilation system, has been opened to address the condition. This will make the TSC non-functional. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the Alternate TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified to respond to the Alternate TSC in the event of an ERO (Emergency Response Organization) activation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 52219 | 2 September 2016 23:22:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Spent Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitor Lost Signal | Unit 1 Spent Fuel Pool Area Radiation Monitor (1EMF17) lost signal resulting in off scale high indications. Subject EMF provides alarm functions and indication which are used for assessment of EAL classifications. Failure response conducted per applicable Alarm Response Procedures and subsequent actions performed per applicable license commitment required actions. Temporary dose rate monitor has been set up for area monitoring with alarm setpoint commensurate with subject EMF. Issue entered into corrective action program and prioritized to restore subject EMF to functional status within required 30 days. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
This notification is being made to retract event EN 52219, which was reported on September 2, 2016. Upon further investigation, the loss of radiation monitor 1EMF17 did not prevent the evaluation of all EALs (Emergency Action Level) for the associated emergency initiating conditions. Additionally, it has been determined 1EMF17 is not utilized for performing radiological assessments. Therefore, no actual or potential major loss of emergency assessment capability existed per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, Rev. 3, Supplement 1 and NEI 13-01, Rev. 0. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of the retraction. Notified R2DO (Bartley). | ||
| ENS 52180 | 15 August 2016 14:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service Due to Facility Upgrade | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. The Technical Support Center (TSC) was removed from service on 08/15/2016 at 1030 (EDT) for a scheduled facility upgrade project, which will improve the overall functionality of the facility. The duration of the upgrade is expected to be 26 days. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), as the TSC will be unavailable for greater than 72 hours. In the event of an emergency, McGuire's alternate TSC will be used while the TSC is upgraded. During this period, the alternate TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified that the TSC will be unavailable during the upgrade and to report to the alternate TSC in the event of an emergency. This upgrade does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 52145 | 2 August 2016 10:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Ventilation Out-Of-Service | This is a non-emergency eight-hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the TSC (Technical Support Center) Ventilation system was discovered on 8/2/16 at 0630 EDT. Repairs are complete at 1030 EDT on 08/02/16. If an emergency would have been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC had become uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team was notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 51828 | 28 March 2016 23:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Power to Meteorological Tower | At approximately 1900 EDT on March 28, 2016, an unplanned loss of retail power to the McGuire Meteorological tower occurred. This loss of power impacted communication between the Meteorological tower and the control room, which resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Compensatory measures existed within the site's emergency planning procedures to obtain meteorological data from the National Weather Service. Meteorological information could have been provided via the emergency notification system to the NRC operations center. Power was restored at 2245 EDT on March 28, 2016. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. There was no impact to the public.
This notification is being made to retract event EN 51828 that was reported March 29, 2016. Based on further investigation, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures provide acceptable alternative methods to perform emergency assessment that are in addition to the control room indications from the meteorological tower. Furthermore, it was determined that the meteorological tower data was valid and available in the control room during the applicable period. It was therefore determined that no actual or potential major loss of emergency assessment capability existed per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, rev 3, supplement 1 and NEI 13-01, rev 0. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the retraction. Notified the R2DO (McCoy). | ||
| ENS 50095 | 8 May 2014 08:29:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of 34 Emergency Sirens | At approximately 0429 hours (EDT) on May 8, 2014, McGuire was informed that 34 emergency sirens were incapable of activation from the primary location. The loss of these 34 sirens for more than one hour is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Until repairs are complete, backup route alerting is in place. Troubleshooting is in progress. During troubleshooting, an inadvertent actuation of emergency sirens occurred at 1030 hours (EDT) on May 8, 2014. Mecklenburg County Emergency Management was notified of this inadvertent actuation which is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). Although these sirens were activated there was no incident at McGuire. This event does not impact public health and safety. The NRC Resident Inspector and local agencies were notified.
The emergency sirens have been repaired and are functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser). | ||
| ENS 50062 | 27 April 2014 20:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out-Of-Service | The Technical Support Center (TSC) cooling system is not operating properly. The temperature of the TSC is currently 80 degrees F. The TSC is still capable of being pressurized. If needed, facilities in the Admin building are available for use as the back-up TSC. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
TSC Ventilation (VH) System is out-of-service. TSC is not capable of being pressurized, filtered or cooled. This is planned maintenance for work to repair leak reported on 04/27/14. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (King). | ||
| ENS 48276 | 5 September 2012 14:40:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Technical Support Center Out of Service Due to Preventative Maintenance on Hvac System | This (report) is being issued in advance of a planned activity. Today, 9/5/2012, the (TSC) Technical Support Center Emergency Ventilation System will be removed from service to support preventative maintenance activities. The Emergency Ventilation System will not be available and cannot be restored within the time period (75 minutes) required to staff and activate the Emergency Response Organization (ERO). This work is scheduled to complete today. If an emergency is declared and the TSC ERO activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological conditions, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the Station Emergency Director will relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48266 | 2 September 2012 16:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Planned Outage of Emergency Operations Facility | As part of preparation for the upcoming Democratic National Convention (DNC), contingencies are in place associated with the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations. The common EOF is located in Charlotte, NC. Because of the potential for event security to delay staffing of the facility within the prescribed time frame, Duke Energy is implementing its business continuity plan for the EOF during the period from 12:00 PM (noon) on September 2nd until 24:00 (midnight) on September 6th. If a declared emergency were to occur at McGuire Nuclear Station, the EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location. This facility is used as a backup location for the Catawba TSC as specified in station procedures. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 48462 | 1 August 2009 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Historical Unavailability of Technical Support Center Ventilation Due to Maintenance | This non-emergency event report is being made per 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(ii) which requires reporting events that occurred within three years of the date of discovery. Based on operating experience, Engineering personnel reviewed past maintenance activities involving the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system (VH system) and identified four (4) occasions between August 2009 and October 2012 (three years) where the VH system functions could not have been restored within the required facility activation time. The specific instances have been documented in our corrective action program. If an emergency had been declared during these period and TSC ERO activation was required, the TSC would have been staffed and activated unless the TSC came uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff was necessary, the Station Emergency Coordinator would relocate the staff to the alternate TSC location. Practices and processes have been revised to improve control of TSC maintenance activities and to improve facility availability going forward. In addition, site reporting guidance has been revised to assure timely reporting for these types of events if required. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since the maintenance activities affected an Emergency Response Facility. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 44339 | 7 July 2008 18:22:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Failure of the Alert Notification System | Alert Notification sirens (60 of 67) failed to operate properly and therefore required licensee to report this per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). All Emergency Planning Zone counties have been notified and placed on backup route alerting, which means notification will be performed by local authorities. Investigation of this matter is ongoing. Licensee has notified NRC Resident Inspector.
A bad radio in the test shop created interference with the Alert Notification sirens, thus preventing them from operating properly. At 1425 EDT all Emergency Planning Zone counties were notified and the backup route alerting was cancelled. The sirens were tested satisfactorily multiple times. Licensee has notified NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Guthrie)
Telecom investigation revealed that all 67 ANS sirens were in fact available and ANS siren failure did not occur. The polling feature of the ANS sirens feedback signal experienced radio interference from a standby radio. This interference in the feedback system of the radio/siren system did not interfere with the activation of the sirens. The ANS sirens were fully functional and available during this time, therefore notification 44339 is being retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Payne) | ||
| ENS 42208 | 15 December 2005 18:04:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of 38 Out of 67 Emergency Sirens Due to Weather | During performance of weekly testing on ANS Sirens 38 of 67 sirens failed. Suspect due to inclement weather. Retested at 15:43 (EST) and currently 4 of 67 are inoperable. " Licensee notified Mecklenburg county. NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. | ||
| ENS 41288 | 23 December 2004 19:10:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Loss of Communications | Test results for the 12/23/04 weekly McGuire Nuclear Station silent siren test performed by the counties located in the McGuire EPZ indicated a failure of 50 out of the 67 sirens. This failure involved all of the sirens located in 2 of the 4 counties located in the EPZ who have the capability to activate these sirens. This failure occurred at 1410 on 12/23/04 and is believed to be due to 'Tropospheric Ducting (TD) radio frequency interference (RFI). A strong weather front was moving through the area at the time of the testing and is believed to be the cause of the TD RFI. Interference cleared at 1425 and subsequent retest by all four affected counties were completed with a 100% success rate with all siren test indications normal. Due to the short period of time of the unavailability and the prompt restoration of function, backup route alerting was not established. Long-term resolution of this RFI problem is being developed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 41157 | 28 October 2004 17:14:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Sirens Inoperable | At 1314 EDT on 10/28/04, all 34 of the Mecklenburg County ANS sirens failed a scheduled weekly test. The silent test checks only the radio circuitry involved in actuating the sirens. This test failure was attributed to a phenomena known as 'Tropospheric Ducting,' which is essentially radio frequency interference on the frequencies utilized for siren control. At 1448 EDT on 10/28/04, the radio frequency interference had cleared and the siren test was repeated with 100% success rate. The remaining 33 sirens in the other four EPZ counties were tested satisfactorily in the same time frame. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |