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 Start dateReporting criterionTitleEvent descriptionSystemLER
ENS 5312215 December 2017 20:30:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsCorporate Individuals Removed from the Fitness for Duty Random Pool

On 12/15/17 at 1430 (CST), it was discovered by corporate Fitness for Duty (FFD) personnel that two individuals in the Corporate Emergency Response Organization (ERO) and one Corporate FFD Authorization (FFDA) individual were removed from the random FFD testing pool by the security database, Illuminate. It was identified that a database coding error removed the FFD random pool flag when an additional clearance was requested for these individuals. The individuals involved did not have Unescorted Access (UA) or Unescorted Access Authorized (UAA). Review by corporate FFD personnel and the security database vendor (Endevor) found this coding error affected only those individuals not holding UA/UAA but who require additional clearances which require being in the FFD random pool (e.g., ERO, FFDA). Corporate security personnel found no other individuals to be affected by this issue. No individuals with UA/UAA are affected by this issue. Affected individuals have been added to the FFD random pool and pre-access testing will be performed for the three identified individuals prior to resuming duties requiring inclusion in the FFD random pool. A code modification for the security database has been created to prevent error recurrence, testing has begun with implementation targeted for Monday 12/18/17. Quarterly reviews will continue to take place for verification purposes. The issue does not affect any Exelon Sites or the process for granting UA/UAA. No other utilities are known to use the Illuminate security database.

  • * * UPDATE ON 04/10/18 AT 1919 EDT FROM MARK HAWES TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

On 7/25/17, it was determined that on 4/1/17, when James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) changed ownership and transferred individuals into the Exelon Fitness for Duty (FFD) security program Illuminate, one individual was inadvertently excluded from the Follow-up portion of the program. This individual's record in the industry Personnel Access Data System (PADS) remained accurate and Illuminate was updated on 7/12/17; however, this individual did not receive four months of Follow-up FFD testing as required by 10 CFR 26.69(b)(4)(iii). No additional FFD program violations occurred by this individual and no other individuals involved in the transfer were affected by this error. A computer code modification by the Illuminate database vendor (Endevor) was created to prevent error recurrence. The failure to transfer an individual into the FFD Follow-up Program on 4/1/17, is a significant FFD programmatic failure which is reportable per 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4). The individual was a non-licensed JAF employee who had Unescorted Access. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Jackson), R3DO (Stone), and FFD Group (email).

ENS 515144 November 2015 21:20:0010 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News ReleaseOffsite Notification Made Due to Transformer LeakDiscovery of a PCB (Polychlorinated Biphenyls) leak on a 440 gallon deenergized transformer. Leak was approximately 0.5 gallons (3-5 lbs of PCB). (The leak was) contained onsite within unit 2, 617 turbine building. Contractor clean-up (is) enroute. No personnel injury or exposure. No offsite release. (The licensee) contacted IEMA (Illinois Emergency Management Agency), National Response Center, and the local emergency planning center. The licensee has notified the NRC Inspector. Notified FEMA, USDA, HHS, DOE, and EPA EOC.
ENS 4869824 January 2013 16:00:00Other Unspec ReqmntNon-Compliance with Storage Cask Technical Specification LimitsThis report is being submitted pursuant to Transnuclear (TN)-68 Technical Specification (TS) Section 2.2, which requires reporting of non-compliances with the Functional and Operational limits of TS Section 2.1.1. A recent review of historical ISFSI (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation) fuel characterization data found that in the ISFSI 2001 campaign, a total of four Unit 3 fuel assemblies were loaded into four dry cask storage casks (i.e., one assembly per cask) having been cooled for 9.8 years, with a decay heat value of 0.201 kW each, which is well below the 0.312 kW limit (TN-68 TS 2.1.1.). Therefore, it is not expected that there were any actual thermal related concerns with the fuel or the associated cask components. However, this was contrary to the Functional and Operational limits of TS Section 2.1.1 , Table 2.1.1-1, which requires the assemblies to have been cooled for 10 years. The decay heat of the assemblies has continued to decrease since their initial loading in 2001 and all assemblies currently meet the TS 2.2.1 limits. The fuel assemblies are in a safe condition as required by TS 2.2.1. These casks were loaded under TN-68 Certificate of Compliance (C of C) Amendment 0 (Certificate 1027). This notification is required pursuant to TN-68 TS Section 2.2.2. This issue has been entered into the Corrective Action Program. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 4604324 June 2010 14:55:0010 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirementsExelon Drug Testing Contractor Tested Positive During Random Fitness-For-Duty TestA contractor used by Exelon Corporate for drug testing at six Exelon nuclear sites tested positive for an illegal substance during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual has been denied unescorted access to Exelon facilities. Contact HOO for details. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspectors at each site.