PNO-III-80-114, on 800618,licensee Discovered That When Routine Safeguards Logic Test Was Conducted W/One Diesel Generator out-of-svc,reduction in Capability of Engineered Safety Features Occurred
| ML19351D193 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Point Beach  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1980 |
| From: | Hague R, Heishman R, James Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| PNO-III-80-114, NUDOCS 8010090191 | |
| Download: ML19351D193 (2) | |
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION
[6N f.
Date:
June 18, 1980 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURENCE--PNO-III-80-114 Page 1 of 2 This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest sionificance.
The information presented is as initially received without verification or evaluation and is basically all that is known by IE staff as of this date.
Facility: Wisconsin Electric Power Company j
Point Beach - Unit #2 (Docket No. 50-301)
Two Creeks, WI
Subject:
REDUCTION IN CAPABILITY OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)
At 8:05 a.m. on 6-18-80 the licensee discovered that a routine safeguards logic test was conducted on 6-17-80 with one diesel out-of-service for annual maintenance.
To perform this test certain safeguards signals must be rendered ineffective so the logic test can be conducted.
Signals tested include "A" and "B" steam line low pressure, primary system low pressure, containment high pressure, and containment high-high pressure.
The first four signals are for initiation of safety injection and any one of them will initiate safety injection.
There is an inherent redundancy between these four signals in that a loss of coolant accident will cause both low primary system pressure and high containment pressure. A steam line break will cause a low steam line pressure, a low primary system pressure and also a high containment pressure if the steam line break is within containment.
The containment high-high pressure' signal is for initiation of containment spray. During logic testing each one of these signals is defeated one at a time for about one minute each. The unit was at 100% power during the test.
With the 3D emergency diesel generator out-of-service, the "A" train is rendered inoperative during a loss of AC power accident.
With the "A" train inoperative the associated safety injection train and containment spray pump will not start upon receiving a start signal since there is no power to the train.
However, the "B" train would be energized by the 4D diesel during a loss of AC, and the associated safety injection train would have started on a LOCA or steam line break even if one of the four associated signals was defeated (as a result of the test) because of the redundancy.
The "B" train containment spray pump would not have started if the containment high-high pressure signal was defeated (as a result of the test).
Therefore, neither spray pump would have operated auto-matica11y, although two containment fan ecolers would have been energized upon a safety injection signal. The spray pump, however, can be manually started upon or before a containment high-high pressure alarm.
Also the spray pump would have etarted automatically upon unblocking the high-high. pressure signal if such a condition existed during and subsequent to testing of that signal logic.
The licensee plans to make a news release. The State of Wisconsin is being notified.
Region III does not plan to make a news release at this time.
PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION 8010090I91
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PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION June 18, 1980 PNO-III-80-114 Page 2 of 2 I
Facility: Wisco.4.n Electric Power Company Point Beach - Unit #2 (Docket No. 50-301)
Two Creeks, WI
Subject:
REDUCTION IN CAPABILITY OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)
The licensee informed the NRC, Region III at 8:30 a.m., 6-18-80, and the NRC IRC at 9:02 a.m., 6-18-80.
This information is current as of 3:00 p.m. CDT, June 18, 1980.
Contact:
J. I7. Smith R. Hague R. F ishman Pt. Beach 414/755-4374 RIII, 932-2565 RIII, 932-2540 (FTS 362-1012)
I Distribution:
Transmitted H St.3 O Chairman Ahearne Comissioner Hendrie S. J. Chilk, SECY Comissioner Gilinsky Comissioner Bradford C. C. Kamerer, CA Comissioner Kennedy ACRS (ForDistribution) 3
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l Transmitted:
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.P. Bldg.Yl03 IE:X005 W. J. Dircks, EDO H. R. Denton, NRR C. Michelson, AE0D -
R. H. Vollmer, NRR Landow (6 min /page)
J. J. Fouchard, PA R. J. Mattson, NRR J. J. Cummings, OIA N. M. Haller, MPA D. F. Ross, NRR R. G. Ryan, OSP D. Eisenhut, NRR MAIL H. K. Shapar, ELD S. H. Hanauer R. Minogue. SD IE:XOOS WillsteBldg.N'/O Document Mgt. Br. (For PDR/LPD J. G. Davis, HMSS Regional Offices Yt M R. J. Budnitz, RES re W 30 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION f
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