SVP-13-050, Technical Specifications Section 5.6.6 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report

Technical Specifications Section 5.6.6 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Report

ML13212A081
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	07/24/2013
From:	Hanley T Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
SVP-13-050
Download: ML13212A081 (3)

Text

Exelo Generatior SVP-13-050 July 24, 2013 U.S. Nuclear Regulaotoy C4m m ATTN: Document Control Desk Wah*%inon, D.C. 2065-0001 Quad CMies NuWdlear Power Station, Units I and 2 Renwe cly Operating Lcense Nos. DPR-29 and OPR-30 k ft. 60-2M and §0-=6 NRhM MM

Subject:

Technial Specfliclltom Section 5.6.6 Poet Accident Monilotor intrumlltledon Report The purpose of ti leter is to subrmi the Poet Accident Monikton (PAM) in Rumentation Ro t as required by Quad Ctes Nuclear Power Staton (QCNPS) T al Spe atons (TS) Section 5.6.6, "Poet Accident Montoring (PAM) InstrumentatIon Report.'

On June 16,2013, during normal panel monitoring, operating personnel identified the'open' light da for the UnL 2 1D (kboard) Main Stenm Iolation Valve (mSIV) wa extinguished. The mo likely cau of the inoperable Indication is high resistance on the associated position limit switch located in ft Unit 2 drywelo (i.e., inside primary co;ntaient).

This dscrepancy required entry into TS Section 3.3.31, T oot Accident Montrn (PAM)

Instumentation," Condition A, due to an inopeable indication channel for Function 6 in Table 3.3.3.1-1, "Penetration Flow Path PCIV PoDltMon. Condition A requires restoration of the required idcto dwcn to an operb status within 30 dftsc or initiat reporting requIrees in accordance with TS Section 5.8.6.

Resolution of this Isue within the 30.day requirement was not feasible due to the signiicant power reduction and potential containment ry required to complete the necessary repairs (see Atacbment). For ftis reasm, QCNPS Is umitti thi report in accordance with TS Section 5.6.6. Acordingly Ow he e report outlinese prplanned altrnt meto of monitoring and the apparent caus of the wit fth plans and schdule for Mnpl~yaong restoring th instrument channel to an opeal status.

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VP-1 3-050 U.S. Nucea R"ua Commssion Page 2 Should you have a"y q*eto oncermntin tIf t r, pleae rler them to Mr. Waly BeK, Reiatoy Aumance Managr, at (30) 2-2800W.

Ste Vioc Pfresd Quad Cl~e Nuclear Power Station Atacmebi n, Pos Acciden MonoringIntrmnai Rpt lnoraw" Channe for Penetaion %lwPath PCIV Posfitio cc: ReioalkIm srao

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ATTACH&MUS

,co Poe dwd Monh,,.ighm mm,,,,lon An alternate method dof mwo t the isolion function for the UnL2 1D inboard Main Steam Isolation Vale (MSV) ha been pimented. The alternte

• m*hod requires operti personnel, fowing an Isolation siga, to vefy Oa flow indication for the D Main Steamn Une on main contro room pal 901-5 Is Indicating zero flow.

This guidance has boen communicated to opeorat personnel and IsIncluded with statim procedure OCOS 1e00-0, 1"Post Ackcient Mwoo inbgirumenaoton Outage Report. This alternate method provides an accepte meamns of Indication to ensure the MSIV Isolation function has boen accompioshed. In addition, the Unit 210 MSIV indlcation anoma has been entord into tho Unlt 2 Degraded Equipment List, as well as the Corectimv Action Program for fl resolution.

It should be noted that hposon indcation for the oubxod MSIV on the D Main Stamn Line is fully hfunc .

A a a.. - a .. - '--a-.~.

The most likely cau is a faulty ImIt switch which provides the open ikndcation (I.e., red lm) fo the inboard MSIV. This Iln switch Islocated inside the Unit 2 d&ell and ispositioned cdose to the valve, which subjects the witch to a high radlant hest load. Limt switch contac contaminaon from heat up of nometsm inthe swtch assembly, resmlting in elevated cor eitn, is the most Ikely cause of the oss of indication.

Efforts have not been made to attm to burnish this set of c Kas with ices current flow, as the cycling of the switch is importnt to the burnhing ort because Itallows some mesure of arcing as the contacts o*mn or close. This would require the MSIV to be yoled ner the closed position to actuate the lmit sWth, which Is not feasible without a significant power reduction.

A m0oication to move the subject limit wich further away from the source of heat has been performed on the outboard MSIVs, and wig be prfkmed on the inboard MSIVs during the next Unit 2 refuel ouage shedued for Spring 2014 (M2M22).

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