NRC-2016-0233, Comment (4) of Anonymous Individual on Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Ejection and Boiling Water Reactor Control Rod Drop Accidents

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Comment (4) of Anonymous Individual on Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Ejection and Boiling Water Reactor Control Rod Drop Accidents
ML17109A359
Person / Time
Site: Summer South Carolina Electric & Gas Company icon.png
Issue date: 04/14/2017
From:
- No Known Affiliation
To:
Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch
References
81FR83288 00004, NRC-2016-0233
Download: ML17109A359 (1)


Text

Page 1of1 As of: 4/17/17 10:28 AM

'Z>l7 Received: April 14, 2017 PUBLIC SUBMISSIONt ti.r~  ! 7 i.tt 10:  :,o Status: Pending_Post Tracking No. lkl-8vtu-n8fj Comments Due: April 21, 2017 Submission Type: Web Docket: NRC-2016,-0233

  • '~=' *~-, ;-u*~

\ /

Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Ejection and Boiling Water Reactor Control Rod Drop Accidents Comment On: NRC-2016-0233-0003 Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Ejection and Boiling Water Reactor Control Rod Drop Accidents; Extension of Comment Period Document: NRC-20 l 6""023 3-DRAFT-0005 Comment on FR Doc# 2017-02073

//jc)-//rH> I ? I Submitter Information *.I rt'! r£.. ta~~~

Name: Anonymous Anonymous General Comment 0 / ,f-.

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station Unit 1 is providing the following comments concerning its review of Draft Regulatory Guide (DG) 1327.

Section 2.1.3: Please clarify what kind of manufacturing tolerances are referred to here. Does this require a statistical analysis with 95/95 uncertainty?

Section 2.2.3: Given that a large majority of the time each reactor spends at power is near 100%, can low power conditions be excluded from the analysis? Many transient analyses are perfofll1ed at zero power .and full power based on probability. It would be very time-consuming to determine if intermediate power levels are more limiting at each bumup interval. It would seem that even for a load-following plant, examinations of 0, 80%, 90%, and 100% would be sufficient to cover 99% of the probability distribution.

Section 2.5.1: For control rod ejection (CRE), since.the reactivity-initiated accident (RIA) transient is caused by the pressure boundary breach, the analysis should be able to credit the pressure boundary breach in the peak RCS pressure analysis.

Section 4: This section should be removed from DG-1327. Information related to the performance of radiological consequence analyses should remain in RG 1.183.

Section 6: The reactor coolant peak pressure acceptance criterion is already defined in a plant's Final Safety Analysis Report and may differ from the limit defined in DG-1327. The Regulatory Guide should not override existing license~ limits._ _ ~-~=?>S-:::::- /}!JiLt-tJ 3 Su.UST ~:1e~~c=;~ ~<--~/!t!/~C/N~ 3)

~~-r/D"-t iOG . .,£. oJJftJ-n-.~.d.fJ(exl))

https://www.fdms.govIfdms/getcontent?objectld=09000064825 56dce&format=xml&showorig=false 04/ 17/2017