SECY-25-0074, Expedited Construction of Certain Structures, Systems, and Components

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SECY-25-0074: Expedited Construction of Certain Structures, Systems, and Components
ML25157A119
Person / Time
Issue date: 08/28/2025
From: Mark King
NRC/EDO
To: Commissioners
NRC/OCM
References
SECY-25-0074
Download: ML25157A119 (1)


Text

August 28, 2025 FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

PURPOSE:

POLICY ISSUE (Information)

The Commissioners Michael F. King Acting Executive Director for Operations SECY-25-0074 EXPEDITED CONSTRUCTION OF CERTAIN STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS This paper is to inform the Commission of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff's strategy for allowing current and potential applicants to build or install structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that do not have a reasonable nexus to safety on optimized timeframes. The staff's strategy is a step toward focusing the definition of construction in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.10, "License required; limited work authorization," and therefore NRC and licensee resources, on the most safety-significant SSCs.

This strategy will reduce the cost impact of the current definition on construction, and execution will depend on the specific technical circumstances presented by vendors and applicants. This effort is consistent with the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024 and recently issued Executive orders ( EOs ). 1 The staff plans to consider if changes to the definition of construction or guidance associated with the scope of construction activities should be pursued as part of the regulatory reforms directed by EO 14300, "Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission," dated May 23, 2025.

CONTACT: Jonathan Greives, NRR/DANU (301) 415-1585 Any activities undertaken in accordance with the staff positions described in this SECY are entirely at the prospective applicant's risk and have no bearing on the issuance of a construction permit or combined license with respect to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), and rules, regulations, or orders issued under the AEA (refer to 10 CFR 50.1 O(f), which describes the effect of a limited work authorization (LWA)).

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BACKGROUND:

Section 101 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) prohibits, among other things, the manufacture, production, or use of a commercial nuclear power reactor, except under a license issued by the NRC. While section 101 does not mention construction of a nuclear power reactor, section 185 of the AEA requires that the NRC grant construction permits to applicants for licenses to construct or modify production or utilization facilities, if the applications for such permits are acceptable. However, the AEA does not define the term "construction"; instead, 10 CFR 50.10 does. 2 The Commission last updated this definition in 2007 as part of the limited work authorization (LWA) rule (72 FR 57416; October 9, 2007). Specifically, 10 CFR 50.10(a)(1) defines construction as follows:

the driving of piles, subsurface preparation, placement of backfill, concrete, or permanent retaining walls within an excavation, installation of foundations, or in-place assembly, erection, fabrication, or testing, which are for:

(i) Safety-related structures, systems, or components (SSCs) of a facility, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2; (ii) SSCs relied upon to mitigate accidents or transients or used in plant emergency operating procedures; (iii) SSCs whose failure could prevent safety-related SSCs from fulfilling their safety-related function; (iv) SSCs whose failure could cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety-related system; (v) SSCs necessary to comply with 10 CFR part 73; (vi) SSCs necessary to comply with 10 CFR 50.48 and criterion 3 of 10 CFR part 50, appendix A; and (vii) Onsite emergency facilities, that is, technical support and operations support centers, necessary to comply with 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR part 50, appendix E.

In the development of this definition, the Commission "determined that construction should include all of the activities that have a reasonable nexus to radiological health and safety, or common defense and security" (72 FR 57416, p. 57429). For the 2007 LWA final rule, the scope of SSCs falling within the definition of construction was derived from the scope of SSCs that are included in the program for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants, as defined in 10 CFR 50.65(b ), because "this definition is well understood and there is good agreement on its implementation" (72 FR 57416, p. 57430). The SSCs were supplemented with those necessary to comply with emergency preparedness and security 2

While a textual argument can be made that the section 101 prohibition on production of a reactor also prohibits "construction," the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC, the Regulatory Division of which was the NRC's predecessor) consistently held that section 101 of the AEA does not prohibit construction. See paragraph 4, page 2, of AEC-R 2/6, "Proposed Revision of 10 CFR, Part 50, Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," dated April 22, 1959 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML21237A256 (nonpublic)).

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regulations because they also have a reasonable nexus to radiological safety or are required for the common defense and security. The 2007 amendment to the definition of construction in the LWA rule clarified which construction activities could be performed without prior NRC authorization by deleting the activities defined as construction solely based on their environmental impact.

New reactor designs and deployment strategies warrant a fresh look at how applying the 10 CFR 50.10 definition of construction may unnecessarily restrict the construction of nuclear power plants using modern construction techniques on optimized schedules. Advanced reactor designs may incorporate features like passive decay heat removal, seismic isolation, and separation between nuclear and balance-of-plant SSCs that render some non-safety-related SSCs much less risk significant. Taking into account these design features, the NRC recently approved two exemptions from the requirement in 10 CFR 50.10: For the Clinch River Nuclear site, an exemption to 10 CFR 50.1 0(c) was granted that allowed conduct of certain excavation support activities (ML24172A206). Similarly, an exemption from 10 CFR 50.1 0(a)(iv) was granted for the Kemmerer Power Station to allow the applicant to build a nonnuclear energy island (ML25119A329).

The importance of the safe deployment of nuclear power on optimized schedules is a priority for the U.S. government. In recognition of the NRC's important role in supporting this U.S.

government priority and leveraging recent experience related to 10 CFR 50.10, the staff plans to define a variety of activities as not included in the definition of construction by applying criteria described in the preambles for previous amendments to 10 CFR 50.10. The staff will consider issuing guidance on this subject or rulemaking if those actions will further enhance this goal.

DISCUSSION:

Non-Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components When the Commission revised the definition of construction in the 2007 amendment to the LWA rule, considerable deliberation occurred over what non-safety-related SSCs should be retained within the definition. Ultimately, the definition included non-safety-related SSCs, as previously described. Advanced reactor applicants can (and have) designed their facilities with separation between nuclear and balance-of-plant SSCs in mind, such that many of the criteria are not met. As an example, the failure of balance-of-plant SSCs of several design concepts cannot directly cause a plant scram or actuation of safety-related systems. However, loss of some of these systems can cause secondary, indirect effects whereby the plant response to their loss causes changes in plant parameters that will be sensed by components on the nuclear island and will ultimately result in some sort of response (e.g., scram or actuation of safety-related systems). Depending on the design of the facility, the impact of this indirect effect on safety could be so low as to be considered negligible. There are several SSCs that NRC considered to have similar effects during development of the LWA rule (72 FR 57416) that were determined to not be within the definition of construction, providing parallels to current scenarios in advanced reactor designs:

In its discussion of construction of SSCs (p. 57429), the NRC stated that-upon consideration of stakeholder comments and further evaluation, the NRC has determined that there may be some SSCs of a facility which are

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required to be described in the FSAR [final safety analysis report], but which do not have a reasonable nexus to radiological health and safety or the common defense and security. These SSCs are those which are required to be described in the FSAR to provide contextual information for understanding the overall design and operation of the facility, but which do not actually directly [emphasis added] affect the radiological health and safety of the public or the common defense and security, and their indirect effect on such health and safety or the common defense and security... is so low as to be considered negligible. The determination of SSCs which do not have a reasonable nexus to radiological health and safety or common defense and security depends on the design of the facility.

In its discussion of the final change to the scope of SSCs within the definition of construction (p. 57432), the NRC stated that-the SSCs which are within the scope of the definition of construction, and which have a reasonable nexus to radiological health and safety or common defense and security are set forth in (10 CFR 50.1 0] paragraph (a)( 1 ). This definition was derived from the scope of SSCs that are included in the program for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants under 10 CFR 50.65 ["Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants"],

and supplemented with SSCs that are needed for fire protection, security, and onsite emergency facilities. There may be some SSCs of a facility which do not have a reasonable nexus to radiological health and safety or common defense and security. The determination of the SSCs that do not have a reasonable nexus to radiological health and safety or common defense and security will be dependent upon the design of the facility. An example SSC that would not be within the scope of construction is a cooling tower that is used to cool the turbine condenser [emphasis added]. However, a cooling system that is used for both safety and non-safety functions would fall within the definition of construction.

These provide a reasonable comparison to the situation encountered for advanced reactor balance-of-plant SSCs. Specifically, for advanced reactor designs, loss of some balance-of-plant SSCs can or will result in a loss of cooling or heat transfer capability of balance-of-plant SSCs, which will result in a reactor scram. However, this would be an indirect effect because the loss of the SSCs would change plant conditions, which would ultimately result in an actuation of components that would directly result in a reactor scram or actuation of safety-related equipment. If the failure of those balance-of-plant SSCs has an indirect effect on public health and safety and common defense and security that is so low as to be considered negligible, then installation of those SSCs could be determined to not be construction. Note that the description of plant response for a generic advanced reactor is generalized. Applicant and staff assessment of how the definition of construction applies will be highly dependent on the specific design of the plant. While the preceding discussion focused on 10 CFR 50.1 0(a)(1 )(iv),

which includes SSCs whose failure could cause a reactor scram in the definition of construction, a similar argument could be made for other criteria within the definition of construction.

In regard to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.1 0(a)(1 )(ii)-(vii), which pertain to non-safety-related SSCs, the NRC staff will ensure that the application of the definition of construction for a facility

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focuses on only those SSCs that have a reasonable nexus to radiological safety and common defense and security based on a review of the design of that facility. The non-safety-related SSCs that are not within the scope of the definition of construction would include those SSCs that do not directly affect the radiological health and safety of the public or the common defense and security, and their indirect effect on such health and safety or common defense and security is so low as to be considered negligible. They could include non-safety-related SSCs that are not directly relied upon to mitigate an accident or transient or used in plant emergency operating procedures (10 CFR 50.1 0(a)(1 )(ii)), whose failure would not directly prevent safety-related SSCs from performing their safety-related function (10 CFR 50.10(a)(1 )(iii)), whose failure would not directly cause a scram or actuation of a safety-related system (10 CFR 50.10(a)(1 )(iv)),

which are not used directly to comply with security and emergency preparedness requirements (10 CFR 50.1 0(a)(1 )(v), (vi), and (vii)) and whose indirect effect is so low as to be considered negligible. 3 For example, if structures containing balance-of-plant systems are considered non-safety-related and their failure would not directly cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety system, and an assessment of their significance determines that their effect on public health and safety is so low as to be considered negligible, then those structures would not be considered within the definition of construction under 10 CFR 50.1 0(a)(1 )(iv). As such, pouring of foundations and walls associated with those structures would not be construction under 10 CFR 50.10 because, for example, the failure of the foundation, such as through excessive settlement or cracking, could only indirectly cause a reactor scram or actuation of a safety system, and the failure probability of such SSCs is so low as to be considered to have a negligible effect on safety. However, installation of some systems and components within the structure may be considered construction under 10 CFR 50.10 if they have a direct effect on any one of the individual criteria or if the impact of their indirect effect is more than negligible.

The applicant could communicate its plan to comply with the regulations and staff feedback could be provided through preapplication engagement. The staff has assessed that taking this approach will reduce the potential need for exemptions and LWAs in the future.

If an applicant determines that a non-safety-related SSC has a direct effect on one of the criteria in 10 CFR 50.1 0(a)(1 ), or if an indirect effect had a more than negligible effect on health and safety and common defense and security, that applicant could submit an exemption request to the NRC to allow for this construction activity to occur before issuance of a license, and the exemption will be granted if the underlying requirements of 10 CFR 50.12 are met. If a categorical exclusion is not applicable, the staff plans to issue its determination on the exemption request and the associated environmental assessment (EA)4 within 30 days for exemption requests associated with sites (1) with an approved early site permit, (2) for which a recent EA or environmental impact statement already describes the impacts associated with the exemption, or (3) for which another bounding approach already evaluates the impacts (e.g., reference to New Reactor Generic Environmental Impact Statement). To be eligible for this accelerated schedule, in addition to providing technical justification for the exemption 3

4 For designs licensed under the technology-inclusive, risk-informed, and performance-based methodology described in Regulatory Guide 1.233 (ML20091L698), SSCs falling under the definition of construction in 10 CFR 50.1 0(a)(1 )(iHiv) would likely include only those SSCs classified as safety-related or non-safety-related with special treatment. SSCs classified as non-safety-related with no special treatment would likely not be included in the definition of construction under those criteria because their impact on safety as evaluated under the methodology would be negligible.

An EA would not be required if the exemption falls into one of the categories listed in 10 CFR 51.22, "Criterion for categorical exclusion; identification of licensing and regulatory actions eligible for categorical exclusion or otherwise not requiring environmental review."

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request, the applicant must confirm that its submittal is bounded by the referenced environmental review and provide any new and significant information as part of the exemption request.

Safety-Related SSCs In general, construction of safety-related SSCs has a direct nexus to radiological safety and cannot be performed before issuance of a license or LWA. However, for designs that have already been approved, and if safety and common defense and security considerations are not inherently sensitive to site-specific factors, other options may be possible to shorten licensing schedules. The NRC is undertaking initiatives other than described in this paper that should effectively shorten construction schedules for safety-related SSCs.

Long-Term Strategy While the above strategies offer near-term solutions that can be quickly implemented, in the medium term, the NRC staff will consider whether guidance updates are needed for effective implementation. In the longer term, rulemaking may be required to modernize the definition of construction consistent with the rapid deployment of new and advanced reactor technologies.

Any potential rulemaking will be communicated to the Commission separately.

COORDINATION:

The Office of the General Counsel reviewed this paper a has no legal objection.

el F. King Acting Executive Director for Operations

ML25157A119 SECY-012 OFFICE NRR/DANU NMSS/REFS NRR/DNRL NAME JGreives JZimmerman MSampson DATE 6/7/2025 6/10/2025 6/11/2025 OFFICE NRR/DANU OGC QTE NAME JBowen RWeisman KAzariah-Kribbs DATE 6/9/2025 8/5/2025 8/12/2025 OFFICE NMSS NRR EDO NAME AKock GBowman (JBowen for)

MKing DATE 8/13/2025 8/13/2025 8/28/2025