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| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 47706 | 24 February 2012 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation | Part 21 Report - Potential Minimum Wall Violation on Seismic Plate Valve Bodies | While reviewing Valve Body drawing 16B2201, it was discovered that an area in the packing bore has the possibility to not meet the minimum wall requirements of ASME B16.34 for a Class 150 valve at the minimum material condition due to a potential stack up of tolerances. Upon discovery of this possible failure to comply, an investigation was performed on all NPS 3-12 Type A11 Class 150 Seismic Plate Valve Bodies and it was determined that this issue was isolated to the NPS 8 Type A11 Class 150 Seismic Plate Valve Body per drawing 16B2201. It is the opinion of Fisher that there is no inherent safety risk associated with this situation. Fisher will be working with the individual plants (Clinton Power Station and Watts Bar) in question to measure the actual dimensions of the bodies to determine if a problem exists and will take appropriate corrective action. Fisher Information Notice: FIN 2012-01 | ||
| ENS 46655 | 25 February 2011 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation | Part 21 - Error in Valve Body Drawing | The purpose of this Fisher Information Notice (FIN) is to alert Duke Energy that as of February 25, 2011, Fisher Controls International LLC became aware of the possibility of a situation which may affect the performance of the applicable equipment provided to McGuire Nuclear Station. Specifically, an error was discovered on valve body drawing V112298, when, during a revision process on Revision B of the drawing, a dimension was omitted that set the depth of the valve shaft bearing bore. This error resulted in a greater possible variation of bearing position in the valve shaft bore. If the error was large, the valve could not be assembled which was not the case for these valves. The valves assembled without incident and passed the operational testing, including a seat leakage test, with no anomalies. In the case that the bearing position error was slight, it is possible that the seal and disc could experience more wear than normal and increased leakage would result. Because these valves are equipped with manual operators, Fisher expects that these valves will not be cycled enough to experience any of the potential problems described above. This equipment included NPS 4, Class 150, Fisher Type A11 Butterfly Valve Assemblies equipped with Fisher Leverlock Manual Actuators. The NPS 4, A11 is a butterfly valve that uses internal bearings (located on either side of the disc) to provide a radial wear surface for shaft rotation and also serve as a centering system for the disc in the waterway. Centering of the disc is accomplished with a wear surface on the end of the bearings adjacent to the side of the disc. Lateral positioning of the disc is accomplished by controlling the length of the bearings and the depth of the bored holes in the body that accept the bearings. Fisher has revised the drawings to ensure that this issue is corrected. | ||
| ENS 44808 | 27 January 2009 06:00:00 | 10 CFR 21.21, Notification of failure to comply or existence of a defect and its evaluation | Part 21 Report - Water Quality Deficiency | The following information was obtained from Fisher Controls International via facsimile: Fisher Controls International issued a Fisher Information Notice: FIN 2009-02, that notified customers of an issue discovered during an internal audit of manufacturing procedures followed by Fisher Controls International LLC. Specifically, on orders processed by Fisher Controls that invoked demineralized water cleaning requirements, Fisher Controls erroneously certified that all orders met demineralized water requirements when all requirements could not be proven to be met. To meet the certification requirements, demineralized water must meet the quality requirements of NQA-1. Fisher Controls uses FMP (Fisher Manufacturing Procedure) 12B3 to verify that demineralized water used to clean parts meets NQA-1. Fisher determined that water quality testing using FMP 12B3 performed from January 1, 2001 to May 1, 2008 did not meet the test protocols. Twenty two orders have been identified, from 500+ orders reviewed, which require either the use of demineralized water and/or NQA-1 high quality water for which Fisher cannot prove full compliance. It is important to note that this review was limited to nuclear assembly orders only. Safety-related parts orders were not included because final cleaning was done either with alcohol or acetone. The affected plants are: Indian Point 2 Seabrook Millstone (two valves) D.C. Cook North Anna (two valves) Catawba (seven valves) Oconee (five valves) McGuire (three valves) |