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 Start dateReporting criterionTitleEvent descriptionSystemLER
ENS 563636 February 2023 11:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessLoss of Communications and Assessment CapabilitiesThe following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified.
ENS 5369626 October 2018 04:00:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness		Automatic Start of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Loss of Radiation MonitorRCS (Reactor Coolant System) Pressure: vented to containment, refueling cavity greater than 23ft. (above reactor vessel). RCS temperature: 96 degrees Fahrenheit. The 12A bus de-energized, 'A' EDG (Emergency Diesel Generator) automatically started and loaded on (emergency) buses 14 and 18. The RCS configuration is refueling cavity level greater than 23ft. above the reactor flange with no impact to shutdown cooling. Radiation monitor R-1, Control Room radiation monitor, lost power for 2 hrs 10 min. This placed Ginna in a major loss of emergency preparedness capabilities. A temporary radiation monitor has been installed in the Control Room. Prior to the notification, the licensee had restored the 12A bus from offsite power and the R-1 monitor was re-energized. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.Emergency Diesel Generator
Shutdown Cooling
ENS 5327219 March 2018 13:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessTechnical Support Center Out of ServiceEmergency Assessment Capability cannot be performed in the Technical Support Center due to an equipment deficiency in the HVAC system which could impact facility habitability. An Alternate Technical Support Center is in place at the Emergency Offsite Facility. Priority maintenance is in progress to correct the deficiency. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.HVAC
ENS 529462 September 2017 15:48:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessArea Radiation Monitor FailureMCR (Main Control Room) area radiation monitor R-1 failed at 1148 (EDT on) 9/2/2017. This caused a loss of capability to classify EAL (Emergency Action Level) RA3.1, Dose Rates greater than 15 mrem/hr in either of the following areas requiring continuous occupancy to maintain plant safety functions: Control Room (R-1) or CAS (Central Alarm Station). Compensatory measures are currently in place with a portable radiation monitor in the MCR with alarm setpoints consistent with R-1. Priority maintenance is being planned to restore R-1 to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5053614 October 2014 14:03:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessTechnical Support Center Ventilation Out of ServiceThe Technical Support Center Air Conditioning Unit is not operating properly and has been declared non-functional. The Air Conditioning Unit functions to cool the Technical Support Center during normal and accident conditions. Current environmental conditions are acceptable. The Corrective Action process has been initiated. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 3, since this condition affects an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4954818 November 2013 10:12:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessCommunications Loss to New York State Watch TowerR.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant was notified at 0512 (EST) by the New York State (NYS) Watch Center that the Radiological Emergency Communications System (RECS) and commercial telephones were not available. The unavailability of the communications systems was a result of an unplanned computer server outage affecting the NYS Watch Center. While the RECS line remained operational, it was not available due to the relocation of personnel from the NYS Watch Center to an alternate location. An alternate method of communication was established via cell phone at the time of notification. This condition is reportable as a major loss of emergency offsite communications capability under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NYS Watch Center network and communications systems have been restored and the facility staffed as of 0757 (EST). The condition has been entered into the station's corrective action program." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4926512 August 2013 12:59:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessTechnical Support Center Ventilation Removed from Service for Planned Maintenance

This condition does not affect the health and safely of the public or the operation of the facility. At 0859 EDT on August 12, 2013, pre-planned maintenance commenced which affects the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation. The scope of the maintenance is to replace the TSC ventilation charcoal filters and sampling canisters. This maintenance is currently scheduled to be completed by August 20, 2013. TSC emergency functionality during a radiation release event requires TSC ventilation be maintained. The actual TSC ventilation emergency function for iodine removal will be lost for the duration of the pre-planned maintenance. If an emergency should occur and a radioactive release occurs, the ventilation system will not provide iodine removal capability. If an emergency is declared and the TSC facility activation is required, the TSC will be staffed and activated unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff becomes necessary, the staff will be directed to relocate to the alternate TSC location. The alternate TSC has been verified to have electrical power and communication capability. The Technical Support Center Directors have been notified. This event is being reported as a loss of emergency preparedness capabilities in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. 

* * * UPDATE FROM KEN CROW TO PETE SNYDER AT 1749 EDT ON 8/20/13 * * *

The TSC ventilation has been returned to service as of 1742 EDT on 8/20/13. Notified R1DO (Schmidt).

ENS 491777 July 2013 07:26:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessLoss of Emergency Sirens Due to Power OutagesAt 0326 EDT on 07/07/2013, it was determined that 14 of 96 Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Offsite Sirens were nonfunctional. The apparent cause is loss of power to the sirens due to storm related power outages. The weather has since returned to normal conditions, and residential power restoration is in progress. (At the time of this report, only 3 sirens remained without power). This event is being reported as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 431435 February 2007 10:25:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessBlocked Emergency Vehicle AccessGinna Station Site access for emergency vehicles has been unavailable since 0525 this morning due to the inability to lower both the North and South Active Vehicle Barriers. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 4306426 December 2006 15:30:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessEmergency Sirens Fail to Operate from County FacilitiesEP (Emergency Planning) Personnel were coordinating routine silent testing of the Wayne County Alert Notification System (ANS) per EPIP 4-10. At approximately 0930, Wayne County personnel activated the system from the Wayne County 911 Center activation point. The test was unsuccessful. In accordance with procedure, Wayne County personnel attempted to activate the system from the Wayne County EOC. This test was also unsuccessful. Per procedure guidance, if the alternate activation point is unsuccessful, Ginna EP personnel are to be notified to perform the test from the Ginna TSC. Ginna EP performed the silent test of the system from the Ginna TSC per procedure EPIP 4-8. The test was successful. Site personnel were notified and the Verizon Phone Company was contacted by Engineering to investigate. Phone line connections from Wayne County to the Brantling Hill transmitter site were functionally tested satisfactorily by Verizon Phone Company. Verizon personnel & Ginna Maintenance personnel were dispatched to the transmitter site to perform troubleshooting. Although the 70 Wayne County ANS sirens could not be tested from either Wayne County test location, the notification system was functional and continuously capable of being activated from the Ginna TSC is in accordance with the E-Plan. Silent siren alarm tests for the 26 Monroe County ANS sirens were initiated from both Monroe County activation points (911 Center and Radio Center). All tests initiated from the Monroe County activation points were successful. Sirens restored to operable at 1552 12/26/06 following communications card repair and testing. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local government agencies.
ENS 4097723 August 2004 17:22:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency PreparednessEmergency Sirens Did Not ActivateAt 1322 hours during routine testing it was discovered that Monroe County Emergency Sirens (24 of 96 total) did not activate from the Monroe County Emergency Command Center . The affected sirens were tested and restored to operable status from an alternate site at 1404 hours." The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
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