ONS-2014-146, Emergency Plan Revision 2014-002

Emergency Plan Revision 2014-002

ML14318A598
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	11/10/2014
From:	Batson S Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ONS-2014-146
Download: ML14318A598 (330)

Text

DUKE ENERGY,0= Scoft L.

utf W Baton Duke Wnegy ONO1VP 17800 RocesterHw Seneca, SC 29672 ONS-2014-146 864.873.3274 864.873.4208 Scott.Baftonduke-energy.com November 10, 2014 10 CFR 50.54(q)

Attn: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2746

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Nos. 50-269, -270, and -287 Emergency Plan Revision 2014-002 Please find attached for your use and review copies of the revisions to the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan along with the associated revision instructions and 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation.

This revision is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) and does not reduce the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. Ifthere are any questions or concerns pertaining to this revision please call Pat Street, Emergency Preparedness Manager, at 864-873-3124.

By copy of this letter, two copies of this revision are being provided to the NRC, Region II, Atlanta, Georgia.

Sincerely, Scott L. Batson Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station Attachments:

Revision Instructions Emergency Plan Revision 2014-002 10 CFR 50.54(q) Evaluation(s) www.duko-energy.com

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 10, 2014 xc: w/2 copies of attachments Mr. Victor McCree, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 w/copy of attachments Mr. James R. Hall, Project Manager U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North Mailstop O-8B1 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 (send via E-mail) w/o attachments Mr. Eddy Crowe NRC Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station ELL EC2ZF

November 6, 2014 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION

SUBJECT:

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures Volume A Revision 2014-002 Please make the following changes to the Emergency Plan:

REMOVE INSERT Cover Sheet Rev. 2014-001 Cover Sheet Rev. 2014-002 EPA List of Effective Pages Rev 011 EPA List of Effective Pages Rev 012 EPA List of Figures Rev 003 EPA List of Figures Rev 004 EPA Record of Changes Rev 011 EPA Record of Changes Rev 012 EPA Section A Rev 003 EPA Section A Rev 004 EPA Section B Rev 006 EPA Section B Rev 007 EPA Section D Rev 006 EPA Section D Rev 007 EPA Section F Rev 004 EPA Section F Rev 005 EPA Section G Rev 005 EPA Section G Rev 006 EPA Section H Rev 004 EPA Section H Rev 005 EPA Section I Rev 003 EPA Section I Rev 004 EPA Section J Rev 004 EPA Section J Rev 005 EPA Section M Rev 002 EPA Section M Rev 003 EPA Section N Rev 003 EPA Section N Rev 004 EPA Section P Rev 005 EPA Section P Rev 006 EPA Appendix 06 Rev 001 EPA Appendix 06 Rev 002 Pat Street ONS Emergency Preparedness Manager

<,pi DUKE ENERGY.

OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY PLAN REVISION 2014-002 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA LIST OF EFFECTIVE]

EMERGENCY PLAN A - LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Revision No.

012 Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHN PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? EZ Yes El No Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

Oconee Emergency Plan List Of Effective Pages SECTION PAGE NUMBER REVISION NO. DATE Emergency Plan Approval Cover Sheet Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 List of Effective Pages Page I - 3 Rev. 2014-01 October 2014 List Of Figures Page 1 - 5 Rev. 2014-01 October 2014 Record Of Changes Page 1 - 10 Rev. 2014-01 October 2014 Table of Contents Page I Rev. 2012-05 December 2012 I. Introduction Page I - 5 Rev. 2012-05 December 2012 Page i-6 Rev. 2008-02 October 2008 Page i-6a Rev. 2012-05 December 2012 II. Planning Standards and Evaluation Criteria A. Assignment of Responsibility Page A-I - A-8 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 B. Onsite Emergency Organization Page B- I - B-21 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 C. Emergency Response Support And Resources Page C- I & C-2 Rev. 2012-05 December 2012 D. Emergency Classification System Page D-I - D-100 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 E. Notification Page E- I & E-2 Rev. 2008-02 December 2008 F. Emergency Communications Page F-I - F-8 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 G. Public Information and Education Page G G-5 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 I Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Oconee Emergency Plan List Of Effective Pages SECTION PAGE NUMBER REVISION NO. DATE H. Emergency Facilities And Equipment Page H H-39 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 I. Accident Assessment Page I 1-37 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 J. Protective Response Page J-I - J-12 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 K. Radiological Exposure Control Page K-I - K-12 Rev. 2012-05 December 2012 L. Medical And Public Health Support Page L- I - L-5 Rev. 2012-05 December 2012 M. Recovery And Reentry Planning And Post-Accident Operations Page M- I - M-5 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 N. Exercises and Drills Page N-I - N-3 Rev. 2012-05 December 2012

0. Emergency Response Training Page 0-I 3 Rev. 2012-05 December 2012 P. Responsibility For The Planning Effort:

Development, Periodic Review and Distribution Of The Emergency Plans Page P-I - P-18 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 III. APPENDICIES APPENDIX 1 Definitions Page 1 - 5 Rev. 2012-05 December 2012 APPENDIX 2 Meteorology And Offsite Dose Assessment Program Page 1 -4 Rev. 2014-01 March 2014 2 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Oconee Emergency Plan List Of Effective Pages SECTION PAGE NUMBER REVISION NO. DATE APPENDIX 3 Alert And Notification

System Description

Page 1 - 4 Rev. 2012-05 December 2012 APPENDIX 4 Evacuation Time Estimates Page 1 Rev. 2013-01 October 2013 APPENDIX 5 Letters of Agreement Page 1 Rev. 2014-01 March 2014 Page 2 Rev. 2014-01 March 2014 APPENDIX 6 Distribution List Page I - 4 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014 APPENDIX 7 Emergency Data Transmittal System Page I Rev. 2012-01 June 2012 APPENDIX 8 Spill Prevention Control Page 1 - 40 Rev. 2012-05 October 2009 And Countermeasure Plan ONS Pollution Prevention Page 1 - 29 Rev. 2012-05 December 2009 Plan - Rev. II Site Drawing Drawing Revision 2001-03 October 2001 APPENDIX 9 Page I - 17 Rev. 2012-05 July 2010 ONS Chemical Treatment Ponds 1, 2 and 3, Groundwater Monitoring Sampling And Analysis Plan APPENDIX 10 Hazardous Materials Response Plan Page 1 - 12 Rev. 2010-01 February 2010 3 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA LIST OF FIGURES EMERGENCY PLAN A - LIST OF FIGURES Revision No.

0)04 Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHO PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination'? C1 Yes C1 No Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date I PrintedName and Signature

)

)LIST OF FIGURES Figures Page A 10 Mile Emergency Planning Zone i-5 B Counties Within a 50-mile Radius i-6 A- I Inter- Relationship of Response Organizations A-5 A-2A Emergency Organization Recall- Normal Working Hours A-6 A-2B Emergency Organization Recall (Backshifts, Holidays and A-7 Weekends)

A-3 Responsibility for Emergency Response Functions A-8 B- I Emergency Response Organization - Functional Areas of B/5-7 Emergency Response B-2 Technical Support Center Organization Chart B-8 B-3 Operational Support Center Organization Chart B-9 B-4A Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Org. (EOF Director) B-10 B-4B Emergency Operations Facility Org. (Site Services Group) B-11 B-4C Emergency Operations Facility Org. (Rad. Assessment Manager) B-12 B-5 Emergency Coordinator Duties B- 13 B-6 Emergency Operations Facility Director Duties B-14 B-8 Minimum Staffing Levels B/15-16 B-9 Emergency Operations Facility Minimum Staffing Levels B-17 B-10 Onsite Emergency Response Duties B/18-19 B-i I Common EOF - Multi-Site Event Staffing B-20 D-1 Emergency Classification BASES Document D-1 F-I Emergency Communications System F-7 1Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

LIST OF FIGURES

) Figures Page F-2 Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Radio Network F-8 G-1 Public Emergency Information Brochure - Oconee Nuclear Site G-5 G-2 Locations for Lake Warning Signs And One-Mile Exclusion Area G-6 Signs H-I Typical Technical Support Center - Primary Location H-9 H-IA Deleted H-2 Typical Operational Support Center - Primary Location H-I1 H-2A Deleted H-3A Charlotte EOF, General Office Building Layout - Charlotte, NC H-13 H-3B Charlotte Emergency Operations Facility Layout H-14 H-3C Oconee Joint Information Center (JIC) H-15

) H-3D In Processing Conference/Training H-16 H-3E Oconee JIC, General Area Layout H-17 H-3F Oconee Backup Count Room Location, ONS Admin Building H-18 H-4 Meteorological Equipment H-19 H-5 Radiation Indicating Alarms H/20,21,22 H-6 Portable Survey Instruments H/23-24 H-7 Air Samplers H-25 H-8 Fire and Combustion Products and Detectors H-26 H-9 Normal Environmental Monitoring Program (Onsite/Offsite H-27 Locations)

H-10 Normal Environmental Monitoring Program (Offsite Locations & H-28 Air Samplers)

H-I1 Count Room Equipment - Onsite H-29

) 2 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

LIST OF FIGURES Figures Page H-12 Contents of Emergency Kits for Field Monitoring Teams (World of H-30 Energy H- 13 Emergency Kit Inventory Sheet (Control Room Locations) H-31 H- 14 Emergency Kit Inventory Sheet (Respirator Equipment Locations) H-32 H-15 Emergency Supplies Inventory List/TSC, OSC & EOF H-33 H- 16 Emergency Cabinet Inventory Sheet of Inplant Surveillance H-34 Equipment (World of Energy)

H- 17 Emergency Cabinet Inventory List for Operational Support Center H-35 H- 18 Seismic Instrumentation Program H-36 H- 19 Spill Control Equipment/Supplies H-37 H-20 Surveys H-38 1-1 Accident Assumptions 1/6-7

[-2 Technical Basis for Estimation of Failed Fuel - Non-Overheating 1/8-14 Condition 1-3 Technical Basis for Estimation of Failed Fuel - Engineering 1-15 Calculations f-3A GAP Inventory Vs. Temperature 1-16 I-3B Percent Activity Release for 100 Percent Overtemperature 1-17 Conditions 1-3C Relationship of % Fuel, Overtemperature, with % Core Inventory 1-18 Released of XE, KR, I or CS 1-4 Technical Basis for Estimation of Failed Fuel Overheating with 1-19 Fuel Melt 1-4A Percent Activity Release for 100 Percent Core Melt Conditions 1-20 1-4B Relationship of % Fuel Melt With % Core Inventory Released of 1-21 BA or SR

[-4C Relationship of % Fuel Melt With % Core Inventory Released of 1-22 XE, KR, 1,CS, or TE 3 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

LIST OF FIGURES 3 Figures Page 1-5 Activity per Fuel Assembly 1/23-24 1-6 Technical Basis for Estimation of Failed Fuel Area Monitors for 1-25/26 Overheat without Fuel Melt I-6A Average Gamma Energy Level 1-27 I-6B Values For Calculating Total Noble Gas Dose Rate 1-27 I-6C Dose Rate vs. Time for Fuel Overheating Without Fuel Melt 1-28 1-7 Technical Basis for Estimation of Failed Fuel Area Monitors for 1-29 Fuel Melt Condition I-7A Dose Rate vs. Time for Fuel Melt 1-30 1-8 Technical Basis for Estimation of Failed Fuel Hydrogen 1131-33 Concentration in the Containment Building 1-9 Technical Basis for Estimation of Failed Fuel Isotope Decay 1U34-35 Correction

) I-9A Parent-Daughter Relationships 1-36 J-I Protective Action Recommendation Flow Chart J-7 J-IA Protective Action Guides J-8 J-2 Evacuation Routes J-9 J-3 Individual Contamination Exposure Levels J-10 J-4 Initial Personnel Contamination Record J-11 J-5 Oconee Nuclear Site Building Layout J-12 K-i Medical Decontamination Kits K-6 K-2 List of Supplies for Decontamination (Offsite) K-7 K-3 Emergency Decontamination Supplies (Onsite) K-8 K-4 Daily Exposure Time Record Card K-9

) K-5 Individual Contamination Exposure Levels K/!10-1 4 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

LIST OF FIGURES

) Figures Page K-6 Radiation Work Permit K-12 L- I Emergency Medical Supplies - (Trauma Kits) L-3 L-2 Medical Equipment - Location L-4 L-3 Radiation Protection Hospital Kit - (Oconee Memorial Hospital) L-5 M-1 Onsite Recovery Organization M-4 M-2 Offsite Recovery Organization M-5 0-1 Emergency Response Training Matrix 0-3 P-I Implementing Plan Cross Reference P/4-7 P-2 Supporting Plans P-8

) Appendix 10 Hazardous Materials Response Plan - (Hazardous Waste Contingency Plan)

) 5 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

) Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA RECORD OF CHANGi EMERGENCY PLAN A - RECORD OF CHANGES Revision No.

012 Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHP PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? El Yes El No

) Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* .(QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

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RECORD OF CHANGES

) REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS Revision I April I, 1981 Meteorological Update Revision 2 December 31, 1981 Rewrite Emergency Plan in Nureg 0654 Format Revision 3 March, 1982 Update Emergency Plan Revision 4 April, 1982 Revisions & Changes to update Emergency Plan Revision 5 September I. 1982 Revision to coincide with Crisis Management Plan Revision 6 November I, 1982 Revision update Revision 7 December 14. 1982 Review and update 83-1 June 10, 1983 Changes required by action items due to annual exercise and review and general update 83-2 November 17. 1983 Changes required by review and general update 84-1 March 26. 1984 Revisions as determined by QA audit and minor editing 84-2 November 15. 1984 Revisions as determined by annual review

) 85-1 June 7. 1985 Revisions/changes/editing 85-2 Revisions/changes/editing-annual review 86-1 March 8. 1986 New Oconee Brochure 86-2 November 13. 1986 Revisions/changes/editing-annual review 86-3 December 9. 1986 Correct changes identified as deficiencies by the NRC in Rev. 85-2.

87-1 February 4. 1987 Revision update, minor editing changes, included failed fuel accident assessment information.

87-2 Revision update, minor editing changes Review Section D. Agreement letters updated.

87-4 December 10, 1987 Incorporate alternate TSC and OSC into Emergency Plan 88-1 June 7, 1988 Revised EALS in Section D.

88-2 October 14, 1988 Annual review. Minor editorial revisions.

89-1 February 28, 1989 Major revision to Section D. Added Appendix 7. Minor editorial changes.

89-2 August 14, 1989 Change to Section D. Minor editorial revisions.

) 89-3 January 5, 1990 Annual Review I

Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

) REVISION EFFECTIVE RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 90-1 March I. 1990 Changes to Section D as required by NRC commitment.

90-2 June i. 1990 Changes reflect upgrade of radiation monitor system and minor editing.

90-3 July 2, 1990 Change to Section D, Emergency Classification.

90-4 October 3 1, 1990 Annual Review 91-1 January 21. 1991 Section D revision. (RIA upgrade) 91-2 February 20. 1991 Section D revision. (TS to SLC) 91-3 March 22. 1991 Section D revision. (RIA upgrade), Section D revision. (SLB revision) 91-5 September 19. 1991 Section D revision. (RIA upgrade) 91-6 December 16, 1991 Annual review.

92-1 March I. 1992 Section D (RIA upgrade). Minor editorial changes.

92-2 June 30, 1992 Major Revision

) 92-3 October 29. 1992 Annual review 92-4 12/31/92 Section B. D, H, J, Appendix 4. 5 & 6 changes.

93-1 03/01/93 Sections D, G. H, N. P, and Appendix 6 93-2 05/07/93 Sections A, B. D, Appendix 5 and 6 93-3 07/23/93 Sections A, B. G, H, 1, J, L, M, N, & Appendix 6 93-4 08/I 1/93 Sections B, D, and Appendix 5 93-05 01/01/94 Annual Review. Incorporation of EPA-400 guidelines.

94-0 I 03/15/94 Additions of Appendix 8 and 9. - (Minor revisions) 94-02 05/09/94 Changes to Appendix 5, Pages I and 2; Changes to Appendix 6, Pages 2 and 4; State of South Carolina Agreement Letter 94-03 05/25/94 Changes to Appendix 5, Page 2; Changes to Appendix 6, Pages 4 and 5; INPO Agreement Letter 94-04 06/06/94 Changes to Appendix 5, Page 2; Change Teledyne Isotopes Badge Service agreement letter to Northeast Utilities Service Company

) 94-05 08/08/94 Changes to Section D 94-06 12/29/94 Annual review. Editorial changes, minor revisions.

2 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

)RECORD REVISION EFFECTIVE OF CHANGES (Continued)

NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 95-01 02/23/95 Changes to Sections B. G. Appendix 5.

95-02 10/23/95 Annual review and changes 95-03 11/01/95 Section D. Change, Incorporated new EAL'S.

95-04 12/31/95 Calendar 1996, HAZMAT Changes. RP/ 14 deleted 96-01 02/13/96 Changes to Sections B, D, and N.

96-02 06/25/96 Changes to Section D 96-03 07/96 Changes to Section D 96-04 12/96 Annual review, editorial changes, minor changes with major change to Appendix 10.

97-01 07-97 Section B, I, Appendix 5 & 7, with editorial/minor changes to Section H & P 97-02 12-97 Annual review and editorial/minor changes 98-01 02-98 Section D. page 35. Correction of title on Enclosure 4.3 98-02 03-98 Section N, page 1 & 2, Added part a (General) to Section N.2 to ensure drills conducted between NRC evaluated exercises are performed in accordance with I0CFR50. Appendix E,Section IV.F.2.b 98-03 04-98 List of Figures page number corrections. Added Emergency Operation Facility to Figure H-15, Figure H-20 reformatted. Added Agreement Letter with Keowee-Key Volunteer Fire Department. Appendix 5, #24. Appendix 10 -

Hazardous Materials Response Plan, corrections on Table of Contents with minor revisions. Headings on Appendix 10, Figure 2 with minor revisions.

98-04 12-98 Annual review and editorial/minor changes.

99-01 03-99 The ONS Technical Specifications have been converted to a set of Technical Specifications based on NUREG 1430. "Standard Technical Specifications Babcock and Wilcox Plants."

Replaced the description phrases (titles) in Section D for Operating Modes with the Mode number from Improved Technical Specifications. In Section I the portion describing leak rate volume percent per day was changed to percent of the containment air weight per day. The reference to Tech Spec 4.4. 1.1 was changed to reference Improved Technical Specification 5.5.2.

NOTE: The implementation date of Improved Tech Specs was moved from March 4, 1999 to March 27, 1999, therefore the revision date for revision 99-01 will depict February when the actual administrative changes were

,) completed.

3 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

R RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 99-02 12-99 Annual review and editorial/minor changes 2000-01 04-2000 Addition of List of Effective Pages 2000-02 05/2000 Editorial /minor changes 2000-03 12/2000 Annual review and editorial/minor changes 2001-01 02/07/2001 Additions and corrections as result of 50.54(t) audit.

Additional information added to Basis Document and additional EAL's resulting from EP drill critiques.

2001-02 08/2001 Changes in areas of responsibility. Added note concerning RVLS to Fission Product Barrier Matrix; 2001 calendar; information added to EP Functional Area Manual: added/updated information on annual average meteorology; Appendix 5: Appendix 6; editorial/minor changes.

2001-03 12/2001 Added information in Basis Document concerning a reactor building containment break. Replaced the 2001 calendar with the 2002 calendar.

Editorial/minor changes.

2002-01 01/02 The present Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Operating Procedure is written in a different format and with some different terms than the earlier version. The term PTS (Pressurized Thermal Shock) has replaced TSOR (Thermal Shock Operating Range). This is only a change in terminology.

The additional EAL is to ensure a site specific credible threat results in a declaration of a notification of Unusual Event (NOUE). This change is also intended to achieve an appropriate level and consistent response Nationwide.

2002-02 06/02 Section B - minor changes; Section D - Added information requested by Emergency Coordinators to Enclosure 4.1; Section G - Rewrite of entire section: Section H - Updated information on Figure H-4 relating to Met Data; Appendix 5 - Updated Letters of Agreement; and miscellaneous spelling/grammar errors.

2002-03 09/02 Section A - Compliance with the NRC Security Interim Compensatory Measure (ICM) issued 02/25/02; Section P - Audit frequencies per revised 10 CFR 50.54 (t) as stated in Federal Register Vol 64, 03/29/99.

Appendix 1 - Added definition of monthly and Semi-Annual; Appendix 5.

Agreement Letters, updated #17, Appendix 6 - Changed name on 78A.

Miscellaneous corrections.

2003-01 02/03 Section D - RIA setpoints change, Section G - 2003 Calendar, Appendix 3 -

Siren upgrade, new map 0i-5) ; Appendix 5 - Agreement Letters, Appendix 6 -

Issued To change, Section B, E, F editorial/minor changes 2003-02 08/03 Section D - incorporates additional guidance for the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director related to classification of a high energy line break, such as a Main Steam Line Break. In addition, Section D has been retyped using a consistent font style - no changes in content resulted from the retype.

4 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUNIBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 2004-01 02/04 Incorporates a retype of the majority of the sections as an editorial change to adopt a consistent format: Section G - Added information concerning One Mile Exclusion Area Signs, Section H - Strip Chart Recorders were removed under an NSM, Section J - Incorporated guidance on the use of KI as a protective action recommendation; Section K - changed KI dose to 5 REM CDE from 25 REM; Appendix 4 - Incorporate results of Evacuation Time Estimate; Appendix 5 -

Revised Agreement Letters 2004-02 12/21/04 Editorial changes to correct typos, drawings, and title/organizational names. This revision also incorporates clarifying information from the latest Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE); clarification of offsite agency responsibilities for protective actions for impediments and special populations; revised EAL #2 for Enclosure 4.3. Unusual Event IC #2; clarification of ERO activation after normal working hours; and revisions to the site's SPCC Plan included in Appendix 8. In addition to these changes, applicable references have replaced generic references in Figure P-I. This revision also incorporates the 2005 Calendar distributed to the 10 mile EPZ population.

2005-01 02/01/05 Section D. Enclosure 4.7. Page 66 - Duke Power Hydro-Electric Group has revised ihe Lake Keowee water level from 807 to 815.5 feet for initiating a Condition B.

This elevation is used in Enclosure 4.7 for classifying the event as an Unusual

)has Event. The Hydro -Electric Group notifies the Control Room when Condition B been declared. No protective actions by the plant are changed.

2005-02 05/17/05 Section I & Letters of Agreement - Incorporates an editorial revision that describes the makeup of Field Monitoring Teams and updated Agreement Letters. 1.7&8 replaced "....personnel from Radiation Protection and Chemistry." with "..a RP Technician and a Driver." Editorial Change - Chemistry personnel no longer perform the function of FMT Driver. FMT Drivers are now provided by other groups.

2005-03 08/24/05 Revision 2005-03 incorporates an addendum for the Fire Department/Volunteer Fire Department Agreement Letters. This addendum was added as a result of NRC guidance provided to utilities. The addendum to these letters provides guidance on the use of the Incident Command System at ONS and identifies the ONS Fire Brigade Leader as the on-scene commander and site-interface for responding offsite fire departments.

2005-04 09/15/05 Revision 2005-04 is a change to Page 66. Enclosure 4.7, Emergency Action Levels

1. 1 - Reservoir elevation greater than or equal to 807.0 feet with all spillway gates open and the lake elevation continues to rise. This change undoes Revision 2005-01 which changed Keowee Lake level from 807 feet elevation to 815.5 feet elevation. This revision was determined to be a non conservative change in that it delayed the Unusual Event emergency classification. Appendix 5, Agreement Letter #21 has been updated.

2005-05 01/09/06 Revision 2005-05 incorporates editorial changes that clarify organizational charts/responsibilities, revise procedure references, replaces public information calendar, and replaces obsolete survey instruments. Agreement Letters #16 and

1. 19 were updated.

5 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

R REVISION EFFECTIVE RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 2006-03 06/8/06 Section D - Change #1 Revised initiating condition #2 for the Alert classification for Enclosure 4.6 (Fire/Explosions and Security Events). This change is based on a correction to the NEI White Paper, Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Programs For Hostile Actions which was endorsed in a letter from the NRC on December 8, 2005. Change #2 - Renumbered Emergency Action Levels through out Section D to match the numbering scheme found in RP/O/B/i000/001 (Emergency Classification) procedure - Renumbering makes it easier for procedure users to locate the correct emergency action level in the Basis Document. Appendix 5 - Agreement Letters #8, 14.15 & 23 were updated.

2006-04 11/06 Reference changes to the deletion of the Clemson EOF and incorporates reference to the Charlotte EOF. In addition. miscellaneous editorial changes are included in this revision.

2007-01 03/07 Appendix 5 Agreement Letters that have been updated/revised.

2007-02 12/07 Editorial changes including a revised 50 mile radius map (Figure B), a revision to the Emergency Classification Basis Section D , the 2008 Emergency Planning Calendar. a revised layout drawing for the JIC, a revised listing of portable survey instruments, the latest renewal of existing agreement letters and a revised Ground Water Monitoring Plan 2008-01 09/08 The original order of the EALs created a human performance trap. The first fission barrier column that the procedure user reviews is the RCS Barrier column which is on the left side of the page. The second fission barrier column that is reviewed is the Fuel Clad Barrier which is in the center of the page. This order gives the procedure user the mind set that the EALs are listed in the same order: RCS EAL followed by the Fuel Clad EAL. Changing the order of the EALs is not a deviation from the approved EAL scheme but is a difference. This change does not constitute a decrease in the effectiveness of the EPLAN since the EALs are exactly the same.

2008-02 10/08 As of this change 2008-02, the Emergency Plan is now available on NEDL/SCRIBE and has been completely re-issued. All changes in the future to the Emergency Plan will be completed thru NEDLJSCRIBE. The following Agreement Letters were also updated: 1,2,3.4,5,6,7,9, 10,11, 19and21.

2009-01 02/09 Revised existing information relating to organization names that have changed, removed specific names and replaced with a title to mitigate the need for future revisions due to personnel changes, and changed staging location names based on changes made to area designation names, however staging will still occur in same area. Changes made only reflect actual organization names, functional position names. and current location names being used to make the E-Plan more accurately reflect current information. No changes are being made to the process or conduct of the how the E-Plan is to be implemented.

)

6 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

)RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 2010-10 02/10 Revised existing information relating to changes made to the callback system, who performs the dose assessments, the basis information for the Containment Barrier EAL based on NEI 99-01 Rev 5 FAQ lessons learned. Made name change for Oconee Medical Center, corrected information relating to testing frequency for major elements referenced in the E-Plan, the new neutron instrument used by radiation protection, and street name change for figure H-3A. Changes made are the result of the Annual Review process and no changes are being made to the process or conduct of how the E-Plan is to be implemented.

The following Agreement Letters were also updated:

Number - 6, 8, 13, 14, 15. 16, 18, 20, 22, & 23.

2011-01 05/Il Figure B Redistribution of support for Field Monitoring Teams from Chemistry to Business Management and Work Control. Section D - Basis corrected to delete reference to USFAR Table 15-114 which has been deleted, revised ICs 4.3.A.3 and 4.4.A.3, EAL A to align with RP/O/B/1000/001, revised ICs and EALs to add levels of operating modes that represent the operating levels of hot shutdown, cold shutdown and hot standby were listed, added "AC" back to IC 4.5.A. I where it had been inadvertently deleted, add SSF to IC 4.6.U. 1, correct IC 4.5.G. 1, EAL I to reflect SSF maintaining Mode 3 (hot standby) rather than hot shutdown. add new ICs for Jocassee Dam condition A and B declarations, correct misprint in IC 4.7.A.2, EAL B. correct formatting errors, and add Security EALs. Section F - deleted onsite areas requiring phone notifications for site assembly due to new wireless system being installed in those areas. Section G - replace 2010 calendar with 2011 calendar.

Figure H- I - revised room layout to reflect current arrangement. Section N - Revised the testing cycle for the EPLAN from a 5 year cycle to a 6 year cycle. Appendix 5 -

update letters of agreement.

2011-02 10/I I This evaluation supports a request to revise the Oconee (ONS), McGuire (MNS). and Catawba (CNS) Emergency Plans to allow for an alternate approach for compliance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) relative to meeting the minimum staffing requirement during emergencies for site Radiation Protection (RP) personnel and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) position staffing to that in Table B-I in NUREG-0654.

endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.101.

2012-01 6/12 Section F - A change to the process for answering the 4911 emergency phone calls.

The new process will have both Operations and Security(SAS) answering the phone.

Appendix 7 -Will clarify the ERDS related system description verbiage from the modem based data transfer system to the new VPN System.

2012-02 06/12 The NRC published Federal Register notice [RIN 3150-AIl10, "Enhancements to Emergency Preparedness Regulations" on November 23, 2011. The amendments contained in the rule are summarized as twelve (XII) topics with varying implementation due dates. Emergency Plan changes to the following sections (C, D, H. 1, J, P, and Appendix 1) are made in accordance with the rule and the appropriate guidance documents pertaining to Topic V - Emergency Action Level for Hostile Action, Topic VI - Emergency Declaration Timeliness, Topic VIII - Emergency Operation Facility (Performance Based), Topic IX - Emergency Response Organization Augmentation at Alternate Facility, and Topic XI - Protective Actions for On-site Personnel.

7 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

) RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

REVISION EFFECTIVE NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 2012-03 06/13 Added Agreement Letter 25 - G&G Metal Fabrication to provide Hale pump technical support and Agreement Letter 26 Operating Agreement between Duke Energy's Lincoln Combustion Turbine Facility & MNS, CNS and ONS Nuclear Supply Chain concerning an Emergency Supply of Diesel Fuel.

2012-04 12/12 Section B - This change is to incorporate the new staffing analysis for the new EP rule and editorial changes.

2012-05 12/12 Revised Section D, Enclosure 4.3 to add threshold values for unit vent sampling as a compensatory measure. Unit vent sampling is performed on the 6th floor auxiliary building at sampling equipment where manual grab samples are retrieved per HP/O/B/1000/060-D. Additionally, the use of RIA 56 was added as a compensatory measure tbr Site Area Emergency and General Emergency Classifications.

This change allows for classification of gaseous radiological releases in the event of a loss of either RIA-45 or 46. This change only clarifies the values to be used in the event normal monitoring is not available.

The plan is also being revised based on annual review requirements. changes are mainly editorial or formatting. Additional changes are being made to reflect

) current name changes. update Agreement letters, Spill Prevention and Control, and Groundwater monitoring programs.

2013-01 10/13 Section D - Added clarification in the basis for Loss of Shutdown function.

Section I - Revised to reference procedures versus RPSM 11.7 which has been deleted.

Section J - Revised to incorporate latest revision to ETE. Deleted climate data tables which were duplicative to information contained within the ETE (Appendix 4).

Section P - Updated appropriate references.

Appendix 4 - Added latest ETE as reference.

Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

REVISION EFFECTIVE RECORD OF CHANGES (Continued)

NUMBER DATE REASON FOR REVISIONS 2014-01 03/14 Section B - Removed reference to having home addresses listed in the emergency telephone directory as these were never listed in the telephone directory and clarified EOF Services Group actions. Updated titles of ERO positions in the TSC and OSC consistent with duty roster.

Section D - Added clarification for which RIA-45 is to be used. Respectively, it is expected that IRIA-45, 2RIA-45 and 3RIA-45 would be used in connection with Enclosure 4.3, Abnormal Rad Level/Radiological Effluent. 4RIA-45 is not specifically related to a unit and therefore it is not applicable to Enclosure 4.3.

Section G - Removed Calendar and replaced with Note that the calendar is retained on file with EP Staff.

Section H - Eliminated drawings of Alternate TSC and Alternate OSC as these are for implementation and not needed in Emergency Plan. Removed implementation details from Primary TSC and Primary OSC drawings.

Corrected Figure H-20 and shifted table alignment.

Section J - Provided editorial corrections to procedure numerical references where applicable.

Section M - Provided clarification of EOF Services listed on Figure M-2.

)Section P - Provided editorial corrections to procedure numerical references where applicable, and changed a reference from the EP Functional Area Manual to a fleet administrative procedure reference (EP FAM to AD-EP-ALL-0001).

Eliminated reference to HR Emergency Plan.

Appendix 5 - Removed all copies of the Letters of Agreement and indicated they are included by reference. The actual Letters of Agreement are retained on file by the EP Staff.

2014-02 10/14 Section A - Revised for change from pagers to notify the ERO to using cell phones. Shift Manager delegates actual activation of notification device to Security if available or qualified operator if security is unable.

Section B - Revised responsibility for Radwaste function from Chemistry Group to Operations Group.

Section D - Revised responsibility for Radwaste function from Chemistry Group to Operations Group, including reference to chemistry procedures to operation procedures.

Section F - Revised for change from pagers to notify the ERO to using cell phones. Shift Manager delegates actual activation of notification device to Security if available or qualified operator if security is unable.

Section G - Procedure number changes Section H - Removed specific locations of kits as these were insufficiently detailed and did not contain all kit locations.

9 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

)Record OF CHAINGES (Continued)

Section I - Procedure number changes.

Section J - Procedure number changes.

Section M - Procedure number changes, title changes.

Section N - Changes to show new rules including 8 year cycle, consistency with fleet documents practices, and format.

Section P - Revised responsibility for independent audit from NSRB to NOS Manager, deleted duplicated paragraph and updated the listing of the implementing procedures.

Appendix 6 - Updated distribution list to reflect new format of E Plan and associated implementing procedures.

)

)

10 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA SECTION A EMERGENCY PLAN A - SECTION A ASSIGNMENT OF Revision No.

RESPONSIBILITY 004 Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHQ PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? E1 Yes El No Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

A. ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY (Organizational Control)

Overall Response Organization L.a The Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan is a coordinated effort involving:

site personnel, site emergency plans, plant facilities and equipment, the emergency resources of Duke Energy Company corporate organization, emergency services of various local, state, and federal agencies having appropriate jurisdiction or concern for public health and safety.

FEDERAL NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission)

DHS (Department Homeland Security)

EPR (Emergency Preparedness And Response)

FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency)

DHS/EPR/FEMA DOE (Department of Energy)

Note: NRC, FEMA and DOE will coordinate response of other Federal Agencies per the National Response Plan, Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex.

STATE State of North Carolina -

See State of South Carolina FNF Plan Note: North Carolina counties are located in the Oconee Ingestion Pathway.

State of South Carolina -

SC Emergency Management Division SC Department of Health and Environmental Control, Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Note: These two agencies are the lead agencies in SC and coordinate activities of other departments.

State of Georgia -

See State of South Carolina FNF Plan Note: Georgia counties are located in the Oconee Ingestion Pathway.

COUNTY See Oconee County FNF Plans See Pickens County FNF Plans A-1 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

Concert of Onerations for Emergencv Resronse - Oconee Nuclear Station L.b During the first critical hours (until outside agencies responsible for public health and safety can properly respond), the Operations Shift Manager on duty at the Oconee Nuclear Station assumes responsibility for initiating protective action required for any location within the Site Boundary or Emergency Planning Zones that may be affected as a result of an emergency. The Operations Shift Manager will determine the emergency action level. Notification of Unusual Events dictate that offsite agencies be notified and that site management and corporate management are made aware of the event. If no further deterioration transpires, the event is closed out and agencies so notified. However, if the event is escalated and determined that a higher action level exists, the Emergency Response Organization is activated.

Pickens County, Oconee County, the State of South Carolina Warning Point, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are notified of any emergency status. The Corporate Office is notified of all emergency classifications and would provide support to the site as requested.

The Pickens County and Oconee County Emergency Management Agencies coordinate designated agency response through their Emergency Operation Centers. Until the State of South Carolina Emergency Organization is in a position to respond to the radiological emergency, the local county emergency preparedness offices will be responsible for the public and will make the necessary response required to provide for the health, safety and welfare of the public. Until the State of South Carolina is in place at their emergency operations center, direct contact will be made through the designated warning point in Columbia, South Carolina.

After the station manager assumes the role as Emergency Coordinator in the Technical Support Center, the Operations Shift Manager is then able to devote his full attention to the Control Room. The Technical Support Center will provide contact to offsite agencies until relieved by the Emergency Operations Facility.

Technical support and accident mitigation strategy will be provided to the control room by the Technical Support Center.

Once the EOF Director assumes control of the Emergency Operations Facility, the Technical Support Center will be relieved of the responsibility of contact with offsite agencies. The EOF Director is responsible for providing technical information to the local and state governmental agencies that will be utilized to determine actions required to protect the health and safety of the public.

A-2 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

During a security event involving an intrusion/attempted intrusion into the site by a hostile force after normal working hours, activation of the Technical Support Center will be delayed for personnel safety. In this situation the Emergency Operations Facility may be activated and relieve the Operations Shift Manager of his Emergency Coordinator responsibilities. This transfer of Emergency Coordinator responsibilities directly to the Emergency Operations Facility will allow the Operations Shift Manager to devote his full attention to the control room.

The Emergency Operations Facility will augment the plant emergency organiza-tion staff with additional Duke Energy management, (both administrative and technical personnel). The Charlotte EOF will be staffed with qualified personnel from the Duke Energy Nuclear General Office and Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations. The lines of authority, responsibilities and functions for the EOF Organization are established in the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan.

Functions are:

-Management of offsite Duke Energy emergency response

-Coordination of radiological and environmental assessment

-Protective Action Recommendations (PARS) for the public

-Coordination of emergency response activities with federal, state, and local agencies.

L.c Interrelationships of Response Organizations Block diagrams, Figure Al, show the interrelationships of County, State, and Federal government agencies with the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Response Organization during any given emergency.

1.d. Emergency Coordinator (Figure B-5)

The Station Manager is designated as the individual who shall be in charge of the plant emergency response at the Oconee Nuclear Station. However, the Operations Shift Manager has been given the authority and the responsibility to initiate emergency actions until the Station Manager or his designated alternate is available. Once the Emergency Operations Facility is activated, the EOF Director becomes responsible for the functions as shown in B-6.

1.e. Emergency Response - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day The Switchboard at the Oconee Nuclear Station is operated twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The Oconee Nuclear Station has assigned duty personnel who are on call by notification device after hours and on weekends. Rosters are listed at the switchboard, in the Operations Shift Manager's office for ready access, and on the ONS WEB Page, (Computer System).

Duty personnel are assigned to the Emergency Response Organizations as first responders since they can be readily reached after hours and weekends. Recall procedures for emergency response is shown as Figure A-2A (weekdays Monday-Thursday 0700-1730), Figure A-2B (after hours, weekends, holidays).

Security will activate the ERO notification device. In the event Security is not available to perform the activities such as during a security threat the OSM or designee will activate the ERO.

A-3 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

2.a Assignment of Responsibilities See Oconee County FNF Plans See Pickens County FNF Plans See State of South Carolina FNF Plans 2.b Legal Basis for Authority See Oconee County FNF Plans See Pickens County FNF Plans See State of South Carolina FNF Plans

3. Agreement Letters Appendix 5 is a display of agreement letters Letters of agreement shall be updated as necessary and at least every three (3) years, or in accordance to conditions set by agreeing agency to insure adequate awareness on the part of all concerned of the existence and commitment to provide agreed services or assistance.

4. Continuity of Resources The Station Vice-President is the individual responsible for assuring continuity of resources within the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan. The EOF Director in the Emergency Operations Facility is responsible for assuring continuity of resources in an emergency situation.

A-4 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE Al DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION INTER-RELATIONSHIP OF RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS A-5 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE A-2A DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION RECALL - NORMAL WORKING HOURS*

NRC RO OSM OPERATIONS CENTER CR OFFSITE/NRC COMMUNICATOR SECURITY OFFSITE NT ACTIVATES AGENCIES 4]I .. SWPOEMPEM

.. NUCLEAR

'*' CHEMISTRY TRAINING )

SUPPLY CHAIN CWORK CONTROL ENGINEERING

• Primary method - PA Announcement/

Notification Device Backup method - Nuclear Callout System A-6 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE A-2B DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION RECALL - BACKSHIFT, HOLIDAYS. WEEKENDS*

SUPERINTENDENT STATION MANAGER

• Primary Method - PA Announcement/

Notification Device Back up Method - Nuclear Callout System A-7 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE A-3 RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUNCTIONS Emergency Class Unusual Site Area General Emergency Response Function Event Alert Emergency Emergency Supervision of reactor operations and CR CR CR CR manipulation of controls Management of plant operations CR TSC TSC TSC Technical Support to reactor CR TSC TSC TSC operations Management of corporate emergency CR EOF EOF EOF response resources Radiological effluent and environs CR EOF EOF EOF monitoring, assessment, and dose projections Inform state and local emergency CR EOF EOF EOF response organizations and make recommendations for public protective actions Management of recovery operations CR TSC TSC TSC (Onsite)

Management of recovery operations EOF EOF (Offsite)

Technical support of recovery CR TSC TSC TSC operations Note: The Emergency Response Organization will be activated at the Operations Shift Manager's discretion for an emergency classification of Unusual Event. For any classification above an Unusual Event, the Emergency Response Organization will be activated.

A-8 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA SECTION B EMERGENCY PLAN A - SECTION B ONSITE Revision No.

EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION 007 Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHR PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? El Yes El No Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* _ (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* .(QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

B. ONSITE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION Adequate staffing to provide for initial emergency response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of response capabilities is available, and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.

B.1. Emergency Response Organization Figures B-1 through B-6 shows the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency Response Organization that would be established during an incident along with the duties the different groups would assume. Designation of personnel to the Emergency Response organization is determined by the particular job expertise of an individual. This assures that these personnel are qualified to carry out their responsibilities during an emergency. The normal staffing assignments at the Oconee Nuclear Site include emergency response responsibilities. See Figures B-10 for emergency responsibilities for designated groups.

The Emergency Response Organization is outlined in Division/Section Directives.

These directives establish the duties, responsibilities and alternates for each required emergency response position. Response procedures have been established for each section through these Directives.

B.2. Emergency Coordinator - (24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />)

As a result of training and day-to-day experiences in the normal operating mode at the Oconee Nuclear Site, the Operations Shift Manager will assume authority and responsibility for any emergency that may arise at the site. He will assume control of the situation, alert and warn personnel and others, take necessary onsite remedial action, obtain necessary outside aid and notify management and appro-priate offsite agencies. The authority vested in this position by Duke Energy management enables the Operations Shift Manager to declare an emergency as necessary to protect the plant, site personnel, and the general public. He is vested with the authority to provide protective action recommendations to state and local agencies for implementing offsite emergency measures.

The Operations Shift Manager will continue with these responsibilities until relieved by the Station Manager (alternate).

B-I Rev. 14-02 October 2014

B.3. Alternates for Emergency Coordinator In an emergency situation where the Station Manager/Emergency Coordinator is unavailable, for whatever reason, and an acting Station Manager has not been designated in writing, an alternate will be contacted. Alternates are personnel with intimate knowledge of plant operations and will fulfill the position as TSC Emergency Coordinator when assigned duty. Alternates are designees appointed by the Station Manager.

Note: Emergency Telephone Directory, provides names and phone numbers for the Emergency Coordinators listed above.

B.4 Functional Responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator Figure B-5 defines the duties and responsibilities of the Emergency Coordinator within the emergency response organization.

The Emergency Coordinator and the EOF Director are the individuals responsible for making protective action recommendations to the state and county agencies.

Once the Emergency Operations Facility is activated, only the EOF Director has this responsibility. Prior to the activation of the EOF, the Emergency Coordinator is responsible for making protective action recommendations, classifying/

downgrading/ escalating/terminating events, and approving notification forms to offsite agencies. These responsibilities may not be delegated.

B.5 Minimum Staffing Requirements for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies Figure B-8(a/b) identifies the positions by title and major tasks to be performed by the persons assigned to the functional areas of emergency activity within 45 to 75 minutes. The TSC and OSC will be activated within 75 minutes of event classification. The EOF (Figure B-9) will also be staffed and operational by a minimum staff within 75 minutes of event classification.

A detailed analysis demonstrating that on-shift personnel assigned emergency plan implementation functions are not assigned responsibilities that would prevent the timely performance of their assigned functions as specified in Figure B-8a is located in ONS-OSSA-12212012 Rev: 0.

B.6 Interface - Onsite, Offsite Organizations (Figure A-i) shows the interfaces between and among the onsite functional areas of emergency activity, site support, local services support, and State and Local government response organizations. The onsite Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center, and the Emergency Operations Facility is shown.

B-2 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

B.7 Minimum Staffing Requirements - Corporate Level Personnel from the corporate location will provide assistance to the Oconee Nuclear Station in the areas of dose assessment, coordination of news media and severe accident analysis. These people will respond on an as needed basis.

The Emergency Response Facility Organization is shown on Figures B-4A through B-4D. Division/Section Directives detail the emergency response organization and are included as implementing procedures.

Should an event occur at another Duke Energy nuclear facility concurrent with an event at Oconee Nuclear Site, additional resources would be required to support the EOF Organization. Figure B-I l shows the supplemental EOF organization that would be required to manage a multi-site event. An additional Assistant EOF Director would function as the lead manager to support the second site. The EOF Director would have overall emergency management responsibility for both events.

B.8 Contractor/Private Organizations - Technical Assistance Private Contractors and/or companies that would be available to augment and support the emergency organization:

Waste Management Chem Nuclear Bartlett Nuclear Emergency Equipment Supplier SEG (e.g. Safe Industries, Inc.)

Alaron AREVA Additional groups that could respond to emergencies would be contacted by the EOF Services Group at the Emergency Operations Facility.

B.9 Local Agency Support Agreements with local agency support groups have been made to assist the Oconee Nuclear Site during emergency situations.

POLICE -

Oconee Sheriffs Department Pickens Sheriffs Department S. C. Highway Patrol S. C. Law Enforcement Division B-3 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

AMBULANCE -

Oconee Medical Center - Emergency Medical Services MEDICAL -

Blue Ridge Emergency Physicians Oconee Medical Center FIRE FIGHTING -

Oconee Rural Fire Association Keowee-Ebenezer Fire Department Corinth-Shiloh Fire Department Six-Mile Fire Department Keowee Fire Department RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING -

Pickens County Emergency Management Agency Oconee County Emergency Management Agency EVACUATION OF POPULATION -

Oconee County Emergency Management Agency Pickens County Emergency Management Agency HOSPITAL -

Oconee Medical Center USE OF BUILDINGS -

Oconee County School District Pickens County School District B-4 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-1 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION FUNCTIONAL AREAS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE

1. Emergency Response Coordination Operations Shift Manager Station Manager Division Managers Section Managers

2. Plant Systems Operations Superintendent of Operations Operations Shift Managers Operations Engineers On Shift Staff (Operations)

Engineering

3. Accident Assessment Emergency Coordinators Operations Shift Managers Operations Engineers Shift Managers Site Engineering Severe Accident Analysis Group (GO)

4. Radiological Environmental Survey and Monitoring Contract service Radiation Protection Section

5. First Aid/Rescue, Firefighting Medical Emergency Response Team Members Fire Brigade

6. Personnel Monitoring Radiation Protection Section

7. Decontamination Radiation Protection Section B-5 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-1 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION

8. Security of Plant and Access Control Duke Security (ONS and Oconee JIC)

Building Security/Access & Control (Charlotte EOF)

9. Repair/Corrective Actions Nuclear Supply Chain Site Services Group

10. Personnel Accountability Division Managers Section Managers Supervisors Duke Security

11. Radiological Accident Assessment Radiation Protection Section (ONS/GO/CNS/MNS)

Site Engineering Operations Group Chemistry Group Severe Accident Analysis Group (GO)

12. Communications Operations Safety Assurance Training Nuclear Assurance

13. Radiation Protection Section Radiation Protection Section

14. Plant Chemistry Chemistry Group B-6 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-1 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION

15. Radwaste Operations Operations Group I

16. Technical Support Site Engineering

17. Manpower Planning and Logistical Support Work Control Group Nuclear Supply Chain Site Services Group

18. Public Information Corporate Communications - Joint Information Center

19. Licensee Representative to State County EOC Site Engineering B-7 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-2 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER ORGANIZATION CHART Assistant Emergency WOE-News JIC/Public LCoordinator

- --- --- --- Group Liaison Accident Assessment Corporate GO (EOF)

............ Desired Position

- Interface Link B-8 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-3 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER ORGANIZATION CHART Radiological Assessment Corporate GO (as needed)

B-9 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-4A OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Emergency Operations Facility EO F Di rt t Director B-10 14-02 Rev. 2014 October

FIGURE B-4B DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY EOF Services Manager Administrative Communications Logistics Transportation B-l1 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-4C OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY B-12 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-5 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY COORDINATOR DUTIES Duties and Responsibilities:

1. Activate the Emergency Response Organization (Technical Support Center, Operational Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility).

2. Coordinate technical assistance for remedial actions to mitigate circumstances surrounding plant operations.

3. Designate individual to communicate with offsite agencies promptly. Approve all information released via the emergency notification form. Approval (signature) of contents of message form may not be delegated to others in the emergency organization.

4. Initiate emergency actions within the provisions of the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency Plan.

5. Classify emergency events. Escalate/de-escalate or terminate from an emergency status if the Emergency Operations Facility is not operational. Responsibility may not be delegated.

6. Make senior technical and management staff available onsite for consultation with NRC and State on periodic basis if EOF has not been activated.

7. Coordinate all emergency actions concerning the technical aspects of the corrective actions taken within the Technical Support Center.

8. Evacuate all non-essential personnel on site if a radiological emergency exists. Be aware of exposure guidelines of personnel.

9. Recommend protective action guides for the safety and welfare of the public to the appropriate offsite agency if the Emergency Operations Facility/EOF Director is not in a position to do so. This authority may not be delegated.

10. Authorize exposures in excess of routine yearly exposure limits for lifesaving and equipment repair missions in accordance with RP/O/B/1000/01 1. This responsibility can be delegated to the RP Manager in the OSC.

B-13 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-6 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY DIRECTOR Duties and Responsibilities:

1. Overall Management of the offsite emergency response activities of Duke Energy (Oconee Nuclear Site).

2. Recommend protective action guides for the safety and welfare of the public to the appropriate offsite agency. This authority may not be delegated.

3. Classify emergency events. Escalate, de-escalate, terminate emergency classification. This responsibility may not be delegated.

4. Approve all information released via the emergency notification form.

Approval (signature) of contents of message form may not be delegated to others in the emergency organization.

5. Coordination with federal, state and local government agencies.

6. Provide approval of news releases if Public Spokesperson is unavailable.

B-14 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-8a OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION MINIMUM ON-SHIFT STAFFING LEVELS FunctionalArea. Major Tasks Emergency Positions.

1. Plant Operations and CR Supervisor (SRO) 3 Assessment of -- Control Room Operator (RO) 6 Operational Aspects (a) Non-Licensed Operator (NLO) 3

2. Emergency Direction Command and Control Ops Shift Manager 1 and Control____________ ________ _____

Licensee Operator (SRO/RO/NLO) ID)

3. Notification & Local/ State SRO 1 Communication Federal Operator (SRO/RO/NLO) -1 Dose Assessment RP Qualified Individual 1

4. Radiological In-plant Surveys . . RP Qualified Individual .......... 1...............

1...............

Assessment Onsite Surveys RP Qualified Individual 1 Chemistry Chemistry Technician 1

.Plant System Tech Support - OPs Shift Technical Advisor 1 5.Pan-yse Core Damage Shift Technical Advisor ___

Engineering, Repair, -h nc d r and Corrective Actions Repair and Corrective Mechanical Maintenance 2 Actions IAE Maintenance 2 Radiation Protection

6. In-Plant PAs (such as access control, job RP Qualified Individual 2 (b) coverage and personnel monitoring) I Fire Brigade Lead (SRO/NLO) 1

7. Fire Fighting (c) Fire Brigade Member (NLO) 4 Fire Brigade Member 5 (bc)

8. 1ssAid and Rescue -- MERT (d) 2

9. Site Access Control SAS Operator 1 and Accountability Security & Accountabilityrsonnel (e)

. .." ... ... .. . . . Minimum #%of Persohnel.d*:. 31':.

(a) The Control Room staff complement is reflective of 3 Units in operation.

(b) May be performed by an individual filling another position provided they are qualified to do the collateral function.

(c) The Fire Brigade requirement of ten members is met by using five personnel from Operations (including the Fire Brigade Leader) and five personnel from either SPOC, Radiation Protection, Chemistry or Security (SLC 16.13.1).

(d) The Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) can be filled by any qualified technician.

(e) Per Duke Energy ONS Security Plan.

B- 15 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-8b OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION MINIMUM AUGMENTED ERO STAFFING LEVELS MAJOR FUNCTIONAL AREA MAJOR TASKS POSITION TITLE OR CAPABILITY EXPERTISE FOR ADDITIONS*

WITHIN 45 WITHIN 75 MINUTES MINUTES Emergency Director and Control Station Manager I (Emergency. Coordinator) ***

Notification/Communication Notify Company Personnel, State, State Communicators 2 County, Federal Agencies and maintain communication EOF/Radiological Accident Assessment EOF Director (Emergency DPC Senior Manager and Offsite Agency Support Classification, Protective Action Recommendation, Offsite Agency Interface, ENF approval)

Emergency Classification EOF Plant Assessment Accident Assessment Manager I Dose Assessment and EOF Offsite Dose Assessment/ Radiological Assessment Protective Action Protective Action Manager I Recommendations Recommendations Offsite Notifications Offsite Agency Notifications Offsite Agency Communicator I EOF Access Control Electronic Card Reader #

TSC Dose Assessment/Protective Radiological Assessment Action Recommendations Offsite Surveys Field Monitoring Teams (2) 4 ****

Onsite Surveys (Out-of-Plant) I In-Plant Surveys RP Qualified Individuals 1 I Chemistry/Radio Chemistry Rad/Chem Technician I__

Plant System Engineering, Repair and Technical Support Core/Thermal Hydraulics 1 Corrective Actions Electrical 1 Mechanical I Repair and Corrective Actions Mechanical Maintenance 1 Rad/Waste Operator I I&E Technician 2 Protective Actions Radiation Protection RP Qualified Individuals 4 (In-Plant) A. Access Control B. RP Coverage for Repair Corrective Actions, Search and Rescue, First Aid & Firefighting C. Personnel Monitoring D. Dosimetry E. On-Shift Dose Assessment Firefighting Fire Brigade Local Support Rescue Operations & First-Aid MERT Team Local Support B-16 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-8b OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION MINIMUM STAFFING LEVELS Consideration is given to the fact that many of the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency Response Organization personnel do not live within a radius of the station which will allow a response time of 30 minutes or less under ideal conditions. Factors such as weather conditions, road capacity and traffic density, and the distance to travel from residence to the emergency response facility, indicate a realistic response time from a few minutes to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes for most employees. Consideration is also given to personnel on shift who are qualified and sufficient in number to handle any emergency condition until response personnel begin to arrive on site.

• • • Management of the Offsite Emergency Response will be assumed by the EOF Director when the Emergency Operations Facility is activated.

Management of the Onsite Emergency Response is assumed by the Station Manager/alternate acting as the Emergency Coordinator when the Technical Support Center and Operational Support Centers are activated.

• • The Field Monitoring Teams will initially report to the Body Burden Analysis (BBA)

Room. If needed, the Field Monitoring Teams will dispatch from the Body Burden Analysis (BBA) Room. Once the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Field Monitoring Coordinator is ready he/she will assume control of the Field Monitoring Teams. A FMT consists of one RP qualified individual and one vehicle driver.

1. An electronic card reader in conjunction with a posted building security officer fulfills the function for controlling access to the EOF during emergencies.

B-17 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-9 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION MINIMUM STAFFING REQUIREMENTS EOF DIRECTOR sadiol a Offsite Agency As entaaer Communicator (2)

B-18 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-10 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ONSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE DUTIES RADIATION CHEMISTRY MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS WORK CONTROL BUSINESS PROTECTION _ I GROUP Onsite Monitoring Post-accident liquid Repair/calibration of Plant Operations OSC Coordination Provide personnel sampling electrical and for field mechanical equipment monitoring teams Initial dose assessment Chemistry analysis Staff OSC with onshift Accident assessment Recovery implementation personnel Decontamination Augment OSC with Safe shut-down of Provide personnel for field additional personnel reactor monitoring teams Post-accident gaseous Liaison with OSC sampling Dose Control Fire brigade response Provide personnel for Initial Emergency field monitoring teams Management Evacuation coordination NRC Communications RP support for work tasks Fire Support in the field Tank Farm Operation Radwaste Operation I B-19 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-10 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ONSITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE DUTIES

[ SAFETY ASSURANCE ENGINEERING SECURITY SAFETY NUCLEAR SUPPLY CHAIN LJ I JSITE SERVICES GROUP TSC LOG ACCESS & CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OFF SITE TSC/OSC LIAISON EVACUATION SUPPLY/PARTS COMMUNICATIONS TECHNICAL ASSISTANT COORDINATION ASSIST WITH ENGINEERING SUPPORT MEDICAL (MERT) PERSONNEL HEAVY EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTABILITY SAFETY OPERATORS REPORTING ASSIST WITH EVACUATION LIAISON WITH CORPORATE COMMISSARY ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT GROUP EMERGENCY PLANNING TSC STATUS BOARDS B-20 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE B-11 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Common EOF - Multi-Site Event Staffing

-- F ite Aec COF Ofmfm I

EOF Services Communicators (6 Manager (1)

I. Notification Devices activated for second unit - all call response

2. Assistant EOF Director assumes responsibily as lead manager for designated Site

3. Additional Log Keeper retained to support 2 Site I

4. Additional Accident Assessment Manager retained to support 20d Site

5. Additional Dose Assessor retained to support 2d Site 6 Additional FMT Coordinator retained to support 2d Site

7. Additional FMT Radio Operator retained to support 20d Site

8. Four additional Offsite Communicators as needed to syupport both Sites

9. Additional Emergency Planner as needed to support 2 Site

10. Additional Radiological Assessment Manager as needed to support 2 d Site 1i. Additional Assistant EOF Director as needed to support 2M Site

12. Oconee Ops Interface position is staffed in the ONS TSC

13. Additional Accident Assessment Interface as needed to support 2nd Site B-21 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA SECTION D EMERGENCY PLAN A - SECTION D EMERGENCY Revision No.

CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 007 Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHT PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? El Yes El No Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

D. EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM RegGuide 1.101, Rev. 3, August, 1992, approved the guidance provided by NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, as an Alternative Methodology for the Development of Emergency Action Levels. Oconee Nuclear Site used the NUMARC guidance for the development of initiating conditions and emergency action levels. The emergency action levels provided in this section have been modified to implement the guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, NEI guidance as endorsed in Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-12 and to support the implementation of NET 03-12.

The emergency classification system utilizes four categories for classification of emergency events.

D.l.a. UNUSUAL EVENT Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring offsite response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

The purpose of an Unusual Event classification is to provide notification of the emergency to the station staff, State and Local Government representatives, and the NRC.

Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D.l.b ALERT Events are in process or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

The purpose of the Alert classification is to assure that emergency personnel are readily available to:

1. Activate the onsite response centers

2. Respond if the situation becomes more serious or to perform confirmatory radiation monitoring if required

3. Provide offsite authorities current status information Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D-1 Rev. 2014-02 October: 2014

D.1.c. SITE AREA EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts; (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

The purpose of the Site Area Emergency classification is to:

1. Activate the offsite response centers

2. Assure that monitoring teams are mobilized

3. Assure that personnel required for taking protective actions of near site areas are at duty stations should the situation become more serious

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D. 1.d. GENERAL EMERGENCY Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility. Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels offsite for more than the immediate site area.

The purpose of the General Emergency classification is to:

1. Initiate predetermined protective actions for the public

2. Provide continuous assessment of information from onsite and offsite measurements

3. Initiate additional measures as indicated by event releases or potential releases

4. Provide current information to the public and be available for consultation with offsite authorities Specific initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency action levels are provided in the Basis Document beginning on page D-4.

D-2 Rev. 2014-02 October: 2014

D.2 Initiating Conditions Initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency actions levels are contained in the BASIS document beginning on page D-4. Classification procedure (RP/O/A/1000/001) provides the guidance necessary to classify events and promptly declare the appropriate emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to cognizant facility staff that an emergency action level threshold has been exceeded. Specific response procedures are in place for the Control Room, Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility which delineate the required response during the appropriate classification.

D.3 LOCAL AND STATE EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Pickens County FNF Plans Oconee County FNF Plans State of South Carolina FNF Plans (Site Specific)

D.4 LOCAL AND STATE EMERGENCY PROCEDURES Pickens County FNF Plans Oconee County FNF Plans State of South Carolina FNF Plans (Site Specific)

D-3 Rev. 2014-02 October: 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.1 FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX DETERMINE TilE APPROPRIATE CLASSIFICATION UJSING THE TABLE BELOW: ADD POINTS TO CLASSIFY. SEE NOTE BELOW

• RCS BARRIERS (BD 5-7) . .... FUEL CLAD BARRIERS (BD 8-9) CONTAINMENT BARRIERS (BD 10-12)

Potential Loss (4 Points) Loss (5 Points) Potential Loss (4 Points) Loss (5 Points) Potential Loss (1 Point) Loss (3 Points)

RCS Leakrate _>160 gpm RCS Leak rate that results in a loss Average of the 5 highest Average of the 5 highest CETC CETC > 12000 F > 15 minutes Rapid unexplained containment of subcooling. CETC > 12000 F OR pressure decrease after increase

_7000 F CETC 700* F> 15 minutes with a OR valid RVLS reading 0" containment pressure or sump level not consistent with LOCA SGTR 160 gpm Valid RVLS reading of 0" Coolant activity _ 300 pCi/ml DEI RB pressure Ž59 psig Failure of secondary side of SG OR results in a direct opening to the RB pressure > 10 psig and no environment with SG Tube Leak >

NOTE: RVLS is RBCU or RBS 10 gpm in the SAME SG NOT valid if one or more RCPs are Entry into the PTS (Pressurized 1RIA 57 or 58 reading 1.0 R/hr nmning OR if LPI Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 Hours RIA 57 OR RIA 58 SG Tube Leak > 10 gpm exists in Thermal Shock) Operation 2 RIA 57 reading Ž_1.6 R/hr pump(s) are running Since SD R/hr R/hr Since SD R/hr R/hr one SG.

NOTE: PTS is entered under 2 RIA 58 reading _Ž1.0 R/hr AND taking suction 0 - <0.5 >300 >150 0 - < 0.5 > 1800 > 860 AND 3RIA 57 or 58 reading 1.0 Rhr NOr from the LPI drop the other SG has secondary side either of the following: line 0.5 - < 2.0 _ 80 > 40 0.5 - < 2.0 Ž>400 > 195 failure that results in a direct

" A cooldown below 400'F @ line.opening to the environment AND

> 100Ft/hr. has occurred. 2.0-8.0 > 32 > 16 2.0-8.0 > 280 _130 is being fed from the affected unit.

• HPI has operated in the injection mode while NO RCPs were operating.

HPI Forced Cooling RCS pressure spike Ž 2750 psig Hydrogen concentration _>9% Containment isolation is incomplete and a release path to the environment exists Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Emergency Coordinator/EOF Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director judgment Director judgment Director judgment judgment Director judgment Director judgment UNUSUAL EVENT (1-3 Total Points) ALERT (4-6TotalPoints) SITE AREA EMERGENCY (7-10 Total Points)

"'. GENERALEMERGENCY (11-13 Total Points)

OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2,3,4 OPERATING MODE: 1, 2, 3,4 4.1 .U. 1 Any potential loss of Containment 4.1 .A.1 Any potential loss or loss of the RCS 4.1 .S. 1 Loss of any two barriers 4.1 .G. 1 Loss of any two barriers and potential loss of the third barrier 4.1 .A.2 Any potential loss or loss of the Fuel 4.1.S.2 Loss of one barrier and potential loss of either 4.1 .U.2 Any loss of containment Clad RCS or Fuel Clad Barriers 4.1 .G.2 Loss of all three barriers 4.1.S.3 Potential loss of both the RCS and Fuel Clad Barriers NOTE: An event with multiple events could occur which would result in the conclusion that exceeding the loss or potential loss threshold is IMMINENT (i.e., within 1-3 hours). In this IMMINENT LOSS situation, use judgment and classify as if the thresholds are exceeded.

D-4 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE RCS BARRIER EALs: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5)

The RCS Barrier includes the RCS primary side and its connections up to and including the pressurizer safety and relief valves, and other connections up to and including the primary isolation valves.

1. RCS Leak Rate Small leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by normal operation of the High Pressure Injection System.

The capacity of one HPI pump at normal system pressure is approximately 160 gpm.

Leakage in excess of this value would call for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory. As such, this is an indication of a degraded RCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

The loss of subcooling is the fundamental indication that the inventory loss from the primary system exceeds the capacity of the inventory control systems. If the loss of subcooling is indicated, the RCS barrier is considered lost.

2. SG Tube Rupture Small Steam Generator tube leaks may result in the inability to maintain normal liquid inventory within the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by normal operation of the High Pressure Injection System. The capacity of one HPI pump at normal system pressure is approximately 160 gpm. Leakage in excess of this value would call for compensatory action to maintain normal liquid inventory. As such, this is an indication of a degraded RCS barrier and is considered to be a potential loss of the barrier.

A tube rupture (> than 160 gpm) with an unisolable secondary line rupture is generally indicated by a reduction in primary coolant inventory, increased secondary radiation levels, and an uncontrolled or complete depressurization of the ruptured SG. This set of conditions represents a potential loss of the RCS and loss of containment fission product barrier and will result in the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. Escalation to a General Emergency would be indicated by at least a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.

D-5 Rev. 2014-02 Octoer 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE

2. SG Tube Rupture Secondary radiation increases should be observed via radiation monitoring of Condenser Air Ejector Discharge, Main Steam, and/or SG Sampling System. Determination of the "uncontrolled" depressurization of the ruptured SG should be based on indication that the pressure decrease in the ruptured steam generator is not a function of operator action. This should prevent declaration based on a depressurization that results from an EOP induced cooldown of the RCS that does not involve the prolonged release of contaminated secondary coolant from the affected SG to the environment. This EAL should encompass steam breaks, feed breaks, and stuck open safety or relief valves.

A steam generator tube leak less than 160 gpm would be classified under Enclosure 4.2, Systems Malfunctions, RCS leakage as an Unusual Event. If a release also occurs such as steam through a steam relief valve failed open, feedwater line break, steam line break on the affected steam generator then a loss of the Containment Barrier has also occurred.

Upgrade to a higher classification would be by Enclosure 4.3, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent or further degradation of RCS or Fuel Clad Barriers.

3. Entry Into PTS Entry into Pressurized Thermal Shock Operation could cause damage to the reactor vessel severe enough to cause a loss of coolant accident. Therefore, this situation represents a potential loss of the RCS. This EAL is satisfied if Rule 8 (Pressurized Thermal Shock) is implemented.

4. Reactor Coolant System Integrity HPI Forced cooling represents the failure of the steam generators to remove heat from the core. To use this mode of cooling indicates that all feedwater (both main and emergency) are not available for use and the pressure in the reactor coolant system is greater than or equal to 2300 psig. The power-operated relief valve must be opened to initiate the cooling through the high pressure injection system. In effect, a self-imposed loss of coolant is established. The condition is classified as a potential loss of the reactor coolant system.

A reactor coolant system pressure spike of greater than or equal to design pressure of 2750 psig represents a loss of the RCS barrier.

D-6 Rev. 2014-02 Octoer 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE

5. Containment Radiation Monitoring A containment radiation monitor reading of > 1 R/hr on radiation monitors 1RIA-57 or 58 (Unit 1), 2RIA-58 (Unit 2), and 3RIA-57 or 58 (Unit 3) indicates the release of reactor coolant to the containment. A containment radiation monitor reading of >1.6 R/hr on radiation monitor 2RIA-57 (Unit 2) also indicates the release of reactor coolant to the containment. The difference in these values is due to the relative strength of the detector check source which affects the background readings for the detector (the source for 2RIA-57 is stronger than that for the remaining detectors). This reading is less than that specified for Fuel Clad Barrier EAL#3. Thus, this EAL would be indicative of a RCS leak only. If the radiation monitor reading increased to that specified by Fuel Clad Barrier EAL

1. 3, fuel damage would also be indicated.

There is no "Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

6. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgment This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly but warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under either the loss or potential loss of the RCS Barrier.

D-7 Rev. 2014-02 Octoer 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE FUEL CLAD BARRIER EALs: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4)

The Fuel Clad Barrier is the zircalloy tubes that contain the fuel pellets.

1. Core Exit Thermocouple Readings The "Potential Loss" EAL reading corresponds to loss of subcooling. The value of 700 'F is indicative of superheated steam and is a value referenced in the Emergency Operating procedure. The loss of subcooling may lead to clad damage and, therefore, this is a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.

The "Loss" EAL reading (1200 'F) indicates significant superheating of the coolant and core uncovery. Clad damage under these conditions is likely; therefore, this is indication of loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

2. Primary Coolant Activity Level The value of 300 pCi/ml DEI coolant activity is well above that expected for iodine spikes and corresponds to about 4% fuel clad damage. This amount of clad damage indicates significant clad damage and thus the Fuel Clad Barrier is considered lost. Basis for determination is Engineering Calculation OSC-5283.

There is no equivalent "Potential Loss" EAL for this item.

3. Reactor Vessel Water Level A valid reading of 0" on the RVLS (Reactor Vessel Level System) is an indicator that the fuel could be uncovered and would signify a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier. RVLS is invalid if LPI pumps are running and taking suction from the LPI drop line.

4. Containment Radiation Monitoring Containment monitor readings on RIA 57/58 in the below listed table is higher than can be attributed to normal reactor coolant activity alone. These levels indicate that approximately 4% of the fuel cladding has failed which is consistent with the release of 300 uC/ml DEI to the containment atmosphere. Release of this amount of activity into containment corresponds to a loss of both the fuel clad and RCS barriers. Basis for the calculation which determined the activity levels can be found in engineering calculation OSC-5283.

Hours Since SD RIA 57 RIA 58 0 - < 0.5 >300 > 150 0.5 - < 2.0 > 80 > 40 2.0-8.0 >32 > 16 There is no "Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

D-8 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE

5. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgment This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly but warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under either the loss or potential loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier.

D-9 Rev. 20 14-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE CONTAINMENT BARRIER EALs: (1 or 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 or 6)

The Containment Barrier includes the containment building, its connections up to and including the outermost containment isolation valves. This barrier also includes the main steam, feedwater, and blowdown line extensions outside the containment building up to and including the outermost secondary side isolation valve.

1. Containment Pressure Containment pressure above 59 psig (the design pressure) indicates that the containment or its heat removal systems are not functioning as intended. This degradation of containment pressure control represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

Containment pressure of 10 psig with no reactor building cooling units or reactor building spray available represents degradation in the control of the containment conditions. Therefore, this situation represents a potential loss of containment integrity.

• A containment hydrogen concentration greater than 9 percent volume is sufficient to expect that any ignition would result in complete combustion of the hydrogen in containment and a significant pressure rise. At hydrogen concentrations near 9 percent volume no challenge to containment integrity would be expected. At levels somewhat higher the possibility of a deflagration to detonation transition raises the uncertainty as to the actual response of the containment. Therefore, it is prudent that this level of hydrogen in the containment be considered a potential loss of containment integrity.

• Rapid unexplained loss of pressure (i.e., not attributable to containment spray or condensation effects) following an initial pressure increase indicates a loss of containment integrity.

Containment pressure and sump levels should increase as a result of the mass and energy release into containment from a LOCA. Thus, sump level or pressure not increasing indicates an interfacing systems LOCA which is a containment bypass and a loss of containment integrity.

D-10 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE

2. Containment Isolation Valve Status After Containment Isolation Failure to isolate those containment pathways which would allow containment atmosphere to be released to the environment is a loss of the containment barrier.

The use of the modifier "direct" in defining the release path discriminates against release paths through interfacing liquid systems. The existence of an in-line charcoal filter does not make a release path indirect since the filter is not effective at removing fission product noble gases. Typical filters have an efficiency of 95-99% removal of iodine. Given the magnitude of the core inventory of iodine, significant releases could still occur. In addition, since the fission product release would be driven by boiling in the reactor vessel, the high humidity in the release stream can be expected to render the filters ineffective in a short period.

There is no Potential Loss threshold associated with this item.

The decision of whether this EAL is satisfied should be based on present and readily available information. This includes physical data seen and heard. It is not the intent of this EAL to use relatively long term calculations to make the determination. If there is a pathway which would allow containment atmosphere to be released to the environment, this EAL is satisfied.

There is no "Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

3. SG Secondary Side Release With Primary To Secondary Leakage Secondary side releases directly to the atmosphere include atmospheric dump valves and stuck open main steam safety valves. If the main condenser is available, there may be releases via air ejector, gland seal exhauster, and other similar controlled, and often monitored, pathways. These pathways do not meet the intent of a direct opening to the environment. These minor releases are assessed using Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent Initiating Conditions. A failure of the secondary side which results in a direct opening to the environment, in combination with Primary to Secondary leakage > 10 gpm in the same steam generator, constitutes a bypass of the containment, and therefore, a loss of the containment barrier.

D- 11 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE Likewise, a failure of the secondary side which results in a direct opening to the environment, in combination with Primary to Secondary leakage > 10 gpm in the other steam generator, constitutes a bypass of the containment, IF the SG with the secondary side failure is being fed feedwater from the affected unit. Therefore, this condition also constitutes a loss of the containment barrier.

In combination with the SG Tube Rupture EAL under the RCS barrier section, the appropriate classification can be determined.

There is no "Potential Loss" EAL associated with this item.

4. Significant Radioactive Inventory in Containment Containment radiation readings shown in the table below are values which indicate significant fuel damage well in excess of the EALs associated with both loss of Fuel Clad and loss of RCS Barriers. NUREG-1228, "Source Estimations During Incident Response to Severe Nuclear Power Plant Accidents," indicates that such conditions do not exist when the amount of clad damage is less than 20%. This amount of activity in containment, if released, could have such severe consequences that it is prudent to treat this as a potential loss of containment.

By treating the radioactive inventory in containment as a potential loss, a General Emergency will be declared when the conditions of the fuel clad and RCS barriers are included in the evaluation. This will allow the appropriate protective actions to be recommended.

Hours Since SD RIA 57 RIA 58 0 - < 0.5 > 1800 >860 0.5 - < 2.0 > 400 _>195 2.0-8.0 > 280 >130 There is no "Loss" EAL associated with this item.

D- 12 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.1 BASIS INFORMATION FOR FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER REFERENCE TABLE

5. Core Exit Thermocouple Core Exit Thermocouple temperatures _>1200 'F or Ž 700 'F with a valid RVLS reading for greater than 15 minutes, in this potential loss EAL represent imminent core damage that, if not terminated, could lead to vessel failure and an increased potential for containment failure. The potential for containment challenge as a result of events at reactor vessel failure makes it prudent to consider an unmitigated core damage condition as a potential loss of the containment barrier.

Severe accident analyses (e.g., NUREG- 1150) have concluded that function restoration procedures can arrest core degradation within the reactor vessel in a significant fraction of the core damage scenarios, and that the likelihood of containment failure is very small in these events. Given this, it is appropriate to provide a reasonable period to allow function restoration procedures to arrest the core melt sequence. Whether or not the procedures will be effective should be apparent within 15 minutes. The Emergency Coordinator should make the declaration as soon as it is determined that the procedures have been, or will be ineffective.

There is no "Loss" EAL associated with this item.

6. Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director Judgment This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly but warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under either the loss or potential loss of the Containment Barrier.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev 2, 01/92, Table 5-F-3 D-13 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY RCS Leakage Unplanned Loss of Most or Inability to Monitor a All Safety System Significant Transient in Unplanned Loss of Most or Annunciation or Indication Progress All Safety System in Control Room With Either Annunciation or Indication (1) a Significant Transient in in the Control Room for Progress, or (2)

Greater than 15 minutes Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators are Inability to Reach Required Unavailable Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications,.

Fuel Clad Degradation D-14 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT

1. RCS Leakage OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Unidentified leakage > 10 gpm B. Pressure boundary leakage > 10 gpm C. Identified leakage > 25 gpm 0 Includes SG tube leakage BASIS:

Reactor Coolant system (RCS) Leakage is defined in RCS Operational Leakage in the Technical Specifications Basis B 3.4.13.

This IC is included as an Unusual Event because it may be a precursor of more serious conditions and, as result, is considered to be a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. The 10 gpm value for the unidentified and pressure boundary leakage was selected as it is observable with normal control room indications. Lesser values must generally be determined through time-consuming surveillance tests (e.g., mass balances).

The EAL for identified leakage is set at a higher value due to the lesser significance of identified leakage in comparison to unidentified or pressure boundary leakage. In either case, escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs or IC, Enclosure 4.4, Loss of Shutdown Function, "Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown".

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU5 D- 15 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT

2. Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in the Control Room for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators for greater than 15 minutes Units 1&3 ISA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16 and 18 3SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16 and 18 Unit 2 2SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15 and 16 AND In the opinion of the Operations Shift Manager, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment.

"Unplanned" loss of annunciators or indicator excludes scheduled maintenance and testing activities. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses. Equipment monitored by referenced annunciator panel is shown on page 20.

This Unusual Event will be escalated to an Alert if a transient is in progress during the loss of annunciation or indication.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling, and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU3 D-16 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT

3. Inability to Reach Required Shutdown Within Technical Specification Limits OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Plant is not brought to required operating mode within Technical Specifications LCO Action Statement Time.

BASIS:

Technical Specification Actions Statements require the plant to be brought to a required shutdown mode when the Technical Specification required configuration cannot be restored. Depending on the circumstances, this may or may not be an emergency or precursor to a more severe condition. In any case, the initiation of plant shutdown required by the site Technical Specifications requires a one hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)

Non-emergency events. The plant is within its safety envelope when being shut down within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications. An immediate Notification of an Unusual Event is required when the plant is not brought to the required operating mode within the allowable action statement time in the Technical Specifications.

Declaration of an Unusual Event is based on the time at which the LCO-specified action statement time period elapses under the site Technical Specifications and is not related to how long a condition may have existed. Other required Technical Specification shutdowns that involve precursors to more serious events are addressed by other System Malfunction, Hazards, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU2 D-17 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT

4. Unplanned Loss of All Onsite or Offsite Communications OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Loss of all onsite communications capability (internal phone system, PA system, pager system, onsite radio system) affecting the ability to perform routine operations.

B. Loss of all offsite communications capability (Selective Signaling, ETS lines, offsite radio system, commercial phone system) affecting the ability to communicate with offsite authorities.

BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of communications capability that either defeats the plant operations staff ability to perform routine tasks necessary for plant operations or the ability to communicate problems with offsite authorities. The loss of offsite communications ability is expected to be significantly more comprehensive than the condition addressed by 10 CFR 50.72.

This EAL is intended to be used only when extraordinary means are being utilized to make communications possible (relaying of information from radio transmissions, individuals being sent to offsite locations, etc.).

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU6 D- 18 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT

5. Fuel Clad Degradation.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. DEI > 5 uCi/ml BASIS:

Chemistry analysis which indicates the presence of > 5 uci/ml dose equivalent iodine in the reactor coolant system clearly denotes a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant and a potential precursor of more serious problems. The basis for the 5 uCi/ml is based upon the Oconee FSAR, Chapter 15, Table 15-14 of RCS Coolant Activity for 1%

failed fuel. Escalation of this IC to the Alert level is via the Fission Product Barrier Degradation Monitoring ICs, Enclosure 4.1 of this document.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU4 D- 19 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION ALERT

1. Unplanned Loss of Most or All Safety System Annunciation or Indication in Control Room With Either (1) a Significant Transient in Progress, or (2)

Compensatory Non-Alarming Indicators are Unavailable.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators for greater than 15 minutes.

Units 1&3 1SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, and 18 3SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, and 18 Unit 2 2SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15 and 16 AND In the opinion of the Operations Shift Manager, the loss of the annunciators or indicators requires additional personnel (beyond normal shift compliment) to safely operate the unit.

AND Either of the following:

A significant plant transient is in progress.

OR Loss of the OAC and PAM indications.

D-20 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION BASIS:

SA 1-9 : ES, RPS, CRD breakers, basic information concerning primary system, fire alarms, seismic trigger, condenser cooling, HPSW and LPSW system status.

SA 14-16: Electrical load (Keowee emergency start, load shed, emergency power switching logic)

SA-18 : CRD shunt trip relay, ICS, PZR relief valve flow, hydrogen concentration in RB, chlorine gas leakage.

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the difficulty associated with monitoring changing plant conditions without the use of a major portion of the annunciation or indication equipment during a transient.

Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

"Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% or greater.

Significant indication is available from the OAC (operational aid computer) and from post accident monitoring (PAM). Loss of this data in conjunction with the loss of other indications would further impair the ability to monitor plant parameters.

Due to the limited number of safety systems in operation during cold shutdown, refueling and defueled modes, no IC is indicated during these modes of operation.

This Alert will be escalated to a Site Area Emergency if the operating crew cannot monitor the transient in progress.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92/ SA4 D-21 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Inability to Monitor a Significant Transient in Progress OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A Unplanned loss of > 50% of the following annunciators for greater than 15 minutes.

Units 1&3 1SA 1,2,3,4,5,6,7, 8,9,14, 15, 16, and 18 3SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,9, 14, 15, 16, and 18 Unit 2 2SA 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, and 16 AND A significant plant transient is in progress.

AND Loss of the OAC and the PAM indications.

AND Inability to directly monitor any one of the following functions:

• Subcriticality

• Inadequate core cooling

• Heat sink

• Containment Integrity 4 RCS integrity 4 RCS Inventory BASIS:

This IC and its associated EAL are intended to recognize the inability of the control room staff to monitor the plant response to a transient. The inability to directly monitor indicates that computer data points or SPDS indicators are not available to monitor the critical safety functions.

D-22 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.2 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION SITE AREA EMERGENCY "Significant Transient" includes response to automatic or manually initiated functions such as scrams, runbacks involving greater than 25% thermal power change, ECCS injections, or thermal power oscillations of 10% of greater.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS6 D-23 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY Any Unplanned Release of Any Unplanned Release of Boundary Dose Resulting Boundary Dose Gaseous or Liquid Gaseous or Liquid from an Actual or Resulting from an Radioactivity to the Radioactivity to the Imminent Release of Actual or Imminent Environment that Exceeds Environment that Exceeds Gaseous Radioactivity Release of Gaseous Two Times the SLC 200 Times the SLC limits Exceeds 100 mRem TEDE Radioactivity that Limits for 60 Minutes or for 15 Minutes or Longer or 500 mRem CDE thyroid Exceeds 1000 mRem Longer for the Actual or Projected TEDE or 5000 mRem Duration of the Release CDE thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release Unexpected Increase in Major Damage to Irradiated Plant Radiation Levels or Fuel or Loss of Water Level Airborne Concentration that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown D-24 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Longer OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. A valid indication on radiation monitor RIA 33 of _>4.06E+06 cpm for > 60 minutes. (See Note)

B. Valid indication on radiation monitor RIA-45 of > 9.35E+05 cpm or RP sample reading of _ 6.62E-2uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for > 60 minutes. (See Note)

C. Confirmed sample analysis of liquid effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11.1 for > 60 minutes as determined by Chemistry procedures.

D. Confirmed sample analysis of gaseous effluent being released exceeds two times SLC 16.11.2 for > 60 minutes as determined by Radiation Protection procedures.

Note: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND the required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made on the valid Radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term "Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

D-25 Rev. 20 14-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT Chapter 16, Selected Licensee Commitments, of the Oconee Nuclear Station FSAR provides guidance to ensure that the release of liquid or gaseous effluent does not exceed the limits established in 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table II and Appendix I, 10 CFR 50.

Unplanned releases in excess of two times the selected licensee commitments that continue for 60 minutes or longer represent an uncontrolled situation and hence, a potential degradation in the level of safety. It is not intended that the release be averaged over 60 minutes. The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 60 minutes.

1. Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds Two Times the SLC Limits for 60 Minutes or Longer Monitor indications are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Annual average meteorology (semi-elevated 1.672E-06 sec/m3) has been used. Radiation Protection will use HP/0/B/1009/015 to quantify a gaseous release.

Operations will use OP/0/A/1 104/068 and/or OP/0/A/1 104/072 to quantify a liquid release.

BASIS:

References to RIA-45 are intended to be related to unit specific RIA-45 only. 4RIA-45 provides a concentration value, not in cpm, that is used by unit 1, 2, 3 RIA-45.

Additionally, a radionuclide concentration value of 6.62E-2 uCi/ml cannot be obtained in the Radwaste Facility (RWF) ventilation system discharge without the input of post-accident concentrations of gaseous radionuclides. There are no post-accident inputs to the RWF other than planned batch transfers of liquids and resins that would be transferred in a controlled manner. All gaseous radionuclides would be entrained in the liquids and resins since there are no gas storage tanks in the RWF to accept a transfer of gaseous waste.

Unit 1,2,3 RIA-45 could detect a concentration of 6.62E-2 uCi/ml post-accident since a LOCA in the Auxiliary Building could provide the source activity.

D-26 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT The Radwaste Facility is only used for waste water and resin processing. The type of waste processed, even if it contained entrained gasses from the reactor coolant system, cannot contain sufficient activity during normal operation to result in SLC limits being exceeded.

Liquid waste is not transferred to the Radwaste Facility during an event. The Radwaste Facility 4RIA-45 alarm set point is set at 5% of the station release limit. This set point is based on providing a set point that will not cause spurious alarms and will maintain total effluent releases below 100% of the station release limit. It is recognized that the Radwaste Facility is a less significant gaseous release pathway since the 4RIA-45 set point is set at one sixth of the 1, 2, or 3 RIA-45 set points. This EAL is only applicable to 1, 2, or 3 RIA-45 since the accident related source term that enters an intact Auxiliary Building will be released out of the unit vents.

Reference NUMARC/NESP/-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AU1 D-27 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT

2. Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation or Airborne Concentration.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. LT 5 reading 14" and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage WITH fuel in the core B. Valid indication of uncontrolled water decrease in the SFP or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblies remaining covered by water AND unplanned valid RIA 3, 6 or portable area monitor readings increase.

C. 1 R/hr radiation reading at one foot away from a damaged irradiated spent fuel dry storage module.

D. Valid area or process monitor exceeds limits stated in Enclosure 4.9 of RP/O/A/1000/001.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

EAL 1 indicates that the water level in the reactor refueling cavity is uncontrolled. If the area/process monitors reach the HIGH alarm setpoint, classification should be upgraded to an Alert.

All of the above events tend to have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary, thus impact to public health and safety is very low.

In light of reactor cavity seal failure incidents, explicit coverage of these types of events via EALs 1 and 2 is appropriate given their potential for increased doses to plant staff.

Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

EAL 3 applies to licensed dry storage of older irradiated spent fuel to address degradation of this spent fuel.

D-28 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT UNUSUAL EVENT EAL 4 addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. The RIA readings for an Unusual Event are 1000 times the normal value. Enclosure 4.9 of RP/O/A/1000/001 will provide the actual readings for the monitors.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AU2 NEI 99-01, Rev. 4, 08/00, AU2 D-29 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.9 (RP/O/A/I1000/O01)

UNEXPECTED/UNPLANNED INCREASE IN AREA MONITOR READINGS This initiating condition is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

UNIT 1, 2,3 UNUSUAL ALERT EVENT mRad/hr normal MONITOR NUMBER normal levels mRad/hr RIA 7, Hot Machine Shop 150 > 5000 Elevation 796 RIA 8, Hot Chemistry Lab 4200 > 5000 Elevation 796 RIA 10, Primary Sample 830 > 5000 Hood, Elevation 796 RIA 11, Change Room 210 > 5000 Elevation 796 RIA 12, Chem Mix Tank 800 > 5000 Elevation 783 RIA 13, Waste Disposal 650 > 5000 Sink, Elevation 771 RIA 15, HPI Room NOTE* > 5000 Elevation 758 NOTE*: RIA 15 normal readings are approximately 9 mRad/hr on a daily basis.

Applying the 1000 x normal readings would put this monitor greater than 5000 mRad/hr just for an Unusual Event. For this reason, an Unusual Event will not be declared for any reading less than 5000 mRad/hr D-30 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT

1. Any Unplanned Release of Gaseous or Liquid Radioactivity to the Environment that Exceeds 200 Times Radiological Technical Specifications for 15 Minutes or Longer.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid indication of RIA-46 of > 2.09E+04 cpm or RP sample reading of > 6.62 uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for > 15 minutes (See Note)

B RIA 33 HIGH alarm AND Liquid effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11.1 for > 15 minutes as determined by chemistry procedure.

C. Gaseous effluent being released exceeds 200 times the level of SLC 16.11.2 for >

15 minutes as determined by RP procedure.

Note: If monitor reading is sustained for the time period indicated in the EAL AND required assessments (procedure calculations) cannot be completed within this period, declaration must be made on the valid Radiation monitor reading.

BASIS:

The term "Unplanned", as used in this context, includes any release for which a liquid waste release (LWR) or gaseous waste release (GWR) package was not prepared, or a release that exceeds the conditions (e.g., minimum dilution flow, maximum discharge flow, alarm setpoints, etc.) on the applicable package.

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

This event escalates from the Unusual Event by escalating the magnitude of the release by a factor of 100.

D-31 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT It is not intended that the release be averaged over 15 minutes. The event should be declared as soon as it is determined that the release duration has or will likely exceed 15 minutes.

Monitor indications are based on the methodology of the site Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). Annual average meteorology (semi-elevated release 1.672 E-06 sec/m3) has been used.

Chapter 16, Selected Licensee Commitments, of the Oconee Nuclear Station FSAR outlines the release limits for gaseous effluent is released by the Control Room. Liquid effluent is discharged by Operations from the Radwaste Facility. Effluent monitors have setpoints established to alarm should activity be detected that would exceed limits established by 10 CFR 20, Table B, Appendix II. Radiation Protection and/or Chemistry would calculate the release rate and quantify the amount being released.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AA1 D-32 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT

2. Release of Radioactive Material or Increases in Radiation Levels Within the Facility That Impedes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid radiation reading > 15 mRad/hr in the Control Room, CAS, or Radwaste Control Room.

B. Unplanned/unexpected valid area radiation monitor readings exceed limits stated in Enclosure 4.9 of RP/O/A/1000/001.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation reading has been confirmed by the operators to be correct.

This IC addresses unplanned/unexpected increased radiation levels that impede necessary access to operating stations, or other areas containing equipment that must be operated manually, in order to maintain safe operation or perform a safe shutdown. It is this impaired ability to operate the plant that results in the actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

The Control Room, Central Alarm Station (CAS) and the Radwaste Control Room are areas that will need to be continuously occupied. No radiation monitors are in the CAS or the Radwaste Control Room.

Oconee has chosen to use a generic emergency action level of greater than or equal to 5000 mRad/hr for the Alert classification for areas in the plant that would need to be utilized for safe operation or safe shutdown of the unit. Enclosure 4.9 of RP/O/A/1000/O01 provides the monitor number and the location of the area monitor.

This IC is not intended to apply to anticipated temporary increases due to planned events (e.g., incore detector movement, radwaste container movement, depleted resin transfers, etc.)

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AA3 D-33 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT

3. Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid RIA 3*, 6, 41, or 49* HIGH alarm readings

• Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only B. Valid HIGH alarm reading on portable area monitors on the main bridge or spent fuel pool bridge.

C. Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered.

D. Operators determine water level drop in either the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered.

BASIS:

This IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage and is not intended to address spent fuel which is licensed for dry storage.

The HIGH alarm for RIA 3 (containment area monitor) and RIA 49 (RB gaseous process monitor) corresponds to the setpoints established to assure that 10 CFR 20 limits are not exceeded.

The HIGH alarm setpoint for RIA 6 (SFP bridge area monitor) is designed to make operators aware of increased readings above 10 CFR 20 limits. The HIGH alarm setpoint for RIA 41 (Spent Fuel Pool gaseous atmosphere) is set to alarm if 4 times the limits of 10 CFR 20 are exceeded based upon Xe-133. RIA 49 monitors the reactor building gas.

Portable monitors are established during refueling outages and are located on the main bridge, and the spent fuel pool bridge.

D-34 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT ALERT There is time available to take corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage. Thus, an Alert Classification for this event is appropriate. Escalation, if appropriate, would occur via Abnormal Rad Level/Radiological Effluent or Emergency Coordinator Judgment.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AA2 D-35 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Radioactivity Exceeds 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid reading on RIA-46 of > 2.09E+05 cpm or RIA 56 reading of > 17.5 R/hr or RP sample reading of 6.62E+01 uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for > 15 minutes. (See Note)

B. Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on Enclosure 4.8 of RP/0/A/1000/001.

(See Note)

C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at the site boundary of 100 mRem TEDE or 500 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid.

D. Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 100 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour; OR analysis of field survey samples indicate adult thyroid dose commitment (CDE) of 500 mRem for one hour of inhalation.

Note: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the valid monitor reading should be used for emergency classification.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The calculation for RIA 46 (vent monitor) setpoint is based on whole body dose (100 mRem) using ODCM guidance: average annual meteorology (semi-elevated release 1.672E-6 sec/m3), vent flow rate of 65,000 cfm, and release duration of 15 minutes. No credit is taken for vent filtration.

The calculation for RIA 57/58 (incontainment monitors) setpoints are based on the following: LOCA conditons which provide the more conservative reading, Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) thyroid (500 mRem), average annual meteorology (7.308 E-6 sec/m3), design basis leakage of 5.6E6 ml/hr, release duration of one hour, and time since unit trip. No credit is taken for filtration.

D-36 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY Dose assessment team members use actual meteorology, release duration, and unit vent flow rate or actual leakage rate from containment. Therefore, the predetermined monitor readings would not be used if dose assessment team calculations are available from the TSC or EOF in a timely manner (within approximately 15 minutes).

The 100 mRem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) and the 500 mRem Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) thyroid in this initiating condition is based on 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. The dose projection uses a 4-hour default for time of release.

If the real time release time is known it will be used in the calculation. One order of magnitude is the gradient factor between the Site Area Emergency and General Emergency classes. These values are 10% of the EPA PAG values given in EPA-400-R-92-001.

The field monitoring survey results are based on actual hand-held instrument readings at the site boundary. It is assumed that the release will continue for more than one hour.

Adult thyroid is considered to be the limiting factor.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AS1 D-37 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.8 (RP/O/A/1000/001)

RADIATION MONITOR READINGS FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION NOTE: IF ACTUAL DOSE ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE COMPLETED WITHIN 15 MINUTES, THEN THE VALID MONITOR READING SHOULD BE USED FOR EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION.

ALL RIA VALUES ARE CONSIDERED TO BE GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO.

HOURS SINCE REACTOR RJA 57 R/hr RIA 58 RJhr*

TRIPPED Site Area Emergency General Emergency Site Area Emergency General Emergency 0 - < 0.5 5.9E+003 5.9E+004 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 0.5 - < 1.0 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 1.1EE+003 1.1E+004 1.0 - < 1.5 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.6E+002 8.6E+003 1.5 - < 2.0 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.5E+002 8.5E+003 2.0 - < 2.5 1.4E+003 1.4E+004 6.3E+002 6.3E+003 2.5 - < 3.0 1.2E+003 1.2E+004 5.7E+002 5.7E+003 3.0 - < 3.5 1.1E+003 1.1E+004 5.2E+002 5.2E+003 3.5 - < 4.0 I.OE+003 1.OE+004 4.8E+002 4.8E+003 4.0 - < 8.0 1.OE+003 I.OE+004 4.4E+002 4.4E+003

• Note: RIA 58 is partially shielded.

Assumptions used for calculation of high range in-containment monitors RIA 57 and 58:

1. Average annual meteorology (7.308 E-6 sec/m3)

2. Design basis leakage (5.6 E6 ml/hr)

3. One hour release duration

4. General Emergency PAGs are I rem TEDE and 5 rem CDE; SAE determination is based on 10% of the General Emergency PAGs.

5. Calculations for monitor readings are based on CDE (adult thyroid - 500 mRem) because thyroid dose is limiting.

6. No credit is taken for filtration.

7. LOCA conditions are limiting and provide the more conservative reading.

Assumptions used for calculation of vent monitor RIA 46:

1. Average annual meteorology (1.672 E-6 sec/m3), semi-elevated

2. Vent flow rate 65,000 cfm (average daily flow rate)

3. No credit is taken for vent filtration

4. Fifteen minute release duration.

5. General Emergency PAGs are 1 rem TEDE and 5 rem CDE; SAE determination is based on 10% of the General Emergency PAGs.

6. Calculations for monitor readings are based on whole body dose (100 mRem).

7. Calculation is based on ODCM methodology and NUMARC guidance D-38 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2. Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5,6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

Loss of Reactor Vessel Water Level as indicated by:

A. Failure of heat sink causes loss of Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) conditions AND LT-5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS makeup.

B. Failure of heat sink causes loss of Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) conditions AND either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS makeup.

BASIS:

Under the conditions specified by this IC, severe core damage can occur due to prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal. Declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the IC. Escalation to a General Emergency is via Enclosure 4.3, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent.

Note: Both the LT-5 and the ultrasonic level instrumentation are located in the center line of the hot leg.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev.2, 01/92, SS5 D-39 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Boundary Dose Resulting from an Actual or Imminent Release of Gaseous Radioactivity that Exceeds 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem (CDE) Adult Thyroid for the Actual or Projected Duration of the Release Using Actual Meteorology.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid reading on RIA 46 of > 2.09E+06 cpm or RIA 56 reading of > 175 R/hr or RP sample reading of 6.62E +02uCi/ml Xe 133 eq for > 15 minutes (See Note)

B. Valid reading on RIA 57 or 58 as shown on Enclosure 4.8 of RP/0/A/1000/001.

(See Note)

C. Dose calculations result in a dose projection at the site boundary of> 1000 mRem TEDE OR > 5000 mRem CDE (Adult Thyroid).

D. Field survey results indicate site boundary dose rates exceeding 1000 mRad/hr expected to continue for more than one hour; OR analyses of field survey samples indicate adult thyroid commitment (CDE) of 5000 mRem for one hour of inhalation.

Note: If actual Dose Assessment cannot be completed within 15 minutes, then the valid monitor reading should be used for emergency classification.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

The calculation for RIA 46 (vent monitor) setpoint is based on the following: whole body dose (100 mRem) using ODCM guidance, average annual meteorology (semi-elevated release 1.672E-6 sec/m3), vent flow rate of 65,000 CFM, and release duration of 15 minutes. No credit is taken for vent filtration.

The calculation for RIA 57/58 (incontainment monitors) setpoints are based on the following: LOCA conditions which provide the more conservative reading, Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE-adult thyroid 500 mRem), average annual meteorology (7.308 E-6, sec/m3), design basis leakage of 5.6E6 ml/hr, release duration of one hour, and time since unit trip. No credit is taken for filtration.

D-40 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.3 ABNORMAL RAD LEVELS/RADIOLOGICAL EFFLUENT GENERAL EMERGENCY Calculations by the dose assessment team use actual meteorology, duration, and unit vent flow rate or actual leakage rate from containment. Therefore, the predetermined monitor readings would not be used if dose assessment calculations are available from the TSC or EOF in a timely manner (within approximately 15 minutes).

The 1000 mRem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) and the 5000 mRem Committed Dose Equivalent (CDE) adult thyroid in this initiating condition is based on 10 CFR 20 annual average population exposure. These values are EPA PAG guidelines as expressed in EPA-400-R-92-001. The dose calculation procedure utilizes a default of 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for the release time. This default value will be utilized until a corrected release time is determined.

Field monitoring results will utilize a one hour period of time for calculating survey results. .8 of RP/0/A/1000/001 is shown on page 34 of this document.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AGI D-41 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTION UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Unexpected increase in plant Failure of Reactor Protection Failure of Reactor Protection Failure of the Reactor radiation levels or airborne System Instrumentation to System Instrumentation to Protection System to Complete concentrations Complete or Initiate an Complete or Initiate an an Automatic Scram and Automatic Reactor Scram Automatic Reactor Scram Manual Scram was NOT Once a Reactor Protection Once a Reactor Protection Successful and There is System Setpoint Has Been System Setpoint Has Been Indication of an Extreme Exceeded and Manual Scram Exceeded and Manual Scram Challenge to the Ability to Was Successful Was NOT Successful Cool the Core Inability to Maintain Plant in Complete Loss of Function Cold Shutdown Needed to Achieve or Maintain Hot Shutdown Major damage to irradiated Loss of Water Level in the fuel or loss of water level that Reactor Vessel That Has or has or will result in the Will Uncover Fuel in the uncovering of irradiated fuel Reactor Vessel outside the reactor vessel D-42 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Unexpected Increase in Plant Radiation or Airborne Concentration.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. LT 5 reading 14" and decreasing with makeup not keeping up with leakage WITH fuel in the core B. Valid indication of uncontrolledwater decrease in the SFP or fuel transfer canal with all fuel assemblies remaining covered by water AND unplanned valid RIA 3, 6 or portable area monitor readings increase.

C. 1 R/hr radiation reading at one foot away from a damaged irradiated spent fuel dry storage module.

D. Valid area or process monitor exceeds limits stated in Enclosure 4.9 of RP/O/A/1000/001.

BASIS:

Valid means that a radiation monitor reading has been confirmed to be correct.

EAL 1 indicates that the water level in the reactor refueling cavity is uncontrolled. If the area/process monitors reach the HIGH alarm setpoint, classification should be upgraded to an Alert.

All of the above events tend to have long lead times relative to potential for radiological release outside the site boundary, thus impact to public health and safety is very low.

In light of reactor cavity seal failure incidents, explicit coverage of these types of events via EALs 1 and 2 is appropriate given their potential for increased doses to plant staff.

Classification as an Unusual Event is warranted as a precursor to a more serious event.

EAL 3 applies to licensed dry storage of older irradiated spent fuel to address degradation of this spent fuel.

D-43 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS UNUSUAL EVENT EAL 4 addresses unplanned increases in in-plant radiation levels that represent a degradation in the control of radioactive material, and represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant. The RIA readings for an Unusual Event are 1000 times the normal value. Enclosure 4.9 of RP/O/A/1000/001 will provide the actual readings for the monitors.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AU2 NEI 99-01, Rev. 4, 08/00, AU2 D-44 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT

1. Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Scram Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Scram Was Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2,3 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. VALID reactor trip signal received or required without automatic scram AND ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

DSS has inserted Control Rods OR Manual reactor trip from the control room is successful and reactor power is less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

This condition indicates failure of the automatic protection system to scram the reactor.

This condition is more than a potential degradation of a safety system in that a front line automatic protection system did not function in response to a plant transient and thus the plant safety has been compromised, and design limits of the fuel may have been exceeded.

An Alert is indicated because conditions exist that lead to potential loss of fuel clad or RCS. Reactor protection system setpoint being exceeded (rather than limiting safety system setpoint being exceeded) is specified here because failure of the automatic protection system is the issue. If the reactor protective system fails, the Diverse Scram Signal system (which was installed at Oconee since 10/7/91 as a result of Generic Letter 83-28) will drop control rod groups 5,6,7 into the core.

A manual scram is any set of actions by the reactor operator(s) at the reactor control console which causes control rods to be RAPIDLY inserted into the core and brings the reactor subcritical.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SA2 D-45 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT Operator action to drive rods does NOT constitute a reactor trip, (i.e. does not meet the rapid insertion criterion).

Failure of Diverse Scram Signal and the manual scram would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SA2 D-46 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT

2. Inability to Maintain Plant in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5,6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Loss of LPI and/or LPSW AND Inability to maintain RCS temperature below 200 'F as indicated by either of the following:

RCS temperature at the LPI pump suction OR Average of the 5 highest CETCs as indicated by ICCM display.

OR Visual observation BASIS:

LPI is the low pressure injection system LPSW is low pressure service water.

This IC is based on concerns raised by Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal."

number of phenomena such as pressurization, vortexing, RCS level differences when operating at a mid-loop condition, decay heat removal system design, and level instrumentation problems can lead to conditions where decay heat removal is lost and core uncovery can occur. NRC analyses show sequences that can cause core uncovery in 15 to 20 minutes and severe core damage within an hour after decay heat removal is lost.

Loss of the LPI system and/or the LPSW system causes an uncontrolled temperature rise in the reactor coolant system. Uncontrolled is understood to be "not as the result of operator action." Rising temperature of the reactor coolant system can be determined at the LPI pump suction, average of the 5 highest CETCs as indicated by ICCM display or through operator visual observation (steam or boiling) in the reactor building.

D-47 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT With a loss of LPI pumps there will be no RCS flow at the LPI pump suction and RCS temperature at that point will not represent RCS temperature in the reactor vessel. Also, with the reactor head in place, visual observation may not be possible.

Escalation to the Site Area Emergency is by, "Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel," or by Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent ICs.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SA3 D-48 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT

3. Major Damage to Irradiated Fuel or Loss of Water Level that Has or Will Result in the Uncovering of Irradiated Fuel Outside the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Valid RIA 3*, 6, 41 or 49* HIGH alarm readings Applies to Mode 6 and No Mode Only.

B. Valid HIGH alarm reading on portable area monitors on the main bridge or spent fuel pool bridge.

C. Report of visual observation of irradiated fuel uncovered.

D. Operators determine water level drop in either the SFP or fuel transfer canal will exceed makeup capacity such that irradiated fuel will be uncovered.

BASIS:

This IC applies to spent fuel requiring water coverage and is not intended to address spent fuel which is licensed for dry storage.

The HIGH alarm for RIA 3 (containment area monitor) and RIA 49 (RB gaseous process monitor) corresponds to the setpoints established to assure that 10 CFR 20 limits are not exceeded.

The HIGH alarm setpoint for RIA 6 (SFP bridge area monitor) is designed to make operators aware of increased readings above 10 CFR 20 limits. The HIGH alarm setpoint for RIA 41 (Spent Fuel Pool gaseous atmosphere) is set to alarm if 4 times the limits of 10 CFR 20 are exceeded based upon Xe-133. RIA 49 monitors the reactor building gas. Portable monitors are established during refueling outages and are located on the main bridge, and the spent fuel pool bridge.

D-49 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS ALERT There is time available to take corrective actions, and there is little potential for substantial fuel damage. Thus, an Alert Classification for this event is appropriate. Escalation, if appropriate, would occur via Abnormal Rad Level/Radiological Effluent, Loss of Shutdown Functions or Emergency Coordinator Judgment.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, AA2 D-50 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Failure of Reactor Protection System Instrumentation to Complete or Initiate an Automatic Reactor Scram Once a Reactor Protection System Setpoint Has Been Exceeded and Manual Scram Was NOT Successful.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. VALID reactor trip signal received or required without automatic scram AND DSS has NOT inserted Control Rods AND Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

BASIS:

Automatic and manual scram are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to scram the reactor.

This EAL is met if a reactor trip is required and the manual reactor trip function fails.

A failure of the manual reactor trip pushbutton to initiate a reactor trip is indication of a failure of the Reactor Protection System.

Under these conditions, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems are designed. A Site Area Emergency is indicated because conditions exist that lead to imminent loss or potential loss of both fuel clad and RCS.

Although this IC may be viewed as redundant to the Fission Product Barrier Degradation IC, its inclusion is necessary to better assure timely recognition and emergency response.

Escalation of this event to a General Emergency would be via Fission Product Barrier Degradation or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS2 D-51 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2. Complete Loss of Function Needed to Achieve or Maintain Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown).

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1,2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

Any of the following conditions exist:

A. Average of the 5 highest CETCs > 1200 'F on ICCM.

B. Unable to maintain reactor subcritical C. EOP directs feeding SG from SSF ASWP or station ASWP BASIS:

This EAL addresses complete loss of functions, core cooling and heat sink, required for hot shutdown with the reactor at pressure and temperature. Under these conditions, there is an actual major failure of a system intended for protection of the public. Thus, declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted. Escalation to General Emergency would be via Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, Emergency Coordinator Judgment, or Fission Product Barrier Degradation ICs.

Core exit thermocouple readings are considered to be the average of the five (5) highest thermocouple readings shown on the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor.

The SSF can provide the following: (1) makeup to the Reactor Coolant pump seals, (2) low pressure service water to the steam generators (additional method for heat sink), (3) capability to keep the unit in hot shutdown for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following an Appendix R fire.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS4 D-52 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS SITE AREA EMERGENCY

3. Loss of Water Level in the Reactor Vessel That Has or Will Uncover Fuel in the Reactor Vessel.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5,6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

Loss of Reactor Vessel Water Level as indicated by:

A. Failure of heat sink causes loss of Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) conditions.

AND LT-5 indicates 0 inches after initiation of RCS makeup.

B. Failure of heat sink causes loss of Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) conditions.

AND Either train ultrasonic level indication less than 0 inches and decreasing after initiation of RCS makeup.

BASIS:

Under the conditions specified by this IC, severe core damage can occur due to prolonged boiling following loss of decay heat removal. Declaration of a Site Area Emergency is warranted under the conditions specified by the IC. Escalation to a General Emergency is via .3, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent.

Note: Both the LT-5 and the ultrasonic level instrumentation are located in the center line of the hot leg.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS5 D-53 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.4 LOSS OF SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Failure of the Reactor Protection System to Complete an Automatic Scram and Manual Scram was NOT Successful and There is Indication of an Extreme Challenge to the Ability to Cool the Core.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. VALID reactor trip signal received or required WITHOUT automatic scram AND Manual reactor trip from the control room was not successful in reducing reactor power to less than 5% and decreasing.

AND Average of five highest CETCs > 1200 'F on the ICCM.

BASIS:

Automatic and manual scram are not considered successful if action away from the reactor control console is required to scram the reactor. Under the conditions of the IC and its associated EALs, the efforts to bring the reactor subcritical have been unsuccessful and, as a result, the reactor is producing more heat than the maximum decay heat load for which the safety systems were designed. The extreme challenge to the ability to cool the core is intended to mean that the core exit temperatures are at or approaching 1200 'F. (Note:

CETCs reading > 1200 °F is also a good indicator that the reactor vessel water level is below the top of the active fuel. Oconee does not have an indication for the reactor vessel water level below the top of the active fuel.)

The General Emergency declaration is intended to be anticipatory of the fission product barrier matrix declaration to permit maximum offsite intervention time.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SG2 D-54 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA GENERAL EMERGENCY EMERGENCY Loss of All Offsite Power to Loss of All Offsite Power Loss of All Offsite Power Prolonged Loss of All Essential Busses for Greater and Loss of All Onsite AC and Loss of All Onsite AC (Offsite and Onsite) AC Than 15 Minutes Power to Essential Busses Power to Essential Busses Power During Cold Shutdown Or Refueling Mode Unplanned Loss of Required AC power to essential Loss of All Vital DC DC Power During Cold busses reduced to a single Power Shutdown or Refueling Mode power source for greater for Greater than 15 Minutes than 15 minutes such that an additional single failure could result in station blackout D-55 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Loss of All Offsite Power to Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Unit auxiliaries being supplied from Keowee or CT5.

AND Inability to energize either MFB from an offsite source (either switchyard) within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

Prolonged loss of AC power reduces required redundancy and potentially degrades the level of safety of the plant by rendering the plant more vulnerable to a complete Loss of AC Power (Station Blackout). Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

Keowee Hydro station provides the emergency power to the Oconee Nuclear Site. CT5 is powered from the Lee Steam Station and provides back-up power to the site.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU1 D-56 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER UNUSUAL EVENT

2. Unplanned Loss of Required DC Power During Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) or Mode 6 (Refueling Mode) for Greater than 15 Minutes.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5,6 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Unplanned Loss of Vital DC power to required DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC.

AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss.

BASIS:

The purpose of this IC and its associated EALs is to recognize a loss of DC power compromising the ability to monitor and control the removal of decay heat during Cold Shutdown or Refueling operations. This EAL is intended to be anticipatory in as much as the operating crew may not have necessary indication and control of equipment needed to respond to the loss.

"Unplanned" is included in this IC and EAL to preclude the declaration of an emergency as a result of planned maintenance activities.

If this loss results in the inability to maintain cold shutdown, the escalation to an Alert will be per Enclosure 4.4, Loss of Shutdown Functions "Inability to Maintain Plant in Cold Shutdown."

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SU7 D-57 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER ALERT

1. Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses During Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) Or Mode 6 (Refueling Mode).

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 5,6, Defueled EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. MFB 1 and 2 de-energized.

AND Failure to restore power to at least one main feeder bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal, Spent Fuel Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink. When in cold shutdown, refueling, or defueled mode the event can be classified as an Alert, because of the significantly reduced decay heat, lower temperature and pressure, increasing the time to restore one of the emergency busses, relative to that specified for the Site Area Emergency EAL. Escalating to Site Area Emergency, if appropriate, is by Enclosure 4.3, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Enclosure 4.7, Natural Disasters, Hazards, and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety, Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SAl D-58 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER ALERT

2. AC power capability to essential busses reduced to a single power source for greater than 15 minutes such that an additional single failure could result in station blackout.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following condition exists:

A. AC power capability has been degraded to a single power source for > 15 min. due to the loss of all but one of the following:

Unit Normal Transformer (backcharged)

Unit Startup transformer Another Unit Startup Transformer (aligned)

CT4 CT5 BASIS:

This IC and the associated EAL is intended to provide an escalation from IC, "Loss of All Offsite Power To Essential Busses for Greater Than 15 Minutes." The condition indicated by this IC is the degradation of the offsite and onsite power systems such that an additional single failure could result in a station blackout. In this particular situation, a station blackout applies to the unit in question even though the other units may not be affected.

This condition could occur due to a loss of offsite power with a concurrent failure of either CT4 or CT5 to supply power to the main feeder busses.

The subsequent loss of this single power source would escalate the event to a Site Area Emergency in accordance with IC, "Loss of All Offsite and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses."

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SA5 D-59 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Loss of All Offsite Power and Loss of All Onsite AC Power to Essential Busses OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

Loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

A. MFB 1 and 2 de-energized AND Failure to restore power to at least one main feeder bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss of both offsite and onsite AC power.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink.

Prolonged loss of all AC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity, thus this event can escalate to a General Emergency.

Escalation to General Emergency is via Enclosure 4.1 Fission Product Barrier Degradation or IC, "Prolonged Loss of All Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power."

Loss of offsite power (6900V) eliminates the use of power from Duke Power grid and also eliminates distribution of power from the unit generator. Loss of onsite AC (4160V) which includes both Keowee Hydro units, eliminates the use of HPI pumps, LPI pumps, reactor building spray pumps, low pressure service water pumps, CCW pumps, condensate booster pumps, hotwell pumps, heater drain pumps and motor driven emergency feedwater pumps.

Turbine driven emergency feedwater pumps are assumed to be available. It is assumed for this scenario that the Standby Shutdown Facility would be available for RCS and secondary inventory control utilizing the RC makeup pump and the auxiliary service water pump.

References NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS1 D-60 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2. Loss of All Vital DC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Unplanned Loss of Vital DC power to required DC busses as indicated by bus voltage less than 110 VDC.

AND Failure to restore power to at least one required DC bus within 15 minutes from the time of loss.

BASIS:

Loss of all DC power compromises ability to monitor and control plant safety functions.

Prolonged loss of all DC power will cause core uncovering and loss of containment integrity when there is significant decay heat and sensible heat in the reactor system.

Escalation to a General Emergency would occur by Enclosure 4.3, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, Enclosure 4.1, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, .7, Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs. Fifteen minutes was selected as a threshold to exclude transient or momentary power losses.

D-61 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER SITE AREA EMERGENCY The purpose of the onsite DC Power system is:

1. Provide a source of reliable, continuous power for instrumentation and controls needed for normal operation and safe shutdown of the unit through the vital DC power distribution system panelboards and essential DC power which feed Inverters for an uninterrupted source of AC power.

2. Supply DC motor operated valves and pumps required during normal operation and a total loss of AC.

Loss of DC power would place the plant in a situation of losing vital instrumentation, valves, and pumps needed to safely operate and shutdown the plant any time the unit is above cold shutdown conditions.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SS3 D-62 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Prolonged Loss of All Offsite Power and Prolonged Loss of All Onsite AC Power.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: 1, 2,3,4 EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

Prolonged loss of all offsite and onsite AC power as indicated by:

A. MFB 1 and 2 de-energized AND Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) fails to maintain Mode 3 (Hot Standby).

AND AT LEAST ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

Restoration of power to at least one MFB within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is NOT likely OR Indication of continuing degradation of core cooling based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring.

BASIS:

Loss of all AC power compromises all plant safety systems requiring electric power including RHR, ECCS, Containment Heat Removal and the Ultimate Heat Sink.

Prolonged loss of all those functions necessary to maintain hot shutdown will lead to loss of fuel clad, RCS, and containment.

The Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) is capable of providing the necessary functions to maintain Mode 3 (Hot Standby) condition for up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. No fission product barrier degradation would be expected if the SSF is functioning as intended.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SG1 D-63 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.5 LOSS OF POWER GENERAL EMERGENCY Analysis in support of the station blackout coping study indicates that the plant can cope with a station blackout for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> without core damage.

The likelihood of restoring at least one emergency bus should be based on a realistic appraisal of the situation since a delay in an upgrade decision based on only a chance of mitigating the event could result in a loss of valuable time in preparing and implementing public protective actions.

In addition, under these conditions, fission product barrier monitoring capability may be degraded. Although it may be difficult to predict when power can be restored, it is necessary to give the Emergency Coordinator a reasonable idea of how quickly (s)he may need to declare a General Emergency based on two major considerations:

1. Are there any present indications that core cooling is already degraded to the point that Loss or Potential Loss of Fission Product Barriers is IMMINENT?

2. If there are no present indications of such core cooling degradation, how likely is it that power can be restored in time to assure that a loss of two barriers with a potential loss of the third barrier can be prevented?

Thus, indication of continuing core cooling degradation must be based on Fission Product Barrier monitoring with particular emphasis on Emergency Coordinator judgment as it relates to IMMINENT Loss or Potential Loss of fission product barriers and degraded ability to monitor fission product barriers.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, SG1 D-64 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Fire/Explosion Within the Fire or Explosion Affecting the HOSTILE ACTION within the Plant operability of plant safety Protected Area systems required to establish or maintain safe shutdown Confirmed Security condition HOSTILE ACTION within the Other conditions exist which in HOSTILE ACTION resulting in or threat which indicates a OWNER CONTROLLED the judgment of the Emergency Loss of Physical Control of the potential degradation in the AREA or airborne attack threat Director warrant declaration of a Facility level of safety of the plant SITE AREA EMERGENCY Other conditions exist which Other conditions exist which in Other conditions exist which in in the judgment of the the judgment of the Emergency the judgment of the Emergency Emergency Director warrant Director warrant declaration of Director warrant declaration of a declaration of a NOUE an ALERT GENERAL EMERGENCY D-65 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Explosion or Fire Within the Plant OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: Note: Within the plant means Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, Reactor Building, Keowee Hydro, Transformer Yard, B3T, B4T, Service Air Diesel Compressors, Keowee Hydro and associated transformers and SSF.

A. Fire within the plant not extinguished within 15 minutes of control room notification or verification of a control room alarm.

B. Unanticipated explosion within the plant resulting in visible damage to permanent structures/equipment.

0 Includes steam line break and FDW line break BASIS:

The purpose of this IC is to address the magnitude and extent of fires/explosions that may be potentially significant precursors to damage to safety systems. This excludes such items as fires within administration buildings, waste-basket fires, and other small fires of no safety consequence. This IC applies to buildings and areas contiguous to plant vital areas containing safety equipment or other significant buildings or areas. Verification of the alarm in this context means those actions taken in the control room to determine that the control room alarm is not spurious. The intent of the 15-minute duration of extinguishing efforts is to size the fire and to discriminate against small fires that are readily extinguished.

Only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment within the plant and Keowee Hydro should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. A high energy line break (e.g., Main Steam Line or Main Feedwater Line, Heater Drain Line, etc.) would satisfy this EAL IF no additional damage is done to ECCS (safety related systems) equipment/components. No attempt is made in this EAL to assess the actual magnitude of the damage. The occurrence of the explosion with reports of evidence of damage (e.g.,

deformation, scorching) is sufficient for declaration. The Emergency Coordinator also needs to consider any security aspects of the explosion, if applicable.

D-66 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT Escalation to a higher emergency class is by, "Fire/Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown".

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HU2 D-67 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT

2. CONFIRMED SECURITY CONDITION or THREAT which indicates a potential degradation in the level of Safety of the plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. A SECURITY CONDITION that does NOT involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by the security shift supervisor.

B. A credible site-specific security threat notification.

C. A validated notification from NRC providing information of an aircraft threat.

BASIS:

NOTE: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervisor and the control room is crucial in the implementation of effective Security EALs.

Security events which do not represent a potential degradation in the level of safety of the plant are reported under 10 CFR 73.71 or in some cases under 10 CFR 50.72. Security events assessed as HOSTILE ACTIONS are classifiable under 4.6.A.2, 4.6.S.1, and 4.6.G.1 A higher initial classification could be made based upon the nature and timing of the threat and potential consequences. The licensee shall consider upgrading the emergency response status and emergency classification in accordance with the Safeguards Contingency Plan and Emergency Plans.

EAL A Reference is made to site specific security shift supervision because these individuals are the designated personnel on-site qualified and trained to confirm that a security event is occurring or has occurred. Training on security event classification confirmation is closely controlled due to the strict secrecy controls placed on the plant Safeguards Contingency Plan.

This threshold is based on site specific security plans. Site specific Safeguards Contingency Plans are based on guidance provided by NEI 03-12.

D-68 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT EAL B This threshold is included to ensure that appropriate notifications for the security threat are made in a timely manner. This includes information of a credible threat. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Notification of an Unusual Event.

The determination of "credible" is made through use of information found in the site specific Safeguards Contingency Plan.

EAL C The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the aircraft threat are made in a timely manner and that OROs and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. It is not the intent of this EAL to replace existing non-hostile related EALs involving aircraft.

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding an aircraft threat from NRC.

Validation is performed by calling the NRC or by other approved methods of authentication.

Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Unusual Event.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Escalation to Alert emergency classification level would be via 4.6.A.2 would be appropriate if the threat involves an airliner within 30 minutes of the plant.

Reference NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HU4 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-69 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS UNUSUAL EVENT

3. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a NOUE.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant or indicate a security threat to facility protection has been initiated. No releases of radioactive material requiring off-site response or monitoring are expected unless further degradation of safety systems occurs.

BASIS This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the NOUE emergency classification level.

Reference NEI 99-0 1, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HU5 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006.

Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-70 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT

1. Fire or Explosion Affecting the Operability of Plant Safety Systems Required to Establish or Maintain Safe Shutdown.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: Note: Only one train of a system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition.

The following conditions exist:

A. Fire or explosion AND ONE OF THE FOLLOWING:

Affected safety-related system parameter indications show degraded performance OR Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit.

BASIS:

With regard to explosions, only those explosions of sufficient force to damage permanent structures or equipment required for safe operation of the plant should be considered. As used here, an explosion is a rapid, violent, unconfined combustion, or a catastrophic failure of pressurized equipment, that potentially imparts significant energy to near-by structures and materials. A fire is combustion characterized by heat and light. Sources of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical equipment do not constitute fires. Observation of flames is preferred but is NOT required if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

The key to classifying fires/explosions as an Alert is the damage as a result of the incident.

The fact that safety-related equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit has been affected or damaged as a result of the fire/explosion is the driving force for declaring the Alert. It is important to note that this EAL addresses a fire/explosion and not just the degradation of a safety system. The reference to damage of the systems is used to identify the magnitude of the fire/explosion and to discriminate against minor fires/explosions.

D-71 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92 D-72 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT

2. HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack threat.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL: (A or B)

A. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the OWNER CONTROLED AREA as reported by the Security Shift Supervisor.

B. A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.

BASIS:

Note: Timely and accurate communication between Security Shift Supervision and the Control Room is crucial for the implementation of effective Security EALs.

These EALs address the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. They are not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack or is an identified attack target with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires a heightened state of readiness and implementation of protective measures that can be effective (such as on-site evacuation, dispersal or sheltering).

EAL A This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the OCA.

D-73 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT Note that this EAL is applicable for any HOSTILE ACTION occurring, or that has occurred, in the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA. This includes ISFSI's that may be outside the PROTECTED AREA but still within the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA.

EAL B This EAL addresses the immediacy of an expected threat arrival or impact on the site within a relatively short time.

The intent of this EAL is to ensure that notifications for the airliner attack threat are made in a timely manner and that OROs and plant personnel are at a state of heightened awareness regarding the credible threat. Airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant.

This EAL is met when a plant receives information regarding an airliner attack threat from NRC and the airliner is within 30 minutes of the plant. Only the plant to which the specific threat is made need declare the Alert.

The NRC Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) will communicate to the licensee if the threat involves an airliner (airliner is meant to be a large aircraft with the potential for causing significant damage to the plant). The status and size of the plane may be provided by NORAD through the NRC.

Reference NEI 99-0 1, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HA4 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-74 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS ALERT

3. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of an ALERT.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant or a security event that involves probable life threatening risk to site personnel or damage to site equipment because of HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels.

BASIS:

This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the Alert emergency classification level.

Reference NEI 99-0 1, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HA6 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-75 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED AREA.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the (Security Shift Supervision).

BASIS This condition represents an escalated threat to plant safety above that contained in the Alert in that a HOSTILE FORCE has progressed from the OWNER CONTROLLED AREA to the PROTECTED AREA.

This EAL addresses the contingency for a very rapid progression of events, such as that experienced on September 11, 2001. It is not premised solely on the potential for a radiological release. Rather the issue includes the need for rapid assistance due to the possibility for significant and indeterminate damage from additional air, land or water attack elements.

The fact that the site is under serious attack with minimal time available for further preparation or additional assistance to arrive requires ORO readiness and preparation for the implementation of protective measures.

This EAL addresses the potential for a very rapid progression of events due to a HOSTILE ACTION. It is not intended to address incidents that are accidental events or acts of civil disobedience, such as small aircraft impact, hunters, or physical disputes between employees within the PROTECTED AREA. Those events are adequately addressed by other EALs.

D-76 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY Reference NEI 99-0 1, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HS4 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-77 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a Site Area Emergency OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public or HOSTILE ACTION that results in intentional damage or malicious acts: (1) toward site personnel or equipment that could lead to the likely failure of or; (2) that prevent effective access to equipment needed for the protection of the public. Any releases are not expected to result in exposure levels which exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels beyond the site boundary.

BASIS:

This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for Site Area Emergency.

Reference:

NEI 99-01, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HS3 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-78 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS: (A or B)

A A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that plant personnel are unable to operate equipment required to maintain safety functions.

B. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.

BASIS:

EAL A This EAL encompasses conditions under which a HOSTILE ACTION has resulted in a loss of physical control of VITAL AREAS (containing vital equipment or controls of vital equipment) required to maintain safety functions and control of that equipment cannot be transferred to and operated from another location.

Typically, these safety functions are reactivity control (ability to shut down the reactor and keep it shutdown) RCS inventory (ability to cool the core), and secondary heat removal (ability to maintain a heat sink).

Loss of physical control of the control room or remote shutdown capability alone may not prevent the ability to maintain safety functions per se. Design of the remote shutdown capability and the location of the transfer switches should be taken into account. Primary emphasis should be placed on those components and instruments that supply protection for and information about safety functions.

If control of the plant equipment necessary to maintain safety functions can be transferred to another location, then the threshold is not met.

D-79 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS GENERAL EMERGENCY EAL B This EAL addresses failure of spent fuel cooling systems as a result of HOSTILE ACTION if IMMINENT fuel damage is likely such as when a freshly off-loaded reactor core is in the spent fuel pool.

Reference:

NEI 99-0 1, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HG 1 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-80 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.6 FIRE/EXPLOSIONS AND SECURITY EVENTS GENERAL EMERGENCY

2. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director warrant declaration of a General Emergency.

Operating Mode Applicability: All EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Director indicate that events are in progress or have occurred which involve actual or IMMINENT substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity or HOSTILE ACTION that results in an actual loss of physical control of the facility.

Releases can be reasonably expected to exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline exposure levels off-site for more than the immediate site area.

BASIS:

This EAL addresses unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Director to fall under the emergency classification level description for General Emergen\cy.

Reference NEI 99-0 1, Rev. 5, 02/2008, HG2 Frequently asked questions (FAQs) generated by users and developers during conversion from previous classifications schemes to NEI 99-01, Revision 4 Security EALs with the Hostile Action changes endorsed by the NRC in RIS 2006-12 on July 19, 2006 Enhanced guidance related to Security EALs to ensure consistency with NEI 03-12.

D-81 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Natural and Destructive Phenomena Natural and Destructive Phenomena Control Room Evacuation Has Been Other Conditions Existing Which in Affecting the Protected Area Affecting the Plant Vital Area Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be the Judgment of the Emergency Established Coordinator Warrant Declaration of Natural and Destructive Phenomena General Emergency Affecting Keowee Hydro Condition B Natural and destructive phenomena affecting Jocassee Hydro Condition B Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Keowee Hydro Dam Failure Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of Jeopardizes Operation of Systems the Plant Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Cold Shutdown Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Turbine Building Flood Coordinator Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency Other Conditions Existing Which in the Control Room Evacuation Has Been Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Initiated Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event Natural and Destructive Other Conditions Existing Which in the Phenomena Affecting Keowee Hydro Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Warrant Declaration of an Alert D-82 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS. HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT

1. Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Protected Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Tremor felt and valid alarm on the "strong motion accelerograph".

B. Tornado striking within protected area boundary.

C. Vehicle crash into plant structures or systems within protected area boundary.

D. Turbine failure resulting in casing penetration or damage to turbine or generator seals.

BASIS:

The protected area boundary is typically that part within the security isolation zone and is defined in the site security plan.

EAL 1. Damage may be caused to some portions of the site, but should not affect ability of safety functions to operate. Strong motion accelerograph will begin to record at .01g. As defined in the EPRI-sponsored "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake",

dated October 1989, a "felt earthquake" is:

An earthquakeof sufficient intensity such that: (a)the vibratory groundmotion isfelt at the nuclearplant site and recognized as an earthquake based on a consensus of control room operatorson duty at the time, and (b) valid alarm on seismic instrumentationoccurs.

EAL 2. A tornado striking (touching down) within the protected boundary may have potentially damaged plant structures containing functions or systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If such damage is confirmed visually or by other in-plant indications, the event may be escalated to Alert.

D-83 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT EAL 3 Addresses such items as a car, truck, plane, or helicopter crash, or train crash that may potentially damage plant structures containing functions and systems required for safe shutdown of the plant. If the crash is confirmed to affect a plant area containing equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit, the event may be escalated to Alert.

EAL 4 Addresses main turbine rotating component failures of sufficient magnitude to cause observable damage to the turbine casing or to the seals of the turbine generator. Of major concern is the potential for leakage of combustible fluids (lubricating oils) and gases (hydrogen cooling) to the plant environs. Actual fires and flammable gas build up are appropriately classified via other EALs. This EAL is consistent with the definition of an Unusual Event while maintaining the anticipatory nature desired and recognizing the risk to non-safety related equipment. Escalation of the emergency classification is based on potential damage done by the missiles generated by the failure.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HUI D-84 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT

2. Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting Keowee Hydro Condition B.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Reservoir elevation greater than or equal to 805.0 feet with all spillway gates open and the lake elevation continues to rise.

B. Seepage readings increase or decrease greatly or seepage water is carrying a significant amount of soil particulates.

C. New area of seepage or wetness, with large amounts of seepage water observed on dam, dam toe, or the abutments.

D. A slide or other movements of the dam or abutments which could develop into a failure.

E. Developing failure involving the powerhouse or appurtenant structures and the operator believes the safety of the structure is questionable.

F. Emergency Coordinator judgment BASIS:

Keowee Hydro is the emergency AC power source for the Oconee Nuclear Station and is covered by the site emergency plan. The conditions cited above are considered to be situations where dam failure may develop. The potentially hazardous situation may allow days or weeks for mitigative actions to prevent failure.

D-85 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT

3. Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting Jocassee Hydro Condition B.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Condition B has been declared for Jocassee BASIS:

Jocassee Hydro is located upstream of the Oconee Nuclear Station. The mitigation strategies for a Condition B for the Jocassee Dam includes shutdown of all operating Oconee Nuclear units and relocation and installation of other equipment in anticipation of the Condition B escalating to a Condition A.

D-86 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT

4. Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Deemed Detrimental to Safe Operation of the Plant.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Detection of toxic or flammable gases that could enter within the site area boundary in amounts that can affect normal operation of the plant.

B. Report by Local, County or State Officials for potential evacuation of site personnel based on offsite event.

BASIS:

This IC is based on releases in concentrations within the site boundary that will affect the health of plant personnel or the safe operation of the plant with the plant being within the evacuation area of an offsite event (i.e., tanker truck accident releasing toxic gases, etc.)

The evacuation area is as determined from the DOT Evacuation Tables for Selected Hazardous Materials in the DOT Emergency Response Guide for Hazardous Materials.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HU3 D-87 Rev. 2014-02 February 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY UNUSUAL EVENT

5. Other Conditions Exist Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Warrant Declaration of an Unusual Event.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

Other conditions exist which in the judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator to fall under the Unusual Event emergency class.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HU5 D-88 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT

1. Natural and Destructive Phenomena Affecting the Plant Vital Area.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Tremor felt and seismic trigger actuates (.05g)

Note: Only one train of a safety related system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy these conditions.

B. Tornado, high winds, missiles resulting from turbine failure, vehicle crashes, or other catastrophic events AND one of the following:

Plant personnel report visible damage to permanent structures or equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit OR Affected safety related system parameter indications show degraded performance BASIS:

EAL 1 Based on the FSAR design basis. Seismic events of this magnitude can cause damage to safety functions.

EAL 2 is intended to address the threat to safety related structures or equipment from uncontrollable and possibly catastrophic events. Damage to safety-related equipment and or structures housing safety-related equipment caused by natural phenomena after striking the site is the key point of this EAL. Only one train of a safety-related system needs to be affected or damaged in order to satisfy this condition. This EAL is, therefore, consistent with the definition of an ALERT in that if events have damaged areas containing safety-related equipment the potential exists for substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant.

D-89 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT Structures/equipment which provide safety functions are designed to withstand sustained wind force of 95mph. These structures are designed to withstand external wind forces resulting from a tornado having a velocity of 300mph. Because high winds may disable the meteorological instrumentation well before the design basis speed is reached, the meteorological tower should not be used for assessment of tornado winds for emergency classification. For tornados, damage would be the prima facie evidence of winds exceeding design basis.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HA1 D-90 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT

2. Release of Toxic or Flammable Gases Jeopardizes Operation of Systems Required to Maintain Safe Operations or to Establish or Maintain Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown).

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS:

A. Report or detection of toxic gases in concentrations that will be life threatening to plant personnel.

B. Report or detection of flammable gases in concentrations that will affect the safe operation of the plant.

Reactor Building Auxiliary Building Turbine Building Control Room BASIS:

EAL 1 is based on toxic gases that have entered a plant structure that are life-threatening to plant personnel. This EAL applies to structures required to maintain safe operations or to establish or maintain cold shutdown. It is appropriate that increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radioactive Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs.

D-91 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT EAL 2 is based on the detection of flammable gases in areas containing equipment required for safe shutdown of the unit. It is appropriate that increased monitoring be done to ascertain whether consequential damage has occurred. Escalation to a higher emergency class, if appropriate, will be based on System Malfunction, Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radioactive Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HA3 D-92 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT

3. TURBINE BUILDING FLOOD OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Turbine building flood requiring use of AP/1,2,3/A/1700/010, Turbine Building Flood.

BASIS:

This initiating condition is discussed in the Oconee Probabilistic Risk Assessment report.

A flood caused by the rupture of the Jocassee Dam could flood the turbine building basement which could disable the main feedwater pumps and the turbine and motor driven emergency feedwater pumps. Also, rupture of some portions of the condenser intake piping could result in a flood in the turbine building basement. Water tight doors have been provided to prevent the water from seeping into the auxiliary building. This scenario assumes that the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) would be available to provide water to the steam generators. Escalation of the event to a higher category would be based on the ability to maintain core cooling or shutdown functions.

D-93 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT

4. Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Evacuation of control room AND one of the following:

Plant control is established from the Aux SD panel or the SSF OR Plant control is being established from the Aux SD panel or the SSF BASIS:

The auxiliary shutdown panel will allow operators to use turbine bypass valves to maintain RCS temperature, one HPI pump for RCS inventory control, pressurizer heaters to maintain RCS pressure and control of the feedwater startup valves but not control over the feedwater pumps.

The standby shutdown facility can maintain hot shutdown by using auxiliary service water to the steam generators for primary heat removal and also to provide makeup to the reactor coolant system. The SSF is only used under extreme conditions since it may involve pumping lake water into the steam generators for heat removed purposes.

With the control room evacuated, additional support, monitoring and direction through the Technical Support Center and/or other Emergency Operations Facility is necessary.

Inability to establish plant control from outside the control room, as evidenced by the inability to maintain RCS or SG inventories, will escalate this event to a Site Area Emergency.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HA5 D-94 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY ALERT

5. Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Warrant Declaration of an Alert.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate that plant safety systems may be degraded AND that increased monitoring of plant functions is warranted.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator to fall under the Alert emergency class.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HA6 D-95 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY

1. Control Room Evacuation Has Been Initiated and Plant Control Cannot Be Established.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

The following conditions exist:

A. Control room evacuation has been initiated AND Control of the plant cannot be established from the Aux SD panel or the SSF within 15 minutes.

BASIS:

The timely transfer of control to alternate control areas has not been accomplished. This failure to transfer control would be evidenced by deteriorating reactor coolant system or steam generator parameters. For most conditions RCP seal LOCAs or steam generator dryout would be indications of failure to accomplish the transfer in the necessary time.

Escalation of this event, if appropriate, would be by Fission Product Barrier Degradation, Abnormal Rad Levels/Radiological Effluent, or Emergency Coordinator Judgment ICs Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HS2 D-96 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY

2. Keowee Hydro Dam Failure OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Imminent/actual dam failure exists involving any of the following:

Keowee Hydro Dam Little River Dam Dikes A,B,C,D Intake Canal Dike Jocassee Dam - Condition A BASIS:

The Keowee Hydro Dam project includes the Keowee Hydro Dam, Little River Dam and Dikes A, B, C, D, and the Intake Canal Dike. Dam failure of any portion of the Keowee Hydro Dam would result in loss of the emergency AC power supply AND the potential to lose the ultimate heat sink source. Some flooding of the site may result. Evaluation of the plant status following failure of the dam would determine the need to escalate to a General Emergency. Failure of the Jocassee Dam has the potential to result in the failure of the Keowee Hydro Project Dams/Dikes.

D-97 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY SITE AREA EMERGENCY

3. Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Warrant Declaration of Site Area Emergency.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator indicate actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the public.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under the emergency class description for Site Area Emergency.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HS3 D-98 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.7 NATURAL DISASTERS, HAZARDS AND OTHER CONDITIONS AFFECTING PLANT SAFETY GENERAL EMERGENCY

1. Other Conditions Existing Which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator Warrant Declaration of General Emergency.

OPERATING MODE APPLICABILITY: ALL EMERGENCY ACTION LEVEL:

A. Other conditions exist which in the Judgment of the Emergency Coordinator/

EOF DIRECTOR indicate:

(1) Actual or imminent substantial core degradation with potential for loss of containment OR (2) Potential for uncontrolled radionuclide release that would result in a dose projection at the site boundary greater than 1000 mRem TEDE or 5000 mRem CDE Adult Thyroid.

BASIS:

This EAL is intended to address unanticipated conditions not addressed explicitly elsewhere but that warrant declaration of an emergency because conditions exist which are believed by the Emergency Coordinator/EOF Director to fall under the General Emergency class.

Releases (if made) can reasonably be expected to exceed EPA PAG levels outside the site boundary.

Reference NUMARC/NESP-007, Rev. 2, 01/92, HG2 D-99 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

ENCLOSURE 4.8 Radiation Monitor Readings for Emergency Classification All RIA values are considered GREATER THAN or EQUAL TO HOURS SINCE RIA 57 R/hr J RIA 58 R/hr*

REACTOR TRIPPED Site Area Emergency General Emergency Site Area Emergency General Emergency 0.0 - < 0.5 5.9E+003 5.9E+004 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 0.5 - < 1.0 2.6E+003 2.6E+004 1.1E+003 1.1E+004 1.0 - < 1.5 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.6E+002 8.6E+003 1.5 - < 2.0 1.9E+003 1.9E+004 8.5E+002 8.5E+003 2.0 - < 2.5 1.4E+003 1.4E+004 6.3E+002 6.3E+003 2.5 - < 3.0 1.2E+003 1.2E+004 5.7E+002 5.7E+003 3.0 - < 3.5 1.1E+003 1.1E+004 5.2E+002 5.2E+003 3.5 - < 4.0 L.OE+003 1.OE+004 4.8E+002 4.8E+003 4.0 - < 8.0 1.OE+003 1.OE+004 4.4E+002 4.4E+003

• RIA 58 is partially shielded Assumptions used for calculation of high range in-containment monitors RIA 57 and 58:

1. Average annual meteorology (7.308 E6 sec/mr)

2. Design basis leakage (5.6 E6 mllhr)

3. One hour release duration

4. General Emergency PAGs are 1 rem TEDE and 5 rem CDE; Site Area Emergency determination is based on 10% of the General Emergency PAGs

5. Calculations for monitor readings are based on CDE because thyroid dose is limiting

6. No credit is taken for filtration

7. LOCA conditions are limiting and provide the more conservative reading D-100 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA SECTION F EMERGENCY PLAN A - SECTION F EMERGENCY Revision No.

COMMUNICATIONS 005 Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHV PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? El Yes El No Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

F. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations and to emergency personnel and to the public.

F.I. Emergency Response Organization The Emergency Response Organization has been developed in such a manner to list primary and alternate personnel. Primary and backup means of communication between the Site, local government agencies, and State response organizations have been established (Figure F-1).

F. L.a Calls to activate State/County agency's emergency function are the responsibility of the Operations Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator.

These calls are made:

1. By selective signaling phone system (where applicable).

2. The site telephone system to a 24-hour emergency number.

Some agencies have numbers for designated work schedules. Numbers can be found in the Emergency Telephone Directory.

A back-up radio system provides alternate communications with Oconee and Pickens Counties emergency response organizations. (Figure F-2)

F. 1.b On a monthly basis, a communication check is made to state and local government warning points within the Emergency Planning Zone.

Communications during an emergency situation would be by selective signaling phone system, site telephone system/commercial phone service, or by radio (where appropriate).

F. 1.c The EOF organization has the responsibility to ask for federal response.

However, communication with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission from the emergency response facilities, would be by use of the Emergency Telecommuication System (ETS) located in the Control Room areas, Technical Support Center, or the Emergency Operations Facility.

F-I Rev. 14-02 October 2014

F. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS F. 1.d The Emergency Response Organization has the following communications systems available for use during emergencies:

1) Oconee Nuclear Station Telephone System (Generator backed and battery backed)

Fiber-Optic to Charlotte GO (65 lines)

Telephone line to Easley (6 circuits)

Anderson (4 lines)

Six-Mile (4 lines)

Site Telephone System - Inward and outward direct dial available from the Control Room, TSC, and OSC

2) Commercial phone service does not go through the site telephone system

3) Duke Selective Signaling (Generator backed at the microwave tower)

The Selective Signaling System is the primary means of communication with the offsite agencies. The Selective Signaling is on the Duke fiber optic system tied to short leased lines from the local telephone company. This circuit allows intercommunication among the EOF, TSC, control room, counties, and states.

Oconee County Pickens County State Warning Point State Emergency Operations Center (Columbia)

Emergency Operations Facility (Charlotte)

Technical Support Center Control Rooms 1&2, Backup Technical Support Center (OOB)

4) Emergency Radio System (Offsite System-Battery Backed)

Control Room Units 1&2 Technical Support Center Field Monitoring Teams (800 MHZ)

Emergency Operations Facility Pickens County (48.5 MHZ)

Oconee County (48.5 MHZ)

State of South Carolina F-2 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

F. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

5) Radio Systems (Onsite) (Emergency Back-up Power by Keowee Hydro Units)

Control Room 1&2, 3 Fire Brigade Chemistry Safety Radiation Protection Maintenance Medical Emergency Response Team Hazardous Materials Response Team

6) Security Radio System (Emergency Back-up Power by Standby Shutdown Facility)

CAS/SAS All Security Guards Oconee County LEC Control Room 1&2, 3

7) Public Address (PA) System Oconee Nuclear Station (Protected Area)

Oconee Office Building Oconee Administration Building Oconee Complex Oconee Maint. Training Facility (Unique Page Number)

Oconee Garage (Unique Page Number)

Oconee Training Facility (Unique Page Number)

Keowee Hydro Station (Unique Page Number)

World of Energy

8) Site Assembly Warning System Paging by Control Room Warble Tone over PA Siren Assembly Horn (Outside Warning)

F-3 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

F. EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS

9) EOF Communication System (Energy Center has back-up generator power)

The emergency communications systems at the Charlotte EOF are designed to ensure the reliable, timely flow of information between all parties having an emergency response role. The Selective Signaling System is the primary means of communicating changes in event classification and protective action recommendations to the state and counties. The Decision Line provides the state and counties with a dedicated line to discuss and coordinate protective action recommendations. Existing commercial telephone service will serve as the designated backup means for communications in the event of a Selective Signaling System or Decision Line failure.

Duke Telephone System (battery backed)

Selective Signaling System (for state/county notifications)

Decision Line (for discussions/coordination of PARs)

Commercial telephones from the Charlotte switch network Radio System to communicate with the Field Monitoring Teams NRC Emergency Telecommunications System phones South Carolina Local Government Radio F. .e Recall of Emergency Response Organization Should an emergency occur that will require activation of the Emergency Response Organization, the Operations Shift Manger will require the following actions to occur:

Normal Working Hours (Figure A-2A)

1. Have announced over the Public Address system that the Emergency Response Organization (Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center) are to be staffed.

2. Security will activate the ERO. If security is unable to activate the ERO, the SM (or designee) will activate the ERO.

3. Notify Duty Operations Engineer who verifies Plant Manager and Superintendent of Operations have been notified.

4. Initiate a Site Assembly

5. Individual groups will contact corporate personnel for support.

F-4 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS Weekends, Holidays, Backshift (Figure A-2B)

1. Security will activate the ERO. If security is unable to activate the ERO, the SM (or designee) will activate the ERO.

2. Duty Operations Engineer who verifies Plant Manager and Superintendent of Operations have been notified.

3. Announce over the PA system that the Emergency Response Organization (Technical Support Center and Operational Support Center) is to be activated.

4. Initiate a Site Assembly.

5. Individual groups will contact corporate personnel for support.

F. 1.f Redundant two way communication exists for communication with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The ETS system, the regular site or EOF telephone system exists for the communication link with NRC. (Figure F-1)

F.2 Medical Support Communication Link Operations and/or Security will utilize the public address system and radio pager system to activate the Medical Emergency Response Team to respond to a medical emergency to assess the situation and render first aid. If an ambulance is needed, Operations and/or Security will call for an ambulance to be dispatched from the Oconee Medical Center by one of several ways:

1. Regular ONS switchboard line

2. Outside line (Commercial Phone Service)

3. Selective Signaling phone to Oconee County who then would contact the Oconee Medical Center. (Operations only)

4. Radio in the Control Room and/or CAS/SAS to Oconee County, who then would contact the Oconee Medical Center.

F-5 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS However, should an emergency at the Oconee Nuclear Station cause the Emergency Response Organization to be activated, personnel will staff the Operational Support Center who can respond to a medical emergency.

Calls will be made from the Operational Support Center for additional medical assistance (i.e. ambulance transport and hospital contact).

F.3 Periodic Testing of the Emergency Communications System Testing of the Emergency Communications System will be tested on a monthly and a quarterly basis in accordance with site procedures. Phones and radios will be checked to determine their availability.

F-6 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE F-1 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM Organization Commercial ONS Select DPC DPC DPC State Decision ETS EOF Phone Phone Site Signal Offsite Onsite Mcrwav. LGR Line System System Service Phone System Radio Radio System Radio Private Line System System System System Control Room x x x x x x x x Technical Support Center x x x x x x x x Operational Support Center Emergency Operations Facility x xxx x xxx Pickens LEC x x x x x x Pickens EOC x x x x x x x Oconee LEC x x x x x x Oconee EOC x x x x x x State EOC x x x x x x State FEOC x x x x x x x NRC Headquarters x x x x NRC Region II x x x x F-7 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE F-2 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY RADIO NETWORK The offsite emergency radio network at the Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) is specifically limited to use in an emergency event. The network consists of two radio frequencies which provide the following services:

A. 48.5 MHZ Backup communications between ONS, Pickens County Emergency Preparedness Agency and Oconee County Emergency Preparedness Agency.

Backup internal communications between the Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility.

Operating instructions are shown in the Emergency Telephone Directory and SH/O/B/2005/002 (Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions)

B. 800 MHZ Provide communications between Field Monitoring Team Coordinator and field teams.

Base station radios are located in the TSC, backup TSC and EOF.

Operating instructions are located in RP Directive 11.7 and SH/0/B/2005/002 (Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions)

F-8 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA SECTION G EMERGENCY PLAN A - SECTION G PUBLIC Revision No.

INFORMATION AND EDUCATION 006 Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHW PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? El Yes El No Reviewed By* _ (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

G. Public Information and Education Information will be made available to the public on a yearly basis concerning notification of a nuclear plant emergency and the response that will be required from the public sector.

G. 1 Public Education and Information Program (G-1)

& G.2 On an annual basis, the licensee will update and distribute to residents within the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone, emergency planning information concerning Oconee Nuclear Station.

It will provide educational information on radiation, emergency planning contacts, protective actions, primary emergency alert system radio station, evacuation routes, pick-up points for school children, relocation centers, shelters, and information for residents with special needs. Local telephone numbers to call with questions will also be listed.

Public information for the transient population includes lake-access signs, one-mile exclusion signs, and emergency planning information. Transient locations will be identified by the Emergency Planning Manager/designee, the site public affairs staff, and state and county emergency management officials. These locations may include but are not limited to motels, hotels, marinas, lake access (signs), and one-mile site exclusion area.

The list of transient locations will be reviewed quarterly and updated as needed. Locations will be contacted periodically to ensure adequate copies of materials are available.

G.3.a Public Affairs - Location and Contacts During a drill or emergency, public information at Oconee Nuclear Station will be coordinated and disseminated through the on-site media center located on Rochester Highway, Seneca, S. C. or the Joint Information Center (JIC) and Oconee media center located on Issaqueena Trail, Clemson, S.C.

During the initial stages of an emergency situation, response to media questions relative to plant status will be provided at the on-site media center. The Oconee media center will be activated as needed. The news release will indicate the location of the primary media center. The news manager and public spokesperson are the primary contacts for the news media.

G-1 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

G. Public Information and Education (Continued)

If the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) is not activated, the normal Duke Energy news release process is followed. If the EOF is activated, then the Standard Procedure for Public Affairs Response To The Emergency Operations Facility (SR/O/A/2000/001), and the Duke Energy Company Communications and Community Relations World of Energy Emergency Response Plan (RP/O/A/1000/028) are implemented for gathering and disseminating information.

G.3.b Public Affairs - Media Centers In a nuclear plant emergency, the licensee relies on the news media to provide prompt, accurate information to local residents and the public. To provide ready access to current information on plant status, a media center is promptly established. An on-site media center will provide space for a limited number of media. A larger media center at the Oconee media center, located on Issaqueena Trail, Clemson, S.C., can be activated as needed to support additional media.

G.4.a Public Spokesperson A public spokesperson will provide plant status and company information during scheduled news conferences and media briefings at a designated media center. Designated public spokespersons are the chief nuclear officer and his direct reports, and their designees.

G.4.b Spokesperson Information Exchange State, county and licensee spokespersons/public information officers are co-located in the Joint Information Center (JIC) to promote a timely exchange and coordination of emergency information.

G.4.c Rumor Control A licensee liaison will work with state, county, and federal public information officers in the JIC to acknowledge rumors and determine the origin. A coordinated response will be made to deal with rumors or correct misinformation.

G-2 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

G. Public Information and Education G.4.c Rumor Control (continued)

Customer inquiries are handled by our Customer Contact Centers.

Employees are updated via the company intranet/portal. Elected officials and regulatory agencies are updated through our public affairs and governmental affairs departments. Industry groups would assist in disseminating information to other industry groups.

G.5 News Media Training Sessions The licensee will annually provide the news media with information about emergency planning, radiation, and points of contact for release of public information in an emergency.

G-3 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE G-1 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE PUBLIC EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION BROCHURE (Calendar)

Calendar is included by reference only. Current year calendar is maintained on file in the Emergency Planning Department files.

G-4 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

FIGURE G-2 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE LOCATIONS FOR LAKE WARNING AND ONE-MILE EXCLUSION AREA SIGNS Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual 3.6 G-5 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA SECTION H EMERGENCY PLAN A - SECTION H EMERGENCY Revision No.

FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 005 Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHX PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? El Yes E] No Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

Emergency Facilities And Equipment H.1.a Technical Support Center A Technical Support Center has been designated for the Oconee Nuclear Station in the area known as the Operations Center, together with the nearby offices adjacent to the Control Rooms 1&2 on the fifth floor of the Auxiliary Building. This area has the same ventilation and shielding as the Control Room enabling plant management and supporting technical and engineering personnel to evaluate plant status and support operations in conjunction with the Operational Support Center.

The Technical Support Center has the capability to display and transmit plant status to those individuals who are knowledgeable of and responsible for engineering and management support of the reactor operations in the event of an accident, and those persons who are responsible for the management of the accident. Upon activation, this facility will provide the main communication link between the Plant, Operational Support Center, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Headquarters, and the Emergency Operations Facility.

The Technical Support Center is staffed by plant management and technical personnel.

The Technical Support Center has access to the following capabilities and characteristics: (Figure H-1).

1. Redundant two-way communication With the Control Room, the Emergency Operations Facility and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center.

2. Monitoring for direct radiation and airborne radioactive contaminants, with local readout of radiation level and alarms if preset levels are exceeded. Laboratory analysis is required if it becomes necessary to detect radioiodines at concentrations as low as 1.0 E-7 microcurie/cc.

3. Display, printout or trending of comprehensive data necessary to monitor reactor systems status and to evaluate plant system abnormalities; in-plant radiological parameters and meteorological parameters are also available. This capability is provided via each unit's Operator Aid Computer.

Offsite radiological conditions are provided via radio from the field monitoring teams.

H-1 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

4. Ready access to as-built plant drawings such as general arrangement, flow diagrams, electrical one-lines, instrument details, etc.

5. Habitability during postulated radiological accidents to the same degree as the Control Room.

H. 1.b Operational Support Center (Figure H-2)

An Operational Support Center has been established in the Operations Center located in the control room area of Unit #3. Personnel assigned to this support center will include the following:

Work Control Chemistry Radiation Protection Maintenance Safety Operations Engineering Nuclear Supply Chain Security The Operational Support Center has shielding and ventilation to the same degree as the Control Room. Breathing equipment and protective clothing are available in the Operational Support Center should any craftsman/technician be required to perform a task or function in an area that would require protective clothing and breathing apparatus.

H.l.c Backup Facilities A Backup Technical Support Center has been established at the Oconee Office Building, Room 316. Radio and telephone communications are available to offsite agencies and the NRC to the same extent as the designated TSC.

A Backup Operational Support Center has been established in the Oconee Office Building, Room 316 A. Communication links are provided for information flow both to the Control Room and Technical Support Center.

H-2 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EOUIPMENT The Issaqueena Trail Facility serves as an alternate response facility that would be accessible even if the site is under threat of or experiencing hostile action, to function as a staging area for augmentation of emergency response staff and having the following characteristics required collectively of the alternate facilities for use when onsite emergency facilities cannot be safely accessed during hostile action:

" The capability for communication with the emergency operations facility, control room, and plant security.

" The capability to perform offsite notifications.

• The capability for engineering assessment activities, including damage control team planning and preparation.

H.2 Emergency Operations Facility The Emergency Operations Facility is located at the Charlotte General Office in North Carolina. The facility is located approximately 120 miles from the Oconee Nuclear Station. See Figures H3A thru H3-E.

The EOF has the following capabilities:

a. The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves.

b. The capability to analyze plant technical information and provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves.

c. The capability to support response to events occurring simultaneously at more than one nuclear power reactor site if the emergency operations facility serves more than one site.

H-3 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Two utility circuits feed Energy Center Phase 1 where the EOF is located.

Primary power to the Power Building is provided by commercial power. All electrical outlets, as well as lighting fixtures and the wiring closet that supports both the voice and data communications in the Energy Center EOF are on generator backed up power. A loss of commercial power should not impact any of the voice or data communications equipment located in the EOF. All common Duke Energy telecom infrastructures that support EOF functions, including, but not limited to, fiber optic transmission equipment, telephone switching equipment and data network routers, is configured to operate from at least one and usually multiple backup power sources in the event of a loss of commercial power. These backup sources include generator, DC battery and UPS systems. EOF HVAC loads are not backed up.

H.3 County, State Emergency Operations Center See Oconee County FNF Plan.

See Pickens County, FNF Plan.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plan, Site Specific.

H.4 Activation and Staffing of the Emergency Response Organization Activation and staffing of the Emergency Response Organization will be in accordance with the emergency action levels and the procedures developed for determining emergency response.

Division/Section Directives describe the Emergency Response Organization.

Figures A-2A, A-2B depicts the procedure for recall of the Emergency Organization.

H.5 Monitoring Systems On Site - If an emergency situation occurs at the plant, plant personnel continually monitor plant parameters with regard to limits and surveillance requirements specified in the appropriate Technical Specifications, Operating Procedures and Emergency Procedures. These parameters will affect the emergency classification and therefore affect decisions implementing specific emergency measures. In addition to monitoring plant parameters, radiological surveys may be used to verify, augment and/or delineate the assessment of the emergency. (Figure H-20).

H-4 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT H.5.a Natural Phenomena Monitors Natural phenomena instrumentation to monitor wind speed and direction, temperature and vertical temperature gradient (Figure H-4); and seismic activity (Figure H- 18).

H.5.b Radiological Monitors (H-5)

Area Radiation Monitoring System The area radiation monitoring system detectors are located throughout the plant in locations where significant radiation levels may exist, which may change with time and with the operation being performed. They are designed primarily for the protection of personnel performing such operations as routine coolant sampling, refueling, reactor building entry, radioactive waste disposal operations and for certain other operating and maintenance work. The system has sufficient range and flexibility to permit readout during routine operations and during any transient or emergency conditions that may exist. The equipment is self checking for proper operation and alarms both in the local area and in the respective control room. Where necessary or desirable, readout is also provided locally.

Process Radiation Monitoring System Radiation monitoring of process systems provides early warning of equipment, component, or system malfunctions or potential radiological hazards. The Process Radiation Monitoring System includes alarms, indications, and recording of data in the control rooms. In some cases automatic action is taken upon an alarm condition; in others the alarm serves as a warning to the operator so that manual corrective action can be taken.

Radioactive liquid and gaseous waste effluent are monitored and coordinated by Operations and controlled to assure that radioactivity released does not exceed 10 CFR 20 limits for the plant as a whole.

H-5 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Personnel Monitoring System Personnel monitoring equipment consisting of film badges and/or their equivalent (thermo-luminescent dosimeters, TLD's), are assigned by the Radiation Protection Section and worn by all personnel at Oconee whose job involves significant levels of radiation exposure as defined in 10 CFR 20. In addition, pocket chambers, electronic dosimeters, self-reading dosimeters, pocket high radiation alarms, wrist badges, and/or finger tabs are readily available for use by those persons who ordinarily work in the Controlled Area or whose job requires frequent access to this area.

Portable Monitors - sufficient numbers are available for use in assessing radiological conditions. (Figure H-6).

Sampling Equipment - sufficient numbers are available for use in assessing radiological conditions. (Figure H-7).

H.5.c Process Monitors - Non-radiological Monitoring Non-radiological monitoring capabilities include reactor coolant system pressure, temperatures, flows, and water level for detection of inadequate core cooling. Containment pressure, temperature, liquid levels, flow rates, and status of equipment components are monitored to assess containment integrity.

H.5.d Fire and Combustion products detectors - (Figure H-8).

H.6 Offsite Monitoring and Analysis for Emergency Response H.6.a Natural-Phenomena Monitors Facilities and equipment include two onsite meteorological towers. Also, an agreement has been established with the Greenville-Spartanburg National Weather service to provide meteorological information should our system become inoperable.

H.6.b Radiological monitors for emergency environmental monitoring are provided in emergency kits. The established environmental monitoring network and sampling equipment in the surrounding area are also available to provide emergency assessment data.

The existing radiological monitoring program will provide base line information as well as in-place monitoring for early assessment data.

(Figure A) (H-9 and H-10).

H-6 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT Normal environmental monitoring equipment includes radioiodine and particulate continuous air samplers and thermo-luminescent dosimeters, located and collected according to pre-established criteria. Environmental monitoring will be expanded as necessary during an emergency situation in accordance with offsite monitoring procedures.

H.6.c Laboratory Facilities - Include mobile emergency monitoring capabilities available through the S.C. Department of Health and Environmental Control, Bureau of Solid and Hazardous Waste Management and the DOE Radiological Assistance Team. In addition, Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) has emergency vehicles for mobile assessment purposes. Fixed facilities are available for gross counting and spectral analysis in the ONS counting laboratory (Figure H-11) and at the Duke Energy Environmental Laboratory near the McGuire Nuclear Station, Charlotte, North Carolina.

Should the plant lose the capability to use the count room onsite, samples can be counted at the backup count room or in one of the mobile assessment field monitoring vans. Portable equipment would be relocated to this area.

(Figure H-3)

H.7 Offsite radiological monitoring equipment is located in the storage area outside the protected area. Emergency kits are available for off-site monitoring teams who would be monitoring for radiation offsite. (Figure H-12).

H.8 Meteorological Instrumentation A primary and one auxiliary meteorological tower provides the basic parameters on display in the Control Room. (Figure H-4 shows the meteorological equipment.)

Meteorological measurement equipment meets the criteria of the milestones addressed in Appendix 2 of NUREG 0654 and Proposed Revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.23.

An operable dose calculation methodology is in use in the Control Room, Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility.

The dose assessment methodology for the Oconee Nuclear STATION consists of calculations for three separate source terms. The first source term is based on the activity that has been or is actually being released through the unit vent; the second source term is based on a potential release using the reactor building dose rate and design basis assumptions for containment leakage; the third source term is based on the activity that has been or is actually being released through the steam relief valves.

H-7 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT The release rate is calculated for each source term using relative atmospheric dispersion factors calculated by the meteorological model and either actual sample data or radiation monitor readings. These release rates are then added together and used to calculate the dose rate or a projected dose over the duration of the release or over 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> if release duration is unknown at 1, 2, 5 and 10 miles downwind from the plant.

These dose assessment methods provide the capability to calculate the dose from actual or potential releases following an accident. A fifty-year committed dose equivalent (CDE) to the thyroid and a total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) from exposure to a semi-infinite cloud and a four-day ground shine as applicable are determined. The dose conversion factors are derived from EPA-400. Near real time radiation monitor readings, sample data, and meteorological data are combined to provide timely, realistic dose calculations.

This model will provide the capability to assess and monitor actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition.

Direct telephone access to the person responsible for making offsite dose calculations is available to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission through the use of the NRC Health Physics Network line. The physical location of this person is in the Emergency Operations Facility.

H.9 Operational Support Center - Emergency Supplies The Operational Support Center will have the same shielding, and ventilation as the Control Room. Protective clothing and breathing equipment are available to the personnel assembled in these areas. (See Figures H-13, H-14, H-17)

H. 10 Inspection and Inventory of Emergency Equipment and Supplies All emergency equipment designated by the Oconee Station Emergency Plan shall be inventoried and inspected on a quarterly basis or in agreement with established procedures. Supplies will be inventoried/replaced after each drill and/or exercise or actual emergency where supplies might have been used.

Calibration of any/all emergency equipment shall be at the intervals recommended by the supplier of the equipment.

H-8 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

H. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT H.11 Identification of Emergency Kits Emergency kits are located in various locations. See figures below and procedure for specific locations.

Protective Equipment Kits - Figures H-13, H-14, H-17 Communications Equipment - Figures H-12, H-16 Radiological Monitoring Equipment - Figures H-12, H-16, H-17 Emergency Supplies - Figures H-16, Figure H-17 Emergency Medical Supplies - L-1, L-2, L-3 Decontamination Supplies - K-3 Spill Cleanup Equipment/Supplies - H-19 H.12 Field Monitoring Data Collection The Emergency Operations Facility has been designated as the central point for the receipt and analysis of all field monitoring data and coordination of sample media. The Radiological Assessment Manager at the Emergency Operations Facility will be responsible for the coordination efforts.

H-9 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-1 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION TYPICAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER PRIMARY LOCATION UNIT 1&2 OPS CENTER N

N H-10 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-lA NO LONGER USED H-11 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-2 OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION TYPICAL OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER PRIMARY LOCATION UNIT 3 OPERATONS CENTER A

E KiTE]

L I I I I I r I RPS/ICS CABINETS SPOC Maintenance/I&E Technicians RPS/ICS CABINETS RP Technicians Operations RPS/ICS CABINETS UNIT 3 CONTROL ROOM A. OSC Manager B. Ops Liaison C. RP Manager D. Unassigned E. Technical Assistant I F. Chemistry Manager G. Maintenance Manager H. RP I. SPOC J. Electrical Engineering K. Maintenance Supervisor (SPOC)

L. Chemistry Supervisor M. SPOC N. Technical Assistant H

0. RP Admin. Supervisor P. Nuclear Supply Chain Liaison Q. RP Shift R. Assistant to RP Mgr.

V. Security Liaison H-12 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-2A NO LONGER USED H-13 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-3A DUKE ENERGY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION CHARLOTTE EOF GENERAL OFFICE BUILDING LAYOUT - CHARLOTTE, NC I I II*

Ij Iu I UI DUKE ENERGY ENERGY CENTER CH*RHISREE CU____TEE I I Lij WACHOVIA CENTER uj z0 TRYON STET.ROSRE V)

I 1 I The EOF is on the 1 at Floor of the Energy Center.

H-14 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-3B DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION CHARLOTTE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY LAYOUT H-15 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-3C DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION TYPICAL OCONEE JIC SET UP I Rev. 2014-02 H-16 October 2014

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FIGURE H-4 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION METEOROLOGY EQUIPMENT Wind Speed Monitoring Systems Wind Direction Monitoring Systems Platinum (RTD) T Delta or T/AT Monitoring System Precipitation Monitoring System NOTE: The Meteorological Monitoring System monitors and records continuous data for upper and lower levels of wind speed and direction, ambient air temperature and temperature differential at Site

1. 1 (Northwest Met Tower). Wind speed, wind direction and precipitation is recorded at Site #2 (Keowee River Tower). All data points are included on each of the Units OAC computers where the data is averaged over a 15 minute period of time, except for precipitation.

IP/O/B/1601/003 gives range, accuracy and location.

H-20 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-5 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION RADIATION INDICATING ALARMS (RIA)

RIA# UNIT# TYPE RANGE FUNCTION LOCATION CLASS 1 1,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Control Room Control Room Area PAM* 1,2,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Main Bridge Reactor Building Area PAM* 1,2,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Aux. Bridge Reactor Building Area 3 1,2,3 GM, IC .1 -I E7mRad/hr Refuel Canal Transfer Canal Area 4 1,2,3 GM, IC .1 -1E7mRad/hr RB Entrance Personnel Hatch Area 5 1,2,3 GM .1 -IE4mRad/hr Incore Tank Outside Incore Tk Hatch Area PAM* 1,3 GM .1 -IE4mRad/hr Spent Fuel SF Bridge Area 6 1,3 GM. IC .1 -IE7mRad/hr Spent Fuel SF Pool Area Area Area/Pool 7 1 GM I -I E4mRad/hr Hot Machine Shop East Wall Area 8 1 GM .1 -lE4mRad/hr Hot Lab/ Chemistry Hot Chem. Lab Area 10 1,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Sample Primary Sample hood Area Hood/Primary 11 1,3 GM .1 -IE4mRad/hr Corridor 796'(3rd Unit 1/2 Change Room, Area Level) Unit 3 Change Room 12 1,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Chem Addition Unit 1/2/3 Mix Tank Area 13 1,3 GM .1 -1E4mRad/hr Waste Disposal Sink Waste disposal Tk Area 15 1,3 GM, IC .1 -lE7mRad/hr HPI HPI Rooms Area 16 1,3 GM, IC .01 -lE7mRad/hr "A" Main "A" Main Steam Area Steam Line Lines 17 1,3 GM, IC .01 -IE7mRad/hr "B" Main Steam "B" Main Steam Lines Area Line 31 1 Nal 10 -1E7cpm LPI cooler LPSW Turbine Building Effl Discharge Basement H-21 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Figure H-5 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION RADIATION INDICATING ALARMS (RIA)

RIA# I UNIT# TYPE RANGE FUNCTION LOCATION CLASS 32 1 P.Beta 10- IE7cpm Aux. Bldg. Gas AB-I SF Resin Tank Area 32 3 P.Beta 10 - IE7cpm Aux. Bldg. Gas AB-2 Elevator Lobby Area 33 Nal 10 - IE7cpm Normal LWD Radwaste Facility Effl 35 1,2,3 Nal 10 - lE7cpm LPSW Disch. Aux Turbine Building Basement Effl Building 37 1,3 P.Beta 10 - 1E7cpm Normal GWD Purge Equipment or Pen Effl Room near elevator 38 1,3 GM 10 - lE7cpm High GWD Purge Equipment or Pen Effl Room near elevator 39 1,3 P.Beta 10- lE7cpm CR-Gas 6th Fl. behind Em. Air Area Booster Pumps 40 1,2,3 P.Beta 10 - lE7cpm Air ejector off gas Purge Equip. room Effl 41 1,3 P.Beta 10 - lE7cpm SF Bldg. Gas Purge Equip. room Area 42 1,3 Nal 10 - IE7cpm RCW return Behind backwash pumps Sys 43 1,2,3 P.Beta 10- IE7cpm Unit vent particulates Purge Equip. room Effl 44 1,2,3 Nal 10 - 1E7cpm Unit vent iodine Purge Equip. room Effl 45 1,2,3 P.Beta 10 - IE7cpm Unit vent gas normal Purge Equip. room Effl 46 1,2,3 CdTe 10 - lE7cpm Unit vent gas high Purge Equip. room Effl 47 1,2,3 P.Beta 10 - lE7cpm RB particulate Purge Equip. room Ettl 48 1,2,3 Nal 10 - IE7cpm RB iodine Purge Equip. room Effl 49 1,2,3 P.Beta 10 - lE7cpm RB gas normal Purge Equip. room Effl 49A 1,2,3 CdTe 10 - lE7cpm RB gas high Purge Equip. room Effl 50 1,2,3 Nal 10 - lE7cpm Component Cooling AB-I Sys H-22 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Figure H-5 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION RADIATION INDICATING ALARMS (RIA)

RIA# I UNIT# TYPE RANGE FUNCTION LOCATION CLASS E 53 lB P.Beta 10 - IE7cpm Interim Bldg. Gas Interim Bldg. FIfl

[ 54 1,3 Nal 10-1E7cpm TB Sump TB Basement EFil 56 [ 1,2,3 IC 1-IE8Rad/hr Vent Stack Effluent Vent Stack (Midway) Effi 57 1,2,3 IC 1 -IE8Rad/hr Containment High Reactor Bldg. Penetration Area range monitor 58 1,2,3 IC I -IE8Rad/hr Containment High Reactor Bldg. Penetration Area range monitor GM = Geiger Mueller IC = Ion Chamber PAM = Portable Area Monitor

• Portable area monitors do not have assigned RIA numbers and are local readout only.

lB = Interim Building H-23 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-6 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION PORTABLE SURVEY INSTRUMENTS INSTRUMENT RESPONSE TIME DETECTOR TYPE RANGES RADIATION TUBE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION TYPE DETECTED SATURATION Ludlum 3 4-22 seconds Halogen quenched GM XO.1 = 0-0.2 mR/hr Beta & Gamma Indicates offscale Typically 1200 cpm per mR/hr. Speaker XI.0 = 0-2.0 mR/hr indication. Contains battery check position.

XIO = 0-20 mR/hr X100 200 mR/hr Eberline RMI4 2.2 - 22 seconds variable Halogen quenched GM XI=0-500 cpm Beta & Gamma Indicates offscale Has alarm setting. Speaker indication.

50 hr operation on fully charged battery.

XIO=0-5000 cpm X100=0-50000 cpm MGPI Telepole 2-30 seconds variable Two GM tubes 0.05 nR/hr - 1000 l/hr Gamma Indicates over Automatic switching between GM tubes.

I low range range I 1'extension probe. Battery self check.

1 high range Eberline R020 5 seconds Ion-chamber 0-50Rad/hr. Beta & Gamma Indicates offscale Has battery check information Air filled. Vented to atmosphere Eberline R07 Variable Air filled ion chamber Med range: 0.1-199.9 Rad/hr Beta & Gamma Indicates over Digital ion chamber with cables to extend range detection up to 60' away or under water.

Hi range: 0 19,900 Rad/hr H-24 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-6 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION PORTABLE SURVEY INSTRUMENTS Instrument Type Response Time Detector Type Ranges Radiation I Detected Tube Saturation IAdditional Information Ludlum-12 4-22 seconds Cadmium loaded 0 - 100,000 mRad/hr Neutron Rejects Gamma Detector can be attached polyethylene sphere with up to 10 Rad/hr. or moved from meter.

He tube in center. Tube operates in proportional region AMP-100 Variable Energy Compensated GM 0 - 1000 R/hr Gamma Over range alarm Can be used with variable tube length of cable.

AMP-200 Variable Energy Compensated GM 1 - 10,000 R/hr Gamma Over range alarm Can be used with variable tube length of cable.

ESP 2 Variable Sodium Iodide Variable Gamma Over range alarm Single channel analyzer Scintillator w/pulse height analysis Nal detectors H-25 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-7 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION AIR SAMPLERS INSTRUMENT NAME EXPECTED FLOW RATE AIR PUMP TYPE MAXIMUM LENGTH OF SJ I R P OPERATION HD29A 2 CFM Centrifugal Carbon Vane Pump Continuous, constant flow air-cooled motor H-809V 2 CFM Two-stage turbine blower air- 15 minutes cooled motor RAP-1 2 CFM Oil Free, Carbon Vane Continuous, constant flow H-26 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-8 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION FIRE AND COMBUSTION PRODUCTS AND DETECTORS FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM - Inaccessible Detectors The purpose of this fire detection system is to detect visible and/or invisible smoke or other products of combustion in any space covered by detectors.

The principal parts of this system; Fire indicating unit, zone indicating units and detectors, with up to 8 zone indicating units-for each fire Indicating unit. Up to 4 detectors circuits (zones) on each zone indicating unit. Each detector circuit (zone) has up to 12 detectors.

When products of combustion are detected a flashing lamp on the detector base is turned on.

The zone lamp for the zone covering that detector will come on. The Red "Alarm" lamp on the fire indicating unit will come on. The statalarm in the control room will come on.

In the event of a failure in the system which makes the system inoperative, an amber "Trouble" lamp will come on, a buzzer will sound and the statalarm will come on.

FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM - Accessible Detectors The purpose of this fire detection system is to detect visible and/or invisible smoke or other products of combustion in any space covered by detectors.

The principal parts of this system include; Fire indicating unit, Zone indication units and detectors, with up to 8 zone indicating units for each fire indicating unit. Up to 4 detector circuits (zones) are on each zone indicating unit. Each detector circuit (zone) has up to 99 detectors.

When products of combustion are detected a red "LED" on the Honeywell detector will come on. The zone lamp for that detector will come on. The Red "Alarm" lamp on the fire indi-cating unit will come on. The statalarm in the control room will come on.

In the event of a failure in the system which makes the system inoperative, an amber "Trouble" lamp on the Honeywell will come on, a buzzer will sound and the statalarm will come on.

H-27 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-9 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION NORMAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM ONSITE/OFFSITE TLD LOCATIONS See: Oconee Offsite Dose Calculation Manual H-28 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-10 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION NORMAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM AIR SAMPLE LOCATIONS OFFSITE LOCATIONS See: Oconee Offsite Dose Calculation Manual H-29 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-11 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION COUNT ROOM EQUIPMENT (ONSITE)

INSTRUMENT TYPE I DESCRIPTION Canberra 9900 Gamma Spectroscopy Computer based gamma spectroscopy system with System solid state germanium detectors for analysis of various sample media.

Canberra 9900/WBC6000 Body Burden Computer based gamma spectroscopy system with Analyzer and Nuclear Data people mover three sodium detectors mounted in a shielded chair which can analyze the thyroid, lungs, and lower torso simultaneously, along with a stand-up total body analyzer using large sodium iodine detectors.

Tennelec APC Automatic Smear Counter An automatic smear counter using a GM detector which performs beta only analyses on up to 50 smears.

Packard Liquid Scintillator Multiple sample liquid scintillation analysis systems that detect and quantify H-3 and gross beta using a computer to correct for quench and activity.

Tennelec Alpha Scintillator An automatic smear counter using a zinc sulfide scintillator detector to detect alpha only. Analyzes up to 50 smears/air samples at a time.

Tennelec Series V An automatic smear counter using a gas flow proportional detector. This instrument performs XLB Proportional Smear Counteranalyses.

H-30 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-12 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION CONTENTS OF EMERGENCY KITS FOR FIELD MONITORING TEAMS (Location World of Energy)

SEE HP/O/B/1009/001 H-31 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-13 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY KIT INVENTORY SHEET Control Room Locations See HP/O/B/1009/001 H-32 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-14 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY KIT INVENTORY SHEET Respiratory Equipment See HP/O/B/1009/001 H-33 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-15 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY SUPPLIES INVENTORY LIST Technical Sunnort Center Operational Support Center Emergency Operation Facility See PT/O/A/2000/008 and ST/O/A/4600/086 H-34 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-16 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION EMERGENCY CABINET INVENTORY SHEET INPLANT SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT (WORLD OF ENERGY)

SEE HP/O/B/1009/001 H-35 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-17 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION INVENTORY LIST FOR OPERATIONAL SUPPORT CENTER EMERGENCY CABINET See HP/O/B/1009/001 H-36 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-18 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION SEISMIC INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM SEISMI[C EQUIPMENT UNIT 1 CABLE ROOM UNIT 1 TENDON UNIT I REACTOR ACCESS GALLERY BUILDING Seismic Trigger (1) (Setpoint .05g and actuates a statalarm and x computer alarm in Control Room I & 3. Also actuates Unit 1 &

2 Events Recorder.

STRONG-MOTION ACCELEROGRAPH SYSTEM. x Starter (1) Setpoint .01g for 1 sec will actuate accelerometers and recorders on Control Panel. Also actuates a computer alarm in Control Room 1.

Accelerometers (2) Actuates recorders on Control Panel at .01g x x for 1 sec Recorders (2) Records for 10 additional sec following x completion of seismic events up to 30 minutes Control Panel (1) Event alarm-alarm light turns yellow to x indicate system is recording approximately 10 sec. Event Indicator-normally black but after an event is recorded, it is white PEAK ACCELERATION RECORDER (6) Records the peak x x acceleration experienced. Capability to measure up to 2g. Uses no power supply.

H-37 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-19 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION SPILL CONTROL EOUIPMENT/SUPPLIES SEE THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES/DOCUMENTS:

Emergency Planning:

PT/O/B/0250/045 PT/O/B/0250/030 ONS Prefire Plan Chemistry:

CP/O/B/2001/008 Safety Assurance:

Spill Prevention Control Countermeasures Plan (SPCC)

H-38 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE H-20 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION SURVEYS Emergency Control Room In Station Site and Site Instrumentation Radiological Boundary Environs Unusual X X

• Alert X X X Site Area X X X X General X X X X

• Conducted in the event effluent technical specifications are exceeded.

H-39 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA SECTION I EMERGENCY PLAN A - SECTION I ACCIDENT Revision No.

ASSESSMENT 004 Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHY PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? E] Yes El No Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

I. Accident Assessment To assure the adequacy of methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition.

I. 1 Emergency Action Level Procedures Implementing procedures to the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan have been developed. These procedures have been developed by many sections of the station. The Oconee Nuclear Station Implementing Procedures make up Volumes B and C of the station emergency plan. The Emergency Classification procedure (RP/O/A/1000/001) identifies plant parameters that can be used to determine emergency situations that require activation of the station emergency plan. NUMARC/NESP-007 (Rev. 2) which was approved by the NRC in Rev. 3 of Regulatory Guide 1.101 and subsequent guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, the NEI guidance as endorsed in RIS 2006-12 and to support implementation of NEI 03-12 has been used as guidance. See BASIS document Section D.

1.2 Onsite Capability and Resources to Provide Initial Values and Continuing Assessment Post Accident Sampling -

The NRC issued Amendments No. 346 (Renewed License No. DPR-38), No.

348 (Renewed License No. DPR-47), and No. 347 (Renewed License No.

DPR-55) on 07/12/05. These amendments, effective 01/08/06, delete Technical Specification Section 5.5.4, Post Accident Sampling for Oconee Nuclear Site Units 1, 2, and 3 and thereby eliminate the requirements to have and maintain Post Accident Sampling Systems - PASS (PALS/PAGS).

Consistent with the requirements of the NRC safety evaluation, contingency plans for obtaining samples have been developed.

Procedures have been developed for taking and analyzing post accident reactor coolant samples using either the normal sample points or the existing PALS sample panels. Containment atmosphere samples are no longer required; however, procedures are in place for surveying the containment building wall as well as sampling the environment and using these values to develop off site dose projections and provide appropriate protective action recommendations for the public.

Radiation and effluent monitors Radiation and effluent monitors are indexed in Figure H-5. The chart shows location, range, radiation detected.

I-i Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Containment High Range Radiation Monitor Duke Energy has designed a system for monitoring containment high range radiation. 1, 2, 3 RIA-57 and 58 are the post-accident high range containment monitors. RIA-57 is located in a penetration in the East Penetration Room.

RIA-58 is located in a penetration in the West Penetration Room. The monitors are coaxial ion chambers with a range of 1 to 10E8 Rad/hr which corresponds to an activity of 1.11EO pCi/ml to 1.11E8 pCi/ml at the time of trip/incident.

In- Plant Iodine Instrumentation The Oconee Nuclear Station has developed Procedure HP/O/B/1009/009 for quantifying high level gaseous radioactivity releases during accident conditions. The purpose of the procedure is to determine quantitative release of radioiodines and particulates for dose calculation and assessment.

Failed Fuel Determination (1) The attached Figures I-1, 1-2, 1-3, and 1-4 provide the technical basis for estimating failed fuel for three conditions: non-overheating, fuel overheating without fuel melt, and overheating with fuel melt, respectively.

(2) The NON-OVERHEATING CONDITION METHODOLOGY for assessing failed fuel is based on steady-state iodine radionuclides in the reactor coolant system. This methodology is judged to provide a significant improvement in accuracy over previous NON-OVERHEATING CONDITION methods employing a single escape coefficient. The reason being the new methods explicitly models the production, decay, and release of radionuclides to the coolant as a function of measured iodine ratio.

The methods CAN ONLY PROVIDE THE best estimate analysis and are not intended for making conservative or licensing related calculations. These methods are benchmarked to long term steady-state iodine behavior, typically reached near mid to end of cycle. Therefore, leaker estimates (percent failed fuel) will vary substantially if based on other than steady-state conditions.

Radioisotope inventories predicted by LOR2 Computer Program are used to compare release isotope quantities to expected core inventories for the fuel overheating without fuel melt and overheating with fuel melt conditions. In order to determine a conservative core inventory for Oconee, three LOR2 computer runs were made. All three runs assumed an enrichment of 3.3%.

1-2 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Each run represents a different bum-up region of the core. (i.e., one run assumes fuel used for 3 cycles, another run assumes fuel used for 2 cycles and the last run assumes fuel used for 1 cycle.) Each region assumed 59 assemblies. Figure 1-5, page 1 of 2, gives activity level for one fuel assembly for each region. Figure 1-5, page 2 of 2, gives total activity in the core and compares these values to UFSAR values. Most of the core values are close to UFSAR values except for XE-133 and XE-135. It is possible that this difference is the result of the higher enrichment value used in the LOR2 runs.

(3) Figures 1-6 and 1-7 provide the technical basis for an estimate of failed fuel from readings from area monitors (without fuel melt and with fuel melt, respectively).

(4) Figure 1-8 provides the technical basis for an estimate of failed fuel from readings of containment building hydrogen analyzers.

(5) Figure 1-9 provides calculations for decay correction in the event it is not available from analytical instrumentation.

1.3 Method for Determining Release Source Term I.3.a Source Term of Releases of Radioactive Material within Plant Systems Operations (Control Room Personnel) will use Enclosure 4.8 & 4.9 of RP/O/A/1000/001 to determine if radiation monitor readings will require classification. This enclosure is a simplified predetermined dose calculation for vent and in-containment radiation monitors.

Operations can also get offsite dose projections from on-shift Radiation Protection technicians using procedure HP/0/B/1009/022.

HP/0/B/1009/022 uses release paths of unit vents and the main steam relief valves. Assumptions for the calculations are based on the following:

1. Annual average meteorology for ground-level release points (7.308 E-6 sec/m 3 ) which is used for the reactor building and is in the ODCM. Annual average meteorology for semi-elevated release points 1.672E-6 sec/m 3 is used for the vent and is also in the ODCM.

2. Design basis leakage (5.6 E6 ml/hr) and/or daily average vent flow rate of 65,000 cfm.

3. One hour release duration 1-3 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

4. Calculations for reactor building monitor readings are based on CDE because thyroid dose is more limiting for this pathway.

Calculations for vent monitor readings are based on whole body dose because whole body dose is more limiting for this pathway.

5. Offsite Protective Actions Guides are 1 rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent and 5 rem Committed Dose Equivalent (thyroid) for a General Emergency. Site Area Emergency levels are one-tenth the General Emergency PAGs.

6. LOCA conditions are limiting for calculating in-containment high range monitors readings for site area and general emergency conditions.

7. Core melt conditions are limiting for calculating vent monitor radiation monitor readings for site area and general emergency conditions.

1.3.b Magnitude of the Release of Radioactive Materials Procedure HP/O/B/1009/18, SH/0/B/2005/001 and/or HP/O/B/1009/022 determines the magnitude of the release of radioactive materials based on plant system parameters and effluent monitors (vent release).

1.4 Dose Calculation Methodology HP/O/B/1009/018 and SH/O/B/2005/001 establish the relationship between effluent monitor readings or reactor building dose rate readings and onsite/offsite doses for various meteorological conditions.

HP/O/B/1009/022 provides guidance for on shift personnel to perform initial dose assessment using a computer based tool.

1.5 Meteorological Information Availability Meteorological information will be available to the Charlotte Emergency Operations Facility, the Technical Support Center, and the Control Room through the automated plant data system. Meteorological data averaged over a period of 15 minutes, will be available to the NRC through the ENS phone, by direct telephone communications with the individual responsible for making offsite dose assessments at the Emergency Operations Facility or through the NRC Emergency Response Data System.

Meteorological information will also be given to both County Emergency Operations Centers, and the State of South Carolina, during follow-up messages.

1-4 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

1.6 Release Rates/Proiected Doses for Offscale Instrumentation Situations HP/O/B/1009/018 and SH/0/B/2005/001 are procedures that can be used to make offsite dose projections and/or protective action recommendations should instrumentation used for assessment indicate offscale or are inoperable.

1.7 Offsite Field Monitoring-Emergency Planning Zone 1.8 Field teams have been organized by the Oconee Nuclear Station under the direction of the Field Monitoring Coordinator located in the Emergency Operations Facility. These teams are comprised of a RP Technician and a Driver. Procedures SHI//B/2005/002 and HP/0/B/1009/026 describe predetermined sampling locations, sampling and monitoring equipment to be used, location of TLD's and air samplers and directions for taking Potassium Iodide Tablets.

1.9 Detect and Measure Radioiodine Concentration in the EPZ Oconee Nuclear Station shall use appropriate instrumentation to measure radioactivity in counts per minute (CPM) and dose rates in mRad/hr. Air samples (taken with a Portable Air Sampler equipped with appropriate cartridge) shall be measured by a portable iodine analysis system.

Interference from the presence of noble gas and background radiation shall not decrease the minimum detectable activity of 1.0 E-7 uCi/cc (1-131) under field conditions.

Samples taken by the offsite monitoring teams will be evaluated further by one of the available laboratory facilities described in H.6.C of this Plan as necessary.

1.10 Relationship Between Contamination Levels and Integrated Dose/Dose Rates Duke Energy Company has developed a means for relating the various measured parameters (e.g. contamination levels, air and water) and gross radioactivity levels.

I.11 Plume Tracking The states of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia have arrangements to locate and track an airborne plume of radioactive materials. Duke Energy Company will have monitoring teams in the field, fixed TLD sites, and the capability for airborne monitoring to assist in plume tracking.

See State of North Carolina, FNF Plans See State of South Carolina, FNF Plans See State of Georgia, FNF Plans 1-5 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE I-1 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ACCIDENT ASSUMPTIONS DBA assumes draft NUREG 1465 release of fission products to the containment atmosphere:

(1) 100% of all core noble gas activity.

(2) 40% of all core iodine activity.

(3) Various quantities of particulate activity.

Loss of reactor coolant assumes the release of one reactor coolant volume with noble gas and iodine activity associated with operation at 100% power with 1% fuel failure before the release.

Gap activity release assumes that there is cladding failure sufficient to release all fission products in the gas gap of the fuel pins to the containment atmosphere. Assumed is loss of 5% of all core noble gas activity, 5% of all core iodine activity, and 5% of cesium particulate activity to the containment atmosphere.

The maximum allowable containment leakage rate following the accident is expressed in percent of the containment air weight per day.

Regulatory Guide 1.4 requires that we assume the design leak rate (Technical Specifications 5.5.2) the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and half the design leak rate for the rest of the accident.

For Oconee these values are:

(a) 0.25%/day for 0-24 hours (b) 0.125%/day for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> - 30 days The 0.25%/day is the Tech. Spec. leak rate at the peak calculated containment internal pressure, 59 psig, for the design basis LOCA.

1-6 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Assumptions used in determining the contribution to the total dose from ECCS leakage are:

(a) 7520 cc/hr leakage from the pump seals and valves of the ECCS in the auxiliary building.

(b) An iodine partition factor of 0.1 is used to determine the amount of iodine released to the auxiliary building atmosphere.

(c) All activity released to the auxiliary building is released to the atmosphere with no filtering.

Most Oconee penetrations through the containment are located in the penetration room.

This room has its own ventilation system which draws a negative pressure on the room. The air drawn from the penetration room passes through charcoal filters and is exhausted through the unit vent. Bypass leakage is the fraction of the total containment that bypasses the penetration room and escapes to the atmosphere unfiltered. Some examples of potential bypass leakage paths are:

(1) Leakage around the equipment hatch seals.

(2) Leakage through isolation valves that do not seal properly.

(3) Leakage through microscopic holes or cracks in the containment wall.

At Oconee the containment bypass leakage is 50% of the total containment leakage.

Tech. Spec. 5.5.2 requires that during the containment leak rate test, if the containment leakage is greater that 50% of the design leakage rate, local leak rate tests must be performed. These tests must verify that any leakage greater than 50% of the design leakage is going into the penetration room. This only verifies that the maximum leakage bypassing the penetration room is 50% of the containment leakage. It does not give the actual bypass leakage.

Dose contributions are as follows:

(a) Bypass leakage contributes approximately 84% of the total thyroid dose.

(b) ECCS leakage contributes approximately 1% of the total thyroid dose.

(c) Penetration room exhaust contributes approximately 15% of the total thyroid dose.

1-7 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE 1-2 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR ESTIMATION OF FAILED FUEL NON-OVERHEATING CONDITION A. Assumptions

1. All Iodine and Xenon isotopes are at equilibrium.

2. All Iodine isotopes in the RCS pass through a 90% efficient demineralizer at the rate of one coolant volume per day.

3. There is no plate out of Iodine in the RCS.

4. The noble gases are equally mixed throughout the RCS and consideration is not given to noble gases that may be in the letdown storage tank or pressurizer.

5. The reactor is operating at 100% power - 2568 MWT or at any steady-state power level with Steps 1 through 4 applicable.

B. Two Region Model Theory The two region model assumes a single escape coefficient for the release from the fuel directly into the coolant through the defect site. The model first solves for the dynamic iodine concentrations in the fuel pellet, then through the use of an escape coefficient, solves for the steady-state release into the coolant. Once into the coolant, the methodology also calculates the effects of radioactive decay and coolant purification on the measured iodine concentrations.

The following is a delineation of the dynamic solution of the above phenomena, including a simplification for steady-state conditions where appropriate.

1-8 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

I. In-Fuel Concentration The rate of change of the number of atoms is given by:

dN f = (GENERATION RATE) - (DECAY RATE) - (RELEASE RATE) dt t dN t= F Y- N [ X-N , b............................................... (1) dt '

Where f is the dynamic number of atoms of a short-lived isotope in a single fuel rod (atoms/rod) t is the time (sec) ft" is the rod volumetric total fission rate, which is a constant for the limits of integration (fiss/sec) is the effective fission product yield (atoms/fiss) x is the decay constant for the isotope (decay probability fraction per atom per second)

) is the two-region model escape-rate coefficient from the fuel to the coolant for the isotope (escape probability fraction per atom per second).

SOLVING FOR TIME EQUALS TO ZERO YIELDS:

f -(A+v)t -(g+Dt e +Fty o)

(A+iv) 1-9 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

II. In-Coolant Concentration The rate of change of the number of atoms of the isotope in the reactor coolant system is given by:

dN c = N ( - KdN

= c = (Release Rate)-(DecayRate) (3) dt Itt dt  !

- (Purification Rate) where Nc is the dynamic number of atoms of a short-lived isotope in the reactor coolant system (atoms)

K is the purification constant associated with the letdown system and is equal to the system mass flow rate divided by the total non-stagnant coolant mass (purification probability fraction per atom per second)

SOLVING FOR TIME EQUALS TO ZERO YIELDS:

N: -

+yv (2+K)

(2+v) ( 1 1 (1(K-v)) [(X.+K)e -(X-i-u)e

-(A+K)t

-(A+v)t -(A+K)t

+ 0

]

(K-v) [e -e

-(A+K)t I

or N = N~l+ Nc + N+3 (4)

In the above:

1) N:' is the atoms of an isotope remaining in the coolant at time, t, from the inventory of atoms generated by fission events during the current time step (t=O to t=t)

2) N2 is the atoms of an isotope remaining in the coolant at time, t, from the inventory of atoms within the rod generated by fission events prior to the current time step; and I-10 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

3) N is the atoms of an isotope remaining in the coolant at time, t, from the atoms in the

)N3 coolant at the beginning of the current time step.

For the event that fissioning begins at time t equals to zero, N 2 and N 3 are also equal to zero at all t. Furthermore, assuming steady-state conditons, Equation 4 reduces to:

- Pv N00Nc =(y+ v) (A+K)

(steady-state)

The conventional units for measuring the concentration of atoms of a radioisotope are in terms of isotopic activity, with units of p.Ci/ml. c is defined as the activity associated with the concentrationfN Since N N:, 2 , and c3 are in units of atoms per rod in Equation 4, the following conversion is required to obtain A A =A' + A +A A 1+

C: 2 +N Nc 3 (atoms) x Nr (rods) x 1 (decay probability)

=I N, +N, (rod) VC (ml) (atom)(sec) l(UCi) (decays) (sec) 106 (min) x 60 (min)

(i , or 2.22x A* = [N' + N:+**2 Nc**] [2.703E-5 WNr/V], (0iCi/ml) (5) where Nr is the number of perforated rods in the core Vc is the non-stagnant volume of the reactor primary coolant system And for steady-state conditions:

1-11 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FyV C 2.703E- 5 2 N,((1ii/fl) (6)

= (2+v)(2+K) x VC III. Escape Rate Methodology This section describes the model and supporting technical basis for an escape rate coefficient model dependent on measured iodine ratio. The need for such a model is illustrated by the following two examples.

At one extreme, assume a leaker with a tight radial through wall capillary type crack, which in effect bottles up the fission products and allows very little leakage to the coolant. At the other extreme, assume a pin with a large open hydride blister, exposing the surrounding fuel directly to the coolant. Obviously, both represent only one defect, however, the latter case would release much more fission products to the coolant than the first case.

Therefore, the need exists to differentiate between various defect conditions. To do this, the concept of holdup time, and its affect on relative radioactive decay is used. The tight defect, due to the long holdup time, would shift the iodine ratio (13 1/133) towards the high end (>1) due to the faster 133 decay (133 half life - 20.8 hrs, 131 half life - 8.05 days). For little or no holdup times, the existing ratio would be around 0.1. This is consistent with observations during failure generation events in which the observed iodine ratio in the coolant approaches two or greater. Calculations for an intact rod (infinite holdup time) yield ratios in excess of 10 or 15.

This rational forms the basis for an iodine ratio dependent escape coefficient model. It certainly is not perfect in that a combination of defects could easily exist at any one time, but it does give an approximation as to the average condition.

Towards this end, an empirical model was developed based on a Combustion Engineering Data Base. The data consists of several operating cycles in which the coolant activities and specific leaking rods were well characterized. The model is empirical, in that the necessary escape coefficients were back calculated and plotted as a function of corrected iodine ratio. However, the ratio needs to be corrected for the decay and purification effects occurring in the primary coolant, so that a consistent and independent model (independent of letdown flow, resin bed efficiency, etc.) can be developed.

The correct or "normalized" iodine ratio is determined as follows:

The equilibrium coolant activity ratio, as determined by Equation 6, is shown here as follows:

y131131vW31 2131 (2133+v133)(2A133+K) (7)

AR = y133 W133 2133 (2133+v131) (2131+ K) 1-12 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Assume that:

R= ARc

'133 = a "133 Substituting and solving for U131 gives:

R (X 131 + K) y 133 a (X 133 + K y131

'131 = (8)

R(X131+K)y133 -1 a(X133+Ky131X131aX131 The normalized iodine ratio (R) is independent of the coolant volume and purification flow rate and is defined as:

R- =(Q 131 +K)

(Q133 +K)

(R) (9)

Equation 8 can be re-written as:

R' y133 v131 a y131 R' y133 1 -1 (10) a y131 2131 a2133 Equation 10 gives a relationship between the iodine-131 escape rate and the normalized iodine ratio. The constant "a", which describes the relationship between the iodine-131 and iodine-133 escape rates, was derived through an analysis of 3 plant cycles in which the number of leaking rods was determined at the end of each cycle. Parametric cases were run to determine, given the known number of leaking rods, the iodine- 131 and iodine- 133 escape rates required 1-13 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

to predict the equilibrium activity levels of these isotopes for the 3 plant cycles. All data were taken at 100% power and at equilibrium conditions.

The escape rate (ration 1)131 / V1D33 = a) was assumed to be function of the normalized iodine ratio. A curve was fit to the data resulting in:

V 131 -a - R" 21 V 133 .437260+.021089R'-.013293R" (

Power Dependence of Escape Rate The kinetics of fission product migration through the fuel pellet into the rod plenum/gap is governed primarily by temperature. Since temperature is primarily a function of power, a power dependent correction factor was developed based on total rod radial power.

The power dependence of escape rate was determined by evaluating the equilibrium coolant iodine- 131 activity as a function of core power level. These data were taken from periods of operation at varying power levels for 8 plant-cycles.

A power function was assumed to represent each individual data set:

A 1 31 = Cpn where:

A1 31 is the equilibrium level of iodine 131 (viCi/ml)

C and n are fitting constants, and P is the core power level (%)

C varies with the plant conditions (purification flow rate, etc.) and numbers of leaking rods but, in theory, n should be constant if the data are consistent. Least-squares analyses were performed for each of the sets of data. The values of n determined from this analysis ranged from 1.8 to 5.4. A value of n = 3.6 was selected as a reasonable representation of the data.

1-14 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

From Equation 6, the equilibrium coolant activity level is directly proportional to power (fission rate) and the escape rate. Therefore, the escape rate must be proportional to power to the (n-1), or 2.6 power. Escape rates are therefore calculated with the following equation:

) = *o (P/Po)2.6 or u = vo (Pr/Poi) 2.6 (12) where:

v. is the escape rate (sec -1)determined at power P0 (%) (As derived from Equation #10); and P is, optionally, the core power level (%), or Pr, the product of core power level and rod or batch peaking factor (relative to core).

If a specific rod or batch peaking factor is suspected, Pr should be used since it can make an appreciable difference.

1-15 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE 1-3 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR ESTIMATION OF FAILED FUEL Nuclear Engineering uses the following calculations to determine Fuel Overheating without Fuel Melt, Utilization of Area Monitors for Overheat Without Fuel Melt, and Utilization of Area Monitors for Fuel Melt Conditions.

OSC-5283 - ONS Core Damage Assessment Guidelines OSC-3794 - Failed Fuel Determination using RIA 57-58 Nuclear Engineering uses the following calculations to determine containment volume versus containment level.

OSC-300 - Containment Volume and Heat Sink in Reactor Building OSC-200 - Water Depth in Reactor Building Information derived from the above calculations are used in RP/O/A/1000/018 to determine estimated failed fuel.

NOTE: Calculation documentation can be viewed at the Oconee Nuclear Engineering offices.

1-16 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE I-3A GAP INVENTORY VS. TEMPERATURE 25 90 70 0

I-0 w 60 3

-J

'U s5 g

£ 0

3-z

'U a

TL'dPSMATURI (AK) sunmuP - 3D00 mwDWO/TU TIMS - 420 OAY'S 1-17 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE I-3B PERCENT ACTIVITY RELEASE FOR 100 PERCENT OVERTEMPERATURE CONDITIONS Nuclear Min.* Max.* Nominal** Min.*** Max.***

Kr-85 40 70 Xe- 133 42 66 52. 40 70 1-131 41 55 Cs-137 45 60 Sr-90 0.08****

Ba-140 0.1 0.2 0.15 0.08 0.2

• Release values based on TMI-2 measurements.

• • Normal value is simple average of all Kr, Xe, I, and Cs measurements.

• Minimum and maximum values of all Kr, Xe, I and Cs measurements.

• • Only value available.

1-18 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE I-3C RELATIONSHIP OF % FUEL OVERTEMPERATURE WITH % CORE INVENTORY RELEASED OF XE, KR, I, OR CS IdA 101 )

I -

1~ -

T -

20j / -

M 10.4 4

-~

/,~%

- - - - - - - t 6

II U

I-0 a.

31 - - I 1.

S 0

S I

I - ft ., *  %

- .. '4 a q-. 0 0 3 Fuel Overtemperature (%)

1-19 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE 1-4 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR ESTIMATION OF FAILED FUEL OVERHEATING WITH FUEL MELT A. THEORY In a fuel melt condition, all five release mechanisms discussed in Figure 1-3 are involved. As fuel melts, up to 99% of the halogens and noble gases will be released. There will also be a significant release of barium and praseodymium. As in Case II, a linear relationship between failed fuel and isotope activity will be assumed. (See Figures I-4b and I-4c).

The major difference between fuel overheating without fuel melt and overheating with fuel melt is the percent of fission product inventory released from the fuel. The methodology for correcting isotopic decay and reactor power remains the same. The methodology for using hydrogen concentration to estimate core damage remains the same. The main changes will be in the radiochemistry method and area monitor method.

B. General Equations for Iodine and Xenon

1) o = Total Activity for Isotope (100) 1)

Pi (Power Correction Factor (Isotope Core Inventory)

2) high = Total Activity for Isotope (100) 2 i (0.7) (Power Correction Factor)(Isotope Core Inventory)

C. General Equations for Barium

1) low Total Activity for Isotope (100) 1Pi (0.44) (Y) (Isotope Core Inventory)

2) high = Total Activity for Isotope (100)

Pil (0.10) (Y) (Isotope Core Inventory)

D. General Equations for Praseodymium

1) ow= Total Activity for Isotope (100)

Pi =(0.024) 1 (Y) (Isotope Core Inventory)

Total Activity for Isotope (100)

2) P-high (0.008) (Y) Isotope Core Inventory) 1-20 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE I-4A PERCENT ACTIVITY RELEASE FOR 100 PERCENT CORE MELT CONDITONS Large* Small* Nominal** Min.*** Max.***

Species LOCA Transient* LOCA Release Release Release Xe 88.35 99.45 78.38 Kr 88.35 99.45 78.38 87 70 90 I 88.23 99.44 78.09 Cs 88.55 99.46 78.84 Te 78.52 94.88 71.04 Sr 10.44 28.17 14.80 24 10 44 Ba 19.66 43.87 24.08 Pr 0.82 2.36 1.02 1.4 0.8 2.4 Calculated releases for severe accident scenarios without emergency safe-guard features, taken from draft NUREG-0956

• • Normal release are averages of Xe, Kr, I, Cs, and Te groups or Sr and Ba groups

• • • Maximum and minimum releases represent extremes of the groups.

1-21 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE I-4B RELATIONSHIP OF % FUEL MELT WITH % CORE INVENTORY RELEASED OF BA OR SR ioo.a 10.0 0.

L.0 10.3 & .0.3 Fuel Melt (%)

1-22 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE I-4C RELATIONSHIP OF % FUEL MELT WITH % CORE INVENTORY RELEASED OF XE, KR, I, CS, OR TE

70. " -

so. - -

so --

20. -" -

T me. -s - -

- T

• Fe. Melt S* 01 4 14 0.*

a.3 0.1 Fuel Melt (%o) 1-23 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE 1-5 ACTIVITY PER FUEL ASSEMBLY 1 Cycle 2 Cycles 3 Cycles Isotope (Curies) (Curies) (Curies)

Kr85 2.102(3)* 3.272(3) 4.524(3)

Kr87 2.264(5) 1.433(5) 1.550(5)

Kr88 3.206(5) 2.030(5) 2.194(5)

Xe133 3.483(5) 6.335(5) 3.161(5)

Xel33m 1.610(5) 9.016(4) 1.164(5)

Xe135 4.714(5) 3.973(5) 4.499(5)

Xe1.35m 1.610(5) 1.255(5) 1.669(5) 1131 3.982(5) 3.075(5) 4.066(5) 1133 8.469(5) 6.317(5) 8.134(5) 1135 7.869(5) 5.879(5) 7.603(5)

Ba139 7.608(5) 5.561(5) 7.051(5)

Bal40 7.429(5) 5.432(5) 6.331(5)

Bal41 6.955(5) 5.073(5) 6.392(5)

Pr145 4.32(5) 3.177(5) 3.950(5)

Pr146 3.437(5) 2.537(5) 3.200(5)

• 2.102(3) = 2.102 x 103 1-24 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

TOTAL CORE ACTIVITY (Isotope) (Curies) (Curies) C/,Lo*

Kr85 5.8405(5)** 5.84(5) 0.0 Kr87 3.0958(7) 4.00(7) -2 9.207 Kr88 4.3837(7) 5.60(7) -2' 7.775 Xe133 1.355(8) 1.28(8) 7.800 Xe133m 2.1686(7) 3.07(6) 85.84 Xe135 7.7798(7) 2.19(7) 7 1.85 Xel35m 2.6751(7) 3.31(7) -23.73 1131 6.5626(7) 7.42(7) -1:3.065 1133 1.3523(8) 1.28(8) 5.340 1135 1.2597(8) 1.27(8) -40.82 Ba139 1.193(8)

Bal40 1.165(8)

Bal4l 1.087(8)

Pr145 6.820(7)

Pr146 5.442(7)

• LOR2 - FSAR LOR2 = 59 (cycle 1 + cycle 2 + cyc le 3)

LOR2 x 100 where cycle 1, cycle 2, cycle 3 is or iTable 5

• • 5.8405(5) = 5.8405 x 105 NOTE: FSAR values assume 400 EFPD and LOR2 values assume 421 EFPD 1-25 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE 1-6 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR ESTIMATION OF FAILED FUEL AREA MONITORS FOR OVERHEAT WITHOUT FUEL MELT Generally, a radiochemistry sample will give a more accurate indication of core damage than area monitors in the containment building. However, radiochemistry samples take a long time to evaluate, whereas area monitors give results immediately. This section will attempt to make some simplifying assumptions and give a rough estimate of failed fuel versus dose rate in containment. It will be assumed that only noble gases are in the containment atmosphere.*

The noble gases are also assumed to be equally distributed throughout the containment building.

X=(2.62 x 105) x Ey x 3600 sec/hr X =(9.432 x 107) x Ey R/hr 3

Where 'k = Ci/cm E-y = Average energy of all -y rays per disintegration

, = Dose rate (R/HR)

Figure I-6a lists the average gamma energy level for the most prominent noble gas isotopes.

Figure I-6b shows the methodology for calculating total noble gas dose rate. Figure I-6c is a plot of dose rate from Figure I-6b as the noble gases decay.

An approximation of failed fuel can be determined by the equation:

_Xm Fm- x 100 (Y) X(t)

Where: Xm = Area monitor reading in the containment (R/HR)

(t) = Dose rate from Figure I-6c (R/HR) at the appropriate time after shutdown Y = Power correction factor Where Y = Average PowerforPrior30 days Rated powerlevel Fm = Fuel failure percent according to area monitors 1-26 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

It should be noted that this equation assumes a "PUFF" release of noble gases. If a small break LOCA occurs then the failed fuel estimate of m will be low. One possible method for using this equation during a small break LOCA is to wait until the monitor dose rate peaks and starts to decline. Figure 1-9 is used to account for decay if required.

• It is understood that more isotopes than noble gases are released to the containment.

However, modeling which isotopes and their activity is difficult. Therefore, only noble gases are considered. This will give a conservative estimate of failed fuel.

1-27 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE I-6A AVERAGE GAMMA ENERGY LEVEL Isotope (Mev) Half-Life Kr85m 0.151 4.4 Hrs.

Kr85 0.00211 10.76 Yrs.

Kr87 1.37 76.0 Min.

Kr88 1.74 2.79 Hrs.

Xe133m 0.326 2.26 Days Xe133 0.030 5.27 Days Xel35m 0.422 15.70 Min.

Xe135 0.246 9.20 Hrs.

FIGURE I-6B VALUES FOR CALCULATING TOTAL NOBLE GAS DOSE RATE Activity in Containment Isotope* At Shutdown Ey X Kr85m 4.8405 (5)* 0.00211 9.3302(-6) 18.569 Kr87 2.0958 (7) 1.370 4.0397(-4) 5.22(5)

Kr88 3.0686 (7) 1.740 5.9148(-4) 9.71(5)

Xe133 9.3558 (7) 0.030 1.8034(-3) 5.10(4)

Xe133m 1.5180 (7) 0.0326 2.9260(-4) 9.00(4)

Xe135 5.4459 (7) 0.246 1.0497(-3) 2.43(5)

Total dose rate at shutdown = 1.88(6) R/HR)

• 4.8405(5) = 4.8405 x 105 1-28 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE I-6C DOSE RATE VS TIME FOR FUEL OVERHEATING WITHOUT FUEL MELT 2.0.

1.8-1.6

'.4,

• 12 g- 1.

2° \

Is 24 TiME IHOUR) 1-29 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE 1-7 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR ESTIMATION OF FAILED FUEL AREA MONITORS FOR FUEL MELT CONDITION Dose rate is based on 70 to 100 percent release of noble gases instead of the 40 to 70 percent used in Figure 1-6. Figure I-7a shows a plot of dose rate versus time for 100% failed fuel. An approximation of failed fuel can be determined by the equation:

XM Fm- .100 (Y) (X(t))

Where: Xm = Area monitor reading in the containment (R/HR)

X(t) = Dose rate from Figure I-7a Y = Average Powerfor Prior 30 days Power correction factor=

Rated power level Fm = Fuel failure percent 1-30 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE I.7A DOSE RATE VS. TIME FOR FUEL MELT 2.4.

Uc 1.

TIME IIhOUNR 1-31 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE 1-8 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR ESTIMATION OF FAILED FUEL HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION IN THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING At approximately 1600°F zirconium reacts with water to produce hydrogen. The greater the temperature the faster the reaction rate. During the zirconium - water reaction heat is also released which raises the cladding temperature which increases the reaction rate. If the hydrogen concentration is constant or increasing slightly without recombiners on, then the cladding temperature is probably around 1600'F or less. If hydrogen concentration is increasing rapidly (with or without recombiners) then the clad temperature is above 1600*F. A rough estimate of core damage can be made, based on hydrogen concentration in the containment if the following assumptions are made.

1. All hydrogen produced in the RCS is released to the containment building.

2. All hydrogen in the containment building comes from the zirconium - water reaction*.

3. The recombiners have not be turned on (i.e., no hydrogen has been burned).

The equation for the zirconium - water reaction is Zr + 2H 20 -> Zr0 2 + 2H 2 or Two moles of hydrogen in the containment building are produced by the reaction of one mole of zirconium in the core.

At STP 1 mole of hydrogen has a volume of 3

22.4. £ or 0.79 ft Volume of hydrogen in containment = hydrogen concentration (volume percent unit) X containment free volume or vcontainment where VH 2 is the volume of hydrogen in V = XH otinecontainment as a percent of atmosphere.

PiVI P2 V2 Ts T2

• There are other sources of hydrogen, but assuming all hydrogen is produced by the zirconium

- water reaction will give a conservative estimate.

1-32 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

VSP= PC V1H2 TS Pc TC VSTP= Pc TSTP XH 2 Vc Tc PsTP Where Vsp, TsTp, PsTp = Volume, temperature, and pressure at STP TsTp = 4920R PsrP = 14.7 PSI TsTp = 4920 R Psrp = 14.7 PSI 3

Vý = Containment free volume = 1,832,033 ft Vs- = Pc 492 (1,832,033) (XH,)

Tc 14.7 Vs-_ = Lc XH, (6.1317 s 107)

The total amount of hydrogen moles in the containment = VsTP mole Volume of one MH -X 6.317x10 7 -, X, (7.7616 x 107)

Tc 0.79 Tc Since it takes 1 mole of Zr to produce 2 moles of H2 then the number of zirconium moles reacting with hydrogen is 1/2 MH or Mzr =1/2 MH = 1/2 Lc XH, (7.7616 x 107)

TC The zirconium mass that reacts can be calculated by the equation Z7 = Mzr x Wm Where Wm = gram - Atomic Weight = 91.22 gr/mole Zr = (Mzr) (91.22) = (Pc TC XH2) (3.5401 x 109) 1-33 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

The fraction of zirconium that reacts with water is calculated by Fz- =Zr Z 'tot Where Zrtot = total amount of zirconium in the core = 8.1204 x 107 gm Fzr = Pc XH2 3.5401X 1097 = PC XH, (43.594) 8.1204 x 10 Tc Fzr = PC X, 43.6 _ Pc PH, (.436)

Tc 100 T Where: Fzr = Fraction of core damage Pzr = Percent of core damage PC = Containment pressure (PSIA)

Tc = Containment temperature (0F + 460)

PH- = Percent of hydrogen in containment atmosphere X H2 = PH, 100 It should be noted that when estimates of core damage are made using radio-chemistry samples, area monitors and hydrogen concentration that the results can be greatly different. Whenever possible, all three methods should be used and their combined results used as an indication of core damage.

1-34 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE 1-9 TECHNICAL BASIS FOR ESTIMATION OF FAILED FUEL ISOTOPE DECAY CORRECTION The specific activity of a sample is decay adjusted to time of reactor shutdown using the following equation.

Specific activity at shutdown = Specific activity (meaured) e -A.i Where:

X = Radioactive decay constant, 1/sec t = Time period from reactor shutdown to time of sample analysis, sec.

Since this correction may also be performed by some analytical equipment, care must be taken to avoid duplicate correction. Also, considerations must be given to account for precursor effect during the decay of the nuclide. For this methodology, only the parent-daughter relationship associated with the methodology. The decay scheme of the parent-daughter relationship (Figure I-9a) is described by the following equation.

QB-= X Q A0 (eA -e B t )QB B')QB e xB' Q B__XA Where:

O = Activity (Ci) or specific activity (piCi/gm or ýiCi/cc) of the parent at "A shutdown

" = Activity (Ci) or specific activity (paCi/gm or ýiCi/cc) of the daughter at shutdown o = Activity (Ci) or specific activity (iCi/gm or paCi/cc) of the daughter at lB time of sample 2A Decay constant of the parent, sec 2 B = Decay constant of the daughter, sec t = Time period from reactor shutdown to time of sample analysis, sec.

Since the activity of the daughter at sample time is due to the decay of the parent and the decay of the daughter initially released at shutdown, an estimation of the fraction of the measured activity at sample time due to only the decay of daughter is required.

1-35 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

To use the above equation to determine the fraction, an assumption is made that the fraction of source inventory released of the parent and the daughter at time of shutdown are equal (for the nuclides used here within a factor of 2). The following steps should be followed to calculate the fraction of the measured activity due to the decay of the daughter that was released and then to calculate the activity of the daughter released at shutdown.

1. Calculate the hypothetical daughter concentration (QB) at the time of the sample analysis assuming 100 percent release of the parent and daughter source inventory.

otx e B' QB = X13 Q' (e -A.t-e-*B)QL Q-XB A A -e B')QB oe Where:

Qv - 100% source inventory (Ci) of parent, Table 6 Qa - 100% source inventory (ci) of daughter, Table 6 time QB (t) = Hypothetical daughter activity (Ci) at sample K = If parent has 2 daughters, K is the branching factor, Table 6 A = Parent decay constant, sec -1 SAB = Daughter decay constant, sec-t = Time period from reactor shutdown to time of sample analysis, sec.

2. Determine the contribution of only the decay of the initial inventory of the daughter to the hypothetical daughter activity at sample time.

t Fr Q0 e B QB (t)

3. Calculate the amount of the measured sample specific activity associated with the decay of the daughter that was released.

MB = Fr x measure specific activity (ýiCi/gm or paCi/cc)

4. Decay correct the specific activity (MB) to reactor shutdown.

MB =

B

-2Bt 1-36 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE I-9A PARENT-DAUGHTER RELATIONSHIPS Parent Daughter Parent Half Life'* Daughter Half Life* K2.*

Kr-88 2.8 h Rb-88 17.8 m 1.00 1-131 8.05 d Xe-131m 11.8 d .008 1-133 20.3 h Xe-133m 2.26 d 0.24 1-133 20.3 h Xe-133 5.27 d .976 Xe-133m 2.26 d Xe-133 5.27 d 1.00 1-135 6.68 h Xe-135 9.14 h .70 Xe-135m 15.6 m Xe-135 9.14 h 1.00 1-135 6.68 h Xe-135m 15.6m .30 Te-132 77.7 h 1-132 2.26 h 1.00 Sb-129 4.3 h Te-129 68.7 m .827 Te- 129m 34.1 d Te- 129 68.7 m .680 Sb-129 4.3 h Te-129m 34.1 d .173 Ba-140 12.8 d La-140 40.22 h 1.00 Ba-142 11 M La-142 92.5 m 1.00 Ce-144 284 d Pr-144 17.27 m 1.00 1* Table of Isotopes, Lederer, Hollander, and Perlman, Sixth Edition 2 ** Branching of decay factor 1-37 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA SECTION J EMERGENCY PLAN A - SECTION J PROTECTIVE Revision No.

RESPONSE 005 Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHZ PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? El Yes El No Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

J. PROTECTIVE RESPONSE To assure that a range of protective actions is available for the plume exposure pathway for emergency workers and the public. Guidelines for protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway appropriate to the locale have been developed.

To protect onsite personnel during hostile action and ensure the continued ability to safely shutdown the reactor and perform the functions of the emergency plan a range of protective actions are in place.

J. 1 Accountability The Oconee Nuclear Site has a Site Assembly Procedure that gives specific instructions to follow during a site assembly. Also, each division/section has specific directives that provide guidance for their personnel. (Site Assembly locations, Figure J-5)

Methods to notify and alert onsite personnel (essential and non-essential) during hostile action activities are described in AP/O/A/1700/045, "Site Security Threats". RP/O/A/1000/010 "Procedure for Emergency Evacuation/Relocation of Site Personnel". RP/0/A/1000/009, "Procedure for Site Assembly".

J. 2 Relocation Assembly Areas and Evacuation Routes Should it be determined that non-essential personnel would need to be relocated onsite or evacuated from the site, procedures are in place to handle this process. Agreements have been reached with local authorities for the use of the Oconee and Pickens school facilities for evacuation of personnel.

(Appendix 5)

Site directives and procedures establish onsite relocation areas as well as evacuation routes (Figure J-2) to suitable offsite locations.

J. 3 Site Evacuation Procedures - Personnel The site evacuation procedure establishes guidelines for evacuation from the station site. This procedure outlines the radiological exposure limits. All station personnel inside the protected area will be monitored before being evacuated from the station. Records will be kept of the individual's exposure/contamination level prior to evacuation. All personnel, so designated, will then be evacuated to pre-designated areas for thorough personnel monitoring and decontamination.

J-1 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Records will be kept for the station and personnel files. All personnel will be required to sign a copy of the monitor readings that will be recorded in personnel files. (Figures J-3, J-4)

During hostile threat conditions relocation of personnel away from the hazard areas are performed in accordance with AP/O/A/1700/045, "Site Security Threats". RP/0/A/1000/010, "Procedure for Emergency Evacuation/Relocation of Site Personnel". RP/O/A/I1000/009, "Procedure for Site Assembly".

J. 4 Site Evacuation Procedures-Decontamination/Non Essential/Essential Personnel Criteria Personnel who have been determined to be non-essential may be evacuated from the plant site in the event of a Site Area Emergency Classification.

However, non-essential personnel are always evacuated from the site during a General Emergency Classification. Provisions are made for the decontamination of vehicles and personnel at an offsite location if the situation should warrant that to be necessary.

EPZ - Population Alerting and Notification See Oconee County FNF Plans.

See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plans, Site Specific.

See Appendix 3.

J.5 Site Evacuation Procedures-Personnel Accountability J.6 Within thirty minutes of a Site Assembly, all persons at the Oconee Nuclear Station shall be accounted for and any person(s) determined to be missing from their control station, will be identified by name. To assist in the location of missing person(s), the Emergency Coordinator will appoint a Search and Rescue Team. Search procedures will be coordinated through the Operational Support Center.

After all non-essential personnel have been evacuated from the site, logsheets will be kept by Radiation Protection personnel in the Operational Support Center of all persons onsite together with their Radiation Protection records to include the following:

a. Individual respiratory protection

b. Protective clothing

c. Use of Radioprotective drugs During hostile threat conditions personnel accountability is performed in accordance with AP/O/A/1700/045, "Site Security Threats" and RP/0/A/1000/009, "Procedure for Site Assembly".

J-2 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

J. 7 Protective Actions Recommendations The Emergency Coordinator (Operations Shift Manager or Station Manager) or the EOF Director (depending on the facility activation) will be responsible for contacting the State and/or local governments to give prompt notification for implementing protective measures within the plume exposure pathway, and beyond it if necessary. Procedure RP/0/A/1000/024, "Protective Action Recommendations" and SR/0/A/2000/003, "Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility" has been written to provide specific guidance for issuing protective action recommendations under various plant conditions to the Emergency Coordinator in the TSC and the EOF Director in the EOF Figure (J-1) respectively. The decision to use sheltering as an alternative to evacuation for impediments and special populations is one that will be made by offsite officials. If dose projections show that PAGs have been exceeded at 10 miles, the dose assessment code and in-field measurements, when available, shall be used to calculate doses at various distances down wind to determine how far from the site PAG levels are exceeded. The Radiological Assessment Manager shall forward the results to the EOF Director who will communicate this information to the offsite authorities.

Figure J-1A (Protective Action Guides) is adopted from EPA 400 and guidance in state plans on use of KI and considers protective action based on projected avoided dose.

Per Appendix 2, initial protective actions are predetermined for Control Room use for general emergency conditions. Meteorological conditions at Oconee require a complex method for determining appropriate sectors to evacuate.

The Control Room will evacuate out to five miles and shelter out to ten miles which will simplify the process for determining the appropriate sectors to evacuate and to shelter.

J. 8 Evacuation Time Estimates A description of the methods and assumptions used in developing the analysis of evacuation time estimates is included in the current Evacuation Time Estimate Study for the Oconee Nuclear Site. (ONS-ETE- 12142012, Rev. 000; ONS Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) Dated 12/14/2012.) The Evacuation Time Estimates will be considered in evaluating protective action recommendations from the Technical Support Center or the Emergency Operations Facility. A copy of the most recent study is available in the Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility.

An updated ETE analysis will be submitted to the NRC under §50.4 no later than 365 days after ONS determination that the criteria for updating the ETE have been met and at least 180 days before using it to form protective action recommendations and providing it to State and local governmental authorities for use in developing offsite protective action strategies.

J-3 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

The criteria for determination that an updated ETE analysis have been met:

a. The availability of the most recent decennial census data from the U.S. Census Bureau; OR

b. If at any time during the decennial period, the EPZ permanent resident population increases such that it causes the longest ETE value for the 2-mile zone or 5-mile zone, including all affected Emergency Response Planning Areas, or for the entire 10-mile EPZ to increase by 25 percent or 30 minutes, whichever is less, from the currently NRC approved or updated ETE.

During the years between decennial censuses ONS will estimate EPZ permanent resident population changes once a year, but no later than 365 days from the date of the previous estimate, using the most recent U.S. Census Bureau annual resident population estimate and State/local government population data, if available. ONS will maintain these estimates so that they are available for NRC inspection during the period between decennial censuses and shall submit these estimates to the NRC with any updated ETE analysis.

ONS' ETE analysis, using the 2010 decennial census data from the U.S. Census Bureau, was submitted to the NRC via §50.4 on December 14, 2012.

J.9 Implementing Protective Measures See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See Oconee County FNF Plan.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plans, Site Specific.

For hostile action events, a range of protective actions for onsite workers including evacuation of essential personnel from potential target buildings, timely evacuation or relocation of non-essential site personnel, dispersal of critical personnel to safe locations, sheltering of personnel away from potential site targets and accountability of personnel after the attack are provided in emergency plan implementing procedures AP/O/A/1700/045, "Site Security Threats", RP/0/A/1000/010, "Procedure for Emergency Evacuation/Relocation of Site Personnel", RP/0/A/1000/009, "Procedure for Site Assembly".

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J. 10 Implementation of Protective Measures for Plume Exposure Pathway J.10.a EPZ - Maps of Oconee EPZ.

See Figure A, page i-5.

J. 10.b EPZ - Population Distribution Charts See Appendix 4 Evacuation Time Estimates J. 10.c EPZ - Population Alerting and Notification See Oconee County FNF Plans.

See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plans, Site Specific.

See Appendix 3.

J.10.d EPZ - Protecting Immobile Persons See Oconee County FNF Plans.

See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plans, Site Specific.

J. 10.e Use of Radioprotective Drugs for Persons in EPZ See Oconee County FNF Plans.

See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See State of South Carolina Operational Radiological Emergency Response Plan - SCOREP, (FNF Plans, Site Specific).

J. 10.f Conditions For Use of Radioprotective Drugs See Oconee County FNF Plans.

See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See State of South Carolina SCOREP, (FNF Plans, Site Specific).

J. 10.g Means of Relocation and J. 10.h State/County Relocation Center Plans See Oconee County FNF Plans.

See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plans, Site Specific.

J-5 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

J. 10.i Evacuation Route - Traffic Conditions See Oconee County FNF Plans.

See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plans, Site Specific.

J. 10.j Evacuated Area Access Control See Oconee County FNF Plans.

See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plans, Site Specific.

J. 10.k Planning for Contingencies in Evacuation See Oconee County FNF Plans.

See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plans, Site Specific.

J. 10.1 State/County Evacuation Time Estimates See Oconee County FNF Plans.

See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plans, Site Specific.

J. 10.m Bases for Protective Action Recommendations DUKE ENERGY uses the following considerations in determining protective action recommendations:

1) Protective Action Guides (PAG)

2) Core Condition See State of South Carolina FNF Plan, Site Specific J. 11 Ingestion Pathway Planning:

See State of South Carolina FNF Plans.

See State of Georgia FNF Plans.

See State of North Carolina FNF Plans.

J. 12 Relocation Center - Registering: & Monitoring See Oconee County FNF Plans.

See Pickens County FNF Plans.

See State of South Carolina FNF Plans.

J-6 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE J-1 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION FLOW CHART CONDITION FUEL DAMAGE CONTAINMENT PROTECTIVE SYMPTOMS STATUS ACTION RECOMENDED General Emergency #Loss of critical Not applicable Evacuate 2- mile radius Declared functions required for and 5- miles downwind core protection unless conditions make evacuation dangerous.

+ High CETCs (See Note 1). Shelter any sector not evacuated.

• RB High rad levels Additional protective recommendations will be based on the following conditions from either the Technical Support Center or the Emergency Operations Facility. TSC or the EOF shall continue assessment based on all available plant and field monitoring information. Modify protective actions as necessary. Locate and evacuate people from hot spots. Do not relax protective actions until the source of the threat is clearly under control.

Fuel Damage Detected by # High rad levels as Known containment Dose calculations Monitors determined by Reactor breach or RB pressure required to determine Building and unit vent greater than I PSIG additional evacuation monitors requirements and recommendations on use of stable iodine.

Shelter any sector not evacuated.

Condition 2 failed fuel as

• RB high rad levels No credit is taken for Evacuate 5-mile radius determined by containment, and 10-miles downwind.

RP/O/A/ 1000/018

• H-2 increasing Shelter any sector not evacuated.

+ Clad > 12000 F Note 1. Dangerous travel conditions or immobile infirmed population.

J-7 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE J-1A DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE PROTECTIVE ACTION GUIDES

[Protective Action Recommended Actions Comments Evacuation 1-5 rem TEDE from significant external and Although the PAG is expressed internal exposure from gamma radiation from as a range, under normal the plume and from deposited material conditions evacuation of the public is usually justified when the projected dose to an individual is one rem.

Evacuation 5-25 rem thyroid CDE from significant Although the PAG is expressed inhalation of activity in the plume as a range, under normal conditions evacuation of the public is usually justified when the projected dose to an individual is five rem.

Administration of stable 5 rem thyroid CDE from radioiodine Duke Energy will recommend iodine (e.g. KI) that offsite agencies consider the use of KI at 5 rem thyroid CDE.

Sheltering Concepts:

Duke Energy will make evacuation recommendations to the offsite agencies. However, if hazardous environmental conditions exists, Oconee emergency personnel will provide information (plant status, release magnitude, release duration, consequences) for the offsite agencies to use in making their decisions as to whether or not the public will be evacuated or sheltered.

J-8 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE J-2 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE EVACUATION ROUTES CHART

'10 oIad IMIRG(NCY IVA*AICU inUIES UnCU STATION ASSIMULY ARIAS-.

ToSSq0STgnmuNKO @v ELUiROINCY COONONATCA I KSOWRA SC9OOL I DA1NIL HIGH SOGOOL Cm Woe J-9 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE J-3 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE INDIVIDUAL CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE LEVELS LICENSEE: DUKE ENERGY COMPANY IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION Name: Date:

Social Security Number Time:

Employer: R.P. Badge CONTAMINATION EXPOSURE LEVELS Instrument Used: Instrument Reading:

(RM-14 with thin window detector or equivalent)

Date: Employee Signature:

Remarks:

Address:

To the individual named above , this report is furnished to you so that you have a prompt record of your radioactive contamination level.

Radiation Protection Manager Date:

Copies to:

Individual Individual File (New Form)

J-10 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE J-4 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE INITIAL PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION RECORD (ONSITE)

NAME RP BADGE NUMBER INITIAL DOSE RATE DOSE RATE (mRad/hr)

I (mRad/hr) After Decon 4 4 4 4 I 4 1 4 1 4 I 1 4 1 I I I 1 4 1 I 4. 1 4 4. &

J-11 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE J-5 Oconee Nuclear Site Building Layout NORTHWEST QUADRANT NORTHEAST QUADRANT 17 16]

18= 3 8

FLZ1 I I I

F23 13 21 1_

14

-I 15 L

SOUTHWEST QUADRANT SOUTHEAST QUADRANT OUADRANT NORTHWEST QUADRANT NORTHEAST OUADRANT NORTHWEST NORTHEAST QUADRANT

18. Administrating Building 1. Security Building

19. Oconee Office Building 2. Locker Building SOUTHWEST QUADRANT 3. Maintenance Service Bd./Clean Machine Shop

20. RP Assembly Building 4. Maintenance Support Building

21. Interim Outage Building 5. Turbine Building North Offices

22. Operations Center (Geo-Technical Ctr.) 6. Turbine Building 1&2 Offices/WCC

23. Warehouse Offices 7. Unit 1&2 Control Room SOUTHEAST QUADRANT 8. Keowee Hydro Station

9. Turbine Bd. 3 Offices 14. Oconee Complex 16. World of Energy

10. Unit 3 CR 15. L-I Storage Yard 17. Oconee Training Center

11. Technical Support Bd. 24. Turbine Bd. South Offices

12. Radwaste Facility 25. Maintenance Training Facility

13. Oconee Garage 26. SPA, RP Assembly Area J-12

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA SECTION M EMERGENCY PLAN A - SECTION M RECOVERY AND Revision No.

REENTRY PLANNING AND POST ACCIDENT 003 OPERATIONS Electronic Reference No.

OAP00012 PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? El Yes El No Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

M. RECOVERY AND REENTRY PLANNING AND POST-ACCIDENT OPERATIONS M. 1 Reentry/Recovery Plans and Procedures After the EOF is activated, it is the EOF Director's responsibility to determine when it is appropriate to enter into Recovery and to terminate from an emergency event. Emergency Plan procedures identify criteria that must be addressed before terminating the emergency condition and initiating recovery operations. The decision to terminate from a General Emergency condition must be discussed with the Senior NRC and State(s) representatives.

Decisions to relax protective actions for the public will be made by the appropriate State representatives. The EOF Director will provide information to the appropriate State agencies to facilitate the decision.

Recovery from a serious emergency situation is guided by the following principles:

The protection of the public health and safety is the foremost consideration in formulating recovery plans.

Public officials would be kept informed of recovery plans so that they can properly carry out their responsibilities to the public, Periodic information would be provided to the news media so that they can provide information to the public regarding recovery plans and progress made.

Periodic status reports would be given to company employees at other locations and to government and industry representatives.

Reentry Planning The plans and procedures for area reentry will consider existing as well as potential conditions inside containment. Prior to reentry, the following actions shall be taken.

1. Review all available radiation survey data.

2. Determine site areas potentially affected by radiological hazards.

M-1 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

3. Review radiation dose history of all personnel scheduled to participate in recovery operations. Determine the need for additional personnel.

The radiation doses to employees and other radiation workers would be kept as low as reasonably achievable.

4. Review the adequacy of radiation survey equipment available.

Determine the need for additional equipment and a source of procurement.

5. Preplan team activities, including areas to be surveyed, anticipated radiation levels, survey equipment required, protective clothing requirements, access control procedures, dose control procedures and communication capabilities.

6. Conduct comprehensive radiation survey of site facilities and define all radiological problem areas.

7. Isolate and post with appropriate warning signs all radiation and contamination areas.

8. Perform visual inspection of site areas and equipment.

9. All radiological conditions discovered and existing in the facility as determined by the reentry survey will be evaluated by site management.

10. Upon evaluation of the radiological condition, site management will determine what procedures are required to restore the site to a normal status.

11. Personnel radiation dose will be closely controlled and documented.

12. Recovery coordinators will take appropriate actions to ensure emergency personnel and equipment are properly monitored and controlled prior to leaving the radiation control area. Radiological conditions at the scene of the emergency should be properly defined, barricaded, and posted with appropriate signs.

M-2 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

M.2 Recovery Organization Before entering the recovery phase, the EOF Director and the Emergency Coordinator shall establish a Recovery organization that is appropriate for the existing on-site and off-site conditions. Figure M-1 and M-2 describe suggested organization structures. They may be modified or supplemented as necessary to fit the particular circumstances. In some situations (such as no core damage), the normal onsite outage organization is adequate and the need for an offsite recovery organization is not anticipated.

M.3 Initiation of Recovery Operation - Radiological Guidance concerning recovery operations are provided in the following procedures:

TSC/OSC - RP/O/A/1000/019, RP/O/A/1000/027 EOF - SR/O/A/2000/003 JIC - RP/0/A/1000/031 (Note: Information carried in plan has now been placed in this procedure)

Initiation of Recovery Operation - Hazardous Wastes/Materials Recovery will be provided as directed by Oconee Nuclear Environmental Work Practice, Section 5.1, Spill Response.

M.4 Total Population Exposure Estimates The Radiological Assessment Group will periodically update the estimate of total population exposure.

M-3 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE M-1 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION ONSITE RECOVERY ORGANIZATION RECOVERY ORGANIZATION (ONSITE)

OUTAGE MANAGER OPRTIN[MIT I I I 1 I CHEMISTrRY 7C JL CORPORATE RESOURCES NUCLEAR GENERATION (GO)

M-4 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE M-2 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION OFFSITE RECOVERY ORGANIZATION M-5 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA SECTION N EMERGENCY PLAN A - SECTION N EXERCISES AND Revision No.

DRILLS 004 Electronic Reference No.

OAP00013 PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? El Yes El No Reviewed By* - (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* .(QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* _(QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

N. Exercises and Drills To assure that periodic exercises are conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, that the results of exercises form the basis for corrective action for identified deficiencies and that periodic drills are conducted to develop and maintain key skills.

N.la & N.lb Exercises Exercises will be designed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. An exercise will be designed to test the integrated capability of those involved and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the plans and organization. The scenario for the biennial exercise will be varied from year to year such that all major elements of the plans and organizations will be tested within an eight calendar-year cycle.

Once every 8 calendar year cycle, a back-shift exercise shall be held as follows:

- If held during a weekday, the exercise shall start between the hours of 6 p.m.

and 4 a.m.

- If held during the weekend, the exercise may start at any hour.

N.2 Drills Oconee Nuclear Station will conduct drills in accordance with requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix E. Drills shall be conducted to test, develop and maintain skills in a particular operation. Drills may be a component of an exercise.

Drills will be conducted and evaluated by a designated drill director. Drills will be held in accordance with Emergency Preparedness FAM Guide Section 3.19, Exercises and Drills.

a. Communication Drills Communication check with NRC Headquarters shall be conducted monthly.

Communication check with State and local governments within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone shall be conducted monthly.

N-i Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Communications check with Government agencies within the ingestion pathway Emergency Planning Zone shall be conducted quarterly.

Communications between the ONS, state and local emergency operations centers and field monitoring teams shall be conducted annually.

b. Fire Drills (Onsite-within Protected Area; Offsite-outside Protected area) shall be conducted as specified in site procedures and directives.

c. Medical Emergency Drills medical emergency drill, involving a simulated externally contaminated injured individual, is required annually with participation by the Oconee Emergency Medical Service (Ambulance), Oconee Medical Center and physicians.

d. Station environs and radiological monitoring drills (on-site and off site) shall be conducted annually. These drills shall include collection and analysis of all sample media (e.g. water, vegetation, soil and air).

e. Radiation Protection Drills shall be conducted semi-annually which involve response to and analysis of, simulated elevated airborne and liquid samples and direct radiation measurements in the environment.

Analysis of samples may be simulated in Radiation Protection drills.

f Site Assembly Drills are required to be held on a semi-annual basis.

g. Activation Drills to test the recall response time of the emergency response organization after hours will be held once during the calendar year. (ONS commitment to the NRC revised 2/14/96)

h. Multi-Station Event Drills to test the ability of the Common EOF to manage multi-station events involving activation of the emergency response organization and facilities, offsite notifications, dose assessment, and field monitoring team coordination will be conducted once every six years. This drill will be rotated between participation with Catawba and McGuire.

N-2 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

N.3 Scenarios Drill scenarios are developed to test various components of the emergency plan. An annual schedule of the drills to be conducted is developed to ensure that all required drills are conducted and are included as part of the site's work schedule.

N.4 Critiques N.4.a Quarterly Drills and Biennial Annual Exercise Critiques of quarterly drills and the biennial exercise will be held. A written critique summary report outlining any specific area that needs improvement and the corrective measures that will be taken to correct the problem will be required.

Resolution of corrective measures is required.

N.4.b Significant Events/Real Emergencies A critique and/or evaluation will be held as a result of an actual emergency to determine the effectiveness of the existing planned emergency response actions. A written critique summary report outlining any specific area that needs improvement and the corrective measures that will be taken to correct the problem will be required. Resolution of corrective measures is required.

N.5 Critique Action Items Action items established as a result of an ONS drill/exercise or significant event/real emergency shall be identified and tracked using the corrective action program until resolution is completed.

N-3 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES P. Responsibility for the Planning Effort: Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of the Emergency Plans To assure that responsibilities for plan development, review and distribution of emergency plans are established and that planners are properly trained:

P. 1 Training for Emergency Planning Personnel Training for emergency planning personnel shall be provided in the form of workshop/seminar sessions on an annual basis. Courses developed by the Duke Training Center are also available in technically related subjects that will enhance the working knowledge of these people.

P.2 & P.3 Overall Authority The Site Vice-President has the overall authority and responsibility for all hazards emergency response planning. The planning effort is delegated to the Manager, Emergency Planning.

The Manager of Emergency Planning at the Oconee Nuclear Site shall have the responsibility for the development, review and coordination of the site emergency plans with other response organizations and shall be responsible for conducting the biennial exercise, drills and training sessions to test the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency Plan. This person is employed in the Safety Assurance Group.

P.4 & P.5 Review and Update of Emergency Plan The ONS Emergency Plan shall be reviewed and updated annually. An in-depth review of the Emergency Plan will be made to determine if any/all changes have been made as a result of drills, exercises, commitments, audits, new regulatory requirements, and any other identified mechanism used to determine the appropriateness of the Emergency Plan. The Manager of Emergency Planning or designee is responsible for conducting the review and updating/revising the Emergency Plan and/or Implementing Procedures, as required. Once the review has been completed and changes made as determined, the Emergency Plan shall be certified as current.

Approved revisions of the Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures shall be distributed according to Appendix 6, (Distribution of Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures). Appendix 6 carries an itemized list of all organizations and individuals receiving copies of the Emergency Plan and P-1 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Implementing Procedures. Revised pages of the Emergency Plan shall be dated and marked to show where changes have been made.

P.6 Supporting: Plans Figure P-2 lists plans in support of the ONS Emergency Plan.

P.7 Implementing Procedures Written procedures will be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities associated with emergency plan implementation. Each procedure and changes thereto, shall be approved by the responsible manager prior to implementation.

Implementing procedures are indexed and cross referenced to the section applicable in NUREG 0654. (Figure P-I)

P.8 Table of Contents The Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures contain a table of contents and an index tab system.

P.9 Independent Audit The NOS Audit Manager will arrange for an independent review of Oconee Nuclear Station's Emergency Preparedness Program as necessary, based on an assessment against performance indicators, and as soon as reasonably practicable after a change occurs in personnel, procedures, equipment, or facilities that potentially could adversely affect emergency preparedness, but no longer than 12 months after the change. In any case, all elements of the emergency preparedness program will be reviewed at least once every 24 months. Guidance for performing the assessment against the performance indicators is provided in the Emergency Preparedness Administrative Procedure AD-EP-ALL-0001. The independent review will be conducted by the Independent Nuclear Oversight Division, which will include the following plans, procedures, training programs, drills/exercises, equipment, and State/local government interfaces:

1. Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan

2. Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures P-2 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES

3. State/Local Support Agency Training Program

4. Site Emergency Response Training Program

5. Public & Media Training/Awareness

6. Equipment: Communications, Monitoring, Meteorological, Public Alerting

7. State/Local Plan Interface The review findings will be submitted to the appropriate corporate and nuclear site management. The part of the review involving the evaluation of the adequacy of interface with State and local governments will be reported to the appropriate State and local governments. Corporate or nuclear site management, as appropriate, will evaluate the findings affecting their area of responsibility and ensure effective corrective actions are taken. The results of the review, along with recommendations for improvements, will be documented, and retained for a period of five (5) years.

P.10 Phone Number Update The Emergency Telephone Directory is updated quarterly.

P-3 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented Assignment of Responsibility Ala ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 Agreement Letters Alb RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP//A/1000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure AD-EP-DEC-0107 Standard Procedure for EOF Services SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Alc ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Fig Al Ald RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Ale RP/0/A/l000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure A2a NA State/County Responsibility A2b NA State/County Responsibility A3 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 A4 RP/O/A/IO00/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/l 000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility On-Site Emergency Organization Bl ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/l000/022 Procedure For Major Site Damage Assessment And Repair RP/0/A/l000/029 Fire Brigade Response AD-EP-DEC-0107 Standard Procedure for EOF Services B2 RP/0/A/l000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility B3 RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility P-4 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented B3 NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities B4 RP/O/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities B5 OMP 2-16 Shift Turnover NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/1000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility B6 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility AD-EP-DEC-0107 Standard Procedure for EOF Services B7a-d NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility AD-EP-DEC-0107 Standard Procedure for EOF Services RP/0/B/1 000/027 Re-Entry Recovery Procedure RP/0/A/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan B8 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 B9 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 Emergency Res onse Support and Resources Cla, b, c ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility RP/0/A/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan RP/0/A/1000/037 Incident Command Post (ICP) Operations and Radiation Protection Liaison Guidelines C2a NA State/County Responsibility C2b EP FAM 3.11 State/County EOC Liaison Reference Manual RP/0/A/1000/037 Incident Command Post (ICP) Operations and Radiation Protection Liaison Guidelines C3 HP/0/B/1009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions C4 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility P-5 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference

,stem Dla, b, c ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan RP/0/A/1000/001 Emergency Classification D2 RP/0/A/1000/001 Emergency Classification D3 NA State/County Responsibility D4 NA State/County Responsibility Notification Methods and Procedures El RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/015A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/0/A/1000/015B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility E2 RP/O/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure E3 RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/015A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/0/A/1000/015B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1 000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility SR/O/A/2000/004 Notification to States and Counties Facility for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee E4a-n RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/015A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/0/A/1000/015B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1 000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility E5 NA State/County Responsibility E6 EP FAM 3.3 Alert and Notification System (Siren Program)

E7 RP/0/A/1000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility E8 RP/0/A/1000/017 Spill Response Emergency Communications Fla RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure P-6 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented Fla RP/0/A/1000/015A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/0/A/1000/015B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Flb PT/0/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment Flc RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/1000/015A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/0/A/1000/015B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/B/1000/003A ERDS Operation PT/0/B/2000/009 Emergency Response Data System Quarterly Test SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Fld PT/0/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment ST/0/A44600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/

Supply Inventory-ST/O/A/4600/094 Standard Procedure For Periodic Test Of The EOF Selective Signaling, ENS and ETS Fle RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure Flf PT/O/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment RP/0/B/1 000/003 A ERDS Operation PT/0/B/2000/009 Emergency Response Data System Quarterly Test F2 PT/0/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment RP/0/A/1000/016 MERT Activation Procedure For Medical, Confined Space, and High Angle Rescue Emergencies RP/0/A/1000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure F3 PT/O/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment PT/0/B/2000/009 Emergency Response Data System Quarterly Test Public Education and Information Gla,b,c EP FAM 3.6 Alert and Notification System - Oconee Specific Supplement NPM Chapter 15 Corporate Communications Departmental Interface Agreement P-7 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented G2 EP FAM 3.6 Alert and Notification System - Oconee Specific Supplement NPM Chapter 15 Corporate Communications Departmental Interface Agreement G3a, b RP/O/A/1000/028 Nuclear Communications Emergency Response Plan RP/0/A/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan SR/0/B/2000/001 Standard Procedure For Corporate Communications Response To The Emergency Operations Facility G4a, b, c RP/0/A/1000/028 Nuclear Communications Emergency Response Plan RP/O/A/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan SR/0/B/2000/001 Standard Procedure For Corporate Communications Response To The Emergency Operations Facility G5 NPM Chapter 15 Corporate Communications Departmental Interface I Agreement Emergency Facilities and Equipment Hla, b, c RP/O/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/1000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure HP/0/B/1 009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check PT/0/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment PT/0/A/2000/008 Procedure to Verify the Availability of Supplies and Equipment in the Emergency Response Facilities PT/O/A/2000/01 0 Review of Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures H2 SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility ST/O/A44600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/Supply Inventory ST/O/A/4600/094 Standard Procedure For Periodic Test Of The EOF Selective Signaling, ENS and ETS H3 NA State/County Responsibility H4 NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure P-8 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented H4 RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure RP/0/A/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility SR/0/B/2000/001 Standard Procedure For Corporate Communications Response To The Emergency Operations Facility AD-EP-DEC-0107 Standard Procedure for EOF Services H5 RP/0/A/1000/001 Emergency Classification H5a, b, c, d ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan IP/0/B/1 601/003 Meteorological Equipment Checks H6a, b, c ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan IP/0/B/1 601/003 Meteorological Equipment Checks ONS ODCM ONS Offsite Dose Calculation Manual HP/0/B/1 009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1009/023 Radiation Protection Emergency Response PT/0/A/2000/008 Procedure to Verify the Availability of Supplies and Equipment in the Emergency Response Facilities ST/0/A/4600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/Supply Inventory PT/0/B/0250/030 Quarterly Fire Brigade Equipment Inspection PT/0/B/0250/032 Quarterly Inspection Of Emergency Medical Equipment PT/O/B/0250/045 Quarterly Inspection Of Hazardous Materials Response Team Equipment CP/0/B/2001/008 Chemistry Safety Equipment And Spill Control

Response

RP/0/A/1000/017 Spill Response H7 HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1009/023 Radiation Protection Emergency Response H8 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan IP/0/B/1 601/003 Meteorological Equipment Checks SH/0/B/2005/001 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections HP/0/B/1 009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections RP/0/A/1 000/024 Protective Action Recommendations H9 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan IP/0/B/1 601/003 Meteorological Equipment Checks ONS ODCM ONS Offsite Dose Calculation Manual P-9 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented H9 HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check PT/0/A/2000/008 Procedure to Verify the Availability of Supplies and Equipment in the Emergency Response Facilities ST/O/A/4600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/Supply Inventory PT/0/B/0250/030 Quarterly Fire Brigade Equipment Inspection PT/0/B/0250/032 Quarterly Inspection Of Emergency Medical Equipment PT/0/B1/0250/045 Quarterly Inspection Of Hazardous Materials Response Team Equipment CP/O/B/2001/008 Chemistry Safety Equipment And Spill Control Response RP/0/A/1000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure H10 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan IP/0/B/1 601/003 Meteorological Equipment Checks ONS ODCM ONS Offsite Dose Calculation Manual HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check PT/O/A/2000/008 Procedure to Verify the Availability of Supplies and Equipment in the Emergency Response Facilities ST/O/A/4600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/Supply Inventory PT/0/B/0250/030 Quarterly Fire Brigade Equipment Inspection PT/0/B/0250/032 Quarterly Inspection Of Emergency Medical Equipment PT/0/B/0250/045 Quarterly Inspection Of Hazardous Materials Response Team Equipment CP/0/B/2001/008 Chemistry Safety Equipment And Spill Control

Response

H11 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Section H.11 H12 HP/0/B/1009/023 Radiation Protection Emergency Response SH/0/B/2005/002 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Accident Assessment 11 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Section D RP/O/A/1000/001 Emergency Classification 12 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan P-I0 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented 12 RP/0/B/1000/018 Core Damage Assessment CSM 5.1 Emergency Response Guidelines CSM 5.2 Procedure Use Guidelines During Emergency

Response

CP/1/A/2002/002 Rheodyne Sample Via Post Accident Liquid Sampling System (PALSS)

CP/2/A/2002/002 Rheodyne Sample Via Post Accident Liquid Sampling System (PALSS)

CP/3/A/2002/002 Rheodyne Sample Via Post Accident Liquid Sampling System (PALSS)

HP/0/B/1009/009 Procedure For Determining The Inplant Radioiodine Concentration During Accident Conditions HP/0/B/1009/015 Procedure For Sampling And Quantifying High Level Gaseous, Radioiodine And Particulate Radioactivity HP/0/B/1009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections HP/0/B/1 009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions SH/0/B/2005/001 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections SH/0/B/2005/002 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions 13a, b RP/O/A/1000/001 Emergency Classification RP/0/A/1 000/024 Protective Action Recommendations HP/0/B/1009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections HP/0/B/1 009/022 On-Shift Off-Site Dose Projections ONS ODCM ONS Offsite Dose Calculation Manual SH/0/B1/2005/001 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections 14 HP/0/B/1009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections HP/0/B/1009/022 On-Shift Off-Site Dose Projections SH/0/B/2005/001 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections 15 RP/0/A/1000/002 Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/O/A/I1000/003 A ERDS Operation RP/0/A/1000/015 A Offsite Communications From The Control Room RP/0/A/1000/015 B Offsite Communications From The Technical Support Center RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure SR/O/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility SR/0/A/2000/004 Notification to States and Counties from the Emergency Operations Facility for Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee P-11 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented 16 HP/0/B/1009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections SH/0/B/2005/001 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections 17 SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility SH/0/B/2005/002 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions HP/0/B/1009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions 18 SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility SH/0/B/2005/002 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions HP/0/B/1009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions 19 HP/0/B/1009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions SH/0/B/2005/002 Protocol for the Field Monitoring Coordinator During Emergency Conditions 110 SH/0/B/2005/001 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections HP/O/B/1009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections HP/0/B/1009/020 Estimating Food Chain Doses Under Post-Accident Conditions HP/0/B/1009/026 Environmental Monitoring For Emergency Conditions Ill NA State/County Responsibility Protective Response J1 AP/0/A/1 700/045 Site Security Threats RP/0/A/1 000/009 Procedure For Site Assembly RP/O/A/1000/010 Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel J2 NSD 114 Site Assembly/Site Evacuation HP/0/B/1009/016 Procedure For Emergency Decontamination Of Personnel And Vehicles On-Site And From Off-Site Remote Assembly Areas HP/0/B/1009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections RP/O/A/1000/010 Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel SH/0/B/2005/001 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections J3 NSD 114 Site Assembly/Site Evacuation AP/0/A/1 700/045 Site Security Threats HP/0/B/1009/016 Procedure For Emergency Decontamination Of Personnel And Vehicles On-Site And From Off-Site Remote Assembly Areas HP/0/B/1009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections RP/O/A/1000/009 Procedure For Site Assembly P- 12 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented J3 RP/0/A/1000/010 Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel SH/0/B/2005/001 Emergency Response Offsite Dose Projections J4 HP/0/B/1009/016 Procedure For Emergency Decontamination Of Personnel And Vehicles On-Site And From Off-Site Remote Assembly Areas HP/0/B/1009/018 Off-Site Dose Projections RP/0/A/1000/009 Procedure For Site Assembly RP/0/A/1000/010 Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel J5/J6 NSD 114 Site Assembly/Site Evacuation AP/0/A/1 700/045 Site Security Threats HP/0/B/1009/009 Procedure For Determining The Inplant Airborne Radioiodine Concentration During Accident Conditions RP/0/A/1 000/009 Procedure For Site Assembly SH/0/B/2005/003 Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release RPM Radiation Protection Manual J7 RP/0/A/1000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility J8 ONS-ETE- ONS Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) Dated 12142012 12/14/2012 J9 NA State/County Responsibility AP/0/A/1 700/045 Site Security Threats RP/0/A/1 000/009 Procedure For Site Assembly RP/O/A/I1000/010 Procedure For Emergency Evacuation/Relocation Of Site Personnel J10a, b, c ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan RPM Radiation Protection Manual J10d - I NA State/County Responsibility J10m RP/0/A/1000/024 Protective Action Recommendations SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility Ji1 NA State/County Responsibility J12 NA State/County Responsibility Radioloqical Exposure Control Kla - g RP/0/B/1000/0 11 Planned Emergency Exposure SH/0/B/2005/003 Distribution of Potassium Iodide Tablets in the Event of a Radioiodine Release K2 RP/0/B/1000/0 11 Planned Emergency Exposure K3a RPM Radiation Protection Manual P- 13 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented K3a HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1009/023 Radiation Protection Emergency Response K3b RPM Radiation Protection Manual HP/0/B/1009/023 Radiation Protection Emergency Response K4 NA State/County Responsibility K5a, b, RPM Radiation Protection Manual HP/0/B/1009/016 Procedure For Emergency Decontamination Of Personnel And Vehicles On-Site And From Off-Site Remote Assembly Areas HP/0/B/1009/024 Radiation Protection Response To A Medical Emergency K6a, b, c RPM Radiation Protection Manual HP/0/B/1009/016 Procedure For Emergency Decontamination Of Personnel And Vehicles On-Site And From Off-Site Remote Assembly Areas K7 HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1009/016 Procedure For Emergency Decontamination Of Personnel And Vehicles On-Site And From Off-Site Remote Assembly Areas Medical and Public Health Support Li ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check L2 RP/O/A/1000/016 MERT Activation Procedure For Medical, Confined Space, and High Angle Rescue Emergencies HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1009/024 Radiation Protection Response To A Medical Emergency PT/0/B/0250/032 Quarterly Inspection Of Emergency Medical Equipment L3 NA State/County Responsibility L4 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Appendix 5 RP/0/A/1000/016 MERT Activation Procedure For Medical, Confined Space, and High Angle Rescue Emergencies HP/0/B/1009/001 Emergency Equipment Inventory and Instrument Check HP/0/B/1009/024 Radiation Protection Response To A Medical Emergency Recovery and Reentry Planning and Post Accident Operations M1 I I RP/O/A/1000/024 I I Protective Action Recommendations P-14 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented M1 RP/O/B/1000/027 Re-Entry Recovery Procedure RP/O/A/1000/028 Nuclear Communications Emergency Response Plan M2 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan, Section M RP/O/B/1000/027 Re-Entry Recovery Procedure RP/0/A/1000/028 Nuclear Communications Emergency Response Plan M3 RP/0/A/1000/019 Technical Support Center Emergency Coordinator Procedure RP/0/A/1000/025 Operational Support Center Manager Procedure RP/0/B/1 000/027 Re-Entry Recovery Procedure SR/0/A/2000/003 Activation of the Emergency Operations Facility RP/O/A/1000/031 Joint Information Center Emergency Response Plan NEWP 5.1 Oconee Nuclear Environmental Work Practice, Section 5.1, Spill Response.

M4 RP/0/B/1000/027 Re-Entry Recovery Procedure Exercises and Drills Nla, b EP FAM 3.19 Drills and Exercises N2, c, d, e, f, g, EP FAM 3.19 Drills and Exercises h,i N2a PT/0/A/2000/002 Periodic Test of Emergency Response Communications Equipment ST/0/A/4600/086 Standard Procedure For Periodic Verification of EOF Communication Equipment Operation and Equipment/Supply Inventory ST/0/A/4600/094 Standard Procedure For Periodic Test Of The EOF Selective Signaling, ENS and ETS N2b PT/0/B/2000/050 Fire Drill - Performance and Evaluation-N3 EP FAM 3.19 Drills and Exercises N4a, b EP FAM 3.19 Drills and Exercises N5 EP FAM 3.1 Administration of Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures EP FAM 3.19 Drills and Exercises Radiological Emergency Response Training 01 NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities ERTG-001 Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Services Training Program ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 02 NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities P- 15 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Emergency Procedure Procedure Title Plan Section(s)

Implemented 02 ERTG-001 Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Services Training Program ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 03 NSD 119 Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) Program Organization, Training, and Responsibilities ERTG-001 Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Services Training Program 04.1, .2 NSD 117 Emergency Response Organization Staffing, Training, and Responsibilities ERTG-001 Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Services Training Program ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 04.3 ETQS 3104.0 Radiation Protection Training and Qualifications ETQS 7104.0 Radiation Protection Staff Professional Development Program 04.4 ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 04.5, .7 NSD 119 Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT) Program Organization, Training, and Responsibilities 04.6 ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 04.8 ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 04.9 ETQS 7111.0 Emergency Response Training 04.10 OC1507-N Appendix R Training OC6792-N Maint SPOC Team Emergency Response Training TTC 471-N Annual ERO Refresher /Update 04.11 ERTG-001 Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Services Training Program 05 ERTG-001 Emergency Response Organization and Emergency Services Training Program Responsibility for the Planning Effort:

Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of Emergency Plans P1 EP FAM 3.20 Emergency Planner Training & Qualification Plan P2 & P3 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan P4 & P5 PT/0/A/2000/01 0 Review of Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures EP FAM 3.1 Administration of Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures P6 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan P7 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan P8 ONS E Plan ONS Emergency Plan P9 AD-EP-ALL-0001 Emergency Preparedness Key Performance Indicators P10 PT/0/A/2000/004 Qrtly Emergency Phone Book Update P-16 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES Cross Reference Appendices Appendix 1 Definitions Appendix 2 Meteorology and Offsite Dose Assessment Program Appendix 3 Alert and Notification System Description Appendix 4 Evacuation Time Estimates Appendix 5 Letters of Agreement Appendix 6 Distribution List Appendix 7 Emergency Data Transmittal System Appendix 8 Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasure Plan ONS Pollution Prevention Plan Rev 11 Site Drawing Appendix 9 ONS Chemical Treatment Ponds 1,2 and 3 Groundwater Monitoring Sampling and Analysis Plan Appendix 10 Hazardous Materials Response Plan P-17 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

FIGURE P1 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES FIGURE P-2 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR SITE SUPPORTING PLANS State of South Carolina Oconee County Pickens County DOE-IRAP Plan INPO-Fixed Facility Agreement NRC Region II P-18 Rev. 2014-02 October 2014

Duke Energy Procedure No.

Oconee Nuclear Station EPA APPENDIX 06 EMERGENCY PLAN A - APPENDIX 6 DISTRIBUTION Revision No.

OF EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND 002 IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES Electronic Reference No.

OAPOOOHH PDF Format Prepared By* Date Requires Applicability Determination? El Yes El No Reviewed By* _ (QR) Date Cross-Disciplinary Review By* _(QR) NA Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* _(QR) NA Date Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date Approved By* Date

• PrintedName and Signature

APPENDIX 6 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Distribution of Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures Series Emergency Emergency Emergency Issued To NOTES Number Plan Plan Plan Implementing Implementing Procedures Procedures Volume 1 Volume 2 1 X X X TSC - Proposed CC, EP 2 X X Superintendent of Operations DM, CC 3 X X X OSC-PROPOSED CC, EP 5

7 X X X Security Manager DM, CC 8 X X X Work Control Superintendent DM, CC 10 X X X Manager, Emergency Preparedness 13 14 X X X Production Training Support DM, CC 15 X X X DHEC - Anderson DM, CC 17 X X X Unit 3 Control Room Library CC, EP 18 X X X Operations Shift Manager CC, EP

&Technical Support Center 19 X X X I&E and Maintenance Support DM, CC Superintendent 20 X Mechanical/Civil/Equipment DM, CC Manager 1 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

APPENDIX 6 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Distribution of Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures Series Emergency Emergency Emergency Issued To NOTES Number Plan Plan Plan Implementing Implementing Procedures Procedures Volume 1 Volume 2 21 X Document Control - DM, CC Complex (Hwy 183) 22 X I/T Manager DM, CC 23 , gV 24 X Radiation Protection DM, CC Manager 25 X Chemistry Manager DM, CC 26 28 X World of Energy Visitor's DM, CC Center 29 x X X NRC Resident Inspector DM, CC 30 X X X Alternate TSC/OSC - CC, EP Emergency Preparedness -

ONS 31 X X X Master File DM, CC 32 X X X Bartlett Nuclear Inc. DM, CC 33 X X X Oconee Training Center DM, EP, CC 34 X X X Emergency Preparedness - CC, EP, US Charlotte EOF 35 X X X Emergency Preparedness - DM, CC Charlotte EC05P 36 A A mcuuire iNuciear Nite u LM, ~uu MGO 1EP/Emergency Preparedness Section 2 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

APPENDIX 6 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Distribution of Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures Emergency Emergency Issued To Plan Plan Implementing Implementing Procedures Procedures Volume 1 Volume 2 x x Catawba Nuclear Site

/CNO 1EP/Emergency Preparedness Section S.C. Emergency Management Division Bureau of Radiological Health Oconee County EMD EMD (electronic) tite CervIces kIp. Manager 3 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

APPENDIX 6 DUKE ENERGY COMPANY OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION Distribution of Emergency Plan and Implementing Procedures Series Number 56 57 58 59 60 xx x Alternate TSC Center CC, EP 75 X X X Oconee Training Center DM, CC (NRC#1) 76 X X x Oconee Training Center DM, CC (NRC#2) 77 x X x NRC - Rockville, MD - us Document Control Desk 78 X Briefing Room - Oconee DM, CC Training Center 79 x Georgia Department of DM, CC Natural Resources, Environmental Protection Division NOTES: CC - Controlled Copy EP - Distribution by EP US - Unstamped Copies DM - Distribution by Document Management Grayed out - currently not used 4 Rev. 14-02 October 2014

Revision/Change Package Fill-In Form Rev. 04/23/2012 The purpose of this fill-in form is to provide a location to type in information you want to appear on the various forms needed for Major/Minor Procedure Revisions, and Major/Minor Procedure Changes. After you type in information on this form, it will be electronically transferred to the appropriate locations in the attached forms when you perform Step 3 below.

Step 1- press [F112] (Save As) then save this form using standard file name convention in appropriate LAN storage location.

Step 2-type in basic information in the blanks below:

Note: place cursor in center of brackets before typing.

1. ID No.: ONS EPlan

2. Revision No.: 2014-02

3. Change No.: - Note: if this package is for a change, replace hyphen with a letter.

4. Procedure

Title:

Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan -

5. For changes only, enter procedure sections affected: LOEP, List Of Figures, Record of Changes, A, B, D, F, G, H, I, J, M, N, P, Appendix 6

6. Prepared By: John Kaminski

7. Preparation Date: 10/08/2014

8. PCR Numbers Included in Revision: ONS-2013-5335, 2013-396, 2013-1348, 2014-3720, 2014-3719, 2013-5334, 2011-7259, 2012-6783, 2013-1446, 2010-2948 Step 3- go to Print Preview to update this information in all the attached documents.

Step 4- page down to affected pages and enter any additional information needed.

Step 5- when all information is entered, print package and review for correctness.

Form 703-1. Procedure Process Record (PPR)

(R08-10) Duke Energy (1) ID No. ONS EPlan PROCEDURE PROCESS RECORD Revision No. 2014-02 PREPARATION (2) Station OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION (3) Procedure Title _ Oconee Nuclear Station Emer cy Plan (4) Prepared By* John Kaminski (Signature) Date 10/08/2014 (5) Requires NSD 228 Applicability Determination?

Z Yes (New procedure or revision with major c anges) - Attach N D 228 documentation.

E] No (Revision with minor changes) o//

(6) Reviewed By* IoDcicJ 1\. QI0 .,. ( AJt*Z.7.__/ "' (QR)(KI) Date /1 -'d-T /.[

Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR)(KI) NA)-Date I I* -

Reactivity Mgmt Review By* .(QR) NAb.'teate it -. S.-1'

• Mgmt Involvement Review By* (Ops. Supt.) NA g k I -5 i (7) Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* Date (8) Approved By* ((AL 5 *I Date /71'i iI PERFORMANCE (Compare with control copy every 14 ca ndar days kileyork is beingperformed.)

(9) Compared with Control Copy* _ Date Compared with Control Copy* _ Date Compared with Control Copy* _ Date (10) Date(s) Performed Work Order Number (WO#)

COMPLETION (11) Procedure Completion Verification:

o Unit 0 0 Unit 1 0 Unit 2 EJ Unit 3 Procedure performed on what unit?

El Yes D NA Check lists and/or blanks initialed, signed, dated, or filled in NA, as appropriate?

o Yes D NA Required enclosures attached?

o Yes D NA Charts, graphs, data sheets, etc. attached, dated, identified, and marked?

o Yes D NA Calibrated Test Equipment, if used, checked out/in and referenced to this procedure?

o Yes D NA Procedure requirements met?

Verified By* Date (12) Procedure Completion Approved Date (13) Remarks (Attach additionalpages, if necessary)

Changes made as a result of changes to procedure numbers, changes as a result of implementation of ERONS, and changes as a result of PIPO-14-7170,PIP-O-14-1203,PIP-O-14-9297,PIP-O-14-7121, and PIP-O-14-10424, as well as numerous change requests.

• PrintedName and Signature

ONS EPlan Revision 2014-02 Change No.

Page 1 of I Procedure

Title:

Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan _

SUMMARY

OF CHANGES: (DESCRIPTION AND REASON)

General Changes Changes made as a result of changes to procedure numbers, changes as a result of implementation of ERONS, and changes as a result ofPIPO-14-7170,PIP-O-14-1203,PIP-O-14-9297,PIP-O-14-7121, and PIP-O-14-10424,as well as numerous change requests PCR Numbers Incorporated ONS-2013-5335, 2013-396, 2013-1348, 2014-3720, 2014-3719, 2013-5334, 2011-7259, 2012-6783, 2013-1446, 2010-2948 Enclosure

[Type text]

APPENDIX C. APPLICABILITY DETERMINATION (Rev. 10)

Page t of 2 PART I - ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION

• DUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS, LLC SITE UNIT(S) 0 Oconee El McGuire El Catawba 0 Unit 1 0 Unit 2 0 Unit 3 Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan, ACTIVITY TITLE/DOCUMENT/REVISION:

Rev 2014-02 PART I1- PROCESS REVIEW For each activity, address all of the questions below. If the answer Is "YES" for any portion of the activity, apply the identified orocess(es) to that nortion of the activitv..'Note: It is not.inusual to have more than one orocess aomlv to a 2iven activity.

Will implementation of the above activity require a change to the:

I Technical Specifications (TS) or Operating NO El If YES, process as a license amendment per NSD 227.

License? YES

2. Quality Assurance Topical? NO El If YES, seek assistance from Independent Nuclear Oversight.

YES

3. Security Plans? NO El If YES, process per the Nuclear Security Manual.

YES (See Appendix H)

EL

4. Emergency Plan? NO If YES, process per the Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual.

5. Inservice Testing Program Plan? El If YES, process per site IST Program for ASME code NO YES compliance and related facility changes.

E]

6. Inservice Inspection Program Plan? NO YES If YES, process per Materials, Metallurgy and Piping Inservice Inspection FAM for ASME code compliance and related facility or procedure changes.

El

7. Fire Protection Program Plan? YES If YES, evaluate activity in accordance with NSD 320.

7a -Utilize Appendix E to address Fire Check to confirm use of Appendix E Screening Questions.

Protection Program Plan Impact.

E]

8. Regulatory Commitments? YES If YES, process per NSD 214.

YES E]

9. Code of Federal Regulations? If YES, contact the Regulatory Affairs group.

YES

10. Programs and manuals listed in the El If YES, contact the Regulatory Affairs group.

Administrative Section of the TS? YES

(Type text]

Page 2 of 21 PART Ilia - 10 CFR 72.48 APPLICABILITY For each activity, address the question below*§If the answer to question 11 is "YES," and questions:14 and 17 are answered "NO", then process the activity per NSD 211.- 10 CFR 72.48 . . does... ..apply. ........................

. ... *........ ... . :. . . .. . ........ .i * .: .... .......

I1. Does the activity involve SSCs, procedures or conduct tests or experiments that support/impact the loading or transport of the canister/cask to the ISFSI, the ISFSi facility, spent fuel cask design? NO YES

" PAR IlIb - 10 CFR 50.59 APPLICABILITY For each activity, address all of the questions lielow...If the answer to question 18 is "YES," then 10 CFR 50.59 does not apply. If the answer to.

questions 18 is "NO," then process the activity per. NSD 209 - 10 CFR 50.59 applies.

12. Does the activity involve a procedure, governed by NSD 703 that has been excluded from the 10 CFR 50.59 JD E]

YES process per NSD 703 and the exclusion status remains valid? NO

13. Does the activity involve an administrative procedure governed by NSD 100 or AD-DC-ALL-0201 that does not contain information regarding the operation and control of Structures, Systems and Components? NO YES

14. Does the activity involve a type of Engineering Change that NSD 301 excludes from the 10 CFR 50.59 and/or 10 CFR 72.48 Processes? Consult NSD 301 for assistance. NO YES

15. Does the activity involve (a) maintenance activities that restore SSCs to their as-designed condition (including activities that implement approved design changes) or (b) temporary alterations supporting N 0YES maintenance that will be in effect during at-power operations for 90 days or less?

16. Does the activity involve a UFSAR modification that NSD 220 excludes from the 10 CFR 50.59 Process?

Consult NSD 220 for assistance. 0 YES

17. Does the activity involve NRC and/or Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC approved changes to the licensing basis?

YES

18. Are ALL aspects of the activity bounded by one or more "YES" answers to questions I through 17, above?

NO PART IV - UFSAR REVIEW

19. Does the activity require a modification, deletion, or addition to the UFSAR to satisfy the UFSAR content to El requirements of 10 CFR 50.34 (b), 10 CFR 50.71 (e), or Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.70? Consult NSD 220 for 1qO YES Assistance.

IF YES, process per NSD 220.

_PI PART V - SIONOFR (Print Name) '.h I. Q-....4 (Sign) 4 444, DATE i" Applicability Determination Preparer 7 " / ""

VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE Nuclear Policy Manual - Volume 2 NSD 228 APPENDIX E. FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM SCREENING The following screening questions are used to assist the Applicability Determination preparer to answer PART II - PROCESS REVIEW question number 7.

A "Yes" answer to any of the screening questions would Indicate the Fire Protection Program Licensing Basis may be affected, and Question # 7 on the Applicability Determination Form (Appendix C) should be checked "Yes" and a review In accordance with NSD 320 is required.

PART A New procedure or a major procedure change FPP Licensing Applicability impact screening:

NOTE: IF the procedure change is a result of a Plant Modification or Engineering Change that has previously been evaluated for impact to the FPP, then question #7 should be checked "No".

Yes No Al. / Does the proposed activity change any plant responses, operator responses or emergency lighting associated with Post Fire Safe Shutdown (PFSS) response procedures?

A2. = Does the proposed activity add, remove or revise any fire protection features as described in the UFSAR or SLCs from any performance test procedures?

A3. Z Does the proposed activity add, remove or revise any procedures related to fire protection features as described in the UFSAR or SLCs?

A4. L, 7 Does the proposed activity add, remove or revise any performance test Acceptance Criteria for any fire protection features as described in the UFSAR or SLCs?

PART B Plant Modification/Engineering Change FPP Licensing Basis impact screening:

Does the proposed activity act .' ?

B I.  : , Any fire rated assembllestboundarles (walls, floors, ceilings, etc.), including fire doors, fire dampers, penetration seals, fire rated wraps, radiant energy heat shields, structural fireproofing, etc. as described the UFSAR or SLCs?

B2. C Any water based fixed fire suppression systems (including water supply flow paths and main fire pumps) as described in UFSAR or SLCs?

B3. _D 1 Any gaseous fire suppression systems (CO2, Halon) as described in the UFSAR or SLCs?

B4. E 4e' Any manual fire fighting equipment such as hose stations and fire hydrants as described in the UFSAR or SLCs?

B5. C / Any portable fire extinguishers located in safety-related and/or safe shutdown areas of theplant or power block?

B6. - i" Any fire detection systems as described in the UFSAR or SLCs?

B7. E ' Any water and/or combustible fluid containment devices such as curbs, dikes, drains, fire protection system spray shields, etc. located in safety-related and/or safe shutdown areas?

B8. El Any administrative control documents for the Fire Protection Program such as NSD 313 (Control of Combustible/Flammable Materials), NSD 314 (Hot Work Authorization), and NSD 316 (Fire Protection Impairment)?

B9. C Any fire brigade equipment, including communication equipment or fire brigade administrative controls as outlined in NSD 112 (Fire Brigade Organization, Training, and Responsibilities)?

B I0. The n Reactor Coolant Pump Lube Oil Collection System?

B I I. E ' The Fire Safety/Hazards Analysis as documented in the plant level Design Basis Document for Fire Protection (CNS- 1465.00-00.0006, MCS- 1465.00-00-0008, OSS-0254.00-O0-4008)?

B 12. _ " Any PFSS/Nuclear Safety Capability Assessment/Non-Power Operations equipment, emergency lighting, commnuclatdons, drcultts, and/or cable routes as described in the site PFSS DBD and associated analysis (CNS-1435.00-00.0002, MCS-1465.00-00-0022, OSS-0254.00-00-4008)?

B13. (' Combustible/Flammable Material or an Ignition Source?

B14. --. 4i'/ Any Site Fire Brigade Response Strategies as described in the Emergency Plan and Fire Protection Planning guide?

BI5. Any plant radiation control boundaries?

B16. Any IIVAC flow changes include air intake/exhaust changes in radiation control areas?

REVISION 10 25 VERIFY HARD COPY AGAINST WEB SITE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO EACH USE

Form 703-2. Procedure Change Process Record (RO8-10)

Duke Energy PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS RECORD (1) ID No. ONS EPlan Revision No. 2014-02 _ Change No.

Permanent/Restricted to (2) Station: OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION (3) Procedure

Title:

Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan (4) Section(s) of Procedure Affected: A, B, C, D, F, G, H, I, J, M, N, P, Appendix 6 (5) Requires NSD 228 Applicability Determination?

E Yes (Procedure change with major changes) - Attach NSD 228 documentation.

[] No (Procedure change with minor changes)

(6) Description of Change: (Attach additionalpages, if necessary.)

Minor editorial and formatting changes as well as changes due to the changeover from pagers to cell phones.

(7) Reason for Change:

Changes made as a result of changes to procedure numbers, changes as a result of implementation of ERONS, and changes as a result ofPIPO-14-7170,PIP-O-14-1203,PIP-O-14-9297,PIP-O-14-7121,and PIP-O 10424, as well as numerous change requests (8) Prepared By* John Kaminski (Signature) Date 10/08/2014 (9) Reviewed By* , . )(KI) Date ,-*-/f Cross-Disciplinary Review By* (QR)(KI) NAJe, Date Reactivity Mgmt. Review By* (QR) NAb/_ Date it i4('

Mgmt. Involvement Review By* .(Ops. Supt.) NA b4,s Date -

(10) Additional Reviews Reviewed By* Date Reviewed By* A Date (11) Approved By* &(1a- /Ktfi-i A Date tLS11

( NKV 1\1ý

• PrintedName and Signature

3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual Attachment 3.10.7.2

§50.54(g) Screening Evaluation Form Activity Description and

References:

Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan rev 2014-02 See attached sheets for all changes. Changes were made as a result of changes to procedure numbers, changes as a result of implementation of ERONS, and changes as a result of PIP-O-14-7170, PIP-O-14-1203, PIP-O 9297, PIP-O- 14-7121, and PIP-O- 14-10424, as well as numerous change requests.

Activity Scope:

Z The activity is a change to the emergency plan F1 The activity is not a change to the emergency plan Change Type: 3 Change1ý Type: I F-1 The change is editorial or typographical [] The change does conform to an activity that has Z The change is not editorial or typographical prior approval Z The change does not conform to an activity that has prior approval Planning Standard Impact Determination: B, Off Z §50.47(b)(1) - Assignment of Responsibility (Organization Control)

Z §50.47(b)(2) - Onsite Emergency Organization E §50.47(b)(3) - Emergency Response Support and Resources Z §50.47(b)(4) - Emergency Classification System*

Z §50.47(b)(5) - Notification Methods and Procedures*

Z §50.47(b)(6) - Emergency Communications

[E1 §50.47(b)(7) - Public Education and Information Z §50.47(b)(8) - Emergency Facility and Equipment Z §50.47(b)(9) - Accident Assessment*

Z §50.47(b)(10) - Protective Response*

E- §50.47(b)(1 1) - Radiological Exposure Control F1 §50.47(b)(12) - Medical and Public Health Support Z §50.47(b)(13) - Recovery Planning and Post-accident Operations Z §50.47(b)(14) - Drills and Exercises Z §50.47(b)(15) - Emergency Responder Training Z §50.47(b)(16) - Emergency Plan Maintenance

• Risk Significant Planning Standards

[] The proposed activity does not impact a Planning Standard Commitment Impact Determination:

F- The activity does involve a site specific EP commitment Record the commitment or commitment reference:

Z The activity does not involve a site specific EP commitment Results: _ Bo_ _ _

F-1 The activity can be implemented without performing a §50.54(q) effectiveness evaluation par.......

Z... am........

Ther.........................................................................................................

activity ....

cannot be implemented without .............................

n.a §50.54(q) performing ...

effectiveness ...............

evaluation Preparer Name: Prep r na eD t-John Kaminski Revier Signfre Date:

Reviewer Name:

Don Crowl if -,S- '¢/

/

Revision 12 3.10 10CFR 50.54(q) Evaluations Emergency Planning Functional Area Manual Attachment 3.10.7.3

§50.54(g) Effectiveness Evaluation Form Activity Description and

References:

Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan rev BLOCK 1 20 14-02 See attached sheets for all changes. Changes were made as a result of changes to procedure numbers, changes as a result of implementation of ERONS, and changes as a result of PIP-0-14-7170, PIP-0-14-1203, PIP-0-14-9297, PIP-0-14-7121, and PIP 14-10424, as well as numerous change requests.

Activity Type: BLOC 2,..

Z The activity is a change to the emergency plan FD The activity affects implementation of the emergency plan, but is not a change to the emergency plan Impact and Licensing Basis Determination:

Licensing Basis:

10CFR50.47b(1) Primary responsibilities for emergency response by the nuclear facility licensee and by State and local organizations within the Emergency Planning Zones have been assigned, the emergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically established, and each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis.

10CFR50 Appendix E.IVA. Organization The organization for coping with radiological emergencies shall be described, including definition of authorities, responsibilities, and duties of individuals assigned to the licensee's emergency organization and the means for notification of such individuals in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the following shall be included:

1. A description of the normal plant operating organization.

ONS E Plan Section A.1.e Emergency Response - 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> per day The Switchboard at the Oconee Nuclear Station is operated twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The Oconee Nuclear Station has assigned duty personnel who are on call by phone or pager after hours and on weekends. Rosters are listed at the switchboard, in the Operations Shift Manager's office for ready access, and on the ONS WEB Page, (Computer System). Duty personnel are assigned to the Emergency Response Organizations as first responders since they can be readily reached after hours and weekends. Recall procedures for emergency response is shown as Figure A-2A (weekdays Monday-Thursday 0700-1730), Figure A-2B (after hours, weekends, holidays). The SM (or Designee) will activate the ERO pagers.

10CFR50.47b(2), On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defmed, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.

10CFR50 Appendix E.IVA. Organization

2. A description of the onsite emergency response organization (ERO) with a detailed discussion of:

a. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of the individual(s) who will take charge during an emergency;

b. Plant staff emergency assignments;

c. Authorities, responsibilities, and duties of an onsite emergency coordinator who shall be in charge of the exchange of information with offsite authorities responsible for coordinating and implementing offsite emergency measures.

ONS E Plan Section B. 1. Emergency Response Organization Figures B-I through B-6 shows the Oconee Nuclear Site Emergency Response Organization that would be established during an incident along with the duties the different groups would assume. Designation of personnel to the Emergency Response organization is determined by the particular job expertise of an individual. This assures that these personnel are qualified to carry out their responsibilities during an emergency. The normal staffing assignments at the Oconee Nuclear Site include emergency response responsibilities. See Figures B- 10 for emergency responsibilities for designated groups. The Emergency Response Organization is outlined in Division/Section Directives. These directives establish the duties, responsibilities and alternates for each required emergency response position. Response procedures have been established for each section through these Directives.

10CFR50.47b(3) Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and local staff at the licensee's Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response have been identified.

10CFR50 Appendix E.IVA Organization

3. A description, by position and function to be performed, of the licensee's headquarters personnel who will be sent to the plant site to augment the onsite emergency organization.

ONS E Plan Section C Emergency Response Support And Resources Arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made, arrangements to accommodate State and Local staff at Duke Energy's Emergency Operations Facility have been made, and for other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response are identified.

10CFR50.47b(4). A standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of minimum initial offsite response measures.

10CFR50 Appendix E.IVB Assessment Actions.

The means to be used for determining the magnitude of, and for continually assessing the impact of, the release of radioactive materials shall be described, including emergency action levels that are to be used as criteria for determining the need for notification and participation of local and State agencies, the Commission, and other Federal agencies, and the emergency action levels that are to be used for determining when and what type of protective measures should be considered within and outside the site boundary to protect health and safety. The emergency action levels shall be based on in-plant conditions and instrumentation in addition to onsite and offsite monitoring. By June 20, 2012, for nuclear power reactor licensees, these action levels must include hostile action that may adversely affect the nuclear power plant. The initial emergency action levels shall be discussed and agreed on by the applicant or licensee and state and local governmental authorities, and approved by the NRC. Thereafter, emergency action levels shall be reviewed with the State and local governmental authorities on an annual basis.

ONS E Plan Section D, NUREG 1.101, Rev. 3, August, 1992, approved the guidance provided by NUMARC/NESP- 007, Revision 2, as an Alternative Methodology for the Development of Emergency Action Levels. Oconee Nuclear Site used the NUMARC guidance for the development of initiating conditions and emergency action levels. The emergency action levels provided in this section have been modified to implement the guidance provided in NRC Bulletin 2005-02, NEI guidance as endorsed in Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-12 and to support the implementation of NEI 03-12.

D.2 Initiating Conditions, Initiating conditions and their corresponding emergency actions levels are contained in the BASIS document beginning on page D-4. Classification procedure (RP/0/A/1000/001) provides the guidance necessary to classify events and promptly declare the appropriate emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to cognizant facility staff that an emergency action level threshold has been exceeded. Specific response procedures are in place for the Control Room, Technical Support Center and the Emergency Operations Facility which delineate the required response during the appropriate classification.

10CFR50.47b(5). Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency personnel by all organizations; the content of initial and follow-up messages to response organizations and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.

IOCFR50 Appendix E.IVC, Activation of Emergency Organization,

1. The entire spectrum of emergency conditions that involve the alerting or activating of progressively larger segments of the total emergency organization shall be described. The communication steps to be taken to alert or activate emergency personnel under each class of emergency shall be described. Emergency action levels (based not only on onsite and offsite radiation monitoring information but also on readings from a number of sensors that indicate a potential emergency, such as the pressure in containment and the response of the Emergency Core Cooling System) for notification of offsite agencies shall be described. The existence, but not the details, of a message authentication scheme shall be noted for such agencies.

The emergency classes defined shall include: (1) Notification of unusual events, (2) alert, (3) site area emergency, and (4) general emergency. These classes are further discussed in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1.

2. By June 20, 2012, nuclear power reactor licensees shall establish and maintain the capability to assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after the availability of indications to plant operators that an emergency action level has been exceeded and shall promptly declare the emergency condition as soon as possible following identification of the appropriate emergency classification level. Licensees shall not construe these criteria as a grace period to attempt to restore plant conditions to avoid declaring an emergency action due to an emergency action level that has been exceeded. Licensees shall not construe these criteria as preventing implementation of response actions deemed by the licensee to be necessary to protect public health and safety provided that any delay in declaration does not deny the State and local authorities the opportunity to implement measures necessary to protect the public health and safety.

ONS E Plan Section E Notification, E.1 & E.2 Response Organization Notification Procedures have been developed that describe the basis for notification of response organizations that is consistent with the emergency classification and action level scheme. An Emergency Organization Recall has been developed for the augmentation of support during an emergency situation. Figures A-2A and A-2B illustrate the methods used by the Operations Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator to activate the Emergency Response Organization.

E.3 & E.4 Initial and Follow-up Message Formats. A single message format has been established that will be used by the Oconee Nuclear Site to properly notify Oconee and Pickens Counties and the South Carolina Emergency Management Division of an emergency situation at the facility. Notification and authentication procedures are in place for all designated agencies.

10CFR50.47b(6). Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations to emergency personnel and to the public.

10CFR50 Appendix E.IVD. Notification Procedures,

1. Administrative and physical means for notifying local, State, and Federal officials and agencies and agreements reached with these officials and agencies for the prompt notification of the public and for public evacuation or other protective measures, should they become necessary, shall be described. This description shall include identification of the appropriate officials, by title and agency, of the State and local government agencies within the EPZs.

2. Provisions shall be described for yearly dissemination to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency planning information, such as the methods and times required for public notification and the protective actions planned if an accident occurs, general information as to the nature and effects of radiation, and a listing of local broadcast stations that will be used for dissemination of information during an emergency. Signs or other measures shall also be used to disseminate to any transient population within the plume exposure pathway EPZ appropriate information that would be helpful if an accident occurs.

3. A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes after declaring an emergency. The licensee shall demonstrate that the appropriate governmental authorities have the capability to make a public alerting and notification decision promptly on being informed by the licensee of an emergency condition.

ONS E Plan Section F Emergency Communications, Provisions exist for prompt communications among principal response organizations and to emergency personnel and to the public.

F.1. Emergency Response Organization. The Emergency Response Organization has been developed in such a manner to list primary and alternate personnel. Primary and backup means of communication between the Site, local government agencies, and State response organizations have been established (Figure F-1).

F. L.a Calls to activate State/County agency's emergency function are the responsibility of the Operations Shift Manager/Emergency Coordinator.

10CFR50.47(8). Adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support the emergency response are provided and maintained.

10CFR50 Appendix E.IVE, Emergency Facilities and Equipment, Adequate provisions shall be made and described for emergency facilities and equipment, including:

1. Equipment at the site for personnel monitoring;

2. Equipment for determining the magnitude of and for continuously assessing the impact of the release of radioactive materials to the environment;

3. Facilities and supplies at the site for decontamination of onsite individuals;

4. Facilities and medical supplies at the site for appropriate emergency first aid treatment;

5. Arrangements for medical service providers qualified to handle radiological emergencies onsite;

6. Arrangements for transportation of contaminated injured individuals from the site to specifically identified treatment facilities outside the site boundary;

7. Arrangements for treatment of individuals injured in support of licensed activities on the site at treatment facilities outside the site boundary; 8.a. (i) A licensee onsite technical support center and an emergency operations facility from which effective direction can be given and effective control can be exercised during an emergency; (ii) For nuclear power reactor licensees, a licensee onsite operational support center;...

ONS E Plan Section H. Emer2ency Facilities and Equipment, H. L.a Technical Support Center, A Technical Support Center has been designated for the Oconee Nuclear Station in the area known as the Operations Center, together with the nearby offices adjacent to the Control Rooms l&2 on the fifth floor of the Auxiliary Building. This area has the same ventilation and shielding as the Control Room enabling plant management and supporting technical and engineering personnel to evaluate plant status and support operations in conjunction with the Operational Support Center.

H. 1.b Operational Support Center (Figure H-2) An Operational Support Center has been established in the Operations Center located in the control room area of Unit #3. Personnel assigned to this support center will include the following: Work Control; Chemistry; Radiation Protection; Maintenance; Safety; Operations; Engineering; Nuclear Supply Chain; Security...

10CFR50.47b(9), Adequate methods, systems, and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition are in use.

10CFR50Appendix E.IVE8e, By June 20, 2012, for a nuclear power reactor licensee's emergency operations facility required by paragraph 8.a of this section, a facility having the following capabilities:

(1) The capability for obtaining and displaying plant data and radiological information for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves; (2) The capability to analyze plant technical information and provide technical briefings on event conditions and prognosis to licensee and offsite response organizations for each reactor at a nuclear power reactor site and for each nuclear power reactor site that the facility serves; ONS E Plan Section I. Accident Assessment, To assure the adequacy of methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition.

1.1 Emergency Action Level Procedures Implementing procedures to the Oconee Nuclear Station Emergency Plan have been developed. These procedures have been developed by many sections of the station.

1.2 Onsite Capability and Resources to Provide Initial Values and Continuing Assessment. Procedures have been developed for taking and analyzing post-accident reactor coolant samples using either the normal sample points or the existing PALS sample panels.

10CFR50.47b(O). A range of protective actions has been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public. In developing this range of actions, consideration has been given to evacuation, sheltering, and, as a supplement to these, the prophylactic use of potassium iodide (KI), as appropriate. Evacuation time estimates have been developed by applicants and licensees. Licensees shall update the evacuation time estimates on a periodic basis. Guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed.

10CFR50 Appendix E - no specific items from Appendix E ONS E Plan Section J Protective Response. To assure that a range of protective actions is available for the plume exposure pathway for emergency workers and the public. Guidelines for protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place and protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway appropriate to the locale have been developed. To protect onsite personnel during hostile action and ensure the continued ability to safely shutdown the reactor and perform the functions of the emergency plan a range of protective actions are in place. These include; accountability, assembly, station evacuation, and PARs. ETEs support the PARs.

IOCFR50.47b(13) General plans for recovery and reentry are developed.

10CFR50 Appendix E.IVH, Recovery. Criteria to be used to determine when, following an accident, reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could be resumed shall be described.

ONS E Plan Section M. Recovery And Reentry Planning And Post-Accident Operations.

M. 1 Reentry/Recovery Plans and Procedures. After the EOF is activated, it is the EOF Director's responsibility to determine when it is appropriate to enter into Recovery and to terminate from an emergency event. Emergency Plan procedures identify criteria that must be addressed before terminating the emergency condition and initiating recovery operations. The decision to terminate from a General Emergency condition must be discussed with the Senior NRC and State(s) representatives.

Decisions to relax protective actions for the public will be made by the appropriate State representatives. The EOF Director will provide information to the appropriate State agencies to facilitate the decision.

10CFR50.47b(14), Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodic drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be) corrected.

10CFR50 Appendix E.IVF, Training

1. The program to provide for: (a) The training of employees and exercising, by periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure that employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency response duties, and (b) The participation in the training and drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiological emergency shall be described. This shall include a description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the following categories of emergency personnel:...

ONS E Plan Section N, Exercises and Drills. To assure that periodic exercises are conducted to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, that the results of exercises form the basis for corrective action for identified deficiencies and that periodic drills are conducted to develop and maintain key skills...

10CFR50.47b(15). Radiological emergency response training is provided to those who may be called on to assist in an emergency.

IOCFR50 Appendix E.IVF. Training

1. The program to provide for: (a) The training of employees and exercising, by periodic drills, of emergency plans to ensure that employees of the licensee are familiar with their specific emergency response duties, and (b) The participation in the training and drills by other persons whose assistance may be needed in the event of a radiological emergency shall be described. This shall include a description of specialized initial training and periodic retraining programs to be provided to each of the following categories of emergency personnel:...

ONS E Plan Section 0. Emergency Response Training. To insure that emergency response training is provided to those who may be called upon to assist in an emergency.

Site Specific Training - Offsite Emergency Organization

0. 1 Offsite Emergency Response Training. The Oconee Nuclear Site will provide for the training of certain offsite response organizations. Site specific Emergency Response Training will be provided on an annual basis for Fire Support, Medical/Rescue, and Governmental Support. The Local Law Enforcement Agencies Training Program will be provided biennially (every two years) .....

10CFR50.47b(16), Responsibilities for plan development and review and for distribution of emergency plans are established, and planners are properly trained.

IOCFR50 Appendix E. IVG, Maintaining Emergency Preparedness. Provisions to be employed to ensure that the emergency plan, its implementing procedures, and emergency equipment and supplies are maintained up to date shall be described.

ONS E Plan Section P. Responsibility for the Planning Effort: Development, Periodic Review and Distribution of the Emergency Plans. To assure that responsibilities for plan development, review and distribution of emergency plans are established and that planners are properly trained:

P. 1 Training for Emergency Planning Personnel Training for emergency planning personnel shall be provided in the form of workshop/seminar sessions on an annual basis. Courses developed by the Duke Training Center are also available in technically related subjects that will enhance the working knowledge of these people.

Compliance Evaluation and

Conclusion:

BLOCK 4 Evaluation:

As can be seen in the attached comparison matrix, a large portion of the changes were for formatting, procedure number updates, titles and organizational changes. These changes (3-9, 12-17, 20,23-25, Add'l changes 10,11, Fig P1 changes 1-2, 62, 63, 70, 79, 87, 91, and 133) are considered editorial and will no longer be included in this effectiveness review. Other changes were made to: clarify content; ensure the accuracy, content and correctness of the ONS E Plan; to document the change in technology used to notify the ERO from pagers to cell phones; to update the list of procedures that implement each section of the plan to ensure its accuracy and completeness and also to eliminate reference to directives which listed responsibilities and expectations but did not provide implementing steps/actions for personnel to actually take. The various changes not considered editorial were undertaken to ensure a complete and accurate E Plan that continues to show compliance with all regulatory requirements. Working through each of the regulations during this effectiveness review shows how compliance was maintained.

10CFR50.47b(1) changes made impacting this regulation (listed as additional changes 1-4 on comparison matrix) were to show the re-alignment of duties associated with Radwaste from the Chemistry department to being performed by Operations.

Regulations continue to be met, the Operations personnel perform the tank farm and radwaste operations previously done by chemistry, therefore changes made to the ONS E Plan were made to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance. Also figures were changed to show that the SM is responsible for initiating the recall of the ERO but delegates the actual implementation of the recall to Security or Operations personnel if security is unable to accomplish as a result of the change from pagers to cell phones which is discussed in the system change 50.54q. Additionally, these changes also maintain the requirements 10CFR50 Appendix E.IVA. Organization 1.

Therefore changes made to the ONS E Plan were made to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance.

10CFR50.47b(2) on-shift facility responsibilities continue to be provided for, the changes made to the E Plan in section B (comparison matrix 3, 4 and additional item 5) were made to ensure accuracy of the E Plan by revising the listing to the Ops Department performing tank and radwaste operations, therefore changes made to the ONS E Plan were made to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance. Additionally, these changes also maintain the requirements 10CFR50 Appendix E.IVA. Organization 2. Therefore changes made to the ONS E Plan were made to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance.

Compliance Evaluation and

Conclusion:

LOC 4 10CFR50.47b(3) a thorough review of the requirements and the ONS E Plan revealed no changes necessary or made to the current ONS E Plan for this revision that impacts or could impact meeting the requirements of 10CFR50.47b(3) or 10CFR50 Appendix E.IVA Organization 3 10CFR50.47b(4) changes made to Section D of the ONS E Plan (comparison matrix 5,6,7) were within the basis statements to clearly show how Operations now performs tank and radwaste operations including revising the procedure used to conduct them. Therefore changes made to the ONS E Plan were made to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance with IOCFR50.47b(4) as well as IOCFR50 Appendix E.IVB Assessment Actions. No changes were made to any EALs or any IC's, therefore compliance is maintained.

10CFR50.47b(5) while no actual changes were made to Section E of the ONS E Plan, reference was made in section E to figures contained in Section A. These were verified to ensure accuracy, and continued compliance with regulations IOCFR50.47b(5) as well as 10CFR50 Appendix E.IVC, Activation of Emergency Organization.

10CFR50.47b(6) changes made to Section F of the ONS E Plan (comparison matrix additional items 6, 7, 8, 9) were made as a result of the changeover from pagers to cell phones and a pager activation system activated by the shift manager to a computer based system called ERONS with shift manager delegating the task of activation to security if available or any available qualified operator if security is unable to activate the system. The changes made to the ONS E Plan were done to ensure fleet consistency. Additionally, an editorial change was made to assure appropriate terminology was used when referring to the backup TSC and OSC. Previously listed as alternate TSC and OSC. Therefore changes made to the ONS E Plan were made to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance with 10CFR50.47b(6) as well as 10CFR50 Appendix E.IVD Notification Procedures.

10CFR50.47b(8) changes made to Section H of the ONS E Plan (comparison matrix 9, 10, 11) were made as a result of the organizational change and ownership of the radwaste function from Chemistry to Ops. Also, a previously made revision was eliminated as could have resulted in misinterpretation of requirements associated with which procedures would require an effectiveness review. Therefore changes made to the ONS E Plan were made to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance with IOCFR50.47b(8) as well as 10CFR50 Appendix E.IVE Emergency Facilities and Equipment.

10CFR50.47b(9) changes made to Section I of the ONS E Plan (comparison matrix 12-15) were editorial and completed to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance with IOCFR50.47b(9) as well as 10CFR50 Appendix E.IVE8c associated with radiological releases and dose assessment.

10CFR50.47b(10) changes made to Section J of the ONS E Plan (comparison matrix 16) were editorial associated with renumbering of procedures and completed to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance with 10CFR50.47b(10) for protective response.

10CFR50.47b(13) changes made to Section M of the ONS E Plan (comparison matrix 17) were editorial associated with renumbering of procedures and completed to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance with 10CFR50.47b(13) and 10CFR50 Appendix E.IVH for recovery operations.

10CFR50.47b(14) changes made to Section N of the ONS E Plan (comparison matrix 18-28) were made to ensure consistency with the fleet model, ensure the ONS E Plan reflects the new revised EP rules associated with drills and exercises, as well as editorial changes to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance with 10CFR50.47b(14) for periodic drills and exercises as well as 10CFR50 Appendix E.IVF for Training.

10CFR50.47b(15) a thorough review of the requirements and the ONS E Plan Section 0 revealed no changes necessary or made to the current ONS E Plan for this revision that impacts or could impact meeting the requirements of 10CFR50.47b(15) or IOCFR50 Appendix E.IVF Training.

10CFR50.47b(16) changes made to Section P of the ONS E Plan (comparison matrix 29-31) were made to ensure consistency between the requirements for independent review and which group is responsible for that review. Also an editorial change was made to eliminate a duplicated paragraph, and to correct wording associated with the conduct of the quarterly telephone number update. Therefore changes made to the ONS E Plan were made to ensure its continued accuracy thereby ensuring continued compliance with 10CFR50.47b(16) as well as IOCFR50 Appendix E.IVG Maintaining Emergency Preparedness.

Therefore as can be seen by the line by line and rule by rule comparison the ONS E Plan as revised will continue to comply with the requirements.

Conclusion:

The proposed activity N does / El does not continue to comply with the requirements.

Reduction in Effectiveness (RIE) Evaluation and

Conclusion:

54" Evaluation:

The comparison matrix provides the reason for each proposed change. These changes will be discussed by comparison matrix number. Changes identified as editorial will not be discussed.

1. Comparison Matrix (CM) #1, 28, P1# 113, - Figure N-I Schedule for Drills and/ or Exercises The elimination of a generic schedule from the E Plan was done to eliminate a generic schedule which provided no function, was not indicative of current schedules used by Emergency Preparedness and could have caused some confusion for auditors who may have thought that the Drill and Exercise Schedule should look like this generic schedule.

Therefore there is no reduction in effectiveness (RIE) as a result of this change.

2. CM #2 - contains a listing of changes made for each revision. As such to ensure correctness and completeness of the ONS E Plan this was revised to include the changes being made for this revision. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

3. CM #3-7, 9 - change as a result of a re-alignment of responsibilities associated with radwaste function. These changes are associated with the operation of radwaste being completed by the Operations Department versus Chemistry. Operations personnel have been trained on the operation of the radwaste system. The Chemistry personnel who had previously performed radwaste functions have been subsumed into the Operations department, therefore there has been no reduction in effectiveness of the ONS E Plan as a result.

4. CM#10 - revised the wording as indicated in the compliance matrix. Previous wording could have resulted in changes being made to implementing procedures without an appropriate 50.54q review. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

5. CM# 1I - The elimination of the locations listing for the emergency kits actually improves the accuracy of the ONS E Plan. The previous listing did not include all the kits in all the various locations. Additionally the locations listed were not specific enough to determine exactly where the kits were stored. The exact locations of the kits is included in the various inventory and surveillance procedures. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

6. CM#18, 19, 21, 22, 26 - The changes to the NRC rules and regulations associated with drills and exercises prompted this change. This change therefore is a conforming change and as such there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

7. CM # 27 - is a grammatical change with no change in intent. This change actually more closely matches the requirements. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

8. CM#29 - is a change in responsibility. It corrects a previous incorrect listing which showed a contracted board having this responsibility versus a Duke employee. This is actually an improvement in accuracy of the ONS E Plan. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

9. CM#30 - the elimination of a duplicate paragraph serves to ensure the accuracy and correctness of the ONS E Plan. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

10. CM#31 - the elimination of an inaccurate statement with respect to the requirement to perform quarterly phone number checks serves to ensure completeness and correctness of the ONS E Plan. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

11. Added changes to the CM (ACCM) #1 - the change from pagers being used to notify the ERO to cell phones is fully reviewed and explained in the 50.54q effectiveness review completed for AD-EP-ALL-0301 which is on file in the Emergency Preparedness records and shows no reduction in effectiveness as a result of the change.

12. ACCM #2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 - the change from the SM performing the pager initiation to delegating the activation of ERONS / cell phones was fully reviewed and explained in the 50.54q effectiveness review completed for AD-EP-ALL-0301 which is on file in the Emergency Preparedness records and shows no reduction in effectiveness as a result of the change.

13. ACCM #6 - the change in terminology from alternate TSC/OSC to backup TSC/OSC is being made to ensure consistency with regulations and intent of the facility. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

14. ACCM#7 - changed paging to public address to ensure clear meaning of the intent of the system being used.

Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

15. Fig P 1 Changes (P1)#3, Added AD-EP-DEC -0107, new procedure number for EOF services, as this procedure implements AIb attributes, added titles of procedures as well for ease of use. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

16. P1#4-10, 12, 13, 16-24, 26-29, 32-40, 42, 44-49, 51-56, 58-61, 63-73, 77-79, 81-84, 86-96,98-112, 114 - 134 - procedures were revised, added or eliminated and titles were added to ensure complete and accurate listing of the implementing procedures by section. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

17. P I# 11, 14, - Revised to ensure appropriate procedures are listed. NSD 117 provides for the complete listing of the ERO positions and associated responsibilities. The procedures / plans that were eliminated duplicated information contained in NSD 117, and duplicated expectations and actions associated with site assembly and evacuation which are contained in: NSD 114, Site Assembly/Site Evacuation; RP/O/A/I000/009, Site Assembly; RP/0/A/l000/0 10, Evacuation, but did not provide specific implementing actions for personnel. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

18. Pl#15, - Added OMP 2-16 and NSD 117 to ensure that all major tasks to be performed by the persons to be assigned to the functional areas of emergency activity are included. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

19. P 1#25 - Previously listed procedures could have been implemented as a result of the declared events as stated in the E Plan for D 1a-d. However the intent of section D is to implement the EALs which is done via RP/0/A/ 1000/001. This revised list more accurately reflects intent of both the ONS E Plan and the requirements. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

20. P1#30, 41, - The procedure that implements the alerting notify and mobilizing of the ERO is RP/0/A/1000/002. The Division /Section Directives listed responsibilities and not the implementing procedure. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

21. P 1#3, 43, - Eliminated reference to RP/0/A/1000/001, as it does not define or establish message content. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

22. Pl#50, - Added appropriate procedures to ensure accuracy and completeness of list. RP/0/A/1000/002, is the OSM procedure which activates the ERO who then (the ERO) activate the TSC and is therefore not implementing this requirement.

Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

23. P 1#57, - Added ONS E Plan , and RP/0/A/1000/024 to ensure consistency with section H8 of the ONS E Plan. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

24. PI#62 - Corrected typo - RP/0/A/1000/010 should have been RP/0/A/1000/001. Added reference to ONS E Plan Section D as it contains the basis information. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

25. P 1#74 - Added NSD 114 to ensure accuracy and completeness of list, eliminated HP/0/B/1009/009, as it does not apply to J2. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

26. P1#75, - Added appropriate reference to NSD 114, and AP/0/A/1700/045 and RP/0/A/1000/009 as they directly apply to J3.

Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

27. P 1#76, - Added to ensure accuracy and completeness of list, eliminated SH/O/B/2005/001, as it does not apply to J4.

Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

28. P 1#80, - Added reference to ONS ETE as appropriate to ensure list is accurate and complete. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

29. P 1#85, - Ensure accuracy and completeness of list. Not a licensee responsibility. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

30. P1#97, - Ensure accuracy and completeness of list, HP/0/B/1009/018- Dose Projections, and SH/0/B/2005/001, Emergency Response Dose Projections do not apply to K7. Therefore there has been no RIE as a result of this change.

Per Reg Guide 1.219, the various functions should be reviewed to ensure that the functions can still be accomplished with no change in timing or timeliness of those functions.

10CFR50.47b(1), Per RG 1.219 the functions associated with this planning standard are:

(1) Responsibility for emergency response is assigned.

(2) The response organization has the staff to respond and to augment staff on a continuing basis (i.e., 24/7 support) in accordance with the emergency plan.

As can be seen by the above review of the various changes identified in the comparison matrix, the review of those changes against the function(s) identified, the function(s) continue(s) to be met, with no change in the timing or timeliness. Therefore there has been no reduction in the effectiveness of the ONS E Plan when complying with the requirements of this planning standard.

10CFR50.47b(2) Per RG 1.219 the functions associated with this planning standard are:

(1) The process ensures that onshift emergency response responsibilities are staffed and assigned.

(2) The process for timely augmentation of onshift staff is established and maintained.

As can be seen by the above review of the various changes identified in the comparison matrix, the review of those changes against the function(s) identified, the function(s) continue(s) to be met, with no change in the timing or timeliness. Therefore there has been no reduction in the effectiveness of the ONS E Plan when complying with the requirements of this planning standard.

10CFR50.47b(4), Per RG 1.219 the functions associated with this planning standard is:

(1) A standard scheme of emergency classification and action levels is in use.

As can be seen by the above review of the various changes identified in the comparison matrix, the review of those changes against the function(s) identified, the function(s) continue(s) to be met, with no change in the timing or timeliness. A standard EAL scheme has been maintained. Therefore there has been no reduction in the effectiveness of the ONS E Plan when complying with the requirements of this planning standard.

10CFR50.47b(6), Per RG 1.219 the functions associated with this planning standard are:

(1) Systems are established for prompt communication among principal emergency response organizations.

(2) Systems are established for prompt communication to emergency response personnel.

As can be seen by the above review of the various changes identified in the comparison matrix, the review of those changes against the function(s) identified, the function(s) continue(s) to be met, with no change in the timing or timeliness. Therefore there has been no reduction in the effectiveness of the ONS E Plan when complying with the requirements of this planning standard.

10CFR50.47b(8), Per RG 1.219 the functions associated with this planning standard are:

(1) Adequate facilities are maintained to support emergency response.

(2) Adequate equipment is maintained to support emergency response As can be seen by the above review of the various changes identified in the comparison matrix, the review of those changes against the function(s) identified, the function(s) continue(s) to be met, with no change in the timing or timeliness. Therefore there has been no reduction in the effectiveness of the ONS E Plan when complying with the requirements of this planning standard.

10CFR50.47b(9), (10), (13), changes associated with these planning standards meet the definitions of editorial changes and no evaluation is required.

10CFR50.47b(14), (16) changes associated with this planning standard meet the requirements for either editorial changes or compliance changes and therefore by definition there has been no reduction in effectiveness per Reg Guide 1.219.

Therefore, a line by line change by change review, compared with a function by function review has been completed and continue to show that there has been no reduction in the effectiveness of the ONS E Plan as a result of the proposed changes.

==

Conclusion:==

The proposed activity El does / Z does not constitute a RIE.

Effectiveness Evaluation Results

[ The activity does continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E and the activity does not constitute a reduction in effectiveness. Therefore, the activity can be implemented without prior approval.

F- The activity does not continue to comply with the requirements of §50.47(b) and §50 Appendix E or the activity does constitute a reduction in effectiveness. Therefore, the activity cannot be implemented without prior approval.

Pr..........

ar......

r...am..........

Preparer Name:

John Kaminski 1.

Pre r ign; re,.

ae Reviewer Name: Re *i Signatu. Date:

Don Growl . /-

Approver Name: A pro r Date:

Pat Street A.,_tA-Revision

ONS Emergency Plan Revision 2014 -002 Com arison Matrix Change Section Current wording Proposed wording Reason for change 1 List of N-I Schedule for Drills and / or (deleted) It's a generic schedule that Figs Exercises serves no purpose and is not used to meet any requirement 2 Record of (Nothing) Adds list of proposed changes for Maintain the record of changes rev 2014-02 changes accurate 3 B - Fig. 15. Radwaste Operations - 15. Radwaste Operations - Organizational re-structuring B-i Chemistry Group Operations Group 4 B- Fig. B- Chemistry Operations Organizational re-structuring 10 - Tank farm operation - Tank farm operation

- Radwaste Operation - Radwaste Operation 5 D - Encl Chemistry will use CP.. .and / or Operations will use Organizational re-structuring 4.3 page CP... to quantify a liquid release OP/0/A/I 104/068 and/or D-26 OP/0/A/1 104/072 to quantify a liquid release 6 change number not used 7 D Encl 4.3 Liquid effluent is discharged by Liquid effluent is discharged by Organizational re-structuring page D-32 chemistry... Operations...

8 G.3a page SR/0/B/2000/001 SR/0/A/2000/001 Editorial - procedure number G-2 RP/0/B/1000/028 RP/0/A/1000/028 change.

9 H.5.b Radioactive liquid.., coordinated Radioactive liquid.., coordinated Organizational re-structuring page H-5 between Operations and by Operations and controlled ...

Radwaste Chemistry and controlled...

10 H. 10, Procedures used to calibrate.., as deleted Procedures used to inventory page H-8 a part of the normal site are in fact implementing administration procedures. procedures.

11 H. 11 page Identification of Emergency Kits Identification of Emergency Kits Several locations were not H-9 Emergency kits are located in the Emergency kits are located in listed. No need to list the various locations. See figures locations here, the procedures listed below and procedures identify the location.

identified on those figures for locations.

12 1.1 page I- RP/0/B/1000/001 RP/0/A/1000/001 Editorial - procedure number I change.

13 1.3a page RP/0/B/1000/001 RP/0/A/1000/001 Editorial - procedure number 1-3 change.

14 1.5 page I- ETS ENS Editorial as change to ENS 4 was made several years ago.

15 Fig 1-3, RP/0/B/1000/018 RP/0/A/1000/018 Editorial - procedure number Spage I- 16 change.

16 , J-7 page RP/0/B/1000/018 RP/0/A/1000/018 EOF Procedure number added, J-3, Fig J- SR/0/A/2000/003 updated classification from B 1 page J-7 to A 17 M.3 page RP/0/B/1000/031 RP/0/A/1000/031 Editorial - procedure number M-3 SR/0/B/2000/003 SR/O/A/2000/003 and / or title change.

Recovery will be... Oconee Recovery will be... Oconee Environmental Work Practice, Nuclear Environmental Work Section 2.0 Practice, Section 5.1 Spill

Response

18 N.la & ... will be tested within a six year ... will be tested within an eight Reflect change in regulations.

N. 1.b schedule, calendar year cycle.

page N-i Once every six years, ... Once every eight calendar year I cycle...

ONS Emergency Plan Revision 2014 -002 Comparison Matrix Change Section Current wording Proposed wording Reason for change 19 N.2 page Drills shall be conducted to test, Oconee Nuclear Station will Consistency with fleet model.

N-i develop and maintain skills in a conduct drills in accordance with More accurately reflects particular operation on the requirements of I OCFR50, practice and requirements.

following frequency: Appendix E. Drills shall be

a. General Oconee Nuclear Site conducted to test, develop and will conduct drills in accordance maintain skills in a particular with 10CFR50 Appendix E to operation. Drills may be a ensure that adequate emergency component of an exercise. Drills response capabilities are will be conducted and evaluated maintained between exercises. At by a designated drill director.

least one drill will be conducted Drills will be held in accordance between exercises involving a with Emergency Preparedness combination of the principal FAM Guide Section 3.19, functional areas of Oconee's on Exercises and Drills.

site emergency response capabilities.

20 N.2 a thru NA NA Editorial - reformatted, h renumbered for consistency with fleet format 21 N.2 N.2.e Radiological Monitoring N.2.d Station environs and Consistency with fleet model.

Drills radiological monitoring drills (on- More accurately reflects A drill involving onsite and site and off-site) shall be requirements.

offsite radiological monitoring conducted annually. These drills teams will be conducted annually. shall include collection and The monitoring teams will analysis of all sample media (e.g.

actually collect and analyze air water, vegetation, soil and air).

samples, as appropriate. Soil, vegetable, and water samples may or may not be taken, as this is done in conjunction with the normal site environmental program. Decision to test these procedures during drills/exercises will be made by the Manager of Emergency Planning.

22 N.2. N.2.f Radiation Protection Drills N.2e Radiation Protection drills Consistency with fleet model.

Radiation Protection drills shall shall be conducted semi-annually More accurately reflects be conducted semi-annually and which involve response to and ! requirements.

will test any one of the major analysis of, simulated elevated aspects of the Radiation airborne and liquid samples and Protection Emergency Response direct radiation measurements in duties. the environment. Analysis of samples may be simulated in Radiation Protection drills.

23 N.2 N.2g N.2f Editorial - reformatted, and 24 N.2 N.2h N.2g renumbered for consistency 25 N.2 N.2i N.2h with fleet format 26 N.3 Drill scenarios are developed to Drill scenarios are developed to deleted Figure as it is generic test various components of the test various components of the and is not needed to meet emergency plan. An annual emergency plan. An annual requirements.

schedule of the drills to be schedule of the drills to be conducted is developed to ensure conducted is developed to ensure that all required drills are that all required drills are conducted. (Figure N-1) conducted and included as part of the site's work schedule.

ONS Emergency Plan Revision 2014 -002 Comparison Matrix Change Section Current wording Proposed wording Reason for change 27 N.5 Critique Action Items Critique Action Items provide clarity Action items established as a Action items established as a result of an ONS drill/exercise or result of an ONS drill/exercise or significant event/real emergency significant event/real emergency shall be identified and tracked shall be identified and tracked until resolution is completed. using the corrective actions program until resolution is completed.

28 Figure N- Schedule for Emergency Drills deleted generic and not reflective of I actual schedule and is not needed to meet requirements.

29 P.9, page The Nuclear Safety Review The NOS Audit Manager will Ensure correct assignment of P-2 Board Chairman will arrange for arrange for an independent review responsibility.

an independent review of Oconee of Oconee Nuclear Station's Nuclear Station's Emergency Emergency Preparedness Preparedness Program Program 30 P9, page The review findings will be deleted deleted second paragraph as it P-3 submitted to the appropriate is same as the one above corporate and nuclear site management. Appropriate portions of the review findings will be reported to the involved federal, state, and local organizations. The corporate or nuclear site management, as appropriate, will evaluate the findings affecting their area of responsibility and ensure effective corrective actions are taken. The result of the review, along with recommendations for improvements, will be documented and retained for a period of five years.

31 P 10, page The Emergency Telephone The Emergency Telephone The second sentence deleted P-3 Directory is updated quarterly. Directory is updated quarterly. as it provided no value and is The Emergency Telephone inconsistent with fleet format Directory is a separate document and is not a part of the Oconee Nuclear Site Implementing Procedures.

Additional changes as a result of implementation of ERONS and other last minute identified issues Ale, page ...The Oconee Nuclear Station has ...The Oconee Nuclear Station has Pager technology is being A-3 assigned duty personnel who are assigned duty personnel who are eliminated and use of cell on call by phone or pager after on call by notification device after phones which can accept hours and on weekends... hours and on weekends... multiple means for notifying the ERO member. A generic term of notification device is being used.

2 Ale, page ...The OSM (or Designee) will Security will activate the ERO. In Fleet consistency A-3 activate the ERO pagers... the event Security is unavailable to perform the activation such as during a Security threat, the OSM or designee will activate the ERO.

ONS Emergency Plan Revision 2014 -002 Com parison Matrix Change Section Current wording Proposed wording Reason for change 3 Fig A-2A, Block diagram revised block diagram showing Fleet consistency page A-6 new process 4 Fig A2-B Block diagram revised block diagram showing Fleet consistency page A-7 new process 5 Fig B-i1 Common EOF - Multi Unit Site Common EOF - Multi Unit Site More generic term for device page B-21 Event Staffing Block Diagram Event Staffing Block Diagram being used.

Note 1: Pagers activated for Note 1: Notification Devices second unit activated for second unit 6 Fl d3 Alternate Technical Support Backup Technical Support Center consistent with purpose and Center intent- the facility is the backup to the TSC and the backup to the OSC.

Regulation changes require an alternate facility if the site is unapproachable due to a hostile action. This assures a clear distinction between the two.

7 Fld7 Paging System Public Address System (PA) ensure clear meaning of system used.

8 F 1e, page Normal Working Hours Normal Working Hours Fleet consistency F-4 2. Activate the offsite pagers from 2. Security will activate the ERO.

the TSC or request the In the event Security is Switchboard to activate offsite unavailable to perform the pagers. activation such as during a Security threat, the SM or designee will activate the ERO 9 F Ie, page Weekends Holidays... Weekends Holidays... Fleet consistency F-5 1. Activate the offsite pagers from 1. Security will activate the ERO.

the TSC or request Security to Security is perform this function. Security unavailable to perform the will also set in motion the activation such as during a Nuclear Callout System for Security threat, the SM or additional personnel to fill the designee will activate the ERO emergency response positions.

10 Fig H-15 SR/O/B/4600/086 ST/0/A/4600/086 Editorial - procedure number and / or title change.

11 Fl d4 NA (added appropriate radio editorial for additional frequencies) clarification of radios in use

Changes Associated With Fig P-1 Imnlementin* Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason I NA (NA) Generic - Added editorial.

names of procedures A. 1a, Each plan shall identify the Appendix 5 - ONS Emergency editorial expanded to include State, local, Federal and private Agreement Letters Plan, Appendix 5 title sector organizations... Agreement Letters 3 A. lb, Each organization and sub- RP/O/A/1000/002, RP/O/A/1000/002 Added AD-EP DEC -0107, organization having an operational RP/0/A/1000/019, RP/O/A/ 1000/019 new procedure number for role shall specify its concept of SR/0/A/2000/003, RP/0/A/1000/025 EOF services, as this operations, and its relationship to RP/O/A/1000/025, AD-EP-DEC-0107 procedure implements Alb the total effort SAD 6.1 SR/O/A/2000/003 attributes, added titles of procedures 4 AIc, Each plan shall illustrate (NA) ONS E Plan, Fig AI Added to ensure accuracy and these interrelationships in a block completeness of list diagram 5 A d, Each organization shall (NA) RP/0/A/1000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and identify a specific individual by SR/O/A/2000/003 completeness of list title who shall be in charge.

6 Ale, Each organization shall (NA) RP/0/A/100/002 Added to ensure accuracy and provide for 24-hour per day completeness of list emergency response, including 24-hour per day manning of communications links 7 A2a, Each organization shall Appendix 5 - NA - State/County Coincides with ONS E Plan specify the functions and Agreement Letters Responsibility which lists the state and responsibilities for major elements county plans and key individuals by title, of emergency response, including...

8 A2b, Each plan shall contain (by (NA) NA - State/County Coincides with ONS E Plan reference to specific acts, codes or Responsibility which lists the 'state and statutes) the legal basis for such county plans authorities.

9 A3, Each plan shall include written (NA) ONS Emergency Added to ensure accuracy and agreements referring to the concept Plan, Appendix 5 completeness of list of operations developed between.

Federal, State, and local agencies and other support organizations 10 A4, Each principal organization (NA) RP/0/A/1000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and shall be capable of continuous (24- RP/0/A/1000/019 completeness of list hour)operations for a protracted RP/0/A/1000/025 period.... SR/O/A/2000/003 11 B 1, Each licensee shall specify the CSM 5.1, ONS E Plan Revised to ensure appropriate onsite emergency organization of MD 9.1, NSD 117 procedures are listed. NSD plant staff personnel for all shifts WPG 1.5, RP/0/A/1000/002 117 provides for the complete and its relation to the OMP 1-7, RP/0/A/1000/019 listing of the ERO positions responsibilities and duties of the RPSM 1I. 1, RP/0/A/1000/022 and associated responsibilities.

normal staff compliment Business RP/0/A/1000/029 The procedures / plans that Management AD-EP-DEC-0 107 were eliminated duplicated Emergency Plan, information contained in NSD SSG-102, 117, and duplicated NSC- 110, expectations and actions EM-5.1, associated with site assembly DTG-007 and evacuation which are contained in:

NSD 114, Site Assembly/Site Evacuation, RP/0/A/1000/009, Site Assembly, RP/0/A/1000/010, Evacuation

Changes Associated With Fig P-I Imnlementin* Plan1 Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 12 B2, Each licensee shall designate (NA) RP/O/A/1000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and an individual as emergency RP/0/A/1000/019 completeness of list coordinator who shall be on shift at SR/O/A/2000/003 all times and who shall have...

13 B3, Each licensee shall identify a (NA) RP/O/A/l000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and line of succession for the RP/O/A/1000/019 completeness of list emergency coordinator position SR/O/A/2000/003 and identify the specific NSD 117 conditions...

14 B4, Each licensee shall establish SAD 6.1, RP/O/A/IO00/002 Added NSD 117 because it the functional responsibilities RP/0/A/1000/019, RP/0/A/ 1000/019 provides for the complete assigned to the emergency RP/0/A/1000/002, SR/O/A/2000/003 listing of the ERO positions coordinator and shall clearly SR/O/B/2000/003 NSD 117 and associated responsibilities.

specify which responsibilities may SAD 6.1 was duplicative of not be delegated to... NSD 117 15 B5, Each licensee shall specify the RP/0/A/1000/019, OMP 2-16 Added OMP 2-16 and NSD positions or title and major tasks to RP/O/A/1000/025, NSD 117, 117 to ensure that all major be performed by the persons to be SR!O/B/2000/003 RP/0/A/1000/019, tasks to be performed by the assigned to the functional areas of RP/O/A/1000/025, persons to be assigned to the emergency activity. For SR/O/B/2000/003 functional areas of emergency emergency situations, specific activity are included.

assignments shall be...

16 B6, Each licensee shall specify the (NA) ONS E Plan Added to ensure accuracy and interfaces between and among the NSD 117 completeness of list onsite functional areas of SR/O/A/2000/003 emergency activity, licensee AD-EP-DEC-0107 headquarters support, local services support, and State and local government response organization...

17 B7, Each licensee shall specify the (NA) NSD 117 Added to ensure accuracy and corporate management, SR/O/A/2000/003 completeness of list administrative, and technical AD-EP-DEC-0107 support personnel who will RP/O/B/1000/027 augment the RP/0/A/1000/031 18 B8, Each licensee shall specify the (NA) ONS Emergency Added to ensure accuracy and contractor and private Plan, Appendix 5 completeness of list organizations who may be requested to provide technical assistance to and...

19 B9, Each licensee shall identify the (NA) ONS Emergency Added to ensure accuracy and services to be provided by local Plan, Appendix 5 completeness of list agencies for handling emergencies, e.g., police, ambulance, medical, hospital, and fire-fighting organizations...

20 C l a,b,c, The Federal government RP/0/B/1000/031, ONS Emergency Added to ensure accuracy and maintains in-depth capability to Appendix 5 - Plan, Appendix 5, completeness of list assist licensees, States and local Agreement Letters SR/O/A/2000/003 governments through the Federal RP/0/A/1000/031 Radiological Monitoring and RP/0/A/1000/037 Assessment Plan (formerly Radiological Assistance Plan 21 C2a, Each principal offsite (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and organization Responsibility completeness of list

Changes Associated With Fig P-1 lmnlemnentin* Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 22 C2b, The licensee shall prepare for (NA) EP FAM 3.11 Added to ensure accuracy and the dispatch of a representative to RP/O/A/1000/037 completeness of list principal offsite governmental emergency operations centers.

23 C3, Each organization shall (NA) HP/O/B/1009/026 Added to ensure accuracy and identify radio- logical laboratories completeness of list and their general capabilities and expected availability...

24 C4, Each organization shall (NA) ONS E Plan Added to ensure accuracy and identify nuclear and other SR/0/A/2000/003 completeness of list facilities, organizations or individuals which can be relied upon in an emergency to provide assistance...

25 D l, An emergency classification D1a, Dla-c Previously listed procedures and emergency action level scheme RP/0/A/1000/002, ONS E Plan could have been implemented as set forth in Appendix 1 must be RP/0/A/1000/0 19, RP/0/A/1000/001 as a result of the declared established by the licensee. SR/0/A/2000/003 events as stated in the E Plan Dlb, c, d for D 1a-d, However the intent RP/0/A/1000/002, of section D is to implement RP/0/A/1000/019, the EALs which is done via SR/0/A/2000/003, RP/0/A/1000/001. This AP/0/A/1700/045 revised list more accurately reflects intent of both the ONS E Plan and the requirements.

26 D2, The initiating conditions shall (NA) RP/0/A/1000/001 Added to ensure accuracy and include the example conditions completeness of list found in Appendix 1 and all postulated accidents in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for...

27 D3, Each State and local (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and organization shall establish an Responsibility completeness of list emergency classification and emergency action level scheme consistent 28 D4, Each State and local (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and organization should have Responsibility completeness of list procedures in place that provide for emergency actions to be taken which are consistent with the emergency actions 29 El, Each organization shall RP/0/A/1000/002 RP/0/A/1000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and establish procedures which RP/0/A/1000/015A completeness of list describe mutually agreeable bases RP/0/A/1000/015B for notification of response RP/0/A/1000/019 organizations consistent with the RP/0/A/1000/024 emergency classification and SR/0/A/2000/003 action...

30 E2, Each organization shall Division/Section RP/0/A/1000/002 The procedure that establish procedures for alerting, Directives implements the alerting notify notifying, and mobilizing and mobilizing of the ERO is emergency response personnel RP/0/A/1000/002

Changes Associated With Fig P-I lmalementing Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 31 E3, The licensee in conjunction RP/0/A/1000/015 A, RP/0/A/1000/002 Eliminated reference to with State and local organizations RP/0/A/1000/015 B, RP/0/A/1000/015A RP/0/A/1000/001, as it does shall establish the contents of the SR/0/B/2000/004, RP/0/A/1000/015B not define or establish initial emergency messages to be RP/0/A/1000/001, RP/0/A/1000/019 message content.

sent from the plant... RP/0/A/1000/002, RP/0/A/1000/024 RP/0/A/1000/019, SR/0/A/2000/003 SR/O/A/2000/003 32 E4a-n, Each licensee shall make (NA) RP/0/AI1000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and prov I s Ions for followup messages RP/0/A/1000/015A completeness of list from the facility to offsite RP/O/A/1000/015B authorities which shall contain... RP/0/A/ 1000/019 RP/O/A/1000/024 SR/0/A/2000/003 33 ES, State and local government (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and organizations shall establish a Responsibility completeness of list system for disseminating to the public appropriate information contained 34 E6, Each organization shall EP Functional Area EP Functional Area Added title for completeness establish administrative and Manual 3.3 Manual 3.3 and ease of use.

physical means, and the time required for notifying and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume...

35 E7, Each organization shall RP/0/A/1000/024, RP/0/A/1000/024, Added title for completeness provide written messages intended SR/0/A/2000/003 SR/0/A/2000/003 and ease of use for the public, consistent with the licensees classification scheme...

36 E8, Notifications Required for RP/0/A/1000/017 RP/0/A/1000/017 Added title for completeness Hazardous Chemical/Waste Spills and ease of use 37 F a, ... provision for 24-hour per RP/0/A/1000/002 RP/0/A/1000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and day notification to and activation RP/0/A/1000/015A completeness of list of the State/local emergency RP/0/A/1000/015B response network; and at a... RP/0/A/ 1000/019 SR!0/A/2000/003 38 Flb, provision for communications (NA) PT/0/A/2000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and with contiguous State/local completeness of list governments within the Emergency Planning Zones 39 FIc, provision for communications (NA) RP/0/A/1000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and as needed with Federal emergency RP/0/A/1000/015A completeness of list response... RP/0/A/1000/015B RP/0/A/1000/019 RP/0/B/1000/003A PT/0/B/2000/009 SR/0/A/2000/003 40 Fld, provision for communications (NA) PT/0/A/2000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and between the nuclear facility and ST/0/A44600/086 completeness of list the licensee's near site EOF... ST/0/A/4600/094 41 F l e, provision for alerting or Division/Section RP/0/A/1000/002 The procedure that activating emergency personnel in Directives implements the alerting notify each response and mobilizing of the ERO is RP/0/A/1000/002 42 F If, provision for communication (NA) PT/0/A/2000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and by the licensee with NRC RP/0/B/1000/003 A completeness of list headquarters and... PT/0/B/2000/009

Changes Associated With Fig P-1 Implementing Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 43 F2, Each organization shall ensure RP/0/A/1000/001 PT/0/A/2000/002 Eliminated reference to that a coordinated communication RP/O/A/1000/016 RP/0/A/1000/001, as it does link for fixed and mobile medical RP/0/A/1000/025 not implement comms, the support facilities.., appropriate procedures were added.

44 F3, Each organization shall (NA) PT/0/A/2000/002 Added to ensure accuracy and conduct periodic testing of the PT/0/B/2000/009 completeness of list entire emergency communications system (see evaluation criteria H.1O, N2a, and appendix 3) 45 G1, Each organization shall (NA) EP FAM 3.6 Added to ensure accuracy and provide a coordinated periodic (at NPM Chapter 15 completeness of list least annually)dissemination of information to the public regarding how they will be notified and what their actions should be...

46 G2, The public information (NA) EP FAM 3.6 Added to ensure accuracy and program shall provide the NPM Chapter 15 completeness of list permanent and transient adult population within the plume exposure EPZ an adequate opportunity to become aware of the information annually. The programs should include 47 G3a,b, Each principal organization SR/O/B/2000/001, RP/O/A/1000/028 Added RP/0/A/1000/031, to shall designate the points of RP/0/A/1000/028 RP/O/A/1000/031 ensure accuracy and contact and physical locations for SR/0/B/2000/001 completeness of list use by news media during...

48 G4a,b, c, Each principal (NA) RP/0/A/1000/028 Added to ensure accuracy and organization shall designate a RP/0/A/1000/031 completeness of list spokesperson who should have SR/0/B/2000/001 access to all necessary information...

49 G5, Each organization shall (NA) NPM Chapter 15 Added to ensure accuracy and conduct coordinated programs at completeness of list least annually to acquaint news media with the emergency plans, information concerning radiation, and points of contact for...

50 H I a,b,c, Each licensee shall RP/0/A/1000/002 RP/0/A/1000/019 Added to ensure accuracy and establish a Technical Support RP/0/A/1000/025 completeness of list.

Center and an onsite operations HP/0/B/1009/001 RP/0/A/1000/002, is the OSM support center (assembly area)in PT/0/A/2000/002 procedure which activates the accordance with NUREG-0696, PT/0/A/2000/008 ERO who then activates the Revision 1 PT/0/A/2000/010 TSC and is therefore not implementing this requirement.

51 H2, Each licensee shall establish (NA) SR/O/A/2000/003 Added to ensure accuracy and an Emergency Operations Facility ST/0/A44600/086 completeness of list from which evaluation and ST/0/A/4600/094 coordination of all licensee activities related to an emergency is to be carried out and...

52 H3, Each organization shall (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and establish an emergency operations Responsibility completeness of list center for use in directing and controlling response...

Changes Associated With Fig P-1 Implementing Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 53 H4, Each organization shall RP/O/A/1000/002 NSD 117 Added to ensure accuracy and provide for timely activation and RP/0/A/1000/019, RP/0/A/1000/002 completeness of list staffing of the facilities and centers SR/0/A/2000/003 RP/0/A/1000/019 described in the RP/O/A/1000/025 RP/0/A/1000/031 SR/0/A/2000/003 SR/0/B/2000/001 AD-EP-DEC-0107 54 H5a,b,c,d, Each licensee shall (NA) RP/0/A/1000/001 Added to ensure accuracy and identify and establish onsite ONS E Plan completeness of list monitoring systems that are to be IP/0/B/1601/003 used to initiate emergency measures in accordance with Appendix 1, as well as those to be used 55 H6a,b,c, Each licensee shall make (NA) ONS E Plan Added to ensure accuracy and provision to acquire data from or IP/0/B/1601/003 completeness of list for emergency access... ONS ODCM HP/0/BI/1009/001 HP/O/B/1009/023 PT/0/A/2000/008 ST/0/A/4600/086 PT/0/B/0250/030 PT/0/B/0250/032 PT/0/B/0250/045 CP/0/B/2001/008 RP/0/A/1000/017 56 H7, Each organization, where HP/0/B/1009/023 HP/0/B/1009/001 Added inventory procedure to appropriate, shall provide for HP/0/B/1009/023 ensure list is accurate.

offsite radiological monitoring equipment in the vicinity of the nuclear...

57 H8, Each licensee shall provide HP/0/B/1009/018, ONS E Plan Added ONS E Plan, and meteorological instrumentation and SH/0/B/2005/001, IP/0/B/1601/003 RP/0/A/1000/024 to ensure procedures which satisfy the IP/0/B/1601/003 SH/0/B/2005/001 consistency with section H8 of criteria in Appendix 2, and HP/0/B/1009/018 the ONS E Plan.

provisions to obtain representative RP/0/A/1000/024 current meteorological information from other 58 H9, Each licensee shall provide for (NA) ONS E Plan Added to ensure accuracy and an onsite operations support center IP/0/B/1601/003 completeness of list (assembly area) which shall have ONS ODCM adequate capacity, and supplies, HP/0/B/1009/001 including, for example... PT/0/A/2000/008 ST/0/A/4600/086 PT/0/B/0250/030 PT/0/B/0250/032 PT/0/B/0250/045 CP/0/B/2001/008 RP/0/A/1000/025

Changes Associated With Fig P-1 Implementing Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 59 H10, Each organization shall make (NA) ONS E Plan Added to ensure accuracy and provisions to inspect, inventory IP/0/B/1 601/003 completeness of list and operationally... ONS ODCM HP/O/B/1009/001 PT/0/A/2000/008 ST/0/A/4600/086 PT/0/B/0250/030 PT/0/B/0250/032 PT/0/B/0250/045 CP/0/B/2001/008 60 H 11, Each plan shall, in an (NA) ONS Emergency Added to ensure accuracy and appendix, include identification of Plan, Section H. 1I completeness of list emergency kits 61 H12, Each organization shall HP/0/B/1009/023, HP/0/B/1009/023 Added SR/0/B/2005/003, establish a central point (preferably SH/O/B/2005/002 SHIO/B/2005/002 Activation of the EOF to associated with the licensee's near- SR/O/A/2000/003 ensure accuracy and site Emergency Operations completeness of list Facility), for the receipt 62 11, Each licensee shall identify RP/0/A/1000/010 ONS E Plan Corrected typo -

plant system and effluent RP/0/A/1000/001 RP/0/A/ 1000/010 should have parameter values characteristic of a been RP/0/A/ 1000/001. Added spectrum of off-normal conditions reference to ONS E Plan and accidents, and shall identify Section D as it contains the the plant parameter values or other basis information.

information which correspond to the example initiating conditions of Appendix 1....

63 12, Onsite capability and resources HP/0/B/1009/015, ONS E Plan editorial expanded to include to provide initial values and HP/0/B/1009/009, RP/0/B/1000/018 titles continuing assessment throughout HP/0/B/1009/018, CSM 5.1 the course of an accident shall CSM 5.2, CSM 5.2 include post-accident sampling CP/I,2,3/A/2002/002, CP/l/A/2002/002 capability, radiation and effluent RP/0/B/1000/018, CP/2/A/2002/002 monitors, in-plant iodine... SH/0/B/2005/001, CP/3/A/2002/002 SHl/0/B/2005/002, HP/0/B/1009/009 HP/0/B/1009/026 HP/0/B/1009/015 HP/0/B/1009/018 HP/0/B/1009/026 SH/0/B/2005/001 SH/O/B/2005/002 64 13a,b, Each licensee shall establish RP/0/A/1000/024, RP/0/A/1000/001 Added ODCM to ensure list is methods and techniques to be used RP/0/A/1000/001, RP/0/A/1000/024 complete and accurate for determining; the source term... HP/0/B/1009/022 HP/0/B/1009/018 HP/0/B/1009/018, HP/0/B/1009/022 SH/0/B/2005/001 ONS ODCM SH/0/B/2005/001 65 14, Each licensee shall establish the RP/0/A/1000/001, HP/0/B/1009/018 Eliminated reference to relationship between effluent HP/0/B/1009/018, HP/0/B/1009/022 RP/0/A/ 1000/001 as it is an monitor readings and onsite and HP/0/B/1009/022, SH/0/B/2005/001 incorrect reference.

offsite exposures and SH/0/B/2005/001 contamination for various meteorological conditions

Changes Associated With Fig P-1 Implementing Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 66 15, Each licensee shall have the RP/0/A/1000/001 RP/0/A/1000/002 Eliminated reference to capability of acquiring and RP/0/A/1000/003 A RP/0/A/1000/001 as it is an evaluating meteorological RP/0/A/ 1000/015 A incorrect reference.

information sufficient to meet the RP/0/A/1000/015 B criteria of Appendix 2.... RP/0/A/ 1000/019 SR/0/A/2000/003 SR/O/A/2000/004 67 16, Each licensee shall establish the RP/0/A/1000/001, HP/O/B/1009/018 Eliminated reference to methodology for determining the HP/0/B/1009/018, SH/O/B/2005/001 RP/0/A/1000/001 as it is an release rate/projected doses if the SH/0/B/2005/001 incorrect reference.

instrumentation used for assessment are off-scale 68 17, Each organization shall SH/0/B/2005/002, SR/O/A/2000/003 Added SR/O/A/2000/003 to describe the capability and HP/0/B/1009/026 SH/0/B/2005/002 ensure list is accurate and resources for field monitoring HP/0/B/1009/026 complete.

within the plume exposure Emergency Planning Zone which are an intrinsic part of the...

69 18, Each organization, where SH/0/B/2005/002, SR/O/A/2000/003 Added SR/0/A/2000/003 to appropriate, shall provide methods, HP/0/B/1009/026 SH/iO/B/2005/002 ensure list is accurate and equipment and expertise to... HP/0/B/1009/026 complete.

70 19, Each organization shall have a SH/0/B/2005/002, SH/O/B/2005/002, editorial expanded to include capability to detect and measure HP/0/B/1009/026 HP/0/B/1009/026 titles radioiodine concentrations in air in the plume exposure EPZ as...

71 110, Each organization shall HP/0/B/1009/018, SH/0/B/2005/001 Added to ensure accuracy and establish means for relating the SH/0/B/2005/001 HP/0/B/1009/018 completeness of list various measured parameters (e.g., HP/0/B/1009/020 contamination levels, water and air HP/0/B/1009/026 activity levels)to dose rates for key isotopes...

72 111, Arrangements to locate and (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and track the airborne radioactive Responsibility completeness of list plume shall be made, using either or both Federal and State resources 73 Jla,b,c,d, Each licensee shall RP/0/A/1000/009 AP/0/A/1700/045 Added to ensure accuracy and establish the means and time RP/0/A/1000/009 completeness of list required to warn or advise onsite RP/0/A/1000/010 individuals and individuals who may be in areas controlled by the operator, including...

74 J2, Each licensee shall make HP/0/B/1009/016, NSD 114 Added to ensure accuracy and provisions for evacuation routes HP/0/B/1009/018, HP/0/B/1009/016 completeness of list, and transportation for onsite HP/O/B/1009/009, HP/0/B/1009/018 eliminated HP/0/B/1009/009, individuals to some suitable offsite SH/0/B/2005/001 RP/0/A/1000/010 as it does not apply to J2.

SH/0/B/2005/001 75 J3, Each licensee shall provide for HP/0/B/1009/016, NSD 114 Added appropriate reference radiological monitoring of people HP/0/B/1009/018, AP/0/A/1700/045 to NSD 114, and evacuated from the site RP/0/A/1000/0 10, HP/0/B/1009/016 AP/0/A/1700/045 and Site Directive, HP/0/B/1009/018 RP/0/A/ 1000/009 as they SH/O/B/2005/001 RP/0/A/1000/009 directly apply to J3.

RP/0/A/1000/010 SH/0/B/2005/001 76 J4, Each licensee shall provide for HP/0/B/1009/016, HP/0/B/1009/016 Added to ensure accuracy and the evacuation of onsite non- HP/0/B/1009/018, HP/0/B/1009/018 completeness of list, essential personnel in the event of SH/0/B/2005/001 RP/0/A/1000/009 eliminated SH/O/B/2005/001, a Site or General Emergency... RP/0/A/1000/010 as it does not apply to J4.

Changes Associated With Fig P-1 Imolementing Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 77 J5, Each licensee shall provide for HP/0/B/1009/009 NSD 114 Added to ensure accuracy and a capability to account for all AP/0/A/1700/045 completeness of list individuals onsite at the time of the HP/0/B/1009/009 emergency and ascertain the names RP/O/A/1000/009 of missing individuals within 30 SH/0/B/2005/003 RPM 78 J6, Each licensee shall, for Radiation Protection NSD 114 Added to ensure accuracy and individuals remaining or arriving Manual, AP/0/A/1700/045 completeness of list onsite during the emergency, make SH/O/B/2005/003 HP/0/B/1009/009 provisions for... RP/0/A/1000/009 SH/O/B/2005/003 RPM 79 J7, Each licensee shall establish a RP/0/A/1000/024, RP/0/A/1000/024, editorial expanded to include mechanism for recommending SH/0/B/2000/003 SH/0/B/2000/003 titles protective actions to the appropriate State and local authorities 80 J8, Each licensee's plan shall (NA) ONS-ETE-12142012 Added reference to ONS ETE contain time estimates for as appropriate to ensure list is evacuation within the plume accurate and complete.

exposure EPZ. These shall be in accordance 81 J9, Each State and local (NA) NA Added to ensure accuracy and organization shall establish a AP/0/A/1700/045 completeness of list capability for implementing RP/0/A/1000/009 protective measures based upon RP/0/A/1000/010 protective action guides and other criteria. This shall be consistent with the recommendations of EPA 82 JOa, Maps showing evacuation Radiation Protection ONS E Plan Added to ensure accuracy and routes, evacuation areas, Manual RPM completeness of list preselected radiological sampling and monitoring points, relocation centers in host areas, and shelter areas 83 J0Ob,c, Maps showing population (NA) ONS E Plan Added to ensure accuracy and distribution around the nuclear RPM completeness of list facility. This shall be by evacuation areas (licensees shall...

84 J 1Od, Means for protecting those (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and persons whose mobility may be Responsibility completeness of list impaired due to such factors as institutional or other 85 J 1Oe, Provisions for the use of SH/O/B/2005/003 NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and radio-protective drugs, particularly Responsibility completeness of list. Not a for emergency workers and licensee responsibility.

institutionalized persons within the plume 86 J 1Of, State and local organizations- (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and plans should include the method by Responsibility completeness of list which decisions 87 J 1Og-I, Means of relocation... (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and Responsibility completeness of list

Changes Associated With Fig P-1 Implementing Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 88 JIOm, The bases for the choice of RP/O/A/1000/024, RP/O/A/1000/024, editorial expanded to include recommended protective actions SR/O/A/2000/003 SR/O/A/2000/003 titles from the plume exposure pathway during emergency conditions.

89 Ji 1, Each State shall specify the (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and protective measures to be used for Responsibility completeness of list the ingestion pathway, including the methods for protecting 90 J12, Each organization shall (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and describe the means for registering Responsibility completeness of list and monitoring of evacuees at relocation centers in host areas.

The personnel and equipment...

90 K 1a-g, Each licensee shall (NA) RP/0/B/l1000/011 Ensure accuracy and establish onsite exposure SH/O/B/2005/003 completeness of list guidelines consistent with EPA Emergency Worker and Lifesaving Activity Protective Actions Guides 91 K2, Each licensee shall provide an RP/0/B/1000/0 11 RP/0/B/1000/011 editorial expanded to include onsite radiation protection program titles to be implemented during emergencies, including methods to implement exposure guidelines.

The plan 92 K3a, Each organization shall make Radiation Protection RPM Ensure accuracy and provision for 24-hour-per-day Manual HP/0/B/ 1009/001 completeness of list capability to determine the doses HP/0/B/1009/023 received by emergency personnel involved in any nuclear accident, including...

93 K3b, Each organization shall (NA) RPM Ensure accuracy and ensure that dosimeters are read at HP/0/B/1009/023 completeness of list appropriate frequencies and provide for maintaining dose records...

94 K4, Each State and local (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and organization shall establish the Responsibility completeness of list decision chain for authorizing emergency workers to incur exposures in excess of the EPA General Public Protective Action Guides (i.e., EPA PAGs for emergency workers and lifesaving activities) 95 K5a,b, Each organization as Radiation Protection RPM Ensure accuracy and appropriate, shall specify action Manual HP/0/B/1009/016 completeness of list levels for determining the need for HP/0/B/1009/024 decontamination.

96 K6a,b,c, Each licensee shall (NA) RPM Ensure accuracy and provide onsite contamination HP/O/B/1009/016 completeness of list control measures including 97 K7, Each licensee shall provide the HP/0/B/1009/018, HP/0/B/1009/001 Ensure accuracy and capability for decontaminating HP/0/B/1009/016, HP/0/B/1009/016 completeness of list, relocated onsite personnel, SH/0/B/2005/001 HP/0/B/1009/018- Dose including provisions for extra Projections, and clothing and decontaminants SH/0/B/2005/001, Emergency suitable for the type of... Response Dose Projections do not apply to K7

Changes Associated With Fig P-I Imnlementine Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 98 LI, Each organization shall (NA) ONS E Plan App 5 Ensure accuracy and arrange for local and backup HP/0/B/1009/001 completeness of list hospital and medical services having the capability for evaluation...

99 L2, Each licensee shall provide for RP/0/B/1000/016 RP/0/A/1000/016 Ensure accuracy and onsite first aid capability HP/0/B/1009/001 completeness of list HP/0/B/1009/024 PT/0/B/0250/032 100 L3, Each State shall develop lists (NA) NA - State/County Ensure accuracy and indicating the location of public, Responsibility completeness of list private and military hospitals and other emergency 101 L4, Each organization shall RP/O/B/1000/016 ONS E Plan Ensure accuracy and arrange for transporting victims of RP/0/A/1000/016 completeness of list radiological... HP/0/B/1009/001 HP/0/B/1009/024 102 M I, Each organization, as (NA) RP/0/A/ 1000/024 Ensure accuracy and appropriate, shall develop general RP/0/B/1000/027 completeness of list plans and procedures for reentry RP/0/A/1000/028 and recovery and describe the means by which decisions to relax protective measures 103 M2, Each licensee plan shall (NA) ONS E Plan Ensure accuracy and contain the position/title, authority RP/0/B/1000/027 completeness of list and responsibilities of individuals RP/0/A/1000/028 who will fill key positions...

104 M3, Each licensee and State plan (NA) RP/0/A/ 1000/019 Ensure accuracy and shall specify means for informing RP/0/A/1000/025 completeness of list members of the response RP/0/B/1000/027 organizations that a recovery SR/0/A/2000/003 operation is to be initiated, and of RP/0/A/1000/031 NEWP 5.1 105 M4, Each plan shall establish a (NA) RP/0/B/1000/027 Ensure accuracy and method for periodically estimating completeness of list total population exposure.

106 N Ia, b, Exercises will be designed (NA) EP FAM 3.19 Ensure accuracy and to meet the requirements of 10 completeness of list CFR Part 50, Appendix E. An exercise will be designed to test the integrated capability of those involved and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the plans and organization...

107 N2a, Communications with State (NA) PT/0/A/2000/002 Ensure accuracy and and local governments within the ST/0/A/4600/086 completeness of list plume exposure pathway ST/0/A/4600/094 Emergency Planning Zone shall be tested monthly...

108 N2b, Fire Drills (Onsite-within (NA) PT/0/B/2000/050 Ensure accuracy and Protected Area; Offsite-outside completeness of list Protected area) shall be conducted as specified in site procedures and directives...

Changes Associated With Fig P-1 Implementing Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 109 N2c, d, e, f, g, h, i, A drill is a (NA) EP FAM 3.19 Ensure accuracy and supervised instruction period completeness of list aimed at testing, developing and maintaining skills in a particular operation. A drill is often a component of an exercise. A drill shall be supervised and evaluated...

110 N3, Drill scenarios are developed (NA) EP FAM 3.19 Ensure accuracy and to test various components of the completeness of list emergency plan. An annual schedule of the drills...

111 N4a, b, Critiques of quarterly drills (NA) EP FAM 3.19 Ensure accuracy and and the biennial exercise will be completeness of list held. A written critique summary report....

112 N5, Action items established as a (NA) EP FAM 3.19 Ensure accuracy and result of an ONS drill/exercise or completeness of list significant event/real emergency shall be identified 113 NA Figure N-1, NA - deleted No requirement for a generic SCHEDULE FOR schedule.

EMERGENCY DRILLS 114 01, Offsite Emergency Response Oconee Training NSD 117 Ensure accuracy and Training. The Oconee Nuclear Site Division Training ERTG-001 completeness of list will provide for the training of Guide ERTG-001 ETQS 7111.0 certain offsite response organizations. Site specific Emergency Response Training...

115 02, Emergency Response Training Oconee Training NSD 117 Ensure accuracy and is required on an annual (plus or Division Training ERTG-001 completeness of list minus three months) basis. Guide ERTG-00 1 ETQS 7111.0 Records will be maintained by the site Training Section...

116 03, First responder training is Security Training NSD4-iI Y Ensure accuracy and provided to those personnel who Plan, Oconee ERTG-00 1 completeness of list have been designated to respond to Training Division medical emergencies Training Guide ERTG-001 117 04.1, .2, The emergency response (NA) NSD 117 Ensure accuracy and organization is designed so that ERTG-001 completeness of list each section will respond in their ETQS 7111.0 specific areas of responsibility.

Training will be provided to...

118 04.3, Radiological monitoring (NA) ETQS 3104.0 Ensure accuracy and teams ETQS 7104.0 completeness of list 119 04.4, Security and fire fighting (NA) ETQS 7111.0 Ensure accuracy and personnel completeness of list 120 04.5, 7, First Aid and Medical ... (NA) NSD 119 Ensure accuracy and completeness of list 121 04.6, Local support... (NA) ETQS 7111.0 Ensure accuracy and completeness of list 122 04.8, Corp support... (NA) ETQS 7111.0 Ensure accuracy and completeness of list 123 04.9, Offsite Communicators... (NA) ETQS 7111.0 Ensure accuracy and completeness of list

Changes Associated With Fig P-1 Implementing Plan Cross Reference Change Requirement Current wording Proposed Wording Reason 124 04.10, DCT... (NA) OC1507-N Ensure accuracy and OC6792-N completeness of list TTC 471-N 125 04.11, Hazmat... (NA) ERTG-001 Ensure accuracy and completeness of list 126 05, Retraining of Personnel (NA) ERTG-001 Ensure accuracy and completeness of list 127 P1, Training for emergency (NA) EP FAM 3.20 Ensure accuracy and planning personnel shall be completeness of list provided in the form of workshop

/seminar sessions on an annual basis. Courses developed by the...

128 P2, 3, The Site Vice-President has (NA) ONS E Plan Ensure accuracy and the overall authority and completeness of list responsibility for all hazards emergency response planning. The planning effort...

129 P4, 5, The ONS Emergency Plan (NA) PT/0/A/2000/010 Ensure accuracy and shall be reviewed and updated EP FAM 3.1 completeness of list annually. An indepth review of the Emergency Plan will be made to determine 130 P6, Supporting: Plans (NA) ONS E Plan Ensure accuracy and completeness of list 131 P7, Implementing Procedures (NA) ONS E Plan Ensure accuracy and completeness of list 132 P8, Table of Contents (NA) ONS E Plan Ensure accuracy and completeness of list 133 P9, Independent Audit AD-EP-ALL-0001, AD-EP-ALL-0001, editorial expanded to include Emergency Emergency titles Preparedness Key Preparedness Key Performance Performance Indicators Indicators 134 P 10, Phone Number Update (NA) PT/0/A/2000/004 Ensure accuracy and completeness of list