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| Entered date | Site | Region | Reactor type | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 57026 | 13 March 2024 02:29:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On March 12, 2024, at 2111 EDT, a valid containment ventilation isolation train 'A' and 'B' signal was received due to a spurious loss of power to 1EMF-38 (containment particulate radiation monitor) and 1EMF-39 (containment gas radiation monitor). The power to 1EMF-38 and 1EMF-39 was restored. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: There were no plant evolutions ongoing at the time of the event and the cause of the loss of power is under investigation. There was no impact to Unit 2.
After further review of the event, it was determined the actuation of the associated containment ventilation isolation train 'A' and 'B' was not valid. This is due to the loss of power being associated with the control room modules for 1EMF-38 and 1EMF-39, and not a result of an actual sensed parameter or plant condition. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller) |
| ENS 56177 | 24 October 2022 11:40:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 10/24/2022 at 0857 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 7 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a 2B train main feedwater pump trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system started automatically as expected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the steam generators and discharging to the condenser. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The automatic start of the auxiliary feedwater system is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56172 | 20 October 2022 20:24:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1446 EDT on October 20, 2022, an individual was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. Due to the nature of the medical condition, the individual was not thoroughly surveyed prior to being transported offsite. Follow-up surveys performed by radiation protection technicians identified no contamination of the worker or of the ambulance and response personnel. This is an eight-hour notification, non-emergency for the transportation of a contaminated person offsite. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 56165 | 15 October 2022 15:46:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 10/15/2022 at 1159 (EDT), during the Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 2 refueling outage, it was determined that the results of a planned surface examination Liquid Penetrant test (PT) performed on a previous overlay repair on nozzle number 74 of the reactor vessel closure head (RVCH) did not meet applicable acceptance standards. The examination was being performed to meet the requirements of Relief Request RA-21-0144, 'Proposed Alternative to Use Reactor Vessel Head Penetration Embedded Flaw Repair for Life of Plant'. The penetration required repairs for the discovered indications. The repairs have been completed in accordance with the ASME Code of Record prior to returning the vessel head to service. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The original indication that led to the overlay repair was discovered in April 2021, during ultrasonic testing and reported to the NRC and assigned EN55201. |
| ENS 55856 | 23 April 2022 06:04:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: On April 23, 2022, at 0224 (EDT) hours, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, two control rods dropped during control rod testing resulting in misalignment, which required a manual reactor trip in accordance with plant procedure. All safety systems functioned as expected. The Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed to provide makeup flow to the steam generators. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the steam generator power operated relief valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The cause of the dropped rods is being investigated. Unit 1 is not affected. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Electrical power is in normal off-site arrangement. All emergency electrical supplies are available. |
| ENS 55549 | 27 October 2021 20:39:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1429 EDT on October 27, 2021 with Unit 1 in Mode 6 at 0 percent power, the 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Load Sequencer was actuated by a valid undervoltage condition on the 1B 4160V Essential Bus that occurred during 1B Sequencer calibration activities. Valid signals were sent to both the 1B EDG and Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) systems. Neither system automatically started as they were both removed from service for maintenance activities at the time. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the 1B EDG and Unit 1 CA systems. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55339 | 4 July 2021 15:59:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 0911 EDT on July 4, 2021, a failure occurred on 2 out of 3 of the required seismic monitoring instruments that feed the Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) annunciator. The failure would prevent an OBE EXCEEDED alarm on the Seismic Monitoring Panel in the Control Room. This results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore the seismic monitoring instruments. Compensatory measures are in place to assure adequate monitoring capability. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the unplanned failure of the required seismic instruments affects the ability to assess a seismic event greater than the OBE. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55275 | 25 May 2021 21:38:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 1751 EDT on May 25, 2021, it was determined the local leak rate test (LLRT) for the 2EMF-IN containment penetration did not meet 10 CFR 50 Appendix J requirements for both the inboard and outboard containment isolation valves (2MISV5230 and 2MISV5231). The LLRT was performed during the previous refueling outage at which time primary containment was not required to be operable. The leakage assigned to the penetration also resulted in total leakage exceeding the allowed overall leakage. The valves were repaired and retested satisfactory prior to entering the mode of applicability, This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55229 | 1 May 2021 15:39:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | At 0755 EDT, on May 1, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at 0 percent (not critical) power, the reactor trip breakers opened during heat-up activities. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. At 1013 EDT, on May 1, 2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System occurred. The loss of both main feedwater pump turbines caused an AFW auto-start. The 2A and 2B motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the loss of both main feedwater pumps signal was received. The cause of the actuation is still being evaluated. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the steam generators and discharging steam to the condenser. Unit 1 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while not critical and the actuation of the AFW system, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55201 | 21 April 2021 02:37:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | During the performance of reactor vessel closure head (RVCH) examinations, at 2230 EDT on April 20, 2021, it was determined that the Unit 2 RVCH penetration nozzle number 74 did not meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME code case N-729-6 . All other RVCH penetration examinations have been completed per 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME code case N-729-6 with no other relevant indications identified. The condition of the Unit 2 reactor vessel head penetration nozzle number 74 will be resolved prior to re-installation of the Unit 2 RVCH. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 54943 | 11 October 2020 10:25:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | At 0315 (EDT) on October 11, 2020, Unit 2 ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. At the current leakage (approximately 3.2 gpm), the dose analysis indicates dose to TSC inhabitants would exceed the 30 days REM TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent) limit should leakage continue for the entire duration. Repairs are currently in-progress to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility, There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54898 | 12 September 2020 21:12:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | At 1748 EDT on September 12, 2020, Unit 2 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long-term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. Repair options to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC are currently being evaluated. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This same condition was reported under EN #54887. | |
| ENS 54888 | 8 September 2020 13:13:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | At 0925 EDT, on September 8, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped on Overpower Delta Temperature. Unit 1 Channel 1 Overpower Delta Temperature was tripped as a planned evolution when an inadvertent Unit 1 Channel 2 Overpower Delta Temperature signal was received. This resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally. Because of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuated as expected due to on ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) signal. Unit 2 is not affected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 4-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54887 | 6 September 2020 11:39:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | At 034S (EDT) on September 6, 2020, Unit 2 ECCS leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. Repairs are currently in-progress to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC: becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54770 | 10 July 2020 08:01:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Catawba, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the McGuire Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54752 | 22 June 2020 01:00:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | At 2100 on June 21, 2020, a condition was discovered which will require corrective maintenance activities to be performed on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work will include repair of the Condensing Unit system. The estimated duration of repair is unknown at this time. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54712 | 14 May 2020 18:36:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | At approximately 1430 (EDT) on May 14, 2020, Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) requested offsite transport for treatment of a contractor to an offsite medical facility. Upon arrival of the coroner, the individual was declared deceased at 1630 (EDT) on May 14, 2020. The fatality was not work-related and the individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area. No news release by CNS is planned. Notifications are planned to the South Carolina Division of Occupational Safety and Health. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54707 | 13 May 2020 01:14:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | During the performance of reactor vessel closure head (RVCH) inspections, at 2220 EDT on May 12, 2020, it was determined that the Unit 1 RVCH penetration nozzle number 18 did not meet ASME code case N-729-4 requirements. A surface examination (penetrant test) identified a linear indication on nozzle number 18. The indication was not through-wall as determined by ultrasonic testing. The condition of the Unit 1 reactor vessel head penetration nozzle number 18 will be resolved prior to re-installation of the Unit 1 reactor vessel head. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54523 | 12 February 2020 21:51:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | At 1800 EST, on February 12, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. Because of the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System actuated as expected due to on ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) signal. The AFW pumps started as designed when the valid system actuation was received. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while critical, this event is being reported as an 4-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The site remains in a normal electrical lineup. The cause of the turbine trip is under investigation. | |
| ENS 54307 | 2 October 2019 11:50:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | On October 2, 2019, at 0415 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 2 containment spray system occurred during valve strokes of the 2A train containment spray header isolations while the 2B train containment spray pump was in recirculation. The reason for the containment spray actuation was due to a conflicting procedural alignment with the 2B containment spray recirculation procedure. The containment spray system does not have an automatic function, and only receives manual actuation. The Unit 2 containment spray actuation was secured at 0416. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the containment spray system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54286 | 19 September 2019 14:08:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A, B, and D) - Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function Unit 2 Component Cooling water system inoperable. On July 6, 2019, from 0156 to 1545 (EDT), it was determined that both trains of the unit 2 component cooling water system were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The affected safety function was restored on July 6, 2019, at 1545 (EDT) when the 2B component cooling train was restored to operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. At the time of the event no other safety related systems were inoperable. The event had no impact on Unit 1. | |
| ENS 54256 | 5 September 2019 16:53:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system occurred on 4/28/19. Filtration capability was not impacted by this condition. Maintenance subsequently repaired the condition and the TSC ventilation system was returned to service on 5/1/19. This condition did not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. | |
| ENS 54233 | 20 August 2019 20:00:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | While performing a purification on the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST), it was discovered that the single train system was inoperable due to the level being less than the required volume per SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.5.4.2. The condition was discovered on 8/18/19 at 1700 (EDT). The FWST level was restored to greater than the required volume per SR 3.5.4.2 at 1744 on 8/18/19. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 53762 | 30 November 2018 04:22:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | At 2300 EST on November 29, 2018 Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) requested offsite transport for treatment of a contractor to an offsite medical facility. Upon arrival of the offsite medical personnel, the individual was declared deceased at 2354 EST on November 29, 2018. The fatality was not work-related and the individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area. No news release by CNS is planned. Notifications are planned to the South Carolina Division of Occupational Safety and Health. This is a four hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 53271 | 19 March 2018 10:49:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Automatic actuation of the 2B CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) System. At 0329 (EDT on) 03-19-18, with Unit 2 in Mode 5, an actuation of the 2B CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) system occurred during maintenance associated with the 2B Main Feedwater Pump. The cause of the CA (Auxiliary Feedwater) system automatic start was an unanticipated reset and subsequent trip signal of the 2B Main Feedwater pump during maintenance activities. The 2B CA Pump/Train automatically started as designed when the 'Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps' signal was received. The system operated as required. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the CA System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident has been notified. |
| ENS 51824 | 28 March 2016 15:43:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A non-licensed, licensee supervisory employee had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 51684 | 25 January 2016 15:26:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality due to a loss of cooling of the TSC (Technical Support Center) Ventilation system was discovered on 1/25/2016. At 1030 (EST), maintenance personnel reported the compressor local power breaker was tripped open and that all 3 phases of the compressor indicated grounded. Maintenance will begin repairs as soon as parts are made available. Estimated time to repair is unknown at this time. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable emergency plan implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team will be notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51635 | 5 January 2016 16:07:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A condition impacting functionality of the TSC (Technical Support Center) ventilation system was discovered on 1/5/2016 at 1120 (EST). The issue involves a loss of cooling capability of the TSC ventilation system due to a failed compressor. Maintenance will begin repairs as soon as parts are made available. Estimated time to repair is unknown at this time. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team will be notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51103 | 29 May 2015 20:17:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as the discovered condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. A condition impacting functionality of the TSC (Technical Support Center) Ventilation system was discovered on 05/29/2015 at 1230 (EDT). The issue involves a loss of cooling capability of the TSC ventilation system due to a failed relay. Maintenance will begin repairs at 0700 (EDT) on 05/30/2015. Estimated time to repair is unknown at this time. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team will be notified of the condition and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. An update will be provided once the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
The TSC ventilation system has been returned to service. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Guthrie). |
| ENS 50522 | 9 October 2014 11:30:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A non-license supervisor has been found in violation of the Duke Energy Fitness for Duty Policy. The individual's access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The licensee will be notifying State and Local authorities. |
| ENS 50316 | 29 July 2014 05:05:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 07/29/2014 to the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes performance of breaker inspections and corrective/preventative AHU (Air Handling Unit) maintenance. The planned work activity duration is approximately 48 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or station employees. The licensee will be notifying state and local authorities. |
| ENS 49990 | 2 April 2014 21:08:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non-emergency notification. As part of converting to NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) 805, Catawba determined that there are conditions that may not ensure required equipment remains available under certain postulated fire scenarios. The determination concluded that the effects of a postulated fire in specific fire areas could prevent critical systems or components from performing their intended functions, potentially resulting in the inability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. Affected fire areas are as follows (elevation numbers are in parentheses): 1. Residual Heat Removal/Containment Spray Pump Room (522) 2. Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (543) 3. Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (543) 4. Auxiliary Building Common Area (543) 5. Unit 2 Electrical Penetration Room (560) 6. Unit 1 Electrical Penetration Room (560) 7. 2ETB Switchgear Room (560) 8. 1ETB Switchgear Room (560) 9. Unit 2 Battery Room (554) 10. Unit 1 Battery Room (554) 11. Auxiliary Building Common Area (560) 14. Unit 2 ETA Switchgear Room (577) 15. Unit 1 ETA Switchgear Room (577) 17. Unit 1 Cable Room (574) 18. Auxiliary Building Common Area (577) 20. Unit 1 Electrical Penetration Room (594) 45. Unit 1 Cable Room Corridor (574) 46. Unit 2 Cable Room Corridor (574) 48. Unit 2 Inside Doghouse 49. Unit 1 Inside Doghouse RB1. Unit 1 Reactor Building RB2. Unit 2 Reactor Building This is reportable as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Fire watches have been implemented as appropriate in response to this determination. This condition has been entered into the Catawba Corrective Action Program. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. The licensee will notify the State of North Carolina and South Carolina and well as the local counties. |
| ENS 49956 | 24 March 2014 21:30:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 03/24/14 starting at approximately 2300 (EDT) to the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. The work includes performance of planned carbon bed filter sample. The planned work activity duration is approximately 5 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event poses no threat to the public or station employees.
The TSC was returned to service at 0325 EDT on 3/25/14. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Shaeffer). |
| ENS 49457 | 21 October 2013 15:02:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | A spill of greater than 100 gallons of water, containing a low-level tritium concentration with the potential to reach groundwater has occurred on the Catawba site. The tritium levels in this water were 8,314 picocuries per liter, less than one-half of the US Environmental Protection Agency drinking water standard for tritium of 20,000 picocuries per liter. While conducting planned Unit 2 maintenance activities, water from the main condenser was being pumped to a site collection pond and overflowed due to exceeding capacity. The source of the spill was stopped. Based upon the on-site spill location and low tritium levels, there is no health or safety risk to the public or employees. In accordance with the industry voluntary Groundwater Protection Initiative, the NRC Resident Inspector, states, and counties will be notified. |
| ENS 49426 | 10 October 2013 15:19:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On August 5, 2013, annunciators were received for diesel generator (DG) 2B low lube oil inlet and outlet temperature. Investigation revealed that a control relay in motor control center cubicle 2EMXF F02D was not operating as expected. A work order was generated to replace the relay. While working the work order, a relay contact pad was found resting next to the relay. An inspection of the relay revealed that the contact pad came from the backside of the left movable contact. With the relay coil in the energized state and the contact pad missing, the relay contact would not engage. This prevented the lube oil heaters from energizing. The failed relay was sent to the Duke Energy Metallurgy Laboratory. It was observed that the gold brazing material was miniscule where the pad should have been attached. The laboratory observed the same brazing issue with the adjacent relay contact pads that were still attached on the failed relay. The material could barely be seen under the pads: it should have protruded out the edges for good brazing. It was determined that the overseas manufacturer of the relays had insufficiently bonded the relay contact pads to the movable contact arms for at least one known batch of relays. The failed relay is a Cutler-Hammer relay, Model Number 9575H3A000. The failed relay had been installed on July 30, 2013 to replace obsolete relay Model Number 9575H2612A. The replacement relay type was purchased by Duke Energy as a commercial grade item and dedicated for use in safety related applications. The failed relay batch number is 1111AF. Similar relays had been installed in the DG lube oil sump tank heater and the DG jacket water heater applications for DGs 2A and 2B. Duke Energy concluded that for these two installed applications, no substantial safety hazard existed, as DGs 2A and 2B were determined to be operable. (The heaters operate while the DGs are in standby to maintain required lube oil and jacket water temperature. Failure of these heaters to automatically start would be detected by alarms and the DGs could be started to maintain temperature. The heaters do not operate when the DGs are running.) However, because similar affected relays were in inventory, they theoretically could have been utilized in other safety related applications (even though they were not actually utilized in any other safety related applications). The most significant safety related applications where the affected relays could have been utilized were in circuitry associated with safety related ventilation system fans. Had they been utilized in these systems, a failure could have prevented the affected ventilation system fan from starting on an actuation signal. Catawba's evaluation that concluded that this issue could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard was completed on October 7, 2013. However, there was no actual impact to public health or safety. The required company officer notification was made on October 9, 2013. Catawba is the only Duke Energy site that had the affected relays. In addition, none of the affected relays were sold or transferred to other utilities by Duke Energy. Notifications will he made to the Catawba NRC Resident Inspector and to the required state and local agencies. The licensee will also be notifying North and South Carolina State, York, Gaston, and Mecklenburg Counties. |
| ENS 49319 | 4 September 2013 04:13:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 09/04/13 to the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes performance of planned outside air intake valve electrical repair. The planned work activity duration is approximately 12 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event poses no threat to the public or station employees. |
| ENS 49311 | 28 August 2013 03:20:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 08/28/13 in the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes performance of planned outside air intake valve electrical troubleshooting. The planned work activity duration is approximately 16 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedure unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The event poses no threat to the public or station employees. |
| ENS 49195 | 16 July 2013 14:20:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This 60-day optional report as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified system, specifically the Nuclear Service Water (RN) system. This event had no impact on public health and safety. During work to replace a timer associated with an RN (Nuclear Service Water) level circuit, electrical adapters and jumpers were installed incorrectly, resulting in generation of an Emergency Low Pit Level signal. This resulted in an unplanned actuation for RN to realign its suction source from Lake Wylie (normal source) to the alternate source, the SNSWP (Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond). On 5/28/13, with both units at 100% power, a lo-lo level signal was received for A Train RN Pit, initiating the realignment to the SNSWP for both A and B trains. Prior to this event, both trains of RN were aligned to the SNSWP for maintenance. The lo-lo level signal did initiate a start of all available RN Pumps. Associated valves, including RN crossover valve, return header isolation valves and non-essential header isolation valves closed as expected. This separated RN trains A and B. This was a complete actuation for Train A and the system performed as designed for existing plant conditions. This event was entered into the site corrective action program for resolution. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, as well as, the State and local governments. |
| ENS 49161 | 30 June 2013 22:53:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | The Auxiliary Feedwater System was inoperable due to elevated hotwell temperatures from 1720 to 1739 EDT on 6/30/13. At no time was there a risk to the health and safety of the public. The elevated hotwell temperatures resulted from the loss of multiple cooling tower fans due to a lightning strike. Cooling tower fans and hotwell temperatures have been restored. Power was slightly reduced solely to maintain condenser vacuum until cooling tower fans were restored. At Catawba, the hotwell is a credited water supply for the auxiliary feedwater system. The unit is currently in a power ascension back to 100%. No other plant equipment was affected by the lightning strike. The licensee will be notifying the state warning points in both North and South Carolina and local warning points in Gaston, York, and Mecklenburg counties. They have notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Catawba Nuclear Station is retracting EN #49161 based on completion of evaluation of auxiliary feedwater system operability. The engineering department performed this evaluation using existing plant conditions during the event to verify existing safety analyses remain bounding and conservative. The evaluation concluded that sufficient volume of secondary condensate was available below the required temperature from the Upper Surge Tanks (USTs), in combination with the hotwell inventory as normally aligned, for the auxiliary feedwater system to remain operable during this event. This condition is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector, State and Counties. Notified the R2DO (King). |
| ENS 49036 | 15 May 2013 15:00:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non-emergency 30 day notification for missing licensed material. This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR20.2201(a)(1)(ii). On April 16, 2013, while performing the required semi-annual source leak check and inventory, Radiation Protection personnel could not locate the source label tag or cable for source RMC-0169 on radiation monitor 1EMF44H (This monitor has not been in use since 1995). The monitor's pre-amplifier box had been removed as well. 1EMH44H was inspected and the source was not found within the housing. A search was conducted for this missing source, however it could not be located. During the previous source leak check and inventory on October 4, 2012, the source was in its expected location. Source RMC-0169 is a 200 milligram depleted uranium source. The total original activity of the source was 9.998E-02 microCuries (3.03E-02 micro curies; U-234; 1.98E-03 microCuries; U-235, 6.77E-02 microCuries; U-238). The reportable limit for U-234 (the shortest-lived isotope in the source is U-234 with a half-live of 2.46E+05 years) is 0.01 microCuries per 10CFR20, Appendix C. Based on the activity of U-234 present in the source of 0.03 microCuries, this 30 day phone notification to the NRC is being provided pursuant to 10CFR22.2201(a)(1)(ii). The external dose to an individual from this source is negligible due to the small quantity and the type of material involved. Therefore, this event has no adverse effect upon the health and safety of employees or the public. The required written report pursuant to 10CFR20.2201(b)(1) will be provided to the NRC within 30 days of the telephone notification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee with notify State and local authorities. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 49032 | 15 May 2013 02:52:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Sample exceeding the industry groundwater protection initiative related to radioactivity in groundwater for which a news release is planned and notification to other government agencies will be made. A leak greater than 100 gallons containing tritium has the potential to reach groundwater. The source has been identified. Actions to isolate this source are being initiated. The licensee has identified a leak in a fiberglass discharge pipe from the turbine building sump. The licensee estimates that greater than 100 gallons of water has been discharged through the leak at the present time. The licensee is in the process of installing a temporary sump pump in the turbine building sump in order to isolate the discharge path. Samples indicate a tritium concentration of 8.964 E-6 uCi/mL. The licensee will notify state and local government agencies. A press release is planned. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48878 | 2 April 2013 16:25:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This is a non emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 4/3/13 to be Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes removal of a pressurizing ventilation fan and opening ventilation system ductwork. The planned work activity duration is approximately 48 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of North Carolina will be notified. |
| ENS 48717 | 5 February 2013 12:26:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation was removed from service on 2/5/13 at 0545 EST to complete scheduled maintenance activities. Without proper ventilation, habitability of the TSC cannot be assured. Work duration is planned to complete today. In the event TSC activation is required, approved procedures are in place to establish an alternate location, if necessary. The licensee will make courtesy notifications to state and local agencies. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48706 | 29 January 2013 16:46:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This 60-day optional report as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), is being made under the reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of a specified system, specifically the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system. On December 22, 2012 at 0142, with Unit 1 in Mode 4, the 1A AFW pump automatically started due to failure to reset the signal created when the 1B Feedwater Pump was tripped for testing. The 1A feedwater pump was already in the 'tripped' condition when the 1B feedwater pump was tripped, resulting in an auto start signal being generated for the AFW system. Both trains of the AFW had the auto start defeat instated at the time of the testing of the 1B Feedwater pump, blocking the start signal. During subsequent alignment of the AFW for standby readiness, the auto start defeat was removed from the 1A AFW system without resetting the system to remove the signal generated during the 1B Feedwater pump testing, resulting in the actuation of the system. The 1B Feedwater Pump had been reset and was in service therefore the signal associated with the trip of both feedwater pumps was not consistent with the actual plant conditions at the time that the auto start defeat was removed from the 1A AFW system. Following the auto start of the 1A motor driven AFW pump, operators confirmed the 1A AFW train experienced a complete actuation and that the 1A AFW Pump and its associated valves functioned as designed. The pump was subsequently secured and the AFW system was returned to standby readiness. This event was entered into the site specific correction action program for resolution. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. The licensee will notify the states of North Carolina and South Carolina. Additionally the licensee will notify York, Gaston, and Mecklenburg County. |
| ENS 48583 | 12 December 2012 19:57:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | While attempting to swap Technical Support Center (TSC) power supplies the TSC air handling unit circuit breaker tripped rendering the TSC unavailable for emergency assessment. An emergent work order has been planned to restore the TSC air handling unit to operational status. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee also notified state, local and other government agencies. |
| ENS 48502 | 12 November 2012 14:13:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | This non-emergency event report is being made per 10CFR50.72(a)(1)(ii) which requires reporting events that occurred within three years of the date of discovery. Based on operating experience, Engineering personnel reviewed past maintenance activities involving the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system (VH system) and identified 11 occasions between September 2009 and October 2012 (3 years) where the VH system functions could not have been restored within the required facility activation time. The specific instances have been documented in our corrective action program. If an emergency had been declared during these periods and TSC ERO activation was required, the TSC would have been staffed and activated unless the TSC became uninhabitable due to ambient temperatures, radiological or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC staff was necessary, the Station Emergency Coordinator would relocate the staff to an alternate TSC location. Practices and processes have been revised to improve control of TSC maintenance activities and to improve facility availability going forward. In addition, site reporting guidance has been revised to assure timely reporting of these types of events if required. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2, since the maintenance activities affected an emergency response facility. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and state and local authorities in North Carolina and South Carolina. |
| ENS 48348 | 26 September 2012 22:27:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | Pressurizer Pressure LO Instrument surveillance testing was discovered to not have been completed as required. Existence of an internal jumper on solid state protection system input to logic cards prevented complete circuit testing. Unit 1 and unit 2 entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 at 1515 hours. Alternate method of surveillance testing on one of the trains was completed and TS 3.0.3 was exited on Unit 1 at 2203 EDT and Unit 2 at 2132 EDT. The licensee plans to complete surveillance testing on the second train before 1515 hours on 9/27/12. The licensee is currently in TS 3.3.2. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The states of North Carolina and South Carolina will be notified. Local county governments of York, Gaston, and Mecklenberg counties will also be notified.
Catawba nuclear station is retracting EN #48348 for both units 1 and 2 based on completion of testing and investigation of system operability. The testing determined that both units respective train 'A' and 'B' pressurizer pressure low were operable and would have functioned as needed. This condition is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (O'Donohue) notified. |
| ENS 48304 | 13 September 2012 13:08:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On 09/13/12 at 0740 (EDT) the TSC ventilation was determined to be non-functional. Investigation is underway to determine the cause of the ventilation failure and make the necessary repairs. While the TSC is unavailable, the Catawba Emergency Plan has provisions to relocate TSC personnel if required to the alternate TSC location. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will inform State and local agencies as a courtesy. |
| ENS 48294 | 10 September 2012 21:30:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | On 9-11-12 the Technical Support System (TSC) ventilation will be removed from service for a planned maintenance activity. The ventilation system will be out of service for approximately 9 hours. During this time the TSC will be unavailable should an event involving a radiological release occur. The Catawba Emergency Plan has provisions to relocate TSC personnel if required to the alternate TSC location. The licensee will inform State and local agencies as a courtesy and the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48267 | 2 September 2012 09:21:00 | Catawba | NRC Region 2 | Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop | As part of preparation for the upcoming Democratic National Convention (DNC), contingencies are in place associated with the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee Nuclear Stations. The common EOF is located in Charlotte, NC. Because of the potential for event security to delay staffing of the facility within the prescribed time frame, Duke Energy is implementing its business continuity plan for the EOF during the period from 12:00 PM (noon) on September 2nd until 24:00 (midnight) on September 6th. If a declared emergency were to occur at Catawba Nuclear Station, the EOF would be set up in the McGuire Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location. This facility is used as a backup location for the McGuire TSC as specified in station procedures. This report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii), and in accordance with NUREG-1022, Revision 2, as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. The licensee will notify the State of North Carolina, State of South Carolina, York County, Gaston County, and Mecklenburg County. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |