PLA-2813, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/86-27 & 50-388/86-30.Corrective Actions:Alarm Response Procedures AR-106-001,AR-015-001 & AR-016-001 Changed to Direct Operator Attention to Impact on Tech Spec

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Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-387/86-27 & 50-388/86-30.Corrective Actions:Alarm Response Procedures AR-106-001,AR-015-001 & AR-016-001 Changed to Direct Operator Attention to Impact on Tech Spec
ML20212P472
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/11/1987
From: Keiser H
PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To: Blough A
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
PLA-2813, NUDOCS 8703160121
Download: ML20212P472 (3)


Text

_ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -.

O PP&L Pennsylvania Power & Light Company Two Nortli Ninth Street

  • Allentown, FA 18101
  • 215 / 770 5151 Harold W. Keiser Vice President-Nuclear Operations 215/770-7502 MAR i 11987 Mr. A. R. Blough, Chief Project Branch No. 1 9

Division of Reactor Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 u

c SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION NRC INSPECTION REPORTS 50-387/86-27 AND 50-388/86-30 Docket Nos. 50-387 PLA-2813 FILE R41-1C, R41-2 50-388

Dear Mr. Blough:

This letter provides PP&L's response to your correspondence of February 9, 1987, which forwarded NRC Region I Combined Inspection Reports 50-387/86-27 and 50-388/86-30 with Appendix A, Notice of Violation.

Your notice advised that PP&L is to submit a written reply within thirty days of the date of the letter. We trust that the Commission will find the attached response acceptable.

Very truly yours, l

H. W. Keiser Vice President - Nuclear Operations v

Attachment cc: NRC Document Control Desk (original)

Mr. L. R. Plisco - NRC Resident Inspector Mr. M. C. Thadani - NRC Project Manager 7@l

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8703160121 870311 PDR ADOCK 05000387 G

PDR I

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y RESPONS7.TO NOTICE OF~ VIOLATION Violation (388/86-30-01)

Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.2.1 states that the Unit i 125-Volt DC load group channel "A" battery bank, ID610, is to be operable in Operational Condition 1.

With one of the Unit 1 125-Volt DC load group battery banks inoperable, the inoperable bank is to be restored to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, or the common loads aligned to the inoperable Unit 1 battery bank are to be transferred to the corresponding Unit 2 battery bank. Otherwise, the common loads aligned to the inoperable battery bank are to be declared inoperable.

Contrary to the above, betseen 10:30 p.m. Dei an 19, 1986 and 3:00 p.m.

December 20, 1986, while in Operational Cond ; ion 1, the Unit 1 125-Volt DC load group channel "A" battery bank 1D610 was inoperable, in that the full capacity battery charger 1D613 had failed, and the inoperable bank was not restored within two hours. In addition, the common loads were not transferred to the corresponding Unit 2 battery bank.

Discussion At approximately 2200 on December 19, 1987, Unit 1 battery charger 1D613 was discovered to be inoperable. Due to the Unit I status of Condition 4 (Cold Shutdown), this did not require an L.C.O. to be entered.

It was not recognized initially that Unit 2 Technical Specifications also address this same charger. For this reason the Unit 2 Unit Supervisor (SRO) was not informed of the equipment failure and no L.C.O. was entered on Unit 2.

At 1500 on December 20, 1987, it was determined that a Limiting Condition for Operation existed for Unit 2.

The L.C.0, was immediately entered and backdated to 2230 on 12/19/87.

It was later determined by calculation that although voltage on the 125VDC bus 1D610 had degraded to 116 volts, if called upon, the 1D610 battery bank would have supplied its design load profile for approximately two hours. This would allow sufficient time for a manual transfer of loads to a Unit 2 battery. Therefore, the potential safety consequences of the event were not severe.

Response

(1) Reason for the violation:

The root cause was the failure of the Unit 1 Supervisor to recognize the impact of the inoperable 1D610 battery bank on Unit 2 and inform the Unit 2 Supervisor.

(2) Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:

Alarm response procedures AR-106-001, AR-015-001 and AR-016-001 have been changed to direct operator attention to the impact on the Technical Specifications for both units for the 125 VDC and 4160 VAC systems.

Operator round sheets (01-PL-0161 and OI-PL-0162) have also been revised so that each notes the dependence of Unit 2 on the Unit 1 125 VDC and 4160 VAC systems and directs notification of Shift Supervision.

2-These improvements in administrative controls provide explicit guidance for the common 125VDC and 4160 VAC systens.

(3) Corrective steps to be taken to avoid further violations:

In addition to the changes to procedures and operator round sheets described in (2) above, this event is being stressed during operator routine training cycle 87-04, to be completed-by March 20, 1987.

(4) Date of full compliance:

Based on the actions already taken as described above, PP&L is in full compliance.

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