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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 56764 | 29 September 2023 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 Interim Report - Deviation Associated with an SMB-1 Geared Limit Switch Assembly | The following information was provided by Flowserve via phone and email: The purpose of this letter is to provide written notification of an evaluation of a deviation in a basic component in accordance with 10 CFR21.21(a)(2). This interim report pertains to actuator geared limit switch assemblies contained in SMB-1 actuators supplied to Bopp & Reuther Valves for use in safety related applications at Bruce Nuclear Generating Station. Flowserve - Limitorque was contacted by Bruce Power who reported a malfunction of an actuator geared limit switch (GLS) assembly which occurred while attempting to set the valve travel position limits prior to placing the actuator into service. Site inspections of the GLS assembly revealed damage to the GLS drive pinion which engages with the actuator drive train. Site photos and dimensional measurements of the drive pinion requested by Flowserve indicate that the GLS was assembled with an incorrect drive pinion resulting in the malfunction. Use of an incorrect subcomponent in the assembly constitutes the deviation to the design being evaluated. The actuator GLS assembly is a safety related component. A malfunction of the GLS in service has the potential to affect the safety function of the actuator. The assembly containing the deviation is a 4-train geared limit switch (GLS) assembly part number 10168 supplied in SMB-1 actuators manufactured on Flowserve order 175377.001 Three actuators (serial numbers L1226986, L1226987, & L1226988) were shipped to Bopp & Reuther Valves on 2/4/2020. Flowserve's evaluation of this issue is ongoing and will not be completed within 60 days. The evaluation is expected to be completed by 11/17/2023 pending return of the affected components to Flowserve for inspection. Questions concerning this notification can be directed to Chris Shaffer, Quality Manager." The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: This issue was identified at a Canadian reactor plant owned by Bruce Power. The Quality Manager at Flowserve is not currently aware of any affected US reactor plants.
Flowserve Quality Assurance Manager submitted the Final Part 21 Report pertaining to a deviation in a basic component in accordance with 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2). The report concluded that the evaluated deviation constitutes a reportable defect affecting three actuators listed in the final report. Notified R1DO (Defrancisco), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Feliz-Adorno), R4DO (Vossmar), and Part 21 Reactors (email). | ||
| ENS 56252 | 5 October 2022 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 - Deviation to Qualified Design | The following is a summary of information provided by Flowserve - Limitorque via email: Entergy Waterford 3 informed Flowserve - Limitorque on 10/5/2022 that it discovered that a Peerless 125 volt, 25ft-lb, 56 frame direct current (DC) motor had two fasteners securing the brush holder ring assembly to the motor frame. However, the DC motor assembly used in the qualification test program was assembled with 4 fasteners. Therefore, the use of two fasteners is a deviation to the qualified design. Flowserve is submitting this report as an interim report and is evaluating this deviation to determine whether this condition could potentially affect the safety related function of DC powered Limitorque actuators. Flowserve is continuing to work with the motor original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to refine the scope of potentially affected motors. Limitorque actuators equipped with Peerless - Winsmith DC electric motors with start torque ratings of 40 ft-lb and larger are not affected by this issue. Limitorque actuators equipped with alternating current (AC) powered electric motors are not affected by this issue. The evaluation is expected to be completed by 01/27/2023. If there are questions, or addition information is required, please contact Chris Shaffer, Quality Assurance Manager, Flowserve Corporation, Ph: (434) 522-4136. Known affected plant: Waterford 3 Nuclear Generating Station
Flowserve provided an update to notify that the final evaluation of the safety consequence and reportability, primarily involving seismic qualification, will be delayed until 02/24/2023. Notified R4DO (Agrawal) via phone and the Part 21 group via email.
Flowserve has completed the evaluation of the deviation described in the initial notification. Flowserve has concluded that the deviation has no substantial impact to the safety function of the component and/or the associated actuator. Notified R4DO (Vossmar) via phone and the Part 21 group via email. | ||
| ENS 55095 | 9 December 2020 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 Report - Actuator Failure Due to Loose Cam Pins | The following is a summary of the report provided by the supplier: Flowserve - Limitorque was informed that during testing of a SMB-0 actuator prior to installation, the actuator failed to return from the manual handwheel mode to motor operation mode. Site personnel removed the electric motor from the actuator and discovered that the worm shaft gear cam pin had become detached from the worm shaft clutch gear. The actuator was one of six identical actuators supplied to Ontario Power Generation by Limitorque in January 2020. Subsequent site inspection of five other actuators received on the order revealed that the cam pins were loose in the worm shaft clutch gear. The issue was discovered prior to placing any of the actuators into service. The defect was the result of improper assembly of the worm shaft clutch gear. The machinist manufacturing the component failed to complete the step require to permanently retain the cam pin in position. Although no other occurrences of this issue have been reported, Flowserve is continuing to evaluate this issue regarding the potential extent of condition. Currently, there are no recommended actions for the nuclear plants concerning this Part 21 notification. The supplier has not identified any affected plants at this time and continue to evaluate the extent of condition. Part number containing the worm shaft clutch gear: 60-420-0130-1 Corrective Actions: The six gears affected were returned to Limitorque for evaluation and replacement. All SMB worm shaft gears of similar design were placed on temporary quality assurance hold for enhanced inspection. No defective parts were found. All worm shaft gears currently being manufactured will have an additional quality control inspection point for proper cam pin installation. Point of contact: Kyle Ramsey, Senior Product Engineer at Flowserve-Limitorque Actuation Systems, 5114 Woodall Road, Lynchburg, VA 24502, Office number: 434-522-4138
Flowserve's investigation has concluded that the assembly error that resulted in the defect being reported was an isolated incident affecting the six parts identified below that were manufactured on a single work order in January 2020. No other gears were manufactured on that work order. Production records indicate that approximately 400 SMB-0 worm shaft clutch gears have been manufactured for nuclear and commercial applications in the past four years. No other instances of loose cam pins have been reported. Notified R1DO (Arner), R2DO (Miller), R3DO (Peterson), R4DO (Azua), and Part 21 Reactors Group (email). | ||
| ENS 54584 | 12 March 2020 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | EN Revision Imported Date : 6/12/2020 INTERIM PART 21 NOTIFICATION - DEFECTIVE SOLENOID VALVES The following is a summary of information that was obtained from Flowserve via facsimile: On January 13, 2020, and January 14, 2020, two Flowserve Model 38878-8, 3-way, 2-postion solenoids valves supplied to Seabrook Station for use on the feed water isolation valve actuator failed bench testing. The failed solenoid valves were returned to Flowserve for evaluation. The evaluation of these solenoid valves will be completed by June 11, 2020. Point of Contact: Matt Hobbs, PE Engineering Manager Office: 919-334-7127 MHobbs@flowserve.com
The following is a summary of the information provided by the vendor via fax and email: Testing at Flowserve determined that valves did not reposition when actuated and were failed. Disassembly determined that one valve had unidentified foreign material that was preventing valve from actuating, and the other valve had been partially disassembled and then reassembled, resulting in damage that caused the valve to not actuate. Flowsever determined that these conditions would have caused failure of the assembly and test performed at Flowserve before the valves were shipped and therefore occurred after Flowserve shipped the valves. Flowserve concluded that these two solenoid valve failures are not defects or deviations that occurred at Flowserve that would be associated with substantial safety hazards. Notified R1DO (Jackson) and Part 21/50.55 Reactors Group (by email). | |||
| ENS 50610 | 13 November 2014 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21(a)(2), Interim Report for Comply or Defect in Component | Part 21 - Miller Air Cylinder Seals Dedication Issue | The following was received from the licensee via fax: This is to notify the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission that, in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR Part 21, we have identified a potential issue and are submitting our evaluation of the event. Description: Flowserve supplied a quantity of two Size 6 Class 900 Anchor Darling Double Disc gate valves with tag numbers CV-3027 and CV-3056 to Palisades Nuclear Plant in 2007. The valves are actuated by Miller air cylinders and have a safety function to maintain the system pressure boundary by remaining fully open during injection and to subsequently move to the fully closed position upon receipt of a recirculation actuation signal. This Miller air cylinder is not spring-assisted and thus uses air to perform the safety-related function. As such, the air cylinder, any tubing, and seals associated with the air system would also be considered safety related. When the valve was tested prior to shipment, the actuator was dedicated as an assembly and performed adequately. However, the seals containing the air system in the Miller Air Cylinder and Flow Control valve were not individually dedicated as a basic component - that is, the seal material was not verified. There is no indication that the material is defective, but in addition to the functional testing at the Flowserve facility, the material of the seals should have been checked and verified. The Flow Control Valve was ordered with Nitrile (Buna-N) seals while the Air Cylinder was ordered with Viton seals. While the seal materials were not verified, the only possible seal material for these items would have been Viton, Buna-N, or EPR. Scope: Flowserve has performed a review of all other air cylinders provided from the Raleigh facility over the last 12 years and found no other instances of this issue. Therefore, the scope of this notification is limited to only the two tag numbers 01-3027 and CV-3056 at Palisades Nuclear Plant. Proposed Action: Flowserve will provide safety-related replacement seal kits for all seals containing the air system for the CV-3027 and CV-3056 valves. This will be sent on a zero dollar purchase order to Palisades Nuclear plant and will be completed as soon as Flowserve receives the purchase order. |