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 Start dateReporting criterionTitleEvent descriptionSystemLER
ENS 5389922 February 2019 05:00:00Agreement StateAgreement State Report - Loss of Licensed MaterialThe following was received via email from the state of North Carolina: North Carolina Radiation Protection Branch (RMB) was notified on February 22, 2019, that a General Licensee could not account for two Microderm hand-held probes containing two sources each (25 micro Ci of Sr-90 and 100 micro Ci of Tl-204). RMB has been in communications with the General Licensee to ascertain whether or not the devices containing the sources have been returned to the vendor or are indeed lost. At this time, this cannot be verified and the RMB anticipates more information to follow on March 4, 2019. Additional details to follow to complete this event report. NC Event Tracking ID: 190007 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 4257324 April 2006 04:00:0010 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluationPart 21 Notification - Bwr Core Shroud Tie Rod Upper Support Cracking
ENS 4098224 August 2004 04:00:0010 CFR 21.21Part 21 Reportable Condition and 60-Day Interim Report Notification: Non-Conservative Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio

Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) and GE Nuclear Energy (GENE) have determined that the current GNF process for determination of the Safety Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (SLMCPR) can result in a non-conservative SLMCPR. GENE has historically used a non-conservative SLMCPR impact of 0.01 as the threshold for reportability under 10CFR21. A preliminary screening evaluation has been completed for all plants operating with a SLMCPR calculated by GNF to determine those that have a nonconservative impact of 0.01 or greater. Verification has been completed for those plants that the screen showed to have a non-conservative SLMCPR impact of 0.01 or greater. Verification has not been completed for the plants that the screen showed had an impact of less than 0.01 or were unaffected, thus requiring a 60-Day Interim Report notification pending verification completion. The plants for which GNF calculates the SLMCPR are identified (below). Those plants for which the preliminary screen indicated that the current SLMCPR is unaffected are identified as a 60-Day Interim Report. Upon completion of verification (assuming the results of the screen are confirmed) the status of these plants will be changed to Not Reportable. GENE will provide a follow-up report to the NRC by September 29, 2004. The plants for which the current SLMCPR is non-conservative by 0.01 or greater are identified as a Reportable Condition under 10CFR21.21(d). These plants will take action to address the Reportable Condition. GNF has notified all plants that have been confirmed to be affected. The plants that have a non-conservative SLMCPR for current plant operation will take action to mitigate the potential impact. Depending on the specific circumstances, mitigating actions to protect the SLMCPR may include increasing the OLMCPR to assure compliance with the low flow calculated SLMCPR. In some cases sufficient conservatism may exist in the OLMCPR at low flow to bound the increased SLMCPR. Each affected plant will notify the NRC and take appropriate action if their Technical Specifications are affected. There are no actions necessary for the plants that are unaffected pending completion of verification. If, in the course of verification, GNF determines that there is an impact, the affected utility will be notified immediately. GNF will complete the verification and GENE, will provide a follow-up letter to the NRC by September 29, 2004. Affected and 60-Day Interim Notification Plants: 60-Day Interim Report: Clinton, Oyster Creek, Brunswick 1, Brunswick 2, Nine Mile Point 2, Fitzpatrick (60-Day interim report for current operation, Reportable Condition for SLMCPR licensing submittal), Pilgrim, Vermont Yankee, Dresden 2, Dresden 3, LaSalle 1, LaSalle 2, Limerick 1, Limerick 2, Peach Bottom 2, Peach Bottom 3, Quad Cities 1, Quad Cities 2, Perry 1, Duane Arnold, Monticello, Hope Creek, Hatch 1, Hatch 2, Browns Ferry 2 Reportable Condition: Nine Mile Point 1, Fermi 2, Fitzpatrick (60-Day interim report for current operation, Reportable Condition for SLMCPR licensing submittal), Cooper.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JASON POST (VIA FAX) TO CROUCH @ 2354 HRS. EST ON 09/29/04 * * *

In part, the update reads: The evaluation for the potentially unaffected plants has now been completed. The results of the screening calculation have been confirmed: this is not a reportable condition for the plants that were previously identified as a 60-Day Interim Report notification in MFN 04-081" (See above). Notified R1DO(Rogge), R2DO(Lesser), R3DO(Kozak), R4DO(Howell) and NRREO(Hodges).

ENS 4000518 July 2003 07:00:0010 CFR 21.21Part 21 Report Involving Impact of Fuel Channel Bow on Control Rod Blades

The following is a portion of text received as a fax: July 18, 2003 MFN 03-045 Subject: 60 Day Interim Notification: Impact of Fuel Channel Bow on Control Rod Blade Deviations Reference: Letter from Jason Post (GENE) to USNRC, 'Interim Surveillance Program for Fuel Channel Bow Monitoring', MFN 03-030 Revision 1, April 30, 2003 This communication is to inform you that GE Nuclear Energy (GENE) has been evaluating a potentially reportable condition (PRC) on the impact of fuel channel bow on control rod blades. The original channel bow evaluation for increased fuel channel - control rod blade interference did not consider previously evaluated deviations in the control rod blade. Channel bow can cause increased deflection and stresses in control rod blades, which must be considered in control rod blade deviation evaluations. The PRC evaluation is limited to control rod blades delivered to those plants identified in the referenced letter, where an interim surveillance plan for channel bow monitoring is recommended, because those are the only plants where there is a concern about increased fuel channel - control rod blade interference. As described in the referenced letter, it was determined that BWR/6 and BWR/4 & 5 C-lattice plants with Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) thick/thin channels potentially have increased channel bow that can cause fuel channel control rod blade interference. An interim surveillance program was provided to augment the surveillance requirements in the plant Technical Specifications until other actions, which mitigate or limit the potential for control rod - fuel channel interference due to channel bow can be identified and implemented. This surveillance program provides early indication of potentially degraded operational performance and assurance that action is taken before reaching excessive levels of control rod interference. This surveillance plan is limited to BWR/6 and BWR/4&5 C-lattice plants with GNF thick/thin channels and GENE control rods. There have been no indications of excessive interference on BWR/2, 3 and 4 D-lattice plants, and as a result, they are excluded from the interim surveillance program. The PRC evaluation was initiated by GENE on May 19, 2003. GENE will not have completed the evaluation by July 18, 2003, when the 60 day evaluation period expires. Therefore, GENE is submitting this 60 Day Interim Notification under 10CFR21.21(a)(2) to inform the NRC that we are working on the issue, and to commit to report the results of the evaluation no later than September 23, 2003. GE Nuclear Energy has identified the following as affected plants: Clinton, Nine Mile Point 2, Fermi 2, Grand Gulf, River Bend, Limerick 1 & 2 and Perry 1.

          • UPDATE ON 9/24/03 AT 0055 FROM POST TO LAURA*****

GE submitted its 60 day update letter which indicated no change from previously submitted information.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/18/03 @ 2115 BY JASON POST TO GOULD * * *

This communication is to inform you that GE Nuclear Energy (GENE) has completed the evaluation of the potentially reportable condition (PRC) identified in References 2 and 3 and has concluded that it is NOT a Reportable Condition under 10CFR21. Channel bow can cause increased deflection and stresses in control rod blades. The impact of channel bow on as-designed control rod blades was considered when the surveillance program identified in Reference 1 was developed_ However, the evaluation did not consider known control rod blade deviations from as-designed conditions that had previously been addressed. The evaluation to determine the impact of channel bow on control rod blade deviations, as reported to the NRC in References 2 and 3, has now been completed. The evaluation concluded that the increased loads from channel bow do not impact the structural integrity of control rods with known deviations from as-designed conditions. Therefore, it does not produce a significant safety hazard or lead to violation of a technical specification safety limit. As described in the Reference 1 letter, it was determined that BWR/6 and BVVR/4 & 5 C-lattice plants with Global Nuclear Fuel (GNF) thick/thin channels are potentially susceptible to increased channel bow that can cause increased fuel channel - control rod blade interference. A surveillance program is recommended per Reference 1 for the potentially susceptible 8 plants listed above. This evaluation examines known deviations from the as-designed condition for original equipment manufactured (OEM) control rod blades and for "DuraLife" and "Marathon" replacement blades in the potentially susceptible plants. The PRC evaluation was initiated by GENE on May 19, 2003. GENE reported the results of the evaluation for OEM blades and "DuraLife" replacement blades in Reference 3. GENE has now completed the evaluation applicable to "Marathon" replacement blades. These evaluations indicate that there is no change from the previous information provided in Reference 1. Therefore, GENE is submitting this Final Notification to inform the NRC that the evaluations have been completed, and to report the GENE conclusion that this is NOT a Reportable Condition per 10CFR21. References: 1. Letter from Jason Post (GENE) to USNRC, "Interim Surveillance Program for Fuel Channel Bow Monitoring", MFN 03-030 Revision 1, April 30, 2003 2. Letter from Jason Post (GENE) to USNRC, "60 Day Interim Notification: Impact of Fuel Channel Bow on Control Rod Blade Deviations," MFN 03-045, July 18, 2003 3. Letter from Jason Post (GENE) to USNRC, "60 Day Interim Notification: Impact of Fuel Channel Bow on Control Rod Blade Deviations," MFN 03-103, September 23, 2003 Notified Reg 1 RDO(Rogge), Reg 3 RDO(Lipa), Reg4 RDO(Kennedy), and NRR(Foster) See related events #39634 and 39806

Control Rod