Semantic search
| Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 54751 | 19 June 2020 14:30:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Onsite Fatality | The following was received via email: At approximately 1030 EDT on Friday, June 19, 2020, a BWXT NOG-L employee lost his life due to a fire incident. There were no eye witnesses, but workers in the area reported hearing a pop and then found the victim on the floor in the Supercompactor Room (an intermediate controlled work area). At this time the investigation has not determined what caused the event. The fire did not continue and was out before the Emergency Team could respond to the incident. There was no release of radioactive material above 1 DAC (Derived-Air-Concentration). The victim was pronounced dead at the scene by paramedics on the Emergency Team. The Campbell County Sheriff's Department and the VA OSHA (Virginia Occupational Safety and Health Administration) were contacted at 1140. A message was left with the Federal OSHA. At approximately 1415, NOG-L was contacted by John Ratcliffe from Federal OSHA. The local Fire Marshall and Campbell County Sheriff's department are completing their investigation and the body has been removed from the scene of the incident. | ||
| ENS 53612 | 17 September 2018 04:00:00 | Part 70 App A (B)(1) | Unanalyzed Condition | On September 17, 2018, a notification was made by (Specialty Fuel Facility) (SFF) Operations that during dissolution of depleted uranium in the Conversion Area, the Recovery scrubber system was shut down for maintenance. During the shutdown, a reduction in vacuum to the box ventilation was experienced and a small amount of NOx (Nitrous Oxide) was released into the room. As the result of BWXT's review of this event, it cannot be determined within the 24 hour notification period that documentation is available to demonstrate that the condition has been analyzed in the (Integrated Safety Analysis) (ISA). BWXT is making this report per 10 CFR 70.61, Appendix A(b)(1), 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the ISA, and which results in a failure to meet the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61 (i.e. high consequence events are highly unlikely and intermediate consequences are unlikely)'. The area is currently shutdown and in preparation for inventory. No material has been processed within the system since the event. BWXT is continuing to review the ISA documentation and will provide further updates as appropriate. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
BWXT is retracting Event Notification #53612 that was reported on September 18, 2018. The notification was made due to the fact that it could not be determined within the 24 hour notification period that documentation was available to demonstrate that a NOx release from the Conversion Area dissolver had been analyzed in the ISA. Subsequently, BWXT located the documentation that the condition was analyzed and meets the performance requirements of 10 CFR 70.61. Additionally, new calculations of the current process were run and the results confirmed the original analysis. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie), NMSS Events and Fuels group (via email). | ||
| ENS 52840 | 4 July 2017 19:33:00 | 10 CFR 70.32(i) Part 70 App A (A)(4) | No Items Relied on for Safety Available / Alert Declared Due to Loss of Parameter Control to Prevent Criticality in the Research Test Reactor Area | On July 4, 2017 at 1533 (EDT) it was identified that two desiccant filters serving a dry train ventilation system on a uranium processing glovebox line contained a uranium compound. The two containers were located within close proximity to one another, but were separated during maintenance activities associated with the equipment prior to knowledge of the uranium mass presence. This was assumed to be a non-uranium-bearing system and there were no documented controls in the Integrated Safety Analysis to prevent accumulations. The system was not included in typical duct surveys to identify such accumulations. Uranium processing operations were shut down and the plant is in the summer shutdown outage. There was no immediate risk of criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. Security is controlling access to the area and the area will remain shutdown. The initial 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(a)(4) 1 hour report notification was made at 1630 EDT. While making that telephone notification, at approximately 1646 EDT, the licensee communicator notified the Headquarters Operations Officer that the licensee had declared an Alert at 1556 EDT. The Alert declaration was based on a loss of control of all parameters preventing criticality for which control cannot be immediately re-established per the site's Emergency Plan. There is no release and a release is not projected. The licensee's Emergency Operations Center has been activated. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of VA and local agencies. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DHS NICC, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC via conference call. Notified FDA EOC, FEMA NWC, Nuclear SSA and FEMA NRCC SASC via email.
The licensee has completed preliminary NCS (Nuclear Criticality Safety) calculations based on conservative theoretical analysis and concluded that vessel no. 1, which has the higher loading of material, could achieve a k-effective >1 if conditions were changed, Vessel no. 2 would remain sub-critical under all conditions. The licensee will reconvene their technical staff in the morning to determine what controls could be applied to the higher loaded vessel to evaluate two possible options; the first option is to characterize the material in the sub-critical vessel no. 2 for a better informed NCS analysis of the higher loaded vessel no.1 and the second option is to poison the higher loaded vessel no. 1. The situation remains stable and the licensee continues to restrict access to the RTR Processing Area. Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Stapleton) and NMSS Events Notification and Fuels Group via email.
The licensee is still reviewing the NCS calculations to identify the appropriate course of action and will reconvene the technical staff at 1300 EDT. Following this meeting, additional surveys of the area will be performed. Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Stapleton) and NMSS Events Notification and Fuels Group via email.
The Licensee is reporting no change in status they are still in an Alert condition. The licensee reported that the density of the desiccant is being re-evaluated. It is expected that actual density is less than initial assumed density which is favorable. The net effect should be to reduce the estimated grams inside the unit. Reduced estimated grams will improve the safety margin and assist the recovery process. Additional calculations and modeling is being conducted and more information is expected at a licensee discussion meeting at 1600 EDT. The Emergency Operations Center remains staffed at this time. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Grant) and NMSS Events Notification and Fuels Group via email.
On July 5, 2017 at 1857 (EDT) BWXT LOG-Lynchburg downgraded form an Alert status. Based on a conservative estimate of U-235 mass and an accurate characterization of the desiccant material involved, Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) has determined that a criticality is highly unlikely. Updated evaluations based on as-found conditions and technical information provided by the system manufacturer demonstrated the maximum amount of U-235 in system #1 and system #2. Current NCS controlled parameters in place are mass, moderation, spacing, and container geometry. NCS has determined that the worst case K-adjusted is below the normal license limit. Based on this information, there was no immediate risk of criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of the event. Access to the area remains restricted under the control of Security and the Emergency Operations Center. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Heisserer), NMSS (Moore), IRD (Grant) and NMSS Events Notification, Fuels Group (via email). Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DHS NICC, USDA Ops Center, EPA EOC via conference call. Notified FDA EOC, FEMA NWC, Nuclear SSA and FEMA NRCC SASC via email. | ||
| ENS 52491 | 16 January 2017 14:15:00 | 10 CFR 26.719, FFD Reporting requirements | Fitness-For- Duty | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the site has been terminated. The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 44761 | 9 January 2009 18:30:00 | Part 70 App A (B)(1) | During Testing, a Specialty Fuels Facility Furnance Failed to Shutdown When Required | A furnace in the Specialty Fuels Facility (SFF) was being tested in order to return it to operation. As part of the test, the airflow for the ventilation was checked to ensure that if the airflow decreased to a level below what was required per the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), then the appropriate furnace systems would automatically shutdown. During the test with hydrogen gas flowing into the furnace and therefore the ventilation system, the shutdown sequence shutdown the hydrogen flow when the flow was at 100%, but it did not shutdown the hydrogen flow when the flow was at 8%. There was no immediate risk or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. An evaluation is currently being performed. BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70.61, Appendix A (b)(1) - 'Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of 70.61.' The furnace is shutdown pending further investigation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
On January 9, 2009 BWXT made event notification #44761 regarding a furnace in the Specialty Fuels Facility (SFF) which failed to perform the shutdown sequence for a given hydrogen flow level required per the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). The furnace was shutdown pending further investigation. As a result of the ongoing investigation supplemental information to this notification is being provided. In reviewing the programming code for the furnace a note was detected related to the flow of Carbon Monoxide (CO). Specifically, the note allowed for the continuation of the flow of CO if the temperature in the furnace was above 1000 C. Simulation testing of the validity of this note was performed and the test proved that the gas would continue to flow until the temperature of the furnace reached a level below 1000 C. An evaluation is currently being performed. The furnace continues to be shutdown pending further investigation. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Rudisail), NMSS EO(Davis), and Fuels Group via e-mail. | ||
| ENS 44711 | 9 December 2008 21:30:00 | Part 70 App A (B)(2) | As-Built Depth of Low Level Dissolver System Dissolver Trays Exceeded Maximum Design Depth | Event Description: Planned upgrades to the Low Level Dissolver System in the BWXT's Uranium Recovery Facility were undergoing a safety review as part of the change management process. One of the upgrades involved replacement of the dissolver trays to utilize trays of the same length, width, and depth throughout the dissolution process. During the evaluation process a Recovery process engineer questioned differences between the tray heights in the current safety basis and the change review documentation. The ISA summary listed the tray geometry as an Item Relied on For Safety (IROFS). This limit was the same as that discussed in the text of the change management documentation. Once it was determined that the discrepancy in the documentation also represented an as-built condition in the field, the Low Level Dissolution process was immediately shutdown pending further evaluation of the safety concern. The IROFS tray geometry was degraded. Evaluation of the Event: A review of related safety release documentation indicated the original trays installed in 1999 met the NCS requirements. The requirements limited the tray or allowed modification of the tray (drilling holes, cutting slots) to limit the solution height. Due to the corrosive nature of the process, the trays degrade over time and are replaced when a minimum wall thickness is achieved. The replacement trays were intended to be of like kind. The current fabrication drawing attached to the change management documentation shows no additional features to limit the solution height. The initial review of the accident scenario for a geometry upset indicated that although an IROFS was degraded, other IROFS (operator control of mass, operator control of moderator, and poisoning by the tray materials of construction) remained available to assure double contingency. This is a qualitative evaluation that does not analyze the magnitude of the upset condition. The original NCS analysis of the Low Level Dissolver trays conducted in 1999 evaluated tray height; the impact of a range of tray heights was not considered. The as-found condition in the field, including tray height, was subsequently modeled using BWXT's validated NCS codes and approved methodology. The normal operating condition was determined to be within the k-effective limit of 0.92 in BWXT's NRC License SNM-42 for a high enriched uranium (HEU) system. When a fully flooded moderation upset condition was analyzed, although the resulting k-effective was shown to be subcritical, it exceeded the safety limit of 0.95 in BWXT's license for a HEU system. This determination was reached at 4:30 pm on December 9, 2008. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. A fully flooded condition in the Low Level Dissolver is extremely unlikely. The equipment is located on a mezzanine, well above the main process area. There are no water sources (e.g., sprinklers) in the area, and the dissolvers are not contained in water tight enclosures. However, with the degradation of the IROFS of tray height, and demonstration that the as-found condition exceeded the license limit for a single upset condition, double contingency could no longer be assured. Notification Requirements: BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(2) loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet the performance requirement of 70.61. Status of Corrective Actions: An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation. The Low Level Dissolution process remains shutdown. The licensee documented this event in their condition report CR#1027010. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The analysis of a fully flooded moderation upset condition showed the resulting k-effective exceeded the safety limit of 0.95 in BWXT's license for a HEU system showed a k-effective of 0.96. Notified R2DO (Ernstes), NMSS (Habighorst), and Fuels Group (via e-mail).
This report was made based on the assumption that the tray dimensions on the drawing were representative of as-built tray dimensions in the field. Subsequent to the report, measurements were taken of the Low Level Dissolver trays in use at the time of discovery. Using the same methodology used to determine the initial reportability of the event, the moderation upset was reevaluated for the as-built tray dimensions. The resulting k-effective was 0.94, which is below the safety limit of 0.95 in BWXT's license for a HEU system. Evaluation of the as-built tray dimensions demonstrated although there was a loss or degradation of Items Relied On For Safety, BWXT did not fail to meet the performance requirement of 10 CFR 70.61. BWXT is therefore withdrawing the 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(2) notification, #44711. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Hopper), NMSS EO (Benner), and Fuels OUO Group (via email). | ||
| ENS 44590 | 22 October 2008 16:17:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Concurrent Report Concerning Nrc News Release | In response to media inquiries concerning the NRC's news release involving a notice of violation and proposed civil penalty, Babcock & Wilcox Company responded for BWXT with the attached information to media representatives from Lynchburg News & Advance and the Associated Press out of West Virginia. As requested the NRC news release is also attached. B&W Response to NRC's Notice of Violation: The incident occurred when an operator responded to a spill of hydrofluoric acid using an incorrect neutralizing chemical. As a result, the operator incurred an injury to his eyes. As noted in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Notice of Violation, the actions of the employee, his coworkers and our onsite emergency team after the hydrofluoric acid exposure occurred ensured that the employee was not seriously injured as a result of this incident. This fact is confirmed by the statements of four independent medical opinions; one of these physicians was independently contracted by the NRC. The company (BWXT) acknowledges that this incident identified weaknesses in our spill response procedures and chemical labeling practices. Corrective actions have been developed to address these weaknesses. The company will submit a written response to the NRC within 30 days. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 44514 | 23 September 2008 16:15:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Media Inquiry Concerning Upcoming Licensee Performance Review | Below are the responses to questions BWXT received from (DELETED) at the News & Advance of Lynchburg, VA, and the BWXT responses. Q: In the past year, there have been a number of 'notices of violation' from NRC regarding events at BWXT. Several of these violations or apparent violations involved Raschig Ring-filled Vacuum Cleaners - one overturned from a forklift last year and spilled some nuclear material; later there was a situation in which one of the RRVCs did not have enough raschig rings in it, etc.-and one other incident involved an employee being splashed with a solution that contained some nuclear material. In what ways has the company responded to these events? What measures have been taken to correct procedures and prevent further occurrences? A: The company has performed detailed incident investigations and identified corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence of these types of incidents. For example, in the case of the RRVCs we have developed and are implementing a new vacuum cleaner design that no longer requires the use of Raschig rings. In the case of the chemical spill, the company has strengthened its chemical spill response procedures. Q: How does the company anticipate the performance review to go? A: We appreciate the opportunity to receive feedback from the NRC on our performance on an annual basis. This feedback is valuable to us as we strive to continuously improve our operating and safety performance. We look forward to discussing our safety and operational successes and improvements at the meeting. Q: Some of BWXT's operations are classified; Do you know how detailed the performance review presentation will be? A: For specifics about the NRC's presentation, it would be better to contact the NRC. I can tell you that the information we plan to present will be detailed enough to explain our successes and improvements without revealing any classified information. | ||
| ENS 44325 | 28 June 2008 01:12:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Concurrent Report Involving Derailment of Train Carrying Waste from Bwxt | The licensee was notified at 2112 EDT on 6/27/08 about a train derailment in Atchison, Kansas that was carrying some low level waste from BWXT. Among the derailed cars were 3 cars containing dried sludge from the final effluent pond classified as LSA-1. There was no release or damage involving the waste material. Each of the 3 rail cars contained approximately 3000 cubic feet (9000 cubic feet total) with a total rad content of approximately 60 millicuries Uranium per car (180 millicuries total). The cars never tipped over and have been placed back on tracks. Pending satisfactory results of a safety inspection of the cars, the waste will continue on to its final destination at the Energy Solutions facility in Clive, Utah. BWXT does not plan to issue a press release at this time but notified the NRC based on the potential for public interest. Several local articles about the derailment have been posted on the internet but no direct inquiries from the press have been received by BWXT at this time. The licensee will also notify NRC Region 2. | ||
| ENS 44313 | 23 June 2008 14:35:00 | Part 70 App A (A)(5) | Only One Safety Item Available for Safety for Greater than 8 Hours | I. EVENT DESCRIPTION: In April of this year, BWXT replaced the recirculation columns on the High Level Trough Dissolvers in the Uranium Recovery Facility. The columns were processed out of the area according to standard waste handling procedures for disposal. An NMC technician raised a concern as the columns were checked by BWXT Security before placement into a SeaLand container. The technician believed the response of Security's monitor was overly sensitive compared to the assigned 235-U values based on calculations. NMC immediately placed a hold on the columns. The columns were later moved into the Decon Area of BWXT's Waste Treatment Facility where they were stored for approximately three weeks. The Decon area is posted by Nuclear Criticality Safety for 100 grams of 235-U. NMC personnel conducted subsequent NDA field measurements of the columns and estimated an accumulation of approximately 695 grams 235-U in four of the columns. The Decon Area was immediately secured and a Radiation Work Permit (RWP) generated to clean and reevaluate the columns in the Uranium Recovery's Maintenance area. The four columns were relocated to the Recovery Maintenance area where they were cleaned according to the instructions in the RWP. NDA measurements of the columns and cleaning materials indicated a total 235-U content of 577 grams. The Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) in the Decon Area is 400 grams. The Item Relied On For Safety (IROFS) for control of mass was degraded. II. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT: The safety basis for the Decon Area takes credit for two IROFS, control of mass and moderation. The control for mass was degraded. Although the LCO for 235-U mass was exceeded by 177 grams, this was less than the fully reflected, optimally moderated minimum critical mass of approximately 800 grams. A criticality was not credible in this scenario. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. The amount of 235-U present in the columns was less than the minimum critical mass of approximately 800 grams. However, with the degradation of one IROFS and only one remaining, double contingency could no longer be assured. III. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS: BWXT is making this 1 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (a)(5) - Loss of controls such that only one item relied on for safety, as documented in the Integrated Analysis Summary, remains available and reliable to prevent a nuclear criticality accident, and has been in this state for greater than eight hours. IV. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: An investigation of the root causes of this event is ongoing. Corrective actions will be determined as a result of the investigation. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 44270 | 5 June 2008 14:07:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | News Inquiry from Local Media Outlet | Below are the responses to questions BWXT received from (a reporter) at the News & Advance of Lynchburg, VA, regarding the closure of the Barnwell Facility in South Carolina. Q: I understand that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has announced new guidelines for the storage of low-level radioactive material since the disposal site in Barnwell, S.C. plans to close. Does B&W ever use the Barnwell Facility for any disposal needs, or will that facility's closure affect B&W operations here in any way? If so, I'd like to discuss those potential effects and perhaps write an article about the issue. A: Annually, the B&W Lynchburg facility generates approximately 15 to 20 cubic feet of Class B and C waste, which was disposed of at the Barnwell site in South Carolina. However, the Lynchburg facility has not been significantly impacted by Barnwell's closure. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 44218 | 15 May 2008 18:00:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Concurrent Report Due to Response to a Press Inquiry | Below are the responses to questions BWXT received from (deleted) the News & Advance of Lynchburg, VA, regarding NRC Inspection Report No. 70-27/2008-001 and Notice of Violation: Q: Is Babcock & Wilcox contesting the notice of violation? A: B&W has 30 days from the notice of the violation, which was issued on April 21, to contest it. A decision has not been made. Q: Other than losing 'personal effects' and undergoing first aid, has the splashed employee experienced any other consequences from the splashing? A: We do not comment on the health status of employees. Q: What happens next in this citation procedure with the NRC? A: B&W will make the decision to contest the notice or accept the violation. No fine has been charged to the facility. Corrective actions were implemented immediately following this event. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 44215 | 14 May 2008 10:00:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Concurrent Report Due to Offsite Notification to the State of Virginia | On May 14, 2008 at approximately 6:00 am, personnel discovered a tote of acid being stored in excess of 90 days allowed by Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) regulations. The tote of acid was generated on February 8, 2008 and in order to meet the regulations it should have been shipped on May 8, 2008. An inquiry into the issue was made and the personnel responsible for scheduling shipments believed the generation date was the same as another tote in storage, February 18, 2008. The waste is scheduled to be shipped for disposal on May 16, 2008. A corrective action has been written for this event and an investigation will occur. This concurrent report is being made because the event was reported to the following government agency, Virginia DEQ The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 44035 | 5 March 2008 13:00:00 | Part 70 App A (B)(2) | Vacuum Daily Inspections Not Completed | Raschig Ring Vacuum Cleaners (RRVCs) are used within BWXT's Research and Test Reactors and Targets (RTRT) radiologically controlled area to collect floor scrubbing solutions. There are no fissile solutions present in the area. The RRVCs are checked daily to ensure the vessels are adequately filled with Raschig rings. According to the form used to document the inspection, the last time the level was verified it was noted as 'good.' However, the inspection was last performed on January 28, 2008. The RTRT foreman had recently been assigned to the area and was not aware of the requirement to perform the daily check. On the morning of March 5, 2008 the foreman realized the check had not been performed and proceeded to inspect the RRVC. The level of the rings within the vacuum cleaner was judged to be inadequate (the form does not contain specific acceptance criteria). The rings were approximately 5 inches below the level of the hose intake. There was a minimal amount of contaminated floor scrubbing solution in the vacuum cleaner at the time of discovery. Only solutions from floor scrubbing are collected with RRVCs in RTRT. Fissile solutions are not generated in the area. The RRVC was immediately removed from service pending the results of an investigation. The initial filling of the vacuum cleaner with Raschig rings by an operator is an Item Relied on for Safety (IROFS). The vacuum cleaner was adequately filled with Raschig rings in September of last year during the semi-annual inventory. However, at the time of event the ring level was less than adequate, resulting in a degraded IROFS. The daily inspection of the Raschig ring level is a second IROFS to ensure an adequate ring level on an ongoing basis. The failure to perform this inspection is a failure of this IROFS. The remaining IROFS is the operator controls what is collected (and therefore the U235 concentration) with the RRVC. Only contaminated floor scrubbing solutions are vacuumed within in RTRT, not fissile solutions. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. There was a portion of the RRVC that contained no rings, but there was only a minimal amount solution in the vacuum cleaner. However, with the degradation of one IROFS and the loss of a second, double contingency could no longer be assured. BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A (b)(2), 'Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet the performance requirements of � 70.61.' The use of the RRVC in the RTRT area was immediately suspended by Nuclear Criticality Safety pending further investigation. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
As a result of the ongoing investigation supplemental information to this notification is being provided. The investigation identified that two other vacuum cleaners were not adequately filled with Raschig rings. One of these RRVCs is used within the Chemistry Lab. The ring level in this vacuum cleaner was approximately 3 inches below the level of the hose intake. The vacuum is used in the Chemistry Lab for floor scrubbing purposes. Although there are no fissile solutions in the lab, the NCS posting on the RRVC allows concentrations of up to 400 grams 235 to be collected. This is the same NCS posting on RRVCs in BWXT's Uranium Recovery facility. Although unlikely, it is possible that the Chem Lab RRVC could be transferred to Uranium Recovery and used to collect high concentration fissile solutions. The ring level of RRVCs used in Uranium Recovery is checked daily. Should the Chem Lab RRVC be moved to Uranium Recovery there are no documented controls to check the ring level before its use. Potentially, the Chem Lab RRVC containing an inadequate level of Raschig rings could have been used to collect a high concentration fissile solution. The filling of the vacuum cleaner with Raschig rings in accordance with American Nuclear Society Standard 8.5 is an Item Relied on for Safety (IROFS). The standard states, 'The level of the solution shall not exceed the level of uniformly packed rings.' The Chem Lab vacuum cleaner was not adequately filled with Raschig rings according to the standard. This IROFS was degraded. A second IROFS for the RRVC is the operator inspects the Raschig ring level according to ANS 8.5. The standard states, 'Raschig rings shall be inspected periodically to demonstrate their continued criticality control properties.' One of the required tests accounts for settling over time. The standard further states, 'If settling is detected, rings meeting specifications of this standard shall be added to restore full packing.' This second IROFS had failed given the level of the rings in the Chem Lab RRVC at the time of discovery. As such, no IROFS as documented in the Integrated Safety Analysis Summary remained. Double contingency had been lost. There was no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public as a result of this event. There was a portion of the RRVC that contained no rings, but there was only a minimal amount of solution in the vacuum cleaner. However, with the degradation of one IROFS and the loss of a second, double contingency could no longer be assured. BWXT is making this 1 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (a)(4)(ii) - An event or condition such that no items relied on for safety, as documented in the Integrated Safety Analysis summary, remain available and reliable in an accident sequence evaluated in the Integrated Safety Analysis, to perform their function: Prevent a nuclear criticality accident. Notified R2DO (Hopper), NMSS (Easton) and Fuels OUO Group (e-mail). * * * UPDATE FROM B. COLE TO P. SNYDER ON 3/7/08 AT 1752 * * * The following "additional supplemental information is being provided to Event Notification #44035 as a result of the ongoing investigation. During the investigation of Event Notification #44035, a concern was expressed about the ability of a RRVC to suction solution above the level of the Raschig rings. It is BWXT's opinion that it is possible to collect solution above the level of the Raschig rings in the vacuum cleaner. The criticality safety of the RRVCs is based on American Nuclear Society Standard 8.5, 'Use of Borosilicate-glass Raschig Rings as a Neutron Absorber in Solutions of Fissile Material.' The standard states, 'The level of the solution shall not exceed the level of uniformly packed rings.' It is BWXT's opinion that it is credible for the solution to exceed the level of the Raschig rings in the RRVC. There is no immediate risk of a criticality or threat to the safety of workers or the public. It is BWXT's opinion that under certain conditions there is a potential for high concentration SNM bearing solutions to be collected above the level of the Raschig rings. According to internal spill procedures this condition is not likely, but is credible. As such, this potential condition is an unanalyzed condition where double contingency is lost. BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (b)(1) - Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of �70.61. The use of all RRVCs at the BWXT facility was immediately suspended by Nuclear Criticality Safety pending further investigation. Notified R2DO (Hopper), NMSS (Easton), and Fuels OUO Group (E-mail). | ||
| ENS 44020 | 28 February 2008 21:56:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Media/Press Release Concerning Bwxt Activities | In response to additional media inquiries regarding the NRC News Release No. II-08-002, BWXT will provide the attached information to media representatives contacting BWXT for additional information. In response to media inquiries concerning the possible use of Lynchburg city wastewater treatment plant to treat water from BWXT, BWXT will provide the attached information to media representatives contacting BWXT for additional information: Regarding NRC News Release No. II-08-002: Q: What are some of the corrective actions taken by the company? One NRC document I read referred to a corrective action of installing brackets onto the raschig ring vacuum cleaners for transport. Is that one of the corrective actions, and has it been completed? What other corrective actions have been taken? A: We developed a comprehensive list of corrective actions in response to last year incident. Currently, we are in the process of completing all corrective actions, and are on schedule to meet our commitments to the NRC. Q: The Company was given 30 days to pay the fine or appeal it. Which action was taken? A; The company paid the fine. Regarding Wastewater Treatment inquiry: Q: I just learned that the city's wastewater treatment plant is studying the idea of treating water from the B&W facility, and that B&W is paying for the study. Could you provide information, or connect me with someone in the company who can offer a comment on this study? Has B&W been treating its own water before? Why is the company interested in possibly having the city treat the water instead? A: A number of new regulations have been issued in recent years to address discharges of nutrients to the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. To meet the new requirements, B&W is studying a variety of options, including the possibility of constructing a new pipeline to allow us to discharge a portion of our wastewater into the city's waste water treatment plant. We are working with the Lynchburg Regional Wastewater Treatment Facility and Campbell County to perform a feasibility study for this option to ensure that the city's treatment plant can handle our flow without impacting their current treatment parameters. It's important to note that these wastewaters are non-radioactive. However, the project is still very much in the preliminary stages and a decision on whether or not to pursue this option wont be made for some time. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday), NMSS EO (Giitter) and Fuels OUO via email. | ||
| ENS 43983 | 13 February 2008 14:30:00 | Part 70 App A (B)(1) | 24 Hour Report Concerning Improperly Analyzed Condition Related to Integrated Safety Analysis | During a routine internal audit of the Uranium Recovery 3-inch Extraction System on February 13 at 0930, a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) engineer observed several inconsistencies between the documented limits and controls in the Integrated Safety Analysis summary and those derived in the associated NCS evaluations. These anomalies were non-conservative in nature and included items such as the inside diameters of the columns, column wall thickness, and limits on the number of stainless steel columns in the system. In addition, the most recent NCS evaluation of the system employed a different analytical methodology than earlier evaluations. The evaluation employed the solid angle methodology, which had not been previously utilized to evaluate the 3-inch Extraction System. In past evaluations, the system was modeled using the law of substitution as a 7 x 2 array of 4-inch columns, mirrored in the x and y faces to form an infinite planar array. This change in methodology was incorrect. Based on these uncertainties in the safety basis, the engineer was unable to determine if double contingency was maintained. An evaluation is currently being performed. BWXT is making this 24-hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70.61, Appendix A, (b)(1) - Any event or condition that results in the facility being in a state that was not analyzed, was improperly analyzed, or is different from that analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis, and which results in failure to meet the performance requirements of � 70.61. The operation was immediately shutdown by Nuclear Criticality Safety pending further investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 43934 | 25 January 2008 22:00:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Statement for Inquiries by Media Concerning Imposed Civil Penalty | BWX Technologies, Inc. will issue the following statement for media inquiries into the NRC imposed civil penalties for an event that occurred at the facility in July, 2007: On July 26, 2007, BWXT in Lynchburg, Va., reported an unusual event at its Mount Athos plant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). A vacuum cleaner containing uranium-bearing wastewater tipped over while being moved from one location to another. Fewer than 22 liters of wastewater spilled from the container; a negligible amount of uranium was present in the wastewater. The incident did not result in a release of radioactive material to employees or the environment, and there was no possibility of a criticality due to the small amount of material being transported. Additionally, no employees were injured as a result of the incident, and manufacturing operations at the facility were not impacted. In accordance with its operating license, BWXT immediately notified the NRC following the incident. As a result of the event, the NRC imposed a civil penalty in the amount of $32,500 on the facility. The NRC has given BWXT 30 days to pay the fine or protest its imposition. Following the incident, BWXT implemented corrective actions related to the process. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector of this notification. | ||
| ENS 43806 | 22 November 2007 20:47:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Offsite News Press Release | This concurrent report is being made to the NRC as a result of a media inquiry from (a reporter) of the Virginian Pilot for an article concerning the closure of Barnwell and its impact on the BWXT operations. The Virginian Pilot is a newspaper in the Hampton Roads, Virginian area. The information was provided to (the reporter) by (Deleted), BWXT's Communications Specialist. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 43795 | 20 November 2007 02:00:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Spill of Sewage Sludge | At approximately 1100 hours on November 19, 2007, waste treatment operators noticed that the sewage sludge pump transferring material to the LLR press, located at the Waste Treatment Facility, had split and that sludge material had been released. The volume of sludge material that was released is estimated to be less than 150 gallons. The material was released in the pump house and flowed to a gravel area north of the pump house and extended into a storm water drainage ditch. A small quantity of material appeared to collect in the ditch, but did not flow off-site. Operators contained the spilled material and cleaned the affected areas in less than 24 hours. Facility sewage is of low activity due to natural content and the possible presence of trace material due to trace contamination in the associated piping system. The material is known to be << (much less than) 30 pCi/g (picoCuries per gram). The total activity spilled including natural background is estimated to be less than 6 uCi (microCuries) using a maximum concentration of 10 pCi/g and 150 gallons of material. Both values are conservative. A study is in progress to determine if licensed material was actually present. On November 20,2007, as required by our VPDES Permit Number 0003697, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality was notified of this non-permitted release to the environment. BWXT is making this concurrent notification in accordance with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(c). There was no other potentially hazardous material released. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 43728 | 17 October 2007 02:30:00 | Part 70 App A (C) | Reportable Quantity of Waste Acid Released Onsite | A second-shift Waste Treatment operator discovered acidic wastewater (a mixture of nitric acid, hydrofluoric acid and water) discharging from a sump on the Bay 5A Pickle Acid Scrubber pad at approximately 10:30 PM on 10/16/2007. The acidic wastewater ran downhill onto the roadway to the north and eventually onto a concrete pad near the bottom of the hill. By the time of the discovery, or very shortly thereafter, the overflow stopped. The operator notified area supervision and verified that all valves and pumps at the Waste Treatment facility were functioning normally and wastewater was being received in the equalization tanks. Estimates on 10/17/2007 by Environmental Engineering of the amount of flow discharged to the line versus the amount received at Waste Treatment, combined with visual observation of the spill area, suggest that approximately 275 gallons of acidic wastewater were released from the trench, of this amount, approximately 25 gallons potentially reached uncovered surfaces adjacent to the road (gravel/grass). This was deemed to be a Reportable Quantity of a hazardous substance and appropriate notifications were made to the National Response Center (Notification #851841), the EPA Region 11 Consent Order Coordinator and the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality. The spill area was neutralized with soda ash and thoroughly rinsed. The small gravel/grass areas that may have been impacted are being assessed for additional remediation as necessary. BWXT will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |