RIS 2009-02, Public Meeting Announcement Re Revision to RIS 2009-02
| ML090890824 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/31/2009 |
| Revision: | 1 |
| From: | Matthew Hamm NRC/NRR/DIRS/ITSB |
| To: | Robert Elliott NRC/NRR/DIRS/ITSB |
| Hamm, Matthew DIRS/ITSB 415-1472 | |
| References | |
| RIS-09-002, Rev 1 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML090890824 (9) | |
DATE, TIME, AND LOCATION CHANGE
March 31, 2009 MEMORANDUM TO: Robert B. Elliott, Chief Technical Specifications Branch Division of Inspection and Regional Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Matthew Hamm, Reactor Engineer /RA/
Technical Specifications Branch Division of Inspection and Regional Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation DATES & TIMES: April 14, 2009; 1:00 pm - 2:00 pm LOCATION: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Room O3B6
11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 PURPOSE: The purpose of the meeting is to discuss changes to RIS 2009-02.
PARTICIPANTS: NRC Industry R. Elliott, NRR TBD
M. Hamm, NRR
Others, NRC
CATEGORY 2: This is a category 2 meeting*. The public is invited to participate in this meeting by discussing regulatory issues with the NRC at designated points identified on the agenda.
CONTACT
301-415-1472 MEH1@nrc.gov Enclosures:
Agenda Draft RIS 2009-02, Revision 1
- *Commissions Policy Statement on "Enhancing Public Participation in NRC Meetings,"
67 Federal Register 36920, May 28, 2002. For information regarding participating via teleconference, please contact Matthew Hamm at 301-415-1472 or MEH1@nrc.gov.
ML090890824 OFFICE ITSB:DIRS BC:ITSB:DIRS
NAME MHamm RElliott DATE 03/31/2009 03/31/2009
Memorandum to R. Elliott, from M. Hamm dated: March 31, 2008 PURPOSE: The purpose of the meeting is to discuss changes to RIS 2009-02.
DISTRIBUTION:
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PLANNED AGENDA
Participants at the April 10, 2009 meeting will discuss changes to RIS 2009-02.
Administrative A. Introductions B. Review Purpose and format of the Meeting
1.
Review Need for Changes to RIS 2009-02
2. History of RIS 2009-02
3. Public Comment Discussion Changes to RIS 2009-02
4. Presentation of Draft RIS
5. Public Comment Adjourn Enclosure
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 NRC REGULATORY ISSUE SUMMARY 2009-02, REV. 1, USE OF CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE GASEOUS RADIOACTIVITY MONITORS
AS REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE DETECTION EQUIPMENT AT
NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS
ADDRESSEES
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors except those who have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
All current and potential applicants for a combined license, manufacturing license, standard design certification, or standard design approval for a nuclear power plant under the provisions of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 52 (10 CFR), Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.
All applicants for nuclear power plant construction permits and operating licenses under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.
INTENT
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this revised regulatory issue summary (RIS) to clarify expectations regarding licensee operability determinations and communicate the NRC plan to address the situation created when some containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitors are unable to meet technical specification (TS)
requirements. The plan consists of integrating a streamlined license amendment process with the use of enforcement discretion, where appropriate. This RIS requires no action or written response on the part of an addressee. RIS 2009-02 was originally issued on January 29, 2009.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In order to meet General Design Criterion 30, Quality of reactor coolant pressure boundary, of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, licensees typically include RCS leakage detection equipment in their plant designs because the equipment can be used to detect reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) leakage. A typical RCS leakage detection system consists of a combination of the following:
- a containment atmosphere particulate radioactivity monitoring system
- a containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring system
- containment sump-level and sump-pump instrumentation
- containment cooler condensate monitoring instrumentation
-2- Containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring systems measure RCS leakage indirectly by detecting airborne radioactivity released from RCS leakage. Response time is the length of time required for these monitoring systems to detect a given volume of RCS leakage.
Response time is dependant on RCS radioactivity concentration, as well as other variables. For a given volume of leakage, with all other variables held constant, a higher RCS radioactivity concentration will yield a shorter response time for these monitoring systems. The design analyses for the containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring systems used in the licensing bases for most plants typically assume a RCS radioactivity concentration approximately equivalent to 0.1 percent failed fuel in the core. Improvements in fuel cladding integrity and RCS chemistry controls have significantly reduced RCS radioactivity concentration at most plants. As a result, the monitors for operating units may have longer response times than they would with 0.1 percent failed fuel in the core because the actual RCS radioactivity concentration is less than it would be with 0.1 percent failed fuel in the core.
Most plants have TS Limiting Conditions for Operation requirements for containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring systems used as part of RCS leakage detection equipment. The TS requirements for the monitoring systems response times are based on the design analysis that is part of a plants licensing basis. If the monitors are not capable of meeting their licensing basis, the monitors could be inoperable. When the monitors are inoperable the licensee is required to take remedial actions as permitted by their TS or to shut down the reactor.
Information Notice (IN) 2005-24, Nonconservatism in Leakage Detection Sensitivity (ADAMS Accession No. ML051780073), communicated the issue created by differences between actual and assumed RCS radioactivity concentrations to all licensees. The purpose of IN 2005-24 was to have licensees review information related to problems with containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitors used as part of RCS leakage detection equipment and consider appropriate actions as applicable to their plants. Information Notices do not require any action by licensees.
In September 2008, NRC inspectors at the Diablo Canyon Power Plant identified a non-cited violation for not complying with TS requirements for RCS leakage detection equipment. In November 2008, the licensee for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant and the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant requested exigent license amendments from the NRC after taking remedial actions as permitted by their TS because of a concern that the containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitor channels of the RCS leakage detection system were inoperable.
To address the issue, licensees working through the industry-sponsored Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) have attempted to create generic TS changes, model License Amendment Requests (LARs), model safety evaluations, and model proposed no-significant-hazards consideration determinations using the NRC TS Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP). See RIS 2000-10, Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process For Adopting Standard Technical Specifications Changes for Power Reactors (ADAMS Accession No. ML003693442) for more information on the NRC CLIIP.
RIS 2009-02 was originally issued on January 29, 2009. NRC received several responses and inquiries regarding NRCs expectations with respect to operability determinations for the containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitors. Some responders incorrectly
-3- interpreted the original RIS to mean that NRC was declaring their site specific containment atmosphere gaseous radiation monitors to be inoperable. NRC does not make generic operability determinations. Per NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900: Technical Guidance, OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND FUNCTIONALITY ASSESSMENTS FOR
RESOLUTION OF DEGRADED OR NONCONFORMING CONDITIONS ADVERSE TO
QUALITY OR SAFETY (ADAMS Accession No. ML081360529), licensees make operability determinations utilizing their plant-specific licensing basis.
SUMMARY OF ISSUE
Improvements in fuel cladding integrity and RCS chemistry controls result in lower RCS
radioactivity concentrations during operational activities, including situations where there is RCS
leakage. Thus, containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring systems which are designed on the basis of higher assumed RCS radioactivity concentrations may not provide accurate indication of RCS leakage in the required length of time due to the longer response time of the monitoring system. If this occurs, the staff believes the monitors could be considered inoperable, since they may not be able to meet their specified safety function.
However, the staff notes that licensees may not agree with the staff position, and that each licensee must determine the operability their gaseous radioactivity monitoring system based on their plant-specific licensing basis.
The NRC considers the longer response times of the containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitors to be of very low safety significance. The monitors would still be able to detect degradation in the RCPB long before components fail in a manner that would affect plant safety. Additionally, plants also have multiple diverse and redundant methods available to detect RCS leakage and to provide licensees with a means to detect significant RCPB
degradation and to take appropriate action to ensure the continued protection of public health and safety. Finally, nuclear power plants are designed to provide adequate core cooling following postulated loss-of-coolant accidents up to and including a break equivalent in size to the double-ended rupture of the largest pipe in the RCS. This design feature, coupled with the extremely low likelihood of unstable crack growth resulting in a loss-of-coolant accident, leads the NRC to conclude that the risk significance of this issue is very low.
The NRC plans to address the issue of inoperable containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring systems in an integrated fashion by: (i) working with the TSTF to develop revised generic TS for the monitoring system, and facilitating licensee implementation of the revised generic TS through a streamlined license amendment process; and (ii) using guidance on NRCs exercise of enforcement discretion involving inoperable containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring systems issued in EGM-09-001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090300467).
The NRC will review the generic TS changes that the TSTF proposes for pressurized-water reactors (PWRs) and boiling-water reactors (BWRs). If the generic TS changes are found to be acceptable, the NRC will make the generic model LARs, model safety evaluations, and model no-significant-hazards consideration determinations available to licensees using the NRC CLIIP.
The revised TS would clarify the licensing basis for the leakage detection system in order to prevent further confusion in the future. Licensees are free to submit LARs for TS changes to
-4- address the issue. If licensees deem further action regarding the issue is unwarranted, they can choose to take no action.
On February 18, 2009, the TSTF submitted TSTF-513, Revision 1 Revise PWR Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation and TSTF-514, Revision 0
Revise BWR Operability Requirements and Actions for RCS Leakage Instrumentation to the NRC for review. Licensees are free to submit LARs to address the issue using TSTF-513 or TSTF-514; or they can propose alternative solutions.
In certain circumstances involving inoperable containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitoring systems, enforcement discretion is available. Specific guidance for this enforcement discretion is described in EGM-09-001 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090300467) and is available on the NRCs web site at www.nrc.gov.
BACKFIT DISCUSSION
The intent of this revised RIS is to inform addressees of the NRCs plan to address the failure of containment atmosphere gaseous radioactivity monitors used as RCS leakage detection equipment to meet TS requirements and clarify expectations regarding licensee operability determinations.
The staff is not imposing any new positions on licensees. This revised RIS is not providing any new regulatory positions. This revised RIS only conveys the NRCs plan to address the issue of RCS leakage detection equipment failing to meet TS requirements because of the difference between actual and assumed RCS radioactivity concentrations. This revised RIS requires no action or written response and, therefore, is not a backfit under 10 CFR 50.109, Backfitting.
Consequently, the staff did not perform a backfit analysis.
FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION
A notice of opportunity for public comment on this RIS was not published in the Federal Register because it is informational and pertains to a staff position that does not represent a departure from current regulatory requirements and practice. However, a public meeting to discuss this RIS and other subjects was held on January 8, 2009. The meeting summary is available under ADAMS Accession No. ML090130583. The NRC intends to work with industry representatives, members of the public, and other stakeholders in developing final guidance and in modifying related guidance documents.
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT
This RIS is not a rule as designated by the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808)
and, therefore, is not subject to the Act.
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT
This RIS does not contain any information collections and, therefore, is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.).
-5-
PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.
CONTACT
Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Division of Policy and Rulemaking Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
301-415-1472 e-mail: matthew.hamm@nrc.gov Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collection