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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 47123 | 4 August 2011 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | Part 21 - Possible Weld Rod Certification Issues | On March 3, 2011, an audit of one of Fisher Control's suppliers determined that weld rod certified by an ISO process (instead of ASME) might have been used for weld repair of castings intended for nuclear service. Fisher and the supplier are in the process of reviewing all orders affected by this issue and have yet to find any that used the subject non-confirming material Fisher expects to complete this evaluation by August 26, 2011. At this time, if the review determines that a failure to comply condition exits, Fisher will issue notification per the requirements of 10 CFR 21.21(b).
Fisher Controls is providing this final notification per the requirements of 10CFR21.21(a). On August 3, 2011, Fisher provided an interim report concerning an audit of one of Fisher Control's suppliers and the determination that weld rod certified by an ISO process (instead of ASME) might have been used for weld repair of castings intended for nuclear service. Fisher and the supplier have completed the process of reviewing all orders affected by this issue and did not find any orders that used the subject non-conforming material. Therefore, Fisher will not issue a notification per the requirements of 10CFR21.21(b), because the review determined that a failure to comply condition does not exist. Notified the NRC Part 21 Group and all NRC Regional RDOs via e-mail. | ||
| ENS 44836 | 6 February 2009 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | Part 21 Report - Defective Asme Sa-193, Grade 6 Cap Screw Material | The following information was obtained from Fisher Controls International via facsimile: Fisher Information Notice (FIN 2009-01, dated February 2, 2009) was issued to notify customers of an issue reported to Fisher by Duke Energy. (Fisher has) informed (their) customers of record of this circumstance in accordance with 21.21 (b) of 10CFR21 because Fisher Controls International LLC, is not aware of each and every application or system design and cannot determine whether an anomaly could cause a defect or "failure to comply," relating to a substantial safety hazard. In particular, this Information Notice deals with customer orders that used improperly heat treated cap screws provided by Texas Bolt Company (Texas Bolt Order 204653, Certified by Texas Bolt Company, April 20, 1987). Receipt of this notice does not necessarily mean that the recipient has been shipped any of the subject equipment. It is expected that the recipients of this notice will review the information for applicability to their facilities, and if required, take the appropriate action as described in the section at the end of this notice. This notice applies only to customer orders processed by Posi-Seal International that used the 100 quantity lot of hex head cap screws identified by Texas Bolt Company Material Certification Report Number 001.87-1758, certified by Texas Bolt Company, April 20, 1987. Fisher was informed by Duke Energy that there have been failures of ASME SA-193 Grade B6 hex head cap screws at the Catawba Nuclear Station. These bolts are used on various size Posi-Seal butterfly valves to maintain a pressure seal on the outboard side of the valve body. Failure of these bolts will impair the pressure retaining capability of the valve body. Based on the experiences at Duke Energy, it is possible that a defective batch of cap screws were used by Posi-Seal around 1987. Fisher Controls International has attempted to determine a complete list of valve serial numbers that may have used bolts from this particular lot. Unfortunately, Fisher Controls International's review of available Posi-Seal records cannot provide validation of its completeness. It is recommended that customers verify if the QA documentation package, provided with the valve, contains a copy of the cap screw material certification attached to this information notice. If so, Fisher Controls International recommends that the subject cap screws be replaced. Fisher Controls requests that the recipient of this notice review it and take appropriate action in accordance with 10CFR21. If there are any technical questions or concerns, contact: Michael Wedemeyer Manager, Quality Fisher Controls International LLC 205 South Center Street Marshalltown, IA 50158 Fax: (641) 754-2854 Phone: (641) 754-2066 Michael.Wedemeyer@.Emerson.com Possible domestic constructions with defective cap screw material (Posi-Seal part number 131550, drawing number 5200-001) include McGuire, Catawba and Indian Point. | ||
| ENS 44809 | 27 January 2009 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | Part 21 Report - Part Not Evaluated for All Critical Characteristics | The following information was obtained from Fisher Controls International via facsimile: The equipment supplied included a 20 inch Fisher valve coupled to a Bettis actuator. The purpose of this Fisher Information Notice (FIN 2009-03) is to alert Alabama Power that as of January 16, 2009, Fisher Controls International LLC became aware of the possibility of a situation which may affect the performance of the applicable equipment. This notice applies only to the subject equipment supplied by Fisher Controls International LLC, identified above, that was provided to Alabama Power - Farley. Fisher Controls has determined that the subject items were provided with parts that were not properly processed per active valve requirements specified by the Alabama Power Order. Specifically, Fisher provided a coupler between the actuator drive lever and valve shaft that was not evaluated for all the critical characteristics deemed necessary for a commercial grade dedicated item per EPRI 5652 and Fisher Manufacturing Procedure FMP 2K27, 'Control of Commercial Grade Items to be Dedicated for Use in Nuclear Safety-Related Systems,' (Fisher Processing Level C). We (Fisher Controls) are reviewing the situation and will pursue a corrective action investigation to prevent problems like this in the future. Arrangements have been made with Alabama Power to retrofit a correctly processed part on the subject serial number. This is a formal notification; Alabama Power was notified of this situation on January 16, 2008. The coupling provided to Alabama Power did not meet the hardness requirements specified in the order. The coupler provided was annealed versus quench-hardened. | ||
| ENS 44653 | 12 November 2008 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21 | All Dimensionally Verified Commercial Grade Items Processed Per Fisher Manufac. Procedure Fmp 2K28 | Commercial grade items processed per FMP 2K28 (Fisher Processing Level D) may not address all the critical characteristics needed to determine if the item can be designated by the utility as a basic component. By accepting 10CFR21 on the order for Level D items, there is the implication that the item can be used as a basic component without further evaluation by the utility. During the latest NUPIC audit, it was pointed out that although FMP 2K28 specifically states that, 'This process does not verify the material or designate the item for use as a basic component,' 10CFR21 is only applicable to basic components. FMP 2K28 is intended to provide dimensional verification only for items where material verification was not readily available through Method 1 discussed in EPRI 5652. Parts provided per Level D are normally elastomer materials (diaphragms, o-rings, etc.) or packing and gasket materials. If a utility decides material verification is a critical characteristic, Fisher assumes that the utility will perform a material evaluation as required prior to designating an item as a basic component. In conclusion, Fisher assumed 10CFR21 responsibility because of defect reporting requirements but did not intend to imply that items processed to FMP 2K28 (Fisher Processing Level D) were capable of becoming a basic component without further evaluation by the purchaser. In the future, Fisher will no longer be able to accept 10CFR21 responsibility for parts processed to FMP 2K28 (Fisher Processing Level D). Fisher will also accommodate those orders requiring dedication traditionally offered as Level D through development and us of additional methods described in EPRI 5652." Potentially affected sites are: Ameren, Arizona Public Service, Arkansas Nuclear, Beaver Valley, Brunswick, Callaway, Calvert Cliffs, Catawba, Comanche Peak, Con Edison, Consumers Energy, Cook, Cooper, CP&L, Crystal River, Davis Besse, Detroit Edison, Dominion Energy, Dominion Power, Duke Energy, Duquesne, Entergy, Exelon, Fermi, Florida Power, G.E. Nuclear, Ginna, Harris, Hatch, Indian Point, Hatch, Kewaunee, Maine Yankee, McGuire, Millstone, Monticello, New York Power Authority, Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point, North Anna, Northeast Nuclear, Oconee, Oyster Creek, Palo Verde, PECA, Perry, Progress Energy, PSE&G, Rochester Gas & Electric, Salem, San Onofre, Shearon Harris, Southern California Edison, South Texas Project, Surry, Texas Utilities, Turkey Point, V.C. Summer, Virginia Power, Vermont Yankee, Waterford, Watts Bar, Westinghouse Electric Corp, Wisconsin Public Service, Wisconsin Electric Power, Wolf Creek, XCEL Energy. |